area handbook series 

Persian Gulf States 

country studies 



Persian Gulf States 

country studies 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Helen Chapin Metz 
Research Completed 
January 1993 



On the cover: Symbol of the Gulf Cooperation Council, to 
which Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
the United Arab Emirates belong 



Third Edition, First Printing, 1994. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Persian Gulf States : country studies / Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress ; edited by Helen Chapin Metz. — 3rd ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) 
(DA Pam; 550-185) 

"Supersedes the 1984 edition of Persian Gulf States : country 
studies, edited by Richard F. Nyrop" — T.p. verso. 
"Research completed January 1993." 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 417-433) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0793-3 

1. Persian Gulf States. I. Metz, Helen Chapin, 1928- . II. 

Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. 

IV. Series: DA Pam ; 550-185. 
DS247.A13P47 1994 93-46476 
953.6-dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-185 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared 
by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress 
under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program spon- 
sored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this 
book list the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign coun- 
try, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and 
national security systems and institutions, and examining the 
interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are 
shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisci- 
plinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a 
basic understanding of the observed society, striving for a 
dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is 
devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins, 
dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the 
issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their 
involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes 
toward each other and toward their social system and political 
order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should 
not be construed as an expression of an official United States 
government position, policy, or decision. The authors have 
sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. 
Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from read- 
ers will be welcomed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, DC 20540-5220 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the 
writers of the 1984 edition of Persian Gulf States: Country Studies, 
edited by Richard F. Nyrop. Their work provided general back- 
ground for the present volume. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various govern- 
ment agencies and private institutions who gave of their time, 
research materials, and expertise in the production of this 
book. These individuals included Ralph K. Benesch, who over- 
sees the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program for the 
Department of the Army The authors also wish to thank mem- 
bers of the Federal Research Division staff who contributed 
directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These people 
included Sandra W. Meditz, who reviewed all graphic and tex- 
tual material and served as liaison with the sponsoring agency; 
Marilyn L. Majeska, who supervised editing; Andrea T. Merrill, 
who managed book production; Ramon Miro, who assisted 
with bibliographic research and other aspects; Barbara Edger- 
ton and Izella Watson, who did the word processing; and 
Stephen C. Cranton and David R Cabitto, who prepared the 
camera-ready copy. Also involved in preparing the text were 
Sheila L. Ross, who edited the chapters and performed the pre- 
publication editorial review, and Joan C. Cook, who compiled 
the Index. Special thanks are due Eric Hooglund, who kindly 
served as reader for the book as a whole. 

Graphics were prepared by David R Cabitto. Tim Merrill pre- 
pared map drafts, and David R Cabitto and the firm of Green- 
horne and O'Mara prepared the final versions. Special thanks 
are owed to Marty Ittner, who prepared the illustrations on the 
title page of each chapter, and to Wayne Home, who did the 
cover art. 

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of individu- 
als and public and private agencies, especially the embassies of 
the countries concerned, who allowed their photographs to be 
used in this study. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xv 

Introduction xix 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

William Smyth 

TRADE IN THE GULF 4 

THE GULF IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 8 

EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAM 9 

Sunni Islam 12 

Shia Islam 13 

The Spread of Islam 17 

THE GULF IN THE MIDDLE AGES 17 

THE AGE OF COLONIALISM 20 

WAHHABI ISLAM AND THE GULF 24 

TREATIES WITH THE BRITISH 25 

DISCOVERY OF OIL 29 

INDEPENDENCE 30 

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 35 

TRIBAL NATURE OF GULF SOCIETY 37 

Chapter 2. Kuwait 41 

Jill Crystal 

COUNTRY PROFILE 43 

GEOGRAPHY 47 

SOCIETY 51 

Population 51 

Education 54 

Health and Welfare 56 

ECONOMY 57 

Oil Industry 58 

vii 



Diversification 64 

Agriculture and Fishing 67 

Transportation and Telecommunications 68 

Banking and Finance 69 

Foreign Investment 71 

Foreign Aid and Trade 72 

POLITICAL SYSTEM 73 

Ruling Family 73 

Bureaucracy 79 

Legislature 80 

Constitution 84 

The Media 86 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 87 

Persian Gulf War 88 

Post-Persian Gulf War Foreign Policy 92 

RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE 

PERSIAN GULF WAR 93 

Postwar Society 93 

Economic Reconstruction 96 

Politics 100 

Chapter 3. Bahrain 105 

Eric Hooglund 

COUNTRY PROFILE 107 

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION 114 

Geography 114 

Climate 117 

Population 118 

SOCIETY. 120 

Education 120 

Health and Welfare 121 

THE ECONOMY 122 

Agriculture and Fishing 1 22 

Petroleum Industry 124 

Other Industry 129 

Labor 129 

Transportation and Telecommunications 132 

Banking and Finance 1 34 

Budget 135 

Foreign Trade and the Balance 

of Payments 135 



viii 



GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 136 

The Constitutional Experiment 137 

Legal System 142 

The Media 143 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 143 

Chapter 4. Qatar 147 

Anthony Toth 

COUNTRY PROFILE 1 49 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 153 

GEOGRAPHY 162 

POPULATION 163 

EDUCATION 164 

HEALTH 166 

THE ECONOMY 167 

Oil and Natural Gas 167 

Industry 173 

Labor 175 

Agriculture and Fishing 177 

Transportation and Telecommunications 178 

Money and Banking 180 

Budget 180 

Trade 182 

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 182 

TheAlThani 188 

The Merchant Families 189 

Opposition 190 

The Media 191 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 191 

Chapter 5. United Arab Emirates 197 

Eric Hooglund and Anthony Toth 

COUNTRY PROFILE 199 

GEOGRAPHY 204 

POPULATION 208 

RELIGION 209 

EDUCATION 210 

STATUS OF WOMEN 211 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 212 

ix 



ECONOMY 214 

Oil and Natural Gas 218 

Industry 223 

Electricity and Water 228 

Labor 228 

Transportation 229 

Telecommunications 230 

Agriculture and Forestry 232 

Fishing 233 

Banking and Finance 234 

Budget 236 

Trade 238 

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 239 

Executive and Legislative Branches 239 

The Judiciary 242 

Ruling Families 243 

The Media 246 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 246 

Chapter 6. Oman 251 

Fareed Mohamedi 

COUNTRY PROFILE 253 

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION 259 

Geography 259 

Climate 262 

Population 263 

SOCIETY. 264 

Religion 264 

Education 265 

Health 266 

THE ECONOMY 268 

Public Finance and the Five-Year 

Development Plans 269 

Foreign Trade and the Balance 

of Payments 272 

Hydrocarbon Sector 274 

Agriculture and Fishing 281 

Non-oil Minerals 285 

Industry 286 

Tourism 289 

Transportation 289 



x 



Telecommunications 290 

Labor 291 

Water and Power 292 

Banking 293 

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 296 

Historical Patterns of Governance 296 

Faisal ibn Turki, 1888-1913 299 

Taimur ibn Faisal, 1913-32 300 

Said ibn Taimur, 1932-70 300 

Qabus ibn Said: The Emergence of a 

Modern State 302 

Government Institutions 310 

The Media 312 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 312 

Regional Relations 313 

International Relations 314 

Chapter 7. Regional and National Security 

Considerations 319 

Jean R. Tartter 

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 323 

Impact of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-88 325 

Persian Gulf War, 1991 326 

TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 328 

REGIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS 331 

COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER THE GULF 

COOPERATION COUNCIL 333 

MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE PERSIAN 

GULF STATES 337 

KUWAIT 340 

Background 340 

Organization and Mission of the Forces 342 

Role of Kuwaiti Armed Forces in the 

Persian Gulf War 344 

Personnel, Training, and Recruitment 345 

Internal Security 346 

Police and the Criminal Justice System 347 

Human Rights Practices 348 

BAHRAIN 350 

Role in the Persian Gulf War 353 

xi 



Internal Security 353 

QATAR 355 

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 360 

Background 360 

Organization and Equipment 363 

The Role of the United Arab Emirates in the 

Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf War 365 

Internal Security Problems 366 

OMAN 367 

Background 367 

Mission of the Armed Forces 369 

Organization and Equipment of the 

Armed Forces 370 

Omani Role in the Persian Gulf War, 1991 372 

Internal Security 374 

Appendix. Tables 379 

Bibliography 417 

Glossary 435 

Index 441 

Contributors 469 

List of Figures 

1 Persian Gulf States: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 

Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, 1993 xviii 

2 Persian Gulf States: Topography 6 

3 Kuwait, 1993 50 

4 Kuwait: Oil Fields, Gas Fields, and 

Refineries, 1993 60 

5 Kuwait: Abbreviated Genealogy of the Al Sabah, 

with Government Positions, Mid-1992 76 

6 Bahrain, 1993 116 

7 Lower Gulf States : Oil Fields, Gas Fields, 

and Refineries, 1993 126 

8 Bahrain: Government Structure, 1992 138 

9 Qatar, 1993 156 

10 Qatar: Abbreviated Genealogy of the Al Thani, 

with Government Positions, 1992 184 

11 United Arab Emirates, 1993 206 

xii 



12 United Arab Emirates: Government 

Structure, 1992 240 

13 Oman, 1993 260 

14 Oman: Oil Fields, Gas Fields, and 

Refineries, 1993 276 

15 Oman: Government Structure, 1992 308 

1 6 Strait of Hormuz, 1 993 324 



xiii 



Preface 




This edition of Persian Gulf States: Country Studies replaces the 
previous edition, published in 1984. Like its predecessor, the 
present book attempts to treat in a compact and objective man- 
ner the dominant historical, social, economic, political, and 
national security aspects of the five contemporary states of the 
Persian Gulf covered in this volume — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Sources of information 
included scholarly books, journals, and monographs; official 
reports and documents of government and international orga- 
nizations; and foreign and domestic newspapers and periodi- 
cals. Available economic data for these countries are not always 
complete or may be inconsistent. 



xv 



Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief 
comments on some of the more valuable sources for further 
reading appear at the conclusion of each chapter. Measure- 
ments are given in the metric system; a conversion table is pro- 
vided to assist those who are unfamiliar with the metric system 
(see table 1, Appendix). The Glossary provides brief defini- 
tions of terms that may be unfamiliar to the general reader, 
such as the use of amir/amirate, shaykh/shaykhdom, and Al/ 
al. 

The transliteration of Arabic words and phrases posed a par- 
ticular problem. For many of the words — such as Muhammad, 
Muslim, Quran, and shaykh — the authors followed a modified 
version of the system adopted by the United States Board on 
Geographic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geo- 
graphic Names for British Official Use, known as the BGN/ 
PCGN system; the modification entails the omission of all dia- 
critical markings and hyphens. In numerous instances, how- 
ever, the names of persons or places are so well known by 
another spelling that to have used the BGN/PCGN system 
might have created confusion. The reader will find Mecca 
rather than Makkah, Oman rather then Uman, and Doha 
rather than Ad Dawhah. In addition, although the five govern- 
ments officially reject the use of the term Persian Gulf— as do 
other Arab governments — and refer to that body of water as 
the Arabian Gulf, the authors followed the practice of the 
United States Board on Geographic Names by using Persian 
Gulf or gulf. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of Jan- 
uary 1993. Certain other portions of the text, however, have 
been updated. The Introduction discusses significant events 
that have occurred since the completion of research; the Coun- 
try Profiles include updated information as available; and the 
Bibliography lists recently published sources thought to be par- 
ticularly helpful to the reader. 



xvi 



54 




a 




SAUDI 
ARABIA / 



f E M E N 




' Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the 
es, 1993 



60 30 



IRAN 




Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Introduction 



THE COUNTRIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF covered in this 
volume — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates — have assumed added prominence as a result of 
Operation Desert Shield in 1990 and the Persian Gulf War in 
1991. These states share certain characteristics while simulta- 
neously differing from one another in various respects. Islam 
has played a major role in each of the Persian Gulf states, 
although Kuwait and Bahrain reflect a greater secular influ- 
ence than the other three. Moreover, the puritanical Wahhabi 
(see Glossary) Sunni (see Glossary) sect prevails in Qatar; Bah- 
rain has a majority population of Shia (see Glossary), a denom- 
ination of the faith that constitutes a minority in Islam as a 
whole; and the people of Oman represent primarily a minor 
sect within Shia Islam, the Ibadi. 

The beduin heritage also exerts a significant influence in all 
of the Persian Gulf states. In the latter half of the twentieth cen- 
tury, however, a sense of national identity increasingly has 
superseded tribal allegiance. The ruling families in the Persian 
Gulf states represent shaykhs (see Glossary) of tribes that origi- 
nally settled particular areas; however, governmental institu- 
tions steadily have taken over spheres that previously fell under 
the purview of tribal councils. 

Historically, Britain exercised a protectorate at least briefly 
over each of the Persian Gulf states. This connection has 
resulted in the presence of governmental institutions estab- 
lished by Britain as well as strong commercial and military ties 
with it. Military materiel and training in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, however, were being provided by other countries in 
addition to Britain. 

Because of the extensive coastlines of the Persian Gulf states, 
trade, fishing, shipbuilding, and, in the past, pearling have rep- 
resented substantial sources of income. In the early 1990s, 
trade and, to a lesser extent, fishing, continued to contribute 
major amounts to the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary) of these states. 

Of the five states, Oman has the least coastal area on the Per- 
sian Gulf because its access to that waterway occurs only at the 
western tip of the Musandam Peninsula, separated from the 
remainder of Oman by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 



xix 




xviii 



Partly as a result of this limited contact with the gulf and partly 
because of the mountains that cut off the interior from the 
coast, Oman has the most distinctive culture of the five states. 

In general, the gulf has served as a major facilitator of trade 
and culture. The ancient civilization of Dilmun, for example, 
in present-day Bahrain existed as early as the fourth millen- 
nium B.C. 

The Persian Gulf, however, also constitutes a ready channel 
for foreign conquerors. In addition to Britain, over the centu- 
ries the gulf states have known such rulers as the Greeks, 
Parthians, Sassanians, Iranians, and Portuguese. When 
England's influence first came to the area in 1622, the Safavid 
shah of Iran sought England's aid in driving the Portuguese 
out of the gulf. 

Britain did not play a major role, however, until the early 
nineteenth century. At that time, attacks on British shipping by 
the Al Qasimi of the present-day UAE became so serious that 
Britain asked the assistance of the ruler of Oman in ending the 
attacks. In consequence, Britain in 1820 initiated treaties or 
truces with the various rulers of the area, giving rise to the term 
Trucial Coast. 

The boundaries of the Persian Gulf states were considered 
relatively unimportant until the discovery of oil in Bahrain in 
1932 caused other gulf countries to define their geographic 
limits. Britain's 1968 announcement that in 1971 it would aban- 
don its protectorate commitments east of the Suez Canal accel- 
erated the independence of the states. Oman had maintained 
its independence in principle since 1650. Kuwait, with the most 
advanced institutions — primarily because of its oil wealth — had 
declared its independence in 1961. Bahrain, Qatar, and the 
UAE followed suit in 1971. In the face of the Iranian Revolu- 
tion of 1979, all of the Persian Gulf states experienced fears for 
their security. These apprehensions led to their formation, 
together with Saudi Arabia, of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) in May 1981. 

Of all the gulf states, Kuwait clearly has the greatest security 
concerns. By early 1994, Kuwait largely had succeeded in 
rebuilding its damaged infrastructure and oil industry facilities 
ravaged by Iraq in the course of its August 2, 1990, invasion and 
subsequent scorched-earth policy concerning Kuwait's oil wells. 
By June 1993, Kuwait had increased its oil production to such 
an extent that it refused the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) quota of 1.8 million barrels per 



xx 



day (bpd — see Glossary); instead, it demanded parity with the 
UAE at 2.2 million bpd, which OPEC refused. 

The war and the occupation left significant scars on the 
Kuwaiti population. The war caused the departure of more 
than half the population, including two-thirds of the foreign- 
ers, many of them Palestinians and other Arabs. In the postwar 
period, most citizens returned, but the government apparently 
decided not to allow foreigners to exceed 50 percent of the 
population, and the number of Palestinians permitted to 
return dropped sharply. 

The war also did away with most of the financial reserves 
from foreign investments that Kuwait had prudently accumu- 
lated in its Reserve Fund for Future Generations. War costs 
were estimated at a minimum of US$20 billion, a reconstruc- 
tion figure less than originally feared. Economic progress in 
1993, however, was such that a projected current account sur- 
plus of US$3.2 billion was predicted, together with GDP growth 
of 11.5 percent in 1994. Kuwait's willingness to implement 
World Bank (see Glossary) recommendations concerning the 
strengthening of its economy appeared questionable, however. 
The bank recommended that Kuwait eliminate subsidies, 
encourage government workers to move to the private sector to 
reduce serious government overstaffing, liberalize business reg- 
ulations to promote private-sector growth, and privatize a num- 
ber of state assets. Various of the recommendations would 
affect significantly members of the ruling family, many of 
whom engage in the business sector. 

Kuwait's life is connected intimately with the Al Sabah, who 
have ruled Kuwait since 1756; the rule has alternated between 
the Jabir and Salim branches, descendants of two sons of the 
ruler Mubarak the Great. In 1963 the ruler took the first step of 
any gulf state to create a popular assembly. The narrow elector- 
ate and the ruler's right to dissolve the assembly have limited 
the influence of the legislature, and the assembly has been dis- 
solved twice, in each case for a number of years. In October 
1992, the National Assembly was reconstituted. However, only 
15 percent of the Kuwaiti population was able to vote. Freedom 
of the press, which had been suspended in 1976, was restored 
in early 1992. Despite the existence of several liberal opposi- 
tion movements and some Islamist (also seen as fundamental- 
ist) pressures, the postwar government represents little change, 
and the ruling family continues to hold all major ministerial 
posts. 



xxi 



Apart from development of its oil industry, which dominates 
its economy despite attempts at diversification, Kuwait's main 
concern continues to be the threat from Iraq to its national 
security. In late 1993, incidents continued to occur along the 
Kuwait-Iraq border, and Iraqi media persisted in referring to 
Kuwait as the "nineteenth province" of Iraq. As of late 1993, 
Iraq was believed to hold more than 800 Kuwaiti prisoners of 
war. 

Kuwait has taken several steps to counter the ongoing men- 
ace of Iraq. Although Kuwait sought help from its GCC allies 
when Iraq invaded, it recognized that the GCC states lacked 
the military strength to provide effective assistance. Kuwait's 
postwar army was reportedly down to about 8,000 from a pre- 
war total of about 16,000 personnel. Kuwait therefore deter- 
mined to build up and indigenize its own armed forces. 
Accordingly, a new military conscription law was enacted in 
December 1992. Furthermore, to upgrade materiel, a postwar 
1992 decree authorized the expenditure of US$11.7 billion on 
military equipment over twelve years. Immediate orders 
included 218 M-1A2 United States main battle tanks, forty F/ 
A-18 United States Hornet fighter aircraft, five United States 
Patriot missile fire units with missiles, 200 British Warrior 
armored personnel carriers, and miscellaneous French mate- 
riel. Kuwait also contracted in January 1993 with the United 
States Hughes Aircraft Company for an early warning system. 
In 1993, however, the National Assembly demonstrated its 
intent to review arms contracts and, if feasible, to reduce 
expenditures, in particular by eliminating commission pay- 
ments to members of the royal family. 

Other major steps included the signing of a security agree- 
ment and a Foreign Military Sales agreement with the United 
States in 1991, defense agreements with Britain and France in 
1992 — followed by additional materiel purchases in 1993 — and 
an agreement with Russia in 1993. These agreements, as well as 
participation in the GCC, involve joint training exercises, thus 
strengthening the capabilities of the Kuwaiti armed forces. In 
line with its closer relations with the West, Kuwait took immedi- 
ate action against perpetrators of the alleged Iraqi-inspired 
assassination attempt on former United States president 
George H.W. Bush during his attendance at Kuwait's April 1993 
celebration of its liberation. In a further defense measure, with 
private donations, Kuwait in 1993 began construction of a 
defensive wall along its 240-kilometer border with Iraq. 



xxii 



With regard to regional relations, Kuwait in 1993 made con- 
ciliatory gestures toward some of the Arab countries that sup- 
ported Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Statements by Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Sabah al Ahmad Al Sabah in late June 1993 and 
by Crown Prince and Prime Minister Saad al Abd Allah Al 
Sabah in late October 1993 set forth conditions for such states 
to mend relations with Kuwait. The conditions covered support 
of United Nations (UN) resolutions condemning Iraqi aggres- 
sion and pressure on Iraq to comply with UN resolutions, par- 
ticularly those concerning border demarcation and release of 
prisoners. These statements, which did not name countries or 
organizations concerned, appear directed primarily at Tunisia 
and Yemen and to a lesser degree at the Palestine Liberation 
Organization. Relations with Jordan, however, continued to be 
chilly, and Kuwait's relations with Qatar cooled over the latter's 
rapprochement with Jordan in August and its restoration of 
diplomatic links with Iraq. 

Bahrain, the only island state of the five Persian Gulf states, 
came under the rule of the Al Khalifa (originally members of 
the Bani Utub, an Arabian tribe) in 1783 after 180 years of Ira- 
nian control. Prior to 1971, Iran intermittently reasserted its 
claim to Bahrain, two-thirds of whose inhabitants are Shia Mus- 
lims although the ruling family is Sunni Muslim. Because of 
sectarian tensions, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and its after- 
math had an unsettling effect on the population; the govern- 
ment believed that a number of Shia plots during the 1980s 
received clandestine support from Iran. In 1992 the island's 
predominantly urban population (85 percent) consisted of 34 
percent foreigners, who accounted for 55 percent of the labor 
force. The exploitation of oil and natural gas — Bahrain was the 
first of the five Persian Gulf states in which oil was discovered — 
is the island's main industry, together with the processing of 
aluminum, provision of drydock facilities for ships, and opera- 
tion of offshore banking units. 

The Al Khalifa control the government of Bahrain and held 
eight of eighteen ministerial posts in early 1994. A brief experi- 
ment in limited democracy occurred with the December 1972 
elections for a Constituent Assembly. The resulting constitu- 
tion that took effect in December 1973 provided for an advi- 
sory legislative body, the National Assembly, voted for by male 
citizens. The ruler dissolved the assembly in August 1975. The 
new Consultative Council, which began debating labor matters 



xxiii 



in January 1993, is believed to have had an impact on the provi- 
sions of the new Labor Law enacted in September 1993. 

Bahrain's historical concern over the threat from Iran as 
well as its domestic unrest prompted it to join the GCC at the 
organization's founding in 1981. Even within the GCC, how- 
ever, from time to time Bahrain has had tense relations with 
Qatar over their mutual claim to the island of Hawar and the 
adjacent islands located between the two countries; this dispute 
was under review by the International Court of Justice at The 
Hague in early 1994. Bahrain traditionally has had good rela- 
tions with the West, particularly Britain and the United States. 
Bahrain's cordial association with the United States is reflected 
in its serving as homeport for the commander, Middle East 
Force, since 1949 and as the site of a United States naval sup- 
port unit since 1972. In October 1991, following participation 
in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Bahrain signed a defense cooper- 
ation agreement with the United States. 

Bahrain's relationship with Qatar is long-standing. After the 
Al Khalifa conquered Bahrain in 1783 from their base in Qatar, 
Bahrain became the Al Khalifa seat. Subsequently, tribal ele- 
ments remaining in Qatar sought to assert their autonomy 
from the Al Khalifa. Thus, in the early nineteenth century, 
Qatar was the scene of several conflicts involving the Al Khalifa 
and their rivals, the Al Thani, as well as various outsiders, 
including Iranians, Omanis, Wahhabis, and Ottomans. When 
the British East India Company in 1820 signed the General 
Treaty of Peace with the shaykhs of the area designed to end 
piracy, the treaty considered Qatar a dependency of Bahrain. 
Not until the signing of a treaty with Britain by Abd Allah ibn 
Qasim Al Thani in 1916 did Qatar enter into the trucial system 
as an "independent" protectorate. Britain's 1971 withdrawal 
from the Persian Gulf led to Qatar's full independence in that 
year. 

In preparation for independence, Qatar enacted a provi- 
sional constitution in 1970 that created an Advisory Council, 
partly elected. Twenty members are selected by the ruler from 
nominees voted on in each of the ten electoral districts; fifteen 
members are appointed directly by the ruler. In January 1992, 
fifty leading Qataris petitioned the ruler for an elected council 
"with legislative powers" and "a permanent constitution capa- 
ble of guaranteeing democracy and determining political, 
social, and economic structures"; as of early 1994, no action 
had been taken on these requests. Governmental control has 



xxiv 



clearly remained in Al Thani hands; in January 1994, ten of the 
eighteen members of the Council of Ministers belonged to the 
family. 

Exploitation of the oil discovered in Qatar in 1939 was 
delayed until after World War II. The petroleum industry has 
grown steadily, and in 1991 the North Field natural gas project 
was inaugurated; the North Field, a 6,000-square-kilometer off- 
shore field considered to be the world's largest, extends slightly 
into Iranian territorial waters. The Qatari government, how- 
ever, has sought to encourage diversification and investment in 
such industries as steel, fertilizers, and petrochemicals. The 
work force is predominantly foreign; in 1992 Qataris were esti- 
mated to represent only 20 percent of the approximately 
484,000 total population. 

In part because most Qataris belong to the Wahhabi sect 
that originated in the Arabian Peninsula, Qatar historically has 
enjoyed close relations with Saudi Arabia, with which it settled 
its 1992 border dispute in 1993. Although Qatar supported 
Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, it subsequently improved 
its relations with Iran, undoubtedly in part because of its 
shared gas field. As a GCC member, Qatar sent forces against 
Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War but continued to maintain a 
diplomatic link with Iraq. Qatar's relations with the United 
States improved following Operation Desert Storm, and the 
two countries signed a defense cooperation agreement in June 
1992 that includes a provision for the pre-positioning of sup- 
plies. 

The UAE represents an independent state created by the 
joining together in the winter of 1971-72 of the seven former 
Trucial Coast states of Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Dubayy, 
Ras al Khaymah, Sharjah, and Umm al Qaywayn. In early 1993, 
UAE citizens constituted about 12 percent of the total popula- 
tion of nearly 2 million. Oil is the major source of income for 
the federation, but it is found in a significant amount only in 
Abu Dhabi and to a lesser extent in Dubayy, Ras al Khaymah, 
and Sharjah. In principle, each amirate is required to contrib- 
ute to the federation's budget (according to the provisional 
constitution, each state's natural resources and wealth are its 
own), but in practice only Abu Dhabi and, to a lesser degree, 
Dubayy have financed the federation. The resulting disagree- 
ment over budget contributions as well as over the integration 
of defense measures and forces led to the recurring renewal at 
five-year intervals of the 1971 provisional constitution, rather 



xxv 



than the intended adoption of a permanent constitution. In 
fact, the separation of powers is nominal; UAE organs consist 
of the Supreme Council of the Union (SCU) composed of the 
rulers of the seven amirates (Abu Dhabi and Dubayy have a 
veto right on proposed measures), the Council of Ministers, 
and the presidency. The chairman of the SCU is the president 
of the UAE. In addition, there is an advisory Federal National 
Council (FNC) of forty members appointed by the rulers of the 
amirates, based on proportional representation; members 
serve two-year terms. Following a one-year delay in naming 
members, the FNC met with UAE citizens in January 1993, 
after which it held several sessions. FNC actions included a call 
for private firms to employ more UAE citizens and the estab- 
lishment of a federal housing loan program for UAE nationals. 

Like other gulf states, the UAE has security concerns, of 
which one is its dispute with Iran over the islands of Abu Musa, 
Tunb al Rubra (Greater Tumb), and Tunb as Sughra (Lesser 
Tumb). This dispute flared anew in early 1992, after lying dor- 
mant for twenty years, when Iran took actions on Abu Musa 
that violated a shared sovereignty agreement. The UAE was 
concerned that Iran intended to extend its control over the 
entire island. However, in November 1992 the two countries 
agreed to abide by the provisions of the 1971 memorandum. 
The UAE would prefer a final resolution of this dispute and has 
expressed a willingness to have its sovereignty claims arbitrated 
by the International Court of Justice or the United Nations. 

Militarily, the UAE participated in the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War and contributed personnel to the UN peacekeeping force 
in Somalia in 1992. The UAE's experience in the Persian Gulf 
War led it to consider itself inadequately prepared in terms of 
materiel; consequently, in February 1993 it ordered Leclerc 
main battle tanks and other equipment from France. 

Oman is the only one of the Persian Gulf states whose ruler 
bears the title of sultan instead of shaykh. Until 1970 the ruler 
was known as the sultan of Muscat (the coastal area) and Oman 
(the rugged interior imamate), reflecting the diverse parts of 
the country. To Ibadi Muslims, the political ruler is also the 
imam (see Glossary); the title sultan, taken from Ottoman 
usage, indicates a Muslim ruling sovereign combining religious 
and political connotations. 

The present sultan, Qabus ibn Said Al Said, began his rule 
in 1970 and immediately started emphasizing economic devel- 
opment and modernization. Such an emphasis was essential 



xxvi 



because Oman's oil, first produced commercially in 1967, had a 
relatively limited production span; 1992 estimates projected 
seventeen more years of output at the 1992 production rate. 
National development plans, therefore, have focused on reduc- 
ing the dependence on oil and on confronting problems occa- 
sioned by the dramatic rural-to-urban population shift, the 
accompanying social transformation, and the large number of 
foreign workers, all in the interests of promoting stability. 
Oman never has had a census, but in 1992, for planning pur- 
poses, the government estimated the population at 2 million 
persons (the actual figure may be closer to 1.5 million), of 
whom about 350,000 were foreigners. The latter constituted 
approximately 60 percent of the labor force. 

Oman faces a number of problems. The government must 
attempt to provide adequate housing and utilities, especially 
water; stimulate agriculture to increase food production; and 
discourage urban migration. Specific development goals 
include establishing new industries and industrial estates; train- 
ing indigenous personnel; developing minerals other than oil; 
encouraging agriculture, fishing, and tourism; increasing priva- 
tization of state-controlled enterprises; and diminishing 
regional imbalances, particularly in the Dhofar region. 

On coming to power, Qabus ibn Said confronted the rebel- 
lion in the Dhofar region, which had begun in 1964. To 
counter the revolt, he concentrated on establishing develop- 
ment projects in this neglected area of the country and on 
improving the transportation and communications infrastruc- 
ture. With the assistance of Iran, Jordan, and several gulf states, 
he also took military action to repress the rebellion. The sultan 
was aided in these efforts by the fact that the bureaucracy and 
major posts were largely in the hands of ruling family mem- 
bers. Leading government posts continued to be in the hands 
of ruling family members into the 1990s. For example, in early 
1994 the sultan also served as prime minister, minister of 
defense, minister of finance, minister of foreign affairs, and 
chairman of the central bank. Other members of the ruling 
family served as deputy prime minister for legal affairs, deputy 
prime minister for security and defense, and minister of 
national heritage and culture. Still other ruling family mem- 
bers served as special advisers and as governors of the capital 
and of the Dhofar region. Close cooperation occurs between 
the ruling family and the merchants; tribal shaykhs now play a 
lesser role. Following the example of other gulf states, in 1991 



xxvii 



Qabus ibn Said created the Consultative Council, which has 
representatives from the forty-one wilayat, or governorates, but 
no government officials, in contrast to the State Consultative 
Council, established in 1981, which the new council replaced. 

In the area of foreign relations, Oman has been closely 
aligned with Britain and the United States; it first signed a mili- 
tary accord with the latter in 1980. This "facilities access" agree- 
ment was most recently renewed in 1990. In the region, Oman 
has sought to play an independent, nonconfrontational role. 
In late October 1992, Oman ended a twenty-five-year border 
dispute with Yemen by signing a border demarcation agree- 
ment; it also concluded a border agreement with Saudi Arabia 
in March 1990 as a result of which Oman began demarcating 
the boundary between the two countries. Moreover, Oman has 
acted as mediator between the United States and Iran and 
between Britain and Iran. Meanwhile, Oman has been increas- 
ing its arms purchases and building up its armed forces. 

Oman's purchase of military materiel is consonant with the 
general pattern of Persian Gulf states, which have been spend- 
ing heavily on military equipment since at least the early 1980s, 
primarily to compensate for their limited manpower. In most 
instances, women are not included in the armed forces. Lack- 
ing domestic arms production capability, the gulf states mainly 
need aircraft, air defense missile systems, early warning sys- 
tems, and small missile attack craft, as well as main battle tanks 
and armored personnel carriers. The gulf countries recognize 
the potential threats they face, particularly from Iraq and possi- 
bly from Iran. In addition, they have experienced the need to 
counter domestic insurgencies, protect their ruling families 
and oil installations, and possibly use military force in pursuing 
claims to disputed territory. A partial solution to their defense 
needs lay in the formation of the GCC in 1981. 

The Persian Gulf War brought with it, however, the realiza- 
tion that the GCC was inadequate to provide the gulf states 
with the defense they required. As a result, most of the states 
sought defense agreements with the United States, Britain, 
France, and Russia, more or less in that order. Concurrently, 
the gulf countries have endeavored to improve the caliber and 
training of their armed forces and the interoperability of mili- 
tary equipment through joint military exercises both within 
the GCC framework and with Western powers. The United 
States has sought to complement GCC collective security 



xxviii 



efforts and has stated that it does not intend to station forces 
permanently in the region. 

At a November 1993 meeting, GCC defense ministers made 
plans to expand the Saudi-based Peninsula Shield force, a 
rapid deployment force, to 25,000. The force is to have units 
from each GCC state, a unified command, and a rotating chair- 
manship. The ministers also agreed to spend up to US$5 bil- 
lion to purchase three or four more AWACS aircraft to 
supplement the five the Saudi air force already has and to cre- 
ate a headquarters in Saudi Arabia for GCC defense purposes. 
The UAE reportedly considered the proposed force increase 
insufficient; furthermore, Oman sought a force of 100,000 
members. 

In addition to these efforts, directed at the military aspects 
of national security, declining oil revenues for many of the 
states and internal sectarian divisions also have led the gulf 
countries to institute domestic efforts to strengthen their 
national security. Such efforts entail measures to increase the 
role of citizens in an advisory governmental capacity, to allow 
greater freedom of the press, to promote economic develop- 
ment through diversification and incentives for foreign invest- 
ment, and to develop infrastructure projects that will increase 
the standard of living for more sectors of the population, 
thereby eliminating sources of discord. The ruling families 
hope that such steps will promote stability, counter the possible 
appeal of radical Islam, and ultimately strengthen the position 
of the ruling families by constituting some form of limited con- 
stitutional monarchy. 

January 26, 1994 Helen Chapin Metz 



xxix 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



Sharjah Mosque, built in the 1 980s in traditional 



THE FIVE COUNTRIES covered in this volume— Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates — are all 
Arab states on the Persian Gulf that share certain characteris- 
tics. Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia share the coastline as well, 
and they too shared in the historical development of the area. 
Of the five states covered in this volume, Oman has a unique 
culture and history that distinguish it from its neighbors. It also 
is the state with the shortest coastline along the Persian Gulf. 
Most of Oman lies along the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian 
Sea (see fig. 1). 

The main element that unites the five countries is their 
involvement with people and nations beyond the region. The 
gulf has been an important waterway since ancient times, 
bringing the people who live on its shores into early contact 
with other civilizations. In the ancient world, the gulf peoples 
established trade connections with India; in the Middle Ages, 
they went as far as China; and beginning in the eighteenth cen- 
tury, they became involved with the European powers that 
sailed into the Indian Ocean and around Southeast Asia. In the 
twentieth century, the discovery of massive oil deposits in the 
gulf made the area once again a crossroads for the modern 
world. 

Other factors also bring these countries together. Their 
indigenous populations are mostly Arab and, with the excep- 
tion of Oman and Bahrain, are mostly Sunni (see Glossary) 
Muslim. Because they live in basically tribal societies, family 
and clan connections underlie most political and economic 
activity. The discovery of oil and the increasing contact with the 
West have led to tremendous material and social changes. 

Important distinctions exist, however, among the five coun- 
tries. Bahrain is an island with historical connections to Iran. 
Kuwait is separated from the others by Saudi Arabia. In Oman 
high mountain ranges effectively cut off the country's hinter- 
land from the rest of the region (see fig. 2). Moreover, various 
tribal loyalties throughout the region are frequently divisive 
and are exacerbated by religious differences that involve the 
major sects of Islam — Sunni and Shia (see Glossary) — and the 
smaller Kharijite sect, as well as Muslim legal procedures. 



3 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Trade in the Gulf 

The Persian Gulf lies between two of the major breadbaskets 
of the ancient world, the Tigris-Euphrates area (Mesopotamia, 
meaning "between the rivers") in present-day Iraq and the Nile 
Valley in Egypt. Mesopotamia, a part of the area known as the 
Fertile Crescent, was important not only for food production 
but also for connecting East to West. 

Rivers provided the water that made agriculture possible. 
Agriculture, in turn, enabled people to settle in an area and to 
accumulate a food surplus that allowed them to create a civili- 
zation. They chose leaders such as kings and priests, they built 
monuments, they devised systems of morality and religion, and 
they traded. 

Mesopotamia became the linchpin of ancient international 
trade. The fertile soil between the Tigris and the Euphrates 
produced a large surplus of food, which was traded for other 
goods. For example, early inhabitants of Mesopotamia found 
copper at Magan, an ancient city that lay somewhere in the 
contemporary state of Oman, and, via Magan, they traded with 
people in the Indus Valley for lumber and other finished 
goods. 

Trade between Mesopotamia and India was facilitated by 
the small size of the Persian Gulf. Water provided the easiest 
way to transport goods, and sailors crossed the gulf fairly early, 
moving out along the coasts of Persia and India until they 
reached the mouth of the Indus. Merchants and sailors became 
middlemen who used their position to profit from the move- 
ment of goods through the gulf. The people of Magan were 
both middlemen and suppliers because the city was a source of 
copper as well as a transit point for Indian trade. Over time, 
other cities developed that were exclusively entrepots, or com- 
mercial way stations. One of the best known of these cities was 
Dilmun. 

Dilmun probably lay on what is now the island state of Bah- 
rain. Excavations on the island reveal rich burial mounds from 
the Dilmun period (ca. 4000 to 2000 B.C.). Scholars believe the 
monuments on the island indicate that residents, in addition to 
farming, earned money from the East-West trade and that 
other cities on the gulf coast survived similarly. 

The trading cities on the gulf were linked closely to Mesopo- 
tamia, reflected in the similarities between the archaeological 
finds in the two areas. The similar finds suggest that the people 



4 




SAUDI 
ARABIA 




\es: Topography 



International boundary 

Administrative line 

Undefined boundary 

x x Boundary in dispute 

® National capital 

A Spot elevation in meters 

50 100 150 200 Kilometers 

I 1 — H h 1 1 

50 100 150 Miles 




Historical Setting 



of the gulf coast and the people of the Tigris and Euphrates val- 
ley developed increasingly complex societies and beliefs. 

The people of the gulf coast differed from those of the inte- 
rior of the Arabian Peninsula. Many of the people in the inte- 
rior were organized in tribes and pursued nomadic lifestyles. 
When the desert provided insufficient food for their flocks, the 
tribes pushed into the date groves or farmlands of the settled 
towns. Centers on the gulf coast were subject to such nomadic 
incursions, as were the people of Mesopotamia. As a result, 
after the second millennium B.C. the gulf began to take on an 
increasingly Arab character. Some Arab tribes from the interior 
left their flocks and took over the date groves that ringed the 
region's oases, while others took up sailing and began to take 
part in the trade and piracy that were the region's economic 
mainstays. These nomadic incursions periodically changed the 
ethnic balance and leadership of the gulf coast. 

Meanwhile, trade flourished in the second millennium B.C., 
as reflected in the wealth of Dilmun. In about 1800 B.C., how- 
ever, both the quality and the amount of goods that passed 
through Dilmun declined, and many scholars attribute this to a 
corresponding decline in the Mesopotamian markets. Concur- 
rently, an alternate trade route arose that linked India to the 
Mediterranean Sea via the Arabian Sea, then through the Gulf 
of Aden, thence into the Red Sea where the pharaohs had built 
a shallow canal that linked the Red Sea to the Nile. This new 
route gave access not only to Mediterranean ports but also, 
through the Mediterranean ports, to the West as well. 

One of the ways that rulers directed goods toward their own 
country was to control transit points on the trade routes. Oman 
was significant to rulers in Mesopotamia because it provided a 
source of raw materials as well as a transshipment point for 
goods from the East. Although a valuable prize, Oman's large 
navy gave it influence over other parts of the gulf. When 
Mesopotamia was strong, its rulers sought to take over Oman. 
When Oman was strong, its rulers pushed up through the gulf 
and into Mesopotamia. One of the basic conflicts in gulf his- 
tory has been the struggle of indigenous peoples against out- 
side powers that have sought to control the gulf because of its 
strategic importance. 

Competition between Red Sea and Persian Gulf trade routes 
was complicated by the rise of new land routes around 1000 
B.C. Technological advances in the second and first millennia 
B.C. made land routes increasingly viable for moving goods. 



7 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

The domestication of the camel and the development of a sad- 
dle enabling the animal to carry large loads allowed merchants 
to send goods across Arabia as well. As a result, inland centers 
developed at the end of the first millennium B.C. to service the 
increasing caravan traffic. These overland trade routes helped 
to arabize the gulf by bringing the nomads of the interior into 
closer contact with peoples on the coast. 

The Gulf in the Ancient World 

Archaeological evidence suggests that Dilmun returned to 
prosperity after the Assyrian Empire stabilized the Tigris- 
Euphrates area at the end of the second millennium B.C. A 
powerful ruler in Mesopotamia meant a prosperous gulf. 
Ashurbanipal, the Assyrian king who ruled in the seventh cen- 
tury B.C., was particularly strong. He extended Assyrian influ- 
ence as far as Egypt and controlled an empire that stretched 
from North Africa to the Persian Gulf. The Egyptians, however, 
regained control of their country about a half-century after 
they lost it. 

A series of other conquests of varying lengths followed. In 
325 B.C., Alexander the Great sent a fleet from India to follow 
the eastern, or Persian, coast of the gulf up to the mouth of the 
Tigris and Euphrates rivers and sent other ships to explore the 
Arab side of the waterway. The temporary Greek presence in 
the area increased Western interest in the gulf during the next 
two centuries. Alexander's successors, however, did not control 
the area long enough to make the gulf a part of the Greek 
world. By about 250 B.C., the Greeks lost all territory east of 
Syria to the Parthians, a Persian dynasty in the East. The 
Parthians brought the gulf under Persian control and 
extended their influence as far as Oman. 

The Parthian conquests demarcated the distinction between 
the Greek world of the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian 
Empire in the East. The Greeks, and the Romans after them, 
depended on the Red Sea route, whereas the Parthians 
depended on the Persian Gulf route. Because they wanted to 
keep the merchants who plied those routes under their con- 
trol, the Parthians established garrisons as far south as Oman. 

In the third century A.D., the Sassanians, another Persian 
dynasty, succeeded the Parthians and held the area until the 
rise of Islam four centuries later. Under Sassanian rule, Persian 
control over the gulf reached its height. Oman was no longer a 
threat, and the Sassanians were strong enough to establish agri- 



8 



Historical Setting 



cultural colonies and to engage some of the nomadic tribes in 
the interior as a border guard to protect their western flank 
from the Romans. 

This agricultural and military contact gave people in the 
gulf greater exposure to Persian culture, as reflected in certain 
irrigation techniques still used in Oman. The gulf continued to 
be a crossroads, however, and its people learned about Persian 
beliefs, such as Zoroastrianism, as well as about Semitic and 
Mediterranean ideas. 

Judaism and Christianity arrived in the gulf from a number 
of directions: from Jewish and Christian tribes in the Arabian 
desert; from Ethiopian Christians to the south; and from 
Mesopotamia, where Jewish and Christian communities flour- 
ished under Sassanian rule. Whereas Zoroastrianism seems to 
have been confined to Persian colonists, Christianity and Juda- 
ism were adopted by some Arabs. The popularity of these reli- 
gions paled, however, when compared with the enthusiasm 
with which the Arabs greeted Islam. 

Early Development of Islam 

Islam is a system of religious beliefs and an all-encompassing 
way of life. Muslims believe that God (Allah) revealed to the 
Prophet Muhammad the rules governing society and the 
proper conduct of society's members. It is incumbent on the 
individual, therefore, to live in a manner prescribed by the 
revealed law and incumbent on the community to build the 
perfect human society on earth according to holy injunctions. 
Islam recognizes no distinctions between the religious institu- 
tion and the state. The distinction between religious and secu- 
lar law is a recent development that in part reflects the more 
pronounced role of the state in society and Western economic 
and cultural penetration. The impact of religion on daily life in 
Muslim countries is extensive. 

The area that constitutes the present-day Persian Gulf states 
was on the immediate periphery of the rise of Islam. In A.D. 
610, Muhammad, a merchant from the Hashimite branch of 
the ruling Quraysh tribe in the Arabian town of Mecca, began 
to preach the first of a series of revelations that Muslims believe 
was granted him by God through the angel Gabriel. A fervent 
monotheist, Muhammad denounced the polytheism of his fel- 
low Meccans. Because the town's economy was based in part on 
a thriving pilgrimage trade to the shrine called the Kaaba and 
to numerous other pagan religious sites in the area, his censure 



9 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

earned him the enmity of the town's leaders. In 622 he and a 
group of followers accepted an invitation to settle in the town 
of Yathrib, later known as Medina (the city), after it became the 
center of Muhammad's activities. The move, or hijra (see Glos- 
sary), sometimes seen as the hegira, marks the beginning of 
the Islamic era and of Islam as a force in history; the Islamic 
calendar begins in 622. In Medina, Muhammad continued to 
preach, and he eventually defeated his detractors in battle. He 
consolidated the temporal and the spiritual leadership in his 
person before his death in 632. After Muhammad's death, his 
followers compiled those of his words regarded as coming 
directly from God into the Quran, the holy scripture of Islam. 
Others of his sayings, recalled by those who had known him, 
became the hadith (see Glossary). The precedent of Muham- 
mad's deeds is called the sunna. Together they form a compre- 
hensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of an 
orthodox Sunni Muslim. 

The major duties of Muslims are found in the five pillars of 
Islam, which set forth the acts necessary to demonstrate and 
reinforce the faith. These are the recitation of the shahada 
("There is no god but God [Allah], and Muhammad is his 
prophet"), daily prayer (salat), almsgiving (zakat) , fasting 
(sawm), and pilgrimage (hajj). The believer is to pray in a pre- 
scribed manner after purification through ritual ablutions each 
day at dawn, midday, midafternoon, sunset, and nightfall. Pre- 
scribed genuflections and prostrations accompany the prayers, 
which the worshiper recites while facing toward Mecca. When- 
ever possible, men pray in congregation at the mosque with an 
imam (see Glossary), and on Fridays they are required to do so. 
The Friday noon prayers provide the occasion for weekly ser- 
mons by religious leaders. Women also may attend public wor- 
ship at the mosque, where they are segregated from the men, 
although most frequently women pray at home. A special func- 
tionary, the muezzin, intones a call to prayer to the entire com- 
munity at the appropriate hour. 

The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, a 
period of obligatory fasting in commemoration of Muham- 
mad's receipt of God's revelation. Throughout the month, all 
but the sick and the weak, pregnant or lactating women, sol- 
diers on duty, travelers on necessary journeys, and young chil- 
dren are enjoined from eating, drinking, or smoking during 
the daylight hours. Those adults excused are obliged to endure 
an equivalent fast at their earliest opportunity. A festive meal 



10 



Historical Setting 



breaks the daily fast and inaugurates a night of feasting and cel- 
ebration. The pious well-to-do usually do little or no work dur- 
ing this period, and some businesses close for all or part of the 
day. Because the lunar year is about ten days shorter than the 
solar year, Ramadan rotates through the seasons. A consider- 
able test of discipline at any time of the year, a fast that falls in 
summer imposes severe hardship on those who must do physi- 
cal work. 

All Muslims, at least once in their lifetime and if circum- 
stances permit, should make the hajj to Mecca to participate in 
special rites held there during the twelfth month of the lunar 
calendar. Muhammad instituted this requirement, modifying 
pre-Islamic custom, to emphasize sites associated with God and 
Abraham (Ibrahim), founder of monotheism and father of the 
Arabs through his son, Ismail. 

The lesser pillars of the faith, which all Muslims share, are 
jihad, or the permanent struggle for the triumph of the word 
of God on earth, and the requirement to do good works and to 
avoid all evil thoughts, words, and deeds. In addition, Muslims 
agree on certain basic principles of faith based on the teach- 
ings of the Prophet Muhammad: there is one God, who is a uni- 
tary divine being in contrast to the trinitarian belief of 
Christians; Muhammad, the last of a line of prophets begin- 
ning with Abraham and including Moses and Jesus, was chosen 
by God to present God's message to humanity; and there is a 
general resurrection on the last, or judgment, day. 

During his lifetime, Muhammad held both spiritual and 
temporal leadership of the Muslim community. Religious and 
secular law merged, and all Muslims traditionally have been 
subject to the sharia, or religious law. A comprehensive legal 
system, the sharia developed gradually through the early centu- 
ries of Islam, primarily through the accretion of interpretations 
and precedents set by various judges and scholars. During the 
tenth century, legal opinion began to be codified into authori- 
tative schools of interpretation. 

After Muhammad's death, the leaders of the Muslim com- 
munity consensually chose Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in- 
law and one of his earliest followers, to succeed him. At that 
time, some persons favored Ali ibn Abu Talib, Muhammad's 
cousin and the husband of his daughter, Fatima, but Ali and his 
supporters (the Shiat Ali, or Party of Ali) eventually recognized 
the community's choice. The next two caliphs (successors) — 
Umar, who succeeded in 634, and Uthman, who took power in 
644 — enjoyed the recognition of the entire community. When 



11 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Ali finally succeeded to the caliphate in 656, Muawiyah, gover- 
nor of Syria, rebelled in the name of his murdered kinsman, 
Uthman. After the ensuing civil war, Ali moved his capital to 
Iraq, where he was murdered shortly thereafter. 

Ali's death ended the last of the so-called four orthodox 
caliphs and the period in which the entire community of Islam 
recognized a single leader. Muawiyah proclaimed himself 
caliph from Damascus. The Shiat Ali refused to recognize him 
or his line, the Umayyad caliphs, and withdrew in the great 
schism of Islam to establish the dissident sect, known as the 
Shia, who supported the claims of Ali's line to the caliphate 
based on descent from the Prophet. The larger faction, the 
Sunnis, adhered to the position that the caliph must be 
elected, and over the centuries they have represented them- 
selves as the orthodox branch. 

Sunni Islam 

Although originally political in nature, the differences 
between Sunni and Shia interpretations rapidly took on theo- 
logical overtones. In principle, a Sunni approaches God 
directly: there is no clerical hierarchy. Some duly appointed 
religious figures, such as imams, however, exert considerable 
social and political power. Imams usually are men of impor- 
tance in their communities, but they need not have any formal 
training. Committees of socially prominent worshipers usually 
are responsible for managing major mosque-owned lands. In 
most Arab countries, the administration of awqaf (religious 
endowments) has come under the influence of the state. Qadis 
(judges) and imams are appointed by the government. 

The Muslim year has two major religious festivals: Id al 
Adha, a sacrificial festival held on the tenth day of Dhu al Hij- 
jah, the twelfth, or pilgrimage, month; and Id al Fitr, the festi- 
val of breaking the fast, which celebrates the end of Ramadan 
on the first day of Shawwal, the tenth month. To Sunnis these 
are the most important festivals of the year. Each lasts three or 
four days, during which time people put on their best clothes 
and visit, congratulate, and bestow gifts on each other. In addi- 
tion, cemeteries are visited. Id al Fitr is celebrated more fes- 
tively because it marks the end of Ramadan. Celebrations also 
take place, although less extensively, on the Prophet's birthday, 
which falls on the twelfth day of Rabi al Awwal, the third 
month. 



12 



Historical Setting 



With regard to legal matters, Sunni Islam has four orthodox 
schools that give different weight in legal opinions to prescrip- 
tions in the Quran, to the hadith, to the consensus of legal 
scholars, to analogy (to similar situations at the time of the 
Prophet), and to reason or opinion. Named for their founders, 
the earliest Muslim legal schools were those of Abd Allah Malik 
ibn Anas (ca. 715-95) and An Numan ibn Thabit Abu Hanifa 
(ca. 700-67). The Maliki school was centered in Medina, and 
the lawbook of Malik ibn Anas is the earliest surviving Muslim 
legal text, containing a systematic consensus of Medina legal 
opinions. The Hanafi school in Iraq stressed individual opin- 
ion in making legal decisions. Muhammad ibn Idris ash Shafii 
(767-820), a member of the tribe of Quraysh and a distant rel- 
ative of the Prophet, studied under Malik ibn Anas in Medina. 
He followed a somewhat eclectic legal path, laying down the 
rules for analogy that were later adopted by other legal schools. 
The last of the four major Sunni legal schools, that of Ahmad 
ibn Muhammad ibn Hanbal (780-855), was centered in Bagh- 
dad. The Hanbali school, which became prominent in Arabia 
as a result of Wahhabi (see Glossary) influence, gave great 
emphasis to the hadith as a source of Muslim law but rejected 
innovations and rationalistic explanations of the Quran and 
the traditions (see Wahhabi Islam and the Gulf, this ch.). 

Shia Islam 

Shia Muslims hold the fundamental beliefs of other Muslims 
(see Sunni Islam, this ch.). In addition to these tenets, however, 
the largest of the Shia denominations believe in the imamate, a 
distinctive institution. Whereas Sunni Muslims view the caliph 
as a temporal leader only and consider an imam to be a prayer 
leader, Shia Muslims known as Twelve Imam Shia hold a hered- 
itary view of Muslim leadership. They believe the Prophet 
Muhammad designated Ali to be his successor as Imam (when 
uppercase, Imam refers to the Shia descendant of the House of 
Ali), exercising both spiritual and temporal leadership. Only 
those who have walayat (spiritual guidance) are free from error 
and sin and have been chosen by God through the Prophet. 
Each Imam in turn designated his successor — through twelve 
Imams — each holding the same powers. 

The imamate began with Ali, who is also accepted by Sunni 
Muslims as the fourth of the "rightly guided caliphs" to succeed 
the Prophet. Twelve Imam Shia revere Ali as the First Imam, 
and his descendants, beginning with his sons Hasan and 



13 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Husayn, continue the line of the Imams until the twelfth. Shia 
point to the close lifetime association of the Prophet with Ali. 
When Ali was six years old, he was invited by the Prophet to live 
with him, and Shia believe Ali was the first person to make the 
declaration of faith in Islam. Ali also slept in the Prophet's bed 
on the night of the hijra, when it was feared that the house 
would be attacked by unbelievers and the Prophet stabbed to 
death. He fought in all the battles the Prophet did, except one, 
and the Prophet chose him to be the husband of one of his 
favorite daughters, Fatima. 

Among Shia, the term imam traditionally has been used only 
for Ali and his eleven descendants. None of the twelve Imams, 
with the exception of Ali, ever ruled an Islamic government. 
During their lifetimes, their followers hoped that they would 
assume the rulership of the Islamic community, a rule that was 
believed to have been wrongfully usurped. Because Sunni 
caliphs were cognizant of this hope, Imams generally were per- 
secuted under the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties. Therefore, 
the Imams tried to be as unobtrusive as possible and to live as 
far as was reasonable from the successive capitals of the Islamic 
empire. 

During the eighth century, Caliph Al Mamun, son of and 
successor to Harun ar Rashid, was favorably disposed toward 
the descendants of Ali and their followers. He invited Imam 
Reza, the Eighth Imam (765-816), to come from Medina to his 
court at Marv (Mary in present-day Turkmenistan). While Reza 
was residing at Marv, Al Mamun designated him as his succes- 
sor in an apparent effort to avoid conflict among Muslims. 
Reza's sister, Fatima, journeyed from Medina to be with her 
brother but took ill and died at Qpm, in present-day Iran. A 
major shrine developed around her tomb, and over the centu- 
ries Qom has become a major Shia pilgrimage site and theolog- 
ical center. 

Al Mamun took Reza on his military campaign to retake 
Baghdad from political rivals. On this trip, Reza died unexpect- 
edly in Khorasan. Reza was the only Imam to reside in, or die 
in, what is now Iran. A major shrine, and eventually the city of 
Mashhad, grew up around his tomb, which is the major pil- 
grimage center in Iran. Several theological schools are located 
in Mashhad, associated with the shrine of the Eighth Imam. 

Reza's sudden death was a shock to his followers, many of 
whom believed that Al Mamun, out of jealousy for Reza's 
increasing popularity, had the Imam poisoned. Al Mamun's 



14 



Historical Setting 



suspected treachery against Imam Reza and his family tended 
to reinforce a feeling already prevalent among his followers 
that Sunni rulers were untrustworthy. 

The Twelfth Imam is believed to have been only five years 
old when he became Imam in 874 on the death of his father. 
Because his followers feared he might be assassinated, the 
Twelfth Imam was hidden from public view and was seen only 
by a few of his closest deputies. Sunnis claim that he never 
existed, or that he died while still a child. Shia believe that the 
Twelfth Imam never died, but disappeared. Since then, the 
greater occultation of the Twelfth Imam has been in force, 
which will last until God commands the Twelfth Imam to mani- 
fest himself on earth again as the mahdi, or messiah. Shia 
believe that during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, he is 
spiritually present — some believe that he is materially present 
as well — and he is besought to reappear in various invocations 
and prayers. His name is mentioned in wedding invitations, 
and his birthday is one of the most jubilant of all Shia religious 
observances. 

The Twelve Imam Shia doctrine of the imamate was not 
fully elaborated until the tenth century. Other dogmas devel- 
oped still later. A characteristic of Shia Islam is the continual 
exposition and reinterpretation of doctrine. 

A significant practice of Shia Islam is that of visiting the 
shrines of Imams in Iraq and in Iran. In Iraq, these include the 
tomb of Imam Ali in An Najaf and that of his son, Imam 
Husayn, in Karbala, because both are considered major Shia 
martyrs. Before the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), tens of thousands 
made the visits each year. Other principal pilgrimage sites in 
Iraq are the tombs of the Seventh Imam and the Ninth Imam 
at Kazimayn near Baghdad. In Iran, pilgrimage sites include 
the tomb of the Eighth Imam in Mashhad and that of his sister 
in Qom. Such pilgrimages originated in part from the difficulty 
and the expense of making the hajj to Mecca in the early days. 

In commemoration of the martyrdom of Husayn, killed 
near Karbala in 680 during a battle with troops supporting the 
Umayyad caliph, processions are held in the Shia towns and vil- 
lages of southern Iraq on the tenth day of Muharram (Ashura), 
the anniversary of his death. Ritual mourning (taaziya) is per- 
formed by groups of five to twenty men each. Contributions 
are solicited in the community to pay transportation for a local 
group to go to Karbala for taaziya celebrations forty days after 



15 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Ashura. There is great rivalry among groups for the best per- 
formance of the taaziya passion plays. 

Shia practice differs from Sunni practice concerning 
divorce and inheritance in that it is more favorable to women. 
The reason for this reputedly is the high esteem in which 
Fatima, the wife of Ali and the daughter of the Prophet, was 
held. 

Shia Islam has developed several sects. The most important 
of these is the Twelver, or Ithna-Ashari, sect, which predomi- 
nates in the Shia world generally. Not all Shia became Twelvers, 
however. In the eighth century, a dispute arose over who 
should lead the Shia community after the death of the Sixth 
Imam, Jaafar ibn Muhammad (also known asjaafar as Sadiq). 
The group that eventually became the Twelvers followed the 
teaching of Musa al Kazim; another group followed the teach- 
ings of Musa's brother, Ismail, and were called Ismailis. Ismailis 
are also referred to as Seveners because they broke off from the 
Shia community over a disagreement concerning the Seventh 
Imam. Ismailis do not believe that any of their Imams have dis- 
appeared from the world in order to return later. Rather, they 
have followed a continuous line of leaders represented in early 
1993 by Karim al Husayni Agha Khan IV, an active figure in 
international humanitarian efforts. The Twelver Shia and the 
Ismailis also have their own legal schools. 

Another group, the Kharijites, arose from events surround- 
ing the assassination of Uthman, the third caliph, and the 
transfer of authority to the fourth caliph, Ali. In the war 
between Ali and Muawiyah, part of Ali's army objected to arbi- 
tration of the dispute. They left Ali's camp, causing other Mus- 
lims to refer to them as "kharijites" (the ones who leave). The 
term Kharijites also became a designation for Muslims who 
refused to compromise with those who differed from them. 
Their actions caused the Sunni community to consider them 
assassins. 

In the eighth century, some Kharijites began to moderate 
their position. Leaders arose who suppressed the fanatical 
political element in Kharijite belief and discouraged their fol- 
lowers from taking up arms against other Islamic leaders. Khar- 
ijite leaders emphasized instead the special benefits that 
Kharijites might receive from living in a small community that 
held high standards for personal conduct and spiritual values. 
One of these religious leaders, or imams, was Abd Allah ibn 
Ibad, whose followers founded communities in parts of Africa 



16 



Historical Setting 



and southern Arabia. Some of Abd Allah's followers, known as 
Ibadis, became the leaders in Oman. 

The Spread of Islam 

The early Islamic polity was intensely expansionist, fueled 
both by fervor for the faith and by economic and social factors. 
After gaining control of Arabia and the Persian Gulf region, 
conquering armies swept out of the peninsula, spreading 
Islam. By the end of the eighth century, Islamic armies had 
reached far into North Africa and eastward and northward into 
Asia. 

Traditional accounts of the conversion of tribes in the gulf 
are probably more legend than history. Stories about the Bani 
Abd al Qais tribe that controlled the eastern coast of Arabia as 
well as Bahrain when the tribe converted to Islam indicate that 
its members were traders having close contacts with Christian 
communities in Mesopotamia. Such contacts may have intro- 
duced the tribe to the ideal of one God and so prepared it to 
accept the Prophet's message. 

The Arabs of Oman also figure prominently among the 
early converts to Islam. According to tradition, the Prophet 
sent one of his military leaders to Oman to convert not only 
the Arab inhabitants, some of whom were Christian, but also 
the Iranian garrison, which was Zoroastrian. The Arabs 
accepted Islam, but the Iranians did not. It was partly the zeal 
of the newly converted Arabs that inspired them to expel the 
Iranians from Oman. 

Although Muhammad had enjoined the Muslim community 
to convert the infidel, he had also recognized the special status 
of the "people of the book," Jews and Christians, whose scrip- 
tures he considered revelations of God's word and which con- 
tributed in some measure to Islam. By accepting the status of 
dhimmis (tolerated subject people), Jews and Christians could 
live in their own communities, practice their own religious 
laws, and be exempt from military service. However, they were 
obliged to refrain from proselytizing among Muslims, to recog- 
nize Muslim authority, and to pay additional taxes. In addition, 
they were denied certain political rights. 

The Gulf in the Middle Ages 

In the Islamic period, the prosperity of the gulf continued 
to be linked to markets in Mesopotamia. Accordingly, after 750 



17 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

the gulf prospered because Baghdad became the seat of the 
caliph and the main center of Islamic civilization. Islam 
brought great prosperity to Iraq during this period, thus 
increasing the demand for foreign goods. As a result, gulf mer- 
chants roamed farther and farther afield. By the year 1000, 
they were traveling regularly to China and beyond, and their 
trading efforts were instrumental in spreading Islam, first to 
India and then to Indonesia and Malaya. 

The Islam they spread, however, was often sectarian. Eastern 
Arabia was a center for both Kharijites and Shia; in the Middle 
Ages, the Ismaili Shia faith constituted a particularly powerful 
force in the gulf. Ismailis originated in Iraq, but many moved 
to the gulf in the ninth century to escape the Sunni authorities. 
Whereas the imam was central to the Ismaili tradition, the 
group also recognized what they referred to as "missionaries" 
(dua; sing., dai), figures who spoke for the imam and played 
major political roles. One of these missionaries was Hamdan 
Qarmat, who sent a group from Iraq to Bahrain in the ninth 
century to establish an Ismaili community From their base in 
Bahrain, Qarmat's followers, who became known as Qarma- 
tians, sent emissaries throughout the Muslim world. 

The Qarmatians are known for their attacks on their oppo- 
nents, including raids on Baghdad and the sack of Mecca and 
Medina in 930. For much of the tenth century, the Ismailis of 
Bahrain were the most powerful force in the Persian Gulf and 
the Middle East. They controlled the coast of Oman and col- 
lected tribute from the caliph in Baghdad as well as from a rival 
Ismaili imam in Cairo, whom they did not recognize. 

By the eleventh century, Ismaili power had waned. The Qar- 
matians succumbed to the same forces that had earlier threat- 
ened centers on the gulf coast — the ambitions of strong leaders 
in Mesopotamia or Iran and the incursion of tribes from the 
interior. In 985 armies of the Buyids, an Iranian dynasty, drove 
the Ismailis out of Iraq, and in 988 Arab tribes drove the 
Ismailis out of Al Ahsa, an oasis they controlled in eastern Ara- 
bia. Thereafter, Ismaili presence in the gulf faded, and in the 
twentieth century the sect virtually disappeared. 

Ibadis figured less prominently than the Shia in the spread 
of Islam. A stable community, the Ibadi sect's large following in 
Oman has helped to distinguish Oman from its gulf neighbors. 
Ibadis originated in Iraq, but in the early eighth century, when 
the caliph's representative began to suppress the Ibadis, many 
left the area. Their leader at the time, Jabir ibn Zayd, had come 



18 



Historical Setting 



to Iraq from Oman, so he returned there. Jabir ibn Zayd's pres- 
ence in Oman strengthened the existing Ibadi communities; in 
less than a century, the sect took over the country from the 
Sunni garrison that ruled it in the caliph's name. Their leader, 
Al Julanda ibn Masud, became the Ibadi imam of Oman. 

In the Ibadi tradition, imams are elected by a council of reli- 
gious scholars, who select the leader that can best defend the 
community militarily and rule it according to religious princi- 
ples. Whereas Sunnis and Shia traditionally have focused on a 
single leader, referred to as caliph or imam, Ibadis permit 
regions to have their own imams. For instance, there have been 
concurrent Ibadi imams in Iraq, Oman, and North Africa. 

Because of the strong sense of community among Ibadis, 
which resembles tribal feelings of community, they have pre- 
dominated in the interior of Oman and to a lesser degree 
along the coast. In 752, for example, a new line of Sunni 
caliphs in Baghdad conquered Oman and killed the Ibadi 
imam, Al Julanda. Other Ibadi imams arose and reestablished 
the tradition in the interior, but extending their rule to the 
coastal trading cities met opposition. The inland empires of 
Iran and Iraq depended on customs duties from East-West 
trade, much of which passed by Oman. Accordingly, the caliph 
and his successors could not allow the regional coastal cities 
out of their control. 

As a result, Oman acquired a dual nature. Ibadi leaders usu- 
ally controlled the mountainous interior while, for the most 
part, foreign powers controlled the coast. People in the coastal 
cities often have been foreigners or have had considerable con- 
tact with foreigners because of trade. Coastal Omanis have 
profited from their involvement with outsiders, whereas Oma- 
nis in the interior have tended to reject the foreign presence as 
an intrusion into the small, tightly knit Ibadi community. Ibadi 
Islam thus has preserved some of the hostility toward outsiders 
that was a hallmark of the early Kharijites. 

While the imam concerned himself with the interior, the 
Omani coast remained under the control of Iranian rulers. 
The Buyids in the late tenth century eventually extended their 
influence down the gulf as far as Oman. In the 1220s and 
1230s, another group, the Zangids — based in Mosul, Iraq — 
sent troops to the Omani coast; around 1500 the Safavids, an 
Iranian dynasty, pushed into the gulf as well. The Safavids fol- 
lowed the Twelve Imam Shia tradition, which they had taken 



19 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

over from the Arabs, and imposed Shia beliefs on those under 
their rule. 

Oman's geographic location gave it access not only to the 
Red Sea trade but also to ships skirting the coast of Africa. By 
the end of the fifteenth century, however, an Iranian ruler, the 
shaykh (see Glossary) of Hormuz, profited most from this 
trade. The shaykh controlled the Iranian port that lay directly 
across the gulf from Oman, and he collected customs duties in 
the busy Omani ports of Qalhat and Muscat. Ibadi imams con- 
tinued to rule in the interior, but until Europeans entered the 
region in the sixteenth century, Ibadi rulers were unable to 
reclaim the coastal cities from the Iranians. 

The Age of Colonialism 

During the Middle Ages, Muslim countries of the Middle 
East controlled East-West trade. However, control changed in 
the fifteenth century. The Portuguese, who were building ships 
with deep hulls that remained stable in high seas, were thereby 
able to make longer voyages. They pushed farther and farther 
down the west coast of Africa until they found their way around 
the southern tip of the continent and made contact with Mus- 
lim cities on the other side. In East Africa, the Portuguese 
enlisted Arab navigators there to take them across to India, 
where they eventually set themselves up in Calicut on the Mala- 
bar Coast. 

Once in India, the Portuguese used their superior ships to 
transport goods around Africa instead of using the Red Sea 
route, thus eliminating the middlemen in Egypt. The Portu- 
guese then extended their control to the local trade that 
crossed the Arabian Sea, capturing coastal cities in Oman and 
Iran and setting up forts and customs houses on both coasts to 
collect duty. The Portuguese allowed local rulers to remain in 
control but collected tribute from them in exchange for that 
privilege, thus increasing Portuguese revenues. 

The ruler most affected by the rise of Portuguese power was 
the Safavid shah of Iran, Abbas I (1587-1629). During the time 
the shaykh of Hormuz possessed effective control over gulf 
ports, he continued to pay lip service and tribute to the Safavid 
shah. When the Portuguese arrived, they forced the shaykh to 
pay tribute to them. The shah could do little because Iran was 
too weak to challenge the Portuguese. For that the shah 
required another European power; he therefore invited the 



20 




Ar Rustaq fort, Oman, restored by Omani Ministry of National 

Heritage and Culture 

Building a dhow in Sur, Oman's ancient port; ship construction is a 

major enterprise of Persian Gulf states. 
Courtesy Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman, Washington 



21 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

English and the Dutch to drive the Portuguese out of the gulf, 
in return for half the revenues from Iranian ports. 

Both countries responded to the shah's offer, but it was 
England that proved the most helpful. In 1622 the English, 
along with some of the shah's forces, attacked Hormuz and 
drove the Portuguese out of their trading center there. Initially, 
the Dutch cooperated with the English, but the two European 
powers eventually became rivals for access to the Iranian mar- 
ket. The English won and by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century had become the major power in the gulf. 

Struggles between Iranians and Europeans contributed to a 
power vacuum along the coast of Oman. The English attacks 
on the Portuguese coincided with the rise of the Yarubid line 
of Ibadi imams in the interior of Oman. The Yarubids took 
advantage of Portuguese preoccupation with naval battles on 
the Iranian side of the gulf and conquered the coastal cities of 
Oman around 1650. The imams moved into the old Portu- 
guese stronghold of Muscat and so brought the Omani coast 
and interior under unified Ibadi control for the first time in 
almost 1,000 years. 

A battle over imamate succession in the early eighteenth 
century, however, weakened Yarubid rule. Between the 1730s 
and the 1750s, the various parties began to solicit support from 
outside powers. The Yarubid family eventually called in an Ira- 
nian army, which reestablished Iranian influence on the 
Omani coast. This time the Iranian hold on Oman was short- 
lived. In 1742 the Al Said, an Ibadi family from one of the 
coastal cities, convinced the local population to help it expel 
the Iranians; this put the leader, Ahmad ibn Said Al Said, in 
control of the Omani coast. His success sufficiently impressed 
the Ibadi leaders that they made him imam several years later. 

The title of imam gave Ahmad ibn Said control over all of 
Oman, and under him and his successors the country pros- 
pered for more than a century. The Omanis extended their 
influence into the interior and into part of the present-day 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), consisting of the states of Abu 
Dhabi, Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Dubayy, Ras al Khaymah, Sharjah, 
and Umm al Qaywayn. They also collected tribute from as far 
away as present-day Bahrain and Iraq. The Omanis conquered 
the Dhofar region, which is part of present-day Oman but was 
not historically part of the region of Oman. 

Oman also strengthened its hold on the Muslim cities of 
East Africa. These cities had been established by Omani traders 



22 



Historical Setting 



in the tenth and eleventh centuries, but their connection to 
Oman had grown somewhat tenuous. At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, however, the Al Said reasserted Omani 
authority in the area. Said ibn Sultan (1806-56) encouraged 
Omanis to settle in Zanzibar, an island off the African coast 
that had retained strong connections with Oman, and, from 
Zanzibar, he sent expeditions to take over several cities on the 
mainland (see Historical Patterns of Governance, ch. 6). 

Although Ahmad ibn Said had succeeded in uniting Oman 
under an Ibadi imamate, the religious nature of his family's 
authority did not last long. His son, Said ibn Ahmad Al Said, 
was elected to the imamate after him, but no other family 
member won the official approval of the religious establish- 
ment. As a result, the Al Said called themselves sultans, a secu- 
lar title having none of the religious associations of imam. They 
further distanced themselves from Ibadi traditions by moving 
their capital from Ar Rustaq, a traditional Ibadi center in the 
interior, to the trading center of Muscat. As a result of the 
move, the dichotomy between coast and interior that had tradi- 
tionally split Oman was reinstituted. 

The relationship between coast and interior was becoming a 
major feature within the gulf. In the eighteenth century, tribes 
from the interior increasingly began to move and settle into 
the coastal centers. Although the economy on the Arab side of 
the gulf did not match past prosperity, coastal conditions 
remained better than those in central Arabia. Limited agricul- 
ture existed, and the gulf waters were the site of rich oyster 
beds for harvesting pearls. The area's easy access to India, a 
major market for pearls, made the pearling industry particu- 
larly lucrative, and this drew the attention of tribes in the inte- 
rior. The tribal migrations that occurred around 1800 put in 
place the tribes and clans that in 1993 controlled Kuwait, Bah- 
rain, Qatar, and the UAE. 

The Bani Utub moved from central Arabia into the north- 
ern gulf in the early 1800s, and one of its families, the Al 
Sabah, established itself as leaders of present-day Kuwait; 
another family, the Al Khalifa, established itself in present-day 
Bahrain. In the early 1800s, a number of other tribes were liv- 
ing along the gulf. Thus, Al Sabah and Al Khalifa control 
meant that these families ruled loosely over other tribes. 
Before taking Bahrain, the Al Khalifa first had established a set- 
tlement across the water on the peninsula that is present-day 
Qatar. Although the Al Khalifa were successful in taking Bah- 



23 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

rain, they were unable to hold Qatar. They lost the peninsula to 
the Al Thani, the leading family from another tribe that, like 
the Bani Utub, had recently moved into the area. 

The exact origins of the Al Thani are unknown, but they 
were already in Qatar when the Al Khalifa came. The origins of 
the Bani Yas tribe and the Al Qasimi family that rule in the 
present-day UAE are somewhat clearer. The Bani Yas origi- 
nated in central Arabia and probably established themselves on 
the coast at Abu Dhabi around 1700; they later extended their 
influence to Dubayy. Historical evidence indicates that the Al 
Qasimi lived along the gulf during the pre-Islamic period and 
engaged in trade, pearling, and piracy. 

Wahhabi Islam and the Gulf 

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a turbulent 
time for Arabia in general and for the gulf in particular. To the 
southeast, the Al Said of Oman were extending their influence 
northward, and from Iraq the Ottoman Turks were extending 
their influence southward. From the east, both the Iranians 
and the British were becoming increasingly involved in Arab 
affairs. 

The most significant development in the region, however, 
was the Wahhabi movement. The name Wahhabi derived from 
Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, who died in 1792. He grew up 
in an oasis town in central Arabia where he studied Hanbali 
law, usually considered the strictest of Islamic legal schools, 
with his grandfather. While still a young man, he left home and 
continued his studies in Medina and then in Iraq and Iran. 

When he returned from Iran to Arabia in the late 1730s, he 
attacked as idolatry many of the customs followed by tribes in 
the area who venerated rocks and trees. He extended his criti- 
cism to practices of the Twelve Imam Shia, such as veneration 
of the tombs of holy men. He focused on the central Muslim 
principle that there is only one God and that this God does not 
share his divinity with anyone. From this principle, his students 
began to refer to themselves as muwahhidun (sing., muwahhid), 
or "unitarians." Their detractors referred to them as "Wah- 
habis." 

Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab considered himself a 
reformer and looked for a political figure to give his ideas a 
wider audience. He found this person in Muhammad ibn Saud, 
the amir (see Glossary) of Ad Diriyah, a small town near 
Riyadh. In 1744 the two swore a traditional Muslim pledge in 



24 



Historical Setting 



which they promised to work together to establish a new state 
(which later became present-day Saudi Arabia) based on 
Islamic principles. The limited but successful military cam- 
paigns of Muhammad ibn Saud caused Arabs from all over the 
peninsula to feel the impact of Wahhabi ideas. 

The Wahhabis became known for a fanaticism similar to 
that of the early Kharijites. This fanaticism helped to intensify 
conflicts in the gulf. Whereas tribes from the interior had 
always raided settled communities along the coast, the Wah- 
habi faith provided them with a justification for continuing 
these incursions to spread true Islam. Accordingly, in the nine- 
teenth century Wahhabi tribes, under the leadership of the Al 
Saud, moved at various times against Kuwait, Bahrain, and 
Oman. In Oman, the Wahhabi faith created internal dissension 
as well as an external menace because it proved popular with 
some of the Ibadi tribes in the Omani interior. 

Wahhabi thought has had a special impact on the history of 
Qatar. Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab's ideas proved popular 
among many of the peninsula tribes, including the Al Thani, 
before the Al Khalifa attempted to take over the area from Bah- 
rain at the beginning of the nineteenth century. As a result, 
Wahhabi beliefs motivated Al Thani efforts to resist the attempt 
of the Al Khalifa, who rejected Wahhabism, to gain control of 
the peninsula. In the early 1990s, Wahhabism distinguished 
Qatar religiously from its neighbors. 

Wahhabi fervor was also significant in the history of the 
present-day UAE. The Al Qasimi tribes that had controlled the 
area since the eighteenth century adapted Wahhabi ideas and 
transferred the movement's religious enthusiasm to the piracy 
in which they had traditionally engaged. Whereas Wahhabi 
thought opposed all that was not orthodox in Islam, it particu- 
larly opposed non-Muslim elements such as the increasing 
European presence in the Persian Gulf. 

Treaties with the British 

The increased European presence resulted in large part 
from commercial competition between Al Qasimi merchants 
and British merchants for the lucrative trade between India 
and the Persian Gulf in the early nineteenth century. British 
merchants enlisted the British navy to assist them by launching 
attacks on Al Qasimi strongholds in the present-day UAE as 
early as 1809. The navy did not succeed in controlling the situa- 
tion until 1819. In that year, the British sent a fleet from India 



25 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

that destroyed Ras al Khaymah, an Al Qasimi port at the east- 
ern end of the gulf. From Ras al Khaymah, the British fleet 
destroyed Al Qasimi ships along both sides of the gulf. 

The British had no desire to take over the desolate areas 
along the gulf; they only wished to control the trading cities. 
The British decided to leave most tribal leaders in power and 
concluded a series of treaties with them. 

As a result of these truces, the Arab side of the gulf came to 
be known as the "Trucial Coast." This area had previously been 
under the nominal control of the sultan in Oman, although 
the Trucial Coast tribes were not part of the Ibadi imamate. 
The area has also been referred to as "Trucial Oman" to distin- 
guish it from the part of Oman under the sultan that was not 
bound by treaty obligation. 

In 1820 the British seemed primarily interested in control- 
ling the Al Qasimi, whose main centers were Ras al Khaymah, 
Ajman, and Sharjah, which were all small ports along the 
southeastern gulf coast. The original treaties, however, also 
involved Dubayy and Bahrain, which were entrepots. The inclu- 
sion of these ports brought two other extended families, the 
Bani Yas and the Al Khalifa, into the trucial system. 

During the next 100 years, the British signed a series of trea- 
ties having wide-ranging provisions with other tribes in the 
gulf. As a result, by the end of World War I, leaders from Oman 
to Iraq had essentially yielded control of their foreign relations 
to Britain. Abu Dhabi entered into arrangements similar to 
those of Dubayy and Bahrain in 1835, Kuwait in 1899, and 
Qatar in 1916. The treaty whose terms convey the most repre- 
sentative sense of the relationship between Britain and the gulf 
states was the Exclusive Agreement of 1882. This text specified 
that the signatory gulf states (members of the present-day 
UAE) could not make any international agreements or host 
any foreign agent without British consent. 

Because of these concessions, gulf leaders accepted the 
need for Britain to protect them from their more powerful 
neighbors. The main threat came from the Al Saud in central 
Arabia. Although the Ottomans had defeated the first Wahhabi 
empire of the Al Saud around 1820, the family rose up again 
about thirty years later; it threatened not only the Al Qasimi, 
who by this time had largely abandoned Wahhabi Islam, but 
also the Al Khalifa in Bahrain and the Ibadi sultan in Oman. In 
the early 1900s, the Al Saud also threatened Qatar despite its 



26 



Boys playing on cannon 
at Az Zubarah fort, Qatar 
Courtesy Anthony Toth 



Restored ancient fort 
at Az Zubarah, Qatar; 
similar forts exist in most 
Persian Gulf states. 
Courtesy Anthony Toth 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Wahhabi rulers. Only with British assistance could the Al Thani 
and other area rulers retain their authority. 

The Al Saud were not the only threat. Despite its treaty 
agreement with Britain, Bahrain on several occasions had 
claimed Qatar because of the Al Khalifa involvement on the 
peninsula. The Omanis and Iranians had also claimed Bahrain 
because both have held the island at various times. Further- 
more, the Ottomans claimed Bahrain occasionally and tried 
throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century to estab- 
lish their authority in Kuwait and Qatar. 

The British wished to maintain security on the route from 
Europe to India so that merchants could safely send goods 
between India and the gulf. Britain also sought to exclude the 
influence in the area of other powers, such as the Ottoman 
Empire and France. 

East-West trade through the Persian Gulf dried up in the 
nineteenth century after the opening of the Suez Canal, which 
provided an all-water route to the Mediterranean Sea. Gulf 
merchants continued to earn substantial income from the slave 
trade, but international pressure, mostly from Britain, forced 
them to abandon this by 1900. Thereafter, the region contin- 
ued to profit from the gulf pearl beds, but this industry 
declined in the 1930s as a result of the world depression, which 
reduced demand, and as a result of the Japanese development 
of a cheaper way to "breed" pearls, or make cultured pearls. 

Oman, which was technically cut off from the gulf after it 
lost the Musandam Peninsula, which fell under British influ- 
ence between 1853 and 1914, fared little better during the late 
nineteenth century. The fifth sultan in the Al Said line, Said 
ibn Sultan, ruled for almost the entire first half of the nine- 
teenth century, increasing Omani influence and revenue tre- 
mendously. The resulting prosperity, however, was short-lived. 
The Omani fleet could not compete with the more technologi- 
cally advanced European ships; thus the sultan gradually lost 
much of the income he had earned from customs duties on the 
Indian trade. At the same time, the increasing pressure to 
restrict the slave trade eliminated much of the revenue the 
Omanis had earned from East Africa. 

The final blow to Oman's economic and political viability 
came after the death of Said ibn Sultan. When the Al Said 
could not agree on a successor, the British acted. They divided 
the Al Said holdings and gave Oman proper to one of the 
claimants to the throne and awarded Omani possessions in 



28 



Historical Setting 



East Africa to another. Thus, after 1856 there were two Al Said 
rulers. The one in Muscat, with a weakened merchant fleet and 
no East African revenues, was left with little support. Because of 
the different centers of power, the country became popularly 
known as Muscat and Oman. 

The sultan's financial weakness contributed to his difficulty 
in maintaining his hold on the interior. The devout Ibadi pop- 
ulation of the interior had long resented the more secular ori- 
entation of the coastal centers. As the sultan grew weaker, 
groups in the interior raised revolts against him on several 
occasions. Only with British help could the sultan remain in 
control, and his growing dependence on outsiders caused his 
relations with the Ibadi population to deteriorate. Whereas 
other gulf rulers used the British to protect them from their 
more powerful neighbors, the sultan needed the British to pro- 
tect him from his subjects. 

Discovery of Oil 

At the end of World War I, the Arab states of the gulf were 
weak, with faltering economies and with local rulers who main- 
tained their autonomy only with British assistance. The rulers 
controlled mainly the small port cities and some of the hinter- 
land. The sultan in Oman claimed a somewhat larger area, but 
resistance to his rule made it difficult for him to exert his 
authority much beyond Muscat. 

The discovery of oil in the region changed all this. Oil was 
first discovered in Iran, and by 1911 a British concern, the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), was producing oil in 
Iran. The British found oil in Iraq after World War I. In 1932 
Standard Oil Company of California (Socal) discovered oil in 
commercial quantities in Bahrain. Socal then obtained a con- 
cession in Saudi Arabia in 1933 and discovered oil in commer- 
cial quantities in 1938. 

A flurry of oil exploration activity occurred in the gulf in 
the 1930s with the United States and Britain competing with 
one another for oil concessions. One reason for the increased 
activity was that in 1932 the new Iranian government of Reza 
Shah Pahlavi revoked APOC's concession. Although the shah 
and the British later agreed on new terms, the threat of losing 
Iranian oil convinced the British in particular that they must 
find other sources. The small states of the Persian Gulf were a 
natural place to look. Geological conditions were similar to 
those in Iran, and, because of treaties signed between 1820 and 



29 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

1916, the British had substantial influence and could restrict 
foreign access. 

Oil exploration did not mean immediate wealth for Arab 
rulers of the area. Although the oil companies struck large 
deposits of oil in Bahrain almost immediately, it took longer in 
other countries to locate finds of commercial size. Oman, for 
instance, was unable to export oil until 1967. World War II 
delayed development of whatever fields had been discovered in 
the 1930s; so it was not until the 1950s that countries still tech- 
nically dependent on Britain for their security began to earn 
large incomes. The oil fields in Kuwait were developed the 
most quickly, and by 1953 that nation had become the largest 
oil producer in the gulf. Considerably smaller fields in Qatar 
came onstream in commercial quantities in the 1950s, and Abu 
Dhabi began to export offshore oil in 1962. Dubayy began to 
profit from offshore oil deposits in the late 1960s. 

Until the 1970s, foreign companies owned and managed 
the gulf oil industry. In most cases, European- and United 
States-based concerns formed subsidiaries to work in specific 
countries, and these subsidiaries paid fees to the local rulers, 
first for the right to explore for oil and later for the right to 
export the oil. When the first arrangements were made, local 
rulers had a weak bargaining position because they had few 
other sources of income and were eager to get revenues from 
the oil companies as fast as possible. Moreover, in 1930 no one 
knew the size of gulf oil reserves. 

As production increased and the extent of oil deposits 
became known, indigenous rulers improved their terms. In the 
1950s, rulers routinely demanded an equal share of oil com- 
pany profits in addition to a royalty fee. By the 1970s, most of 
the gulf countries, which by then were independent of British 
control, bought major shares in the subsidiary companies that 
worked within their borders. By the early 1990s, many of these 
subsidiaries had become completely state-owned concerns. 
They continued to employ Western experts at the highest deci- 
sion-making levels, but the local government had ultimate 
responsibility and profits. 

Independence 

With the exception of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the Arab coast 
of the gulf is ruled by ten families: in Kuwait the Al Sabah; in 
Bahrain the Al Khalifa; in Qatar the Al Thani; in the present- 
day UAE the Al Nuhayyan in Abu Dhabi, the Al Nuaimi in 



30 



Historical Setting 



Ajman, the Al Sharqi in Al Fujayrah, the Al Maktum in Dubayy, 
the Al Qasimi in Ras al Khaymah and Sharjah, and the Al 
Mualla in Umm al Qaywayn; and the Al Said in present-day 
Oman. These families owe their positions to tribal leadership. 
It was on this traditional basis that the British had negotiated 
treaties with their leaders in the nineteenth century and the 
early twentieth century. 

A major provision of these treaties was the recognition of 
sovereignty. The British were concerned that rulers of the 
weaker gulf families would yield some of their territory under 
pressure from more powerful groups, such as the Al Saud or 
the Ottomans. Accordingly, the treaties signed between 1820 
and 1916 recognized the sovereignty of these rulers within cer- 
tain borders and specified that these borders could not be 
changed without British consent. Such arrangements helped to 
put tribal alliances into more concrete terms of landowner ship. 
This meant that the Al Nuhayyan of Abu Dhabi, for example, 
not only commanded the respect of tribes in the hinterland 
but also owned, as it were, the land that those tribes used — in 
this case, about 72,000 square kilometers of Arabia. 

Controlling, or owning, land became more important with 
the discovery of oil. When oil companies came to explore for 
oil, they looked for the "owner" of the land; in accordance with 
British treaties, they went to the area's leading families and 
agreed to pay fees to the heads of these families. As oil reve- 
nues increased, the leaders became rich. Although the leaders 
spent much of their new wealth on themselves, they also dis- 
tributed it in the area they controlled according to traditional 
methods, which initially consisted mostly of largesse: gifts for 
friends, and food for whomever needed it. As time passed, the 
form of largesse became more sophisticated and included, for 
example, the construction of schools, hospitals, and roads to 
connect principal cities to towns in the interior. 

Oil revenues did not change traditional tribal ideas about 
leadership. New money, however, increased the influence of 
area leaders by giving them more resources to distribute. 
Because of oil exploration, tribal boundaries became clearer, 
and areas were defined more precisely. Distinctions among 
tribes also became more evident. A new sense of identity 
appeared in gulf shaykhdoms and aroused a growing expecta- 
tion that they should rule themselves. To do this, shaykhs had 
to cut themselves off from British control and protection. 



31 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

By the early 1960s, this was something to which the British 
had little objection. India and Pakistan won their indepen- 
dence in 1947, meaning that Britain no longer had to worry 
about protecting the western flank of the subcontinent. Britain 
was also burdened by the tremendous sacrifices it made during 
World War II and could not be as globally involved as it had 
been before the war. Therefore, Britain yielded many of its stra- 
tegic responsibilities to the United States in the postwar period 
or gave them up entirely. However, the British were bound to 
the gulf by treaties and so remained in the region, but it was 
clear by the 1960s that they sought to leave the gulf. 

Kuwait was the first state to terminate the agreement con- 
necting it with Britain. Oil production in Kuwait had devel- 
oped more quickly than in neighboring states; as a result, 
Kuwaitis were better prepared for independence. They 
declared independence in 1961 but ran into immediate trou- 
ble when Iraq claimed their territory. The Iraqis argued that 
the British had recognized Ottoman sovereignty over Kuwait 
before World War I and, because the Ottomans had claimed to 
rule Kuwait from what was then the province of Iraq, the terri- 
tory should belong to Iraq. 

The British immediately sent troops to Kuwait to deter any 
Iraqi invasion. British and Kuwaiti positions were supported by 
the newly formed League of Arab States (Arab League), which 
recognized the new state and sent troops to Kuwait. The Arab 
League move left the Iraqis isolated. Accordingly, when a new 
Iraqi government came to power in 1963, one of its first steps 
was to give up its claim and recognize the independence of 
Kuwait. 

The experience of Kuwait may have increased the anxiety of 
other gulf leaders about declaring their independence. Even 
into the 1970s, Iran and Saudi Arabia continued to make 
claims on territory in Bahrain and the UAE, although by the 
end of 1971 those states were independent, and nothing came 
of the claims. Gulf leaders also faced uncertainty about the 
form their states should take. Should they all, with the excep- 
tion of Oman, whose situation was different in that its treaty 
relationship with Britain did not guarantee its borders as did 
treaties of the other gulf states, band together in the largest 
entity possible? Or should they break up into nine separate 
states, the smallest of which had little territory, few people, and 
no oil? 



32 



Historical Setting 



British action forced gulf leaders to decide. Because of 
domestic financial concerns, Britain decided in the late 1960s 
to eliminate its military commitments east of Suez. As a result, 
the gulf shaykhs held a number of meetings to discuss indepen- 
dence. Initially, leaders considered a state that would include 
all nine shaykhdoms; Qatar had even drawn up a constitution 
to this effect. 

Various obstacles existed, however, to the creation of a 
"superstate." The ruler of Bahrain especially and to a lesser 
degree the ruler of Qatar were not satisfied with the political 
and economic status that their countries would enjoy in such 
an arrangement. They wished to have a preeminent position 
and therefore decided that independence would be preferable 
to federation. Accordingly, Bahrain declared its independence 
on August 15, 1971, and Qatar followed suit on September 3, 
1971. 

With regard to the other gulf shaykhdoms, their political 
options were limited. The only one with significant oil revenues 
was Abu Dhabi; Dubayy had only just begun to receive income 
from its oil. The five southern shaykhdoms — Ajman, Al 
Fujayrah, Ras al Khaymah, Sharjah, and Umm al Qaywayh — 
had at the time no mineral resources to provide revenues. 
Therefore, realistically, their only choice was to join in a federa- 
tion in which they would be strengthened by the collective 
resources of their neighbors. Abu Dhabi and Dubayy consid- 
ered such a federation advantageous to themselves because of 
their small size and limited population. 

Thus, in 1971 soon after Qatar became independent, the 
remaining shaykhs, with the exception of the Al Qasimi in Ras 
al Khaymah, took the preliminary constitution that Qatar had 
originally drawn up for a nine-member confederation and 
adapted it to a six-member body. On December 2, 1971, one 
day after the British officially withdrew, these six shaykhdoms 
declared themselves a sovereign state. 

Ras al Khaymah originally refused to join the confederation. 
The Al Qasimi, who ruled the area, claimed a number of 
islands and oil fields within the gulf to which Iran laid claim as 
well. In the negotiations to form the UAE, the Al Qasimi 
sought support for their claims from Arab states on the penin- 
sula as well as from some Western powers. When their efforts 
proved unsuccessful, the Al Qasimi pulled out of the negotia- 
tions. They quickly realized, however, that they could not exist 
on their own and joined the union in February 1972. 



33 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Oman, which traditionally regarded itself as an independent 
state, had not contemplated joining the federation. Oman had 
experienced considerable British involvement in its affairs 
since the latter half of the nineteenth century. By taking over 
Zanzibar and other areas of East Africa formerly controlled by 
Oman, Britain had destroyed much of Oman's trade. The trade 
loss created resentment on the part of the Omanis, which grew 
in the twentieth century when the ruler granted oil conces- 
sions to British companies. The increasing British presence 
caused tensions that resulted in charges of foreign interference 
in Omani affairs. Many Omanis blamed the Al Said sultan for 
allowing foreign influence, which they considered detrimental 
to the religious and cultural life of the sultanate. 

In 1958 the sultan withdrew to his palace in the coastal city 
of Salalah in Dhofar, the southern region that the Al Said had 
annexed in the nineteenth century, but took little interest in 
maintaining stability in the country. While keeping his military 
relationship with the British, he restricted Oman's contacts 
with the rest of the world, discouraged development, and pro- 
hibited political reform. 

In the end, the Al Said control over a united Oman sur- 
vived, but Said ibn Taimur did not. Although the sultan had 
partially reestablished his authority in the Omani interior, he 
was unable to handle the increasing complexity of domestic 
politics. By the 1960s, Omani affairs had become international 
issues. Western oil companies sought to work in the interior of 
the country, and foreign governments, such as the Marxist 
state of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, were send- 
ing arms to the rebels in Dhofar. 

The Al Said hold over the region remained problematic, 
however, and in 1964 a rebellion arose, this time in Dhofar. 
The Dhofar rebellion, which was not brought under control 
until late 1975, obliged the sultan to seek foreign military assis- 
tance; therefore, British forces, particularly the air force, 
resumed activity in the country. The rebels pointed to British 
involvement as an indication of the sultan's illegitimacy and 
brought their case to the United Nations (UN), which eventu- 
ally censured Britain for its continuing involvement in Oman. 

Said ibn Taimur's policies frustrated many, not only in 
Oman but also in Britain, whose citizens were heavily involved 
in the sultan's military and intelligence apparatus. By 1970 
these elements decided they could bear with the situation no 
longer; a coalition of Omani military and civilian forces, as well 



34 



Historical Setting 



as British forces, attacked the palace and forced Said ibn 
Taimur to abdicate. They replaced him with his son, Qabus ibn 
Said Al Said, who had played no role in Said ibn Taimur's gov- 
ernment. The sultan had actually locked his son in the palace 
for fear that Qabus ibn Said, who had been educated in Britain, 
would challenge his archconservative policies. 

On his release, Qabus ibn Said consolidated the sultanate's 
hold over the interior and then solicited regional rather than 
British help to put down the rebellion in Dhofar. Other Arab 
leaders, as well as the shah of Iran, sent troops to Oman in 
response to Qabus ibn Said's requests; with the help of this coa- 
lition, by late 1975 the sultan ended the Dhofar rebellion. 

Qabus ibn Said was not an Ibadi imam as the first rulers in 
his line had been, but in 1970 this was less important than it 
had been in earlier times. Only about 60 percent of Oman's 
population was Ibadi, concentrated in the northern moun- 
tains. Furthermore, the Dhofar region had a relatively short 
history of association with the rest of Oman. 

Developments since Independence 

Since the early 1970s, increased oil production and regional 
instability have dominated events in the Persian Gulf. Revenues 
from the oil industry grew dramatically after oil producers 
raised their prices unilaterally in 1973; as a result, funds avail- 
able to gulf rulers increased. Governments began massive 
development projects that brought rapid material and social 
change. As of 1993, the turmoil that these changes caused had 
not yet stabilized. Those states that had benefited longest from 
oil money, such as Kuwait and Bahrain, made the greatest 
progress in adjusting to the new oil wealth. Oman — which has 
used its oil reserves only since the early 1970s and which had 
suffered under the repressive policies of Said ibn Taimur — saw 
substantially less progress. 

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 challenged gulf stability. 
Many gulf leaders agreed with some of the social goals of the 
revolution and its efforts to tie Iran more firmly to its Islamic 
roots. But Iran's desire to spread the movement beyond its bor- 
ders clearly threatened gulf leaders. Furthermore, several gulf 
states have significant Shia or Iranian minorities (Bahrain has a 
Shia majority although the ruling family is Sunni), and gulf rul- 
ers feared that Iran would use ethnic or sectarian loyalties to 
stir up such minorities. 



35 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

As of 1993, however, Shia of the gulf had not responded 
enthusiastically to the Iranian call. Kuwait and Bahrain, which 
have the largest Shia populations, experienced some limited 
pro-Iranian demonstrations in 1979. 

Iran was perhaps more threatening to gulf stability because 
of its strong anti-Western stance in world and regional politics. 
The new Iranian position stood in stark contrast to the gulf 
amirs' long history of involvement with the British and the 
close ties to the West that the oil industry entailed. Thus, the 
Iranian political worldview was one to which rulers in the gulf 
states could not subscribe. 

In 1980 the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War made the Iranian 
threat more concrete. The gulf states supported Iraq both in 
the Arab League, beginning in 1980, and through loans, begin- 
ning in 1981. The tanker war began in 1984 with Iraqi air 
attacks on neutral ships carrying oil and other goods from 
Iran. Iran, in turn, responded with mine laying and attacks on 
merchant shipping, causing added concern among the states 
of the region. 

In 1981, partly as a result of such concerns, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE formed the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) (see Collective Security under the 
Gulf Cooperation Council, ch. 7). The goal of the GCC has 
been to provide for regional defense and to coordinate policy 
on trade and economic issues. Although the GCC has taken 
steps to increase the military capabilities of various members, 
the region has remained dependent to a great extent on the 
protection of the Western powers. For instance, when the Iran- 
Iraq War made the gulf unsafe for oil tankers in 1987-88, it was 
ships from Europe and the United States that protected ship- 
ping and cleared the area of mines. 

Whereas broader, regional alliances in the gulf have 
changed dramatically since the 1970s, individual political sys- 
tems have remained relatively unchanged. All the gulf coun- 
tries grant ultimate power to a single family, whose leading 
member rules as amir, but they also provide for an advisory 
body whose members are drawn from outside the royal family. 
Kuwait and Bahrain have gone beyond this and have set up sep- 
arate parliaments with limited power to draft legislation. How- 
ever, the Al Sabah and the Al Khalifa have sometimes dissolved 
these bodies; thus, it remains uncertain whether parliaments 
will become a permanent feature of gulf politics. 



36 



Historical Setting 



The ruling families' hold on power has been challenged at 
various times. More problematic is the manner in which the 
gulf states have distributed individual citizenship. Since the 
1930s, the population has increased dramatically because of 
the oil boom, but the number of citizens has not increased cor- 
respondingly. Most of the gulf states place restrictions on citi- 
zenship, requiring that an individual trace his or her roots in 
the country to before 1930. Accordingly, the millions of people 
that have poured into the region since the 1940s have only par- 
tial legal status and lack political rights in the countries in 
which they reside. Although they may have lived there for two 
generations, they can be asked to leave at any time. 

Tribal Nature of Gulf Society 

The gulf states have not granted citizenship freely for two 
reasons: first, they are reluctant to share wealth with recent 
arrivals; second, the tribal nature of gulf society does not admit 
new members easily. A tribe usually traces its lineage to a partic- 
ular eponymous ancestor. The standard Arabic reference to 
tribe is banifulan, or "the sons [bani] of so-and-so." The Bani al 
Murrah in Saudi Arabia, for example, trace their line back to a 
figure named Murrah, who lived some time before the 
Prophet. 

Over a period of 1,500 years, the sons of Murrah, or any 
other ancient figure, have tended to become numerous, mak- 
ing further distinctions necessary. Accordingly, tribes are 
divided into clans and then into households (fukhud; sing., 
fakhd). Households include groups of single families. Together 
this extended group of families calls itself a tribe. Each tribe 
has certain characteristics, such as different speech, dress, and 
customs. But since the 1950s, speech has become less of a dis- 
tinguishing factor because of the fluidity of gulf society. 

The name of a tribe may also reflect some past event. For 
example, the name Utub — the tribe to which the Al Sabah of 
Kuwait and the Al Khalifa of Bahrain belong — comes from the 
Arabic word for wander (atab). In 1744 the tribe "wandered" 
out of the desert and into the gulf area and became the Utub. 

Two of the most important tribal groups in Arabia are the 
Qahtan and the Adnan, whose roots stem from the belief that 
tribes in the north of the peninsula were descended from 
Adnan, one of Ismail's sons, and that tribes in the south were 
descended from Qahtan, one of Noah's sons. People in the gulf 
often attribute the structure of tribal alliances to this north- 



37 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

south distinction, and many still classify their tribes as Adnani 
or Qahtani. 

Historically the tribal nature of society has occasioned petty 
warfare in the gulf Arab tribes have attacked each other since 
before the Islamic era, but tribal customs have prevented these 
attacks from turning into random violence. Clans, however, 
have defected from their tribe and made alliances with other 
tribes, and tribes have sometimes banded together to form a 
more powerful group. 

Moreover, although some tribes may trace their lineage to 
some heroic figure, the real identity of the tribe lies in the peo- 
ple that currently compose it. In the tribe, an individual bases 
his or her sense of self-esteem on the honor of the tribe as a 
whole. 

In Arabia it was impossible to survive in the desert alone, 
and so families banded together to find water and move their 
flocks to new grazing lands. Once they established the neces- 
sary resources through collective effort, they guarded them 
jealously and refused to share them with outsiders. It therefore 
became necessary to set up boundaries between members of 
the group or between the tribe and outsiders. The tribe worked 
to restrict membership in order to preserve its sense of solidar- 
ity. As a result, birth into the right family tended to be the only 
way to become a member of a tribe. Marriage sometimes 
extended the tribal line beyond blood lines, but, in general, 
people tended to marry within the tribe and only went outside 
to establish alliances with other tribes. 

The emphasis on the group precluded the rise of a strong 
leader. Accordingly, tribal leadership is often described as "the 
first among equals," suggesting a collective leadership in which 
one among a number of leaders is recognized as the most 
authoritative. This principal leader must continue to consult 
with his lesser colleagues and so rules by consensus. 

An extension of this pattern of leadership is the concept of 
leading families within the tribe. Although tribalism tends to 
discourage inherited authority, traditions of leadership are nev- 
ertheless passed down, and tribes expect that certain families 
will furnish them with leaders generation after generation. 
This pattern occurred when tribes that were previously 
nomadic settled down in oases or coastal areas. It then became 
more likely that certain families would accumulate wealth, 
whether in food or in goods, and with this wealth would 
increase their authority. In this way, the individual families that 



38 



Historical Setting 



in the 1990s controlled the gulf states established themselves 
around 1800. Relations with the British and the discovery of oil 
continued that process. 

The existence of these ruling families is perhaps the most 
obvious manifestation of Arab tribalism in gulf society in 1993. 
Another manifestation is the collective manner in which these 
families rule. In most of these states, the position of amir is not 
passed from father to son but rotates among different parallel 
patrilineal lines. This makes the appointment of the next amir 
an open issue and something on which the entire family must 
agree. The family also participates in the various consultative 
bodies that exist to advise the leader. Such bodies, which 
include figures outside the ruling family, help to institutional- 
ize the first among equals system in these states. 

The way that government officials are appointed reflects the 
importance of tribal connections. Members of the ruling family 
are accommodated first, followed by families and tribes with 
whom the rulers have been traditionally allied. In Bahrain, for 
example, the ruling Al Khalifa have given the major positions 
in the bureaucracy to Sunni Arabs from tribes that helped 
them rule the island in the nineteenth century. The Al Khalifa 
have given lesser positions to Shia Arabs from merchant fami- 
lies with whom they engaged in the pearl industry but with 
whom they had no tribal alliances. 

Tribal cohesiveness is also reflected in the efforts of the gulf 
states to restrict citizenship. The gulf has always been relatively 
cosmopolitan, and its port cities have included Arab Shia from 
Iraq, freed slaves from Africa, Indian pearl traders, and Iranian 
merchants, in addition to tribal Sunni Arabs. (In 1939, for 
example, before the oil boom started, 39 percent of Qatar's 
population was non-Arab.) The dominant Arab tribes have 
accommodated many of these groups, and those who arrived in 
the region before 1930 became full citizens of the gulf states, 
albeit without the connections of tribal Arabs. The tremendous 
influx since 1940 has caused the naturally restrictive nature of 
tribal society to reassert itself to prevent a further dilution of 
tribal identities. 

Modern Arab politics, however, often speaks of a single Arab 
nation in which all Arabs might be citizens. This has led to the 
notion that Arabs should have rights in the gulf states simply 
because of their ethnicity. The continuing exodus of millions 
of Palestinian Arabs since 1948, and their subsequent residence 
throughout the Arab world, has added urgency to the demand 



39 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

that individual Arab states define their qualifications for citi- 
zenship. Many Arabs argue that Palestinians in particular, but 
other Arabs as well, should be accepted as citizens in the gulf. 
Gulf leaders have understandably opposed this for fear that 
nontribal Arabs would challenge traditional ruling institutions. 
Although people from all over the world may come to the gulf 
to work, sovereignty and citizenship are closely guarded by the 
predominantly tribal population that has its roots in the Ara- 
bian Peninsula. In this way, the Persian Gulf coast has pre- 
served its ties with the Arab interior that form the essence of its 
identity. 

* * * 

The literature on Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the 
UAE may be divided into two groups: books on Oman and 
books on the rest of the gulf states. Calvin Allen has a relatively 
brief study of the modern history of Oman entitled Oman: The 
Modernization of the Sultanate. John C. Wilkinson has written a 
number of scholarly studies on Oman, including his recent 
work, The Imamate Tradition of Oman. This is an excellent and 
detailed study of most aspects of Omani history. 

For the rest of the gulf, a number of brief studies exist, of 
which the most recent is The Arab Gulf and the Arab World, a col- 
lection of articles on various aspects of modern gulf life edited 
by B.R. Pridham; it contains little on the history of the region. 
For more historical background, the reader may consult an 
older but more substantial collection edited by Alvin Gottrell 
entitled The Persian Gulf States. Further history can be found in 
Donald Hawley's The Trucial States. 

Of books on particular countries or issues, among the best 
are Fuad Khuri's Tribe and State in Bahrain, which considers the 
social, religious, and ethnic divisions of the island nation; Fred 
H. Lawson's Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy; and Jill 
Crystal's Oil and Politics in the Gulf and Kuwait: The Transforma- 
tion of an Oil State. A recent brief work on the UAE by Malcolm 
C. Peck, The United Arab Emirates, is very good. Abdulrasool al- 
Mossa's study, Immigrant Labor in Kuwait, provides a description 
of the situation of foreign workers in the gulf. Religious distur- 
bances in the gulf are discussed in relevant chapters of Robin 
Wright's Sacred Rage. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



40 



Chapter 2. Kuwait 



Crest of the State of Kuwait 



Country Profile 



Country 

Formal Name: State of Kuwait. 
Short Form: Kuwait. 

Term for Citizens: Kuwaiti(s); adjectival form, Kuwaiti. 

Capital: Kuwait (city of Kuwait frequently used to distinguish it 
from country). 

Date of Independence: June 19, 1961. 

Geography 

Size: About 17,818 square kilometers. 
Topography: Almost entirely flat desert. 

Climate: Hot, dry, desert climate; sandstorms in June and July; 
some rain, mainly in spring. 

Boundaries: Mostly defined; United Nations post-Persian Gulf 
War 1992 boundary settlement accepted by Kuwait but rejected 
by Iraq. 

Society 

Population: March 1992 estimate 1,175,000, of whom 53 
percent Kuwaiti; a decline from preinvasion population of 
2,155,000 (mid-1990 estimate), of whom 27 percent Kuwaiti. 

Education: Free from preschool through university and 
compulsory to age fourteen. Adult literacy rate 74 percent in 
1990. 

Health: National comprehensive health care system extensive 
and continuing to expand and improve. Life expectancy in 
1990 seventy-two years for males and seventy-six for females. 

NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



43 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Ethnic Groups: Majority of population Arab. Noncitizen 
population shifted from predominantly Arab to predominantly 
Asian in 1980s. After 1990-91 Iraqi occupation, exodus of 
about 370,000 of the 400,000 Palestinians. 

Religion: Most Kuwaitis are Sunni Muslims. About 20 percent 
of citizens are Shia Muslims. Most foreigners are also Muslims, 
the majority Sunni. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1990 United Nations 
Development Programme estimated US$15,984 per capita 
GDP. 

Oil Industry: Provided 41 percent of GDP and 87 percent of 
government revenues in 1989, 58 percent of government 
revenues in 1990, and 11 percent of government revenues in 
1991, showing effects of Persian Gulf War. Crude oil production 
in 1992 (after oil well restoration during year) about 41 million 
barrels, compared with about 387 million barrels in 1985. 

Industry: About 14 percent of GDP in 1989. Largest industries 
petrochemicals and building materials. 

Agriculture: Little farming — mostly vegetables and fruits. Most 
food imported. Some fishing. 

Exports: US$11.5 billion in 1989; mostly crude oil and refined 
products. Asia and Western Europe main markets. 

Imports: US$6.3 billion in 1989 — largely such finished products 
as appliances and vehicles from industrialized nations, 
particularly Japan, United States, and Western Europe. 

Currency and Exchange Rate: Kuwaiti dinar. On March 1, 
1994, exchange rate US$1 = KD3.55. 

Fiscal Year: July 1 to June 30. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Transportation: In 1993 more than 3,900 kilometers of roads, 
of which 3,000 kilometers paved. Three major ports: Ash 
Shuaybah, Ash Shuwaykh, and Mina al Ahmadi. Airlines use 



44 



Kuwait 



Kuwait International Airport. 

Telecommunications: Prior to Persian Gulf War, excellent 
telecommunications system; all telecommunications severely 
damaged during Iraqi occupation and being restored. 

Government and Politics 

Government: 1962 constitution specifies "hereditary amirate" 
and fixes succession among male "descendants of the late 
Mubarak Al Sabah." Ruler in 1994 was Jabir al Ahmad al Jabir 
Al Sabah, who became amir in 1977. Sixty-member (fifty 
elected, ten appointed) National Assembly created in 1963, 
suspended from 1976 to 1980 and again in 1986; replaced in 
1990 with partially elected National Council. National 
Assembly reconstituted by October 1992 elections. Opposition 
and independent candidates — including some nineteen 
Islamists — won thirty to thirty-five seats. 

Politics: Al Sabah family dominates political events, but several 
prominent merchant families also powerful. Opposition, 
independent, and Islamist elements becoming stronger in early 
1990s. Political parties illegal. 

Foreign Relations: As result of Iraqi invasion of August 2, 1990, 
and 1991 Persian Gulf War, Kuwait's relations with the West and 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, particularly Saudi 
Arabia, strengthened to prevent future Iraqi incursion. In 
addition to GCC, Kuwait belong to more than twenty 
international organizations, including United Nations, League 
of Arab States, Nonaligned Movement, Organization of the 
Islamic Conference, and Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In mid-1993, according to The Military Balance, 
1993-94, personnel strength 13,700, including 1,000 central 
staff: army, 9,000; navy, 1,200 (including coast guard); and air 
force, 2,500. Materiel of all services largely destroyed or 
captured in Persian Gulf War; being renewed by large-scale 
foreign arms purchases. 



45 



KUWAIT CAPTURED THE WORLD'S ATTENTION on 
August 2, 1990, when Iraqi forces invaded and occupied the 
country, catalyzing a series of events that culminated in military 
intervention and ultimate victory by United States-led coalition 
forces in February 1991. In 1993 it appeared that the invasion 
and its aftermath would have a lasting effect on the people, the 
economy, and the politics of Kuwait. Once a small gulf shaykh- 
dom known locally as a center for pearl diving and boat con- 
struction, Kuwait came to international prominence in the 
post-World War II era largely because of its enormous oil reve- 
nues. Yet its history as an autonomous political entity is much 
older, dating back to the eighteenth century. At that time, the 
town of Kuwait was settled by migrants from central Arabia who 
arrived at what was then a lightly populated fishing village 
under the suzerainty of the Bani Khalid tribe of Arabia. Mem- 
bers of one family, the Al Sabah, have ruled Kuwait from that 
time. 

Since 1977 Kuwait has been ruled by Shaykh Jabir al Ahmad 
al Jabir Al Sabah and his designated successor, Shaykh Saad al 
Abd Allah as Salim Al Sabah, the prime minister and crown 
prince. In the postwar period, these men have supported, with 
some ambivalence, the strengthening of popular participation 
in decision making as provided for in the constitution. 

Geography 

Kuwait is located at the far northwestern corner of the Per- 
sian Gulf, known locally as the Arabian Gulf (see fig. 3). It is a 
small state of about 17,818 square kilometers, a little smaller 
than the state of New Jersey. At its most distant points, it is 
about 200 kilometers north to south and 170 kilometers east to 
west. 

Shaped roughly like a triangle, Kuwait borders the gulf to 
the east, with 195 kilometers of coast. Kuwait includes within its 
territory nine gulf islands, two of which, Bubiyan (the largest) 
and Warbah, are largely uninhabited but strategically impor- 
tant. The island of Faylakah, at the mouth of Kuwait Bay, is 
densely inhabited. It is believed to be the outermost point of 
the ancient civilization of Dilmun, which was centered in what 
is present-day Bahrain. Faylakah is the site of an ancient Greek 



47 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

temple built by the forces of Alexander the Great. Kuwait's 
most prominent geographic feature is Kuwait Bay, which 
indents the shoreline for about forty kilometers, providing nat- 
ural protection for the port of Kuwait and accounting for 
nearly one-half the state's shoreline. 

To the south and west, Kuwait shares a long border of 250 
kilometers with Saudi Arabia. The boundary between Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia was set by the Treaty of Al Uqayr in 1922, 
which also established the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone of 
5,700 square kilometers. In 1966 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
agreed to divide the Neutral Zone; the partitioning agreement 
making each country responsible for administration in its por- 
tion was signed in December 1969. The resources in the area, 
since then known as the Divided Zone, are not affected by the 
agreement, and the oil from onshore and offshore fields con- 
tinues to be shared equally between the two countries. 

The third side of the triangle is the 240 kilometers of histor- 
ically contested border to the north and west that Kuwait 
shares with Iraq. Although the Iraqi government, which had 
first asserted a claim to rule Kuwait in 1938, recognized the 
borders with Kuwait in 1963 (based on agreements made ear- 
lier in the century), it continued to press Kuwait for control 
over Bubiyan and Warbah islands through the 1960s and 1970s. 
In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and, shortly thereafter, 
formally incorporated the entire country into Iraq. Under 
United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 687, after 
the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty in 1991, a UN commis- 
sion undertook formal demarcation of the borders on the basis 
of those agreed to in 1963. The boundary was demarcated in 
1992, but Iraq refuses to accept the commission's findings. 

Kuwait has a desert climate, hot and dry. Rainfall varies 
from seventy-five to 150 millimeters a year across the country; 
actual rainfall has ranged from twenty-five millimeters a year to 
as much as 325 millimeters. In summer, average daily high tem- 
peratures range from 42°C to 46°C; the highest recorded tem- 
perature is 51.5°C. The summers are relentlessly long, 
punctuated mainly by dramatic dust storms in June and July 
when northwesterly winds cover the cities in sand. In late sum- 
mer, which is more humid, there are occasional sharp, brief 
thunderstorms. By November summer is over, and cooler win- 
ter weather sets in, dropping temperatures to as low as 3°C at 
night; daytime temperature is in the upper 20s°C range. Frost 



48 




IRAQ 

/ 

I 




SAUDI \ 





International 




boundary 




Expressway 




Paved road 


® 


National capital 


• 


Populated place 


+ 


Airport 


•I 


Major port 


5 10 


15 20 Kilometers 


I L ^ 

5 


10 15 20 Miles 



ARABIA 



47 Boundaryjepresem 



Figure 3. Kuwait, 1993 
50 



Kuwait 



rarely occurs; rain is more common and falls mostly in the 
spring. 

The land was formed in a recent geologic era. In the south, 
limestone rises in a long, north-oriented dome that lies 
beneath the surface. It is within and below this formation that 
the principal oil fields, Kuwait's most important natural 
resource, are located. In the west and north, layers of sand, 
gravel, silt, and clay overlie the limestone to a depth of more 
than 210 meters. The upper portions of these beds are part of a 
mass of sediment deposited by a great wadi whose most recent 
channel was the Wadi al Batin, the broad shallow valley form- 
ing the western boundary of the country. On the western side 
of the Ar Rawdatayn geological formation, a freshwater aquifer 
was discovered in 1960 and became Kuwait's principal water 
source. The supply is insufficient to support extensive irriga- 
tion, but it is tapped to supplement the distilled water supply 
that fills most of the country's needs. The only other exploited 
aquifer lies in the permeable zone in the top of the limestone 
of the Ash Shuaybah field south and east of the city of Kuwait. 
Unlike water from the Ar Rawdatayn aquifer, water from the 
Ash Shuaybah aquifer is brackish. Millions of liters a day of this 
water are pumped for commercial and household purposes. 

The bulk of the Kuwaiti population lives in the coastal capi- 
tal of the city of Kuwait. Smaller populations inhabit the nearby 
city of Al Jahrah, smaller desert and coastal towns, and, prior to 
the Persian Gulf War, some of the several nearby gulf islands, 
notably Faylakah. 

Society 
Population 

In the summer of 1990, Kuwait had an estimated population 
of 2,1^5,000. The most dramatic division in this preinvasion 
population was that between the national population of 
Kuwaiti citizens and the larger population, more than 70 per- 
cent of the total population, of foreign workers (see table 2, 
Appendix). 

The percentage of foreigners in the population grew 
steadily after World War II, following the rise in oil revenues 
and the consequent government development programs with 
their sudden need for substantial labor. The labor market came 
to consist increasingly of foreigners for a number of reasons. 
The most important factor was the small size of the indigenous 



51 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

population and, in the early years, their low level of education. 
As oil revenues and government investment in education pro- 
duced a generation of highly educated Kuwaitis, they began to 
replace foreigners at the highest levels of employment, but 
even this highly educated population was small. The low partic- 
ipation rates of women in the work force also contributed to 
the reliance on foreign workers. Restrictions on female dress 
and behavior in public and consequently on labor force partic- 
ipation are not as strong as they are elsewhere in the gulf, nota- 
bly in Saudi Arabia. Customary norms, however, coupled with 
higher family incomes, which reduce the need to employ more 
family members and lessen the incentive for individuals to 
undertake the more unpleasant sorts of work, combine to pro- 
mote a lower labor force participation rate in the national pop- 
ulation. 

The importance of foreign workers to the economy in the 
post-World War II period is difficult to exaggerate. Most of 
these foreigners were male. Most were employed by the state. 
Most were in Kuwait for relatively short periods (40 percent 
used to stay less than five years); Arabs used to stay somewhat 
longer than non-Arabs. Historically, Arabs constituted the bulk 
of the non-Kuwaiti population. In addition to a large number 
of Palestinian workers, estimated at 400,000 in 1990, there were 
numerous Egyptians, Iraqis, Syrians, and Lebanese. A smaller 
but significant and growing number of workers came from 
Asia. In the early 1980s, the composition of the work force 
shifted, and by 1985 slightly more than one-half the foreign 
workers (52 percent) were Asian and less than one-half (46 per- 
cent) were Arab. Africans, Europeans, and United States citi- 
zens constitute the remainder. The government favors Asian 
workers because of their lower labor costs, and, because they 
are unable to speak Arabic or lay a claim to oil revenues on the 
basis of Arab nationalism, Asian workers are more apt to return 
home in a few years, thus raising fewer social and political 
issues. 

The foreign population does not enjoy the economic and 
political rights of the national population. Not being citizens, 
they can neither vote nor run for seats in the National Assem- 
bly. They are not allowed to own real property. They cannot 
form their own unions; although they can join Kuwaiti unions, 
they are prohibited from voting or running for union offices. 
Acquiring Kuwaiti citizenship is very difficult, and the number 
of naturalized citizens remains low. 



52 



Traditional dhow, characteristic 
of Persian Gulf fishing and 
trading 

Courtesy Aramco World 




The large number of foreigners creates social tensions 
between foreigners and the indigenous population. Foreign 
workers, particularly those who have worked many years in 
Kuwait, resent the discrimination against them. Citizens often 
view foreign workers with suspicion, if not hostility. Even before 
the Persian Gulf War, public debate often focused on a per- 
ceived compromise between Kuwait's economic needs and its 
security needs. 

Although the most important social division in the country 
is between citizens and foreigners, the indigenous population 
is internally divided along a number of lines as well. The first is 
sectarian. The majority of Kuwaiti nationals are Sunni (see 
Glossary) Muslims; the minority are Shia (see Glossary). Fig- 
ures have never been published on the number of Shia, but 
estimates in the 1980s ranged from 15 to 25 percent of the 
national population. Shia are a diverse group. Some are Arab, 
many the descendants of immigrants from Ash Sharqiyah 
(Eastern Province) in Saudi Arabia or from Bahrain. Others 
come from Arab families who moved from the Arabian side of 
the gulf to Iran, stayed awhile, and then returned. Others are 
of Iranian origin, who often speak Farsi as well as Arabic at 
home and sometimes maintain business or family ties with Ira- 
nians across the gulf. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and 
the subsequent Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, this Shia community 



53 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

experienced a renewed sense of sectarian identification. The 
identification resulted from sympathy with their revolutionary 
coreligionists in Iran and from increasing government and 
social discrimination. During the 1980s, the tension between 
Sunnis and Shia, which had erupted occasionally in the past, 
became somewhat sharper. 

Kuwaitis are also divided to a certain extent along class lines. 
Although the national population is generally well off because 
of the state's generous employment policies regarding nation- 
als and its extensive social services, important divisions none- 
theless exist between the country's economic elite and the rest 
of the population. The wealthiest Kuwaitis are members either 
of the ruling family or of what was once a powerful and still dis- 
tinct merchant class. Many of these are descendants of the Bani 
Utub, the original central Arabian tribe that settled Kuwait in 
the eighteenth century. The most important and wealthiest of 
the Bani Utub are members of the Al Sabah, the ruling family 
of Kuwait. The economic elite is largely Sunni. However, some 
Shia families and individual Shia are also wealthy. 

Despite these internal divisions, the national population is 
also characterized by a strong sense of national identity. There 
are no important ethnic divisions: the national population is 
overwhelmingly Arab. The major sectarian divisions are sub- 
sumed in the larger shared Islamic identity. Unlike many of its 
neighbors, Kuwait is not a twentieth-century colonial fabrica- 
tion. It has been an autonomous political and social unit since 
the eighteenth century. In the intervening years, a strong sense 
of local identity has arisen. This national sense was deeply rein- 
forced by the Iraqi occupation. 

Education 

In 1993 Kuwait's population was highly educated, both in 
comparison to other states in the region and in comparison to 
its pre-oil education levels. The impressive education system 
was brought about by a conscious government decision, made 
possible by revenues from oil that began in the 1950s, to invest 
heavily in human resources. 

Although the pre-oil education system was modest by 1993 
standards, it was still impressive, given the limited finances at 
the time. In the early 1900s, education consisted largely of 
Quran schools, offering basic literacy training in the context of 
religious instruction. This system provided some formal school- 
ing for nearly all boys and some girls. Wealthy families often 



54 



Kuwait 



sent sons abroad for further education. In the first decades of 
the twentieth century, merchants anxious for more extensive 
training for their sons opened a few private schools, notably 
the Mubarakiyyah School in 1911 and the Ahmadiyyah School 
in 1921. In the 1930s, merchants established the Education 
Council and expanded the system to include four new primary 
schools, including one for girls. The government soon took 
over this growing system and, with new oil revenues after World 
War II, rapidly expanded the system. In 1956 the government 
laid down the basis of the education system that still existed in 
1993: kindergarten and primary, middle, and secondary 
schools. A 1965 law, largely enforced, made education compul- 
sory until the age of fourteen. A small system of private schools 
also developed. Public education, including preschool and 
higher education, was from the beginning free for all nation- 
als. The government absorbs not only the costs of schools but 
also those of books, uniforms, meals, transportation, and inci- 
dental expenses. In preinvasion Kuwait, the majority of the stu- 
dents in the education system were non-Kuwaitis (see table 3, 
Appendix). 

The apex of the public education system is Kuwait Univer- 
sity, which the government established in 1966. More than half 
the students at Kuwait University are women, in part because 
families are more likely to send boys abroad for study. The gov- 
ernment also subsidizes hundreds of students in university 
study abroad, many in the United States. 

As a result of these efforts, the school population and the lit- 
eracy rate increased steadily. By the mid-1980s, literacy and 
education rates were high. Although only 55 percent of the cit- 
izen population was literate in 1975, by 1985 that percentage 
had increased to 73.6 percent (84 percent for males and 63.1 
percent for females). In 1990 the overall literacy rate was 74 
percent. The total number of teachers increased from just 
under 3,000 at independence in 1961 to more than 28,000 in 
academic year 1988-89; the number of schools increased from 
140 to 642 during the same period (see table 4, Appendix). 

The education system has its problems, however. For exam- 
ple, it relies heavily on foreign teachers. In the late 1950s, 
almost 90 percent were non-Kuwaitis. Despite a long-standing 
government effort to indigenize education, the system contin- 
ues to rely heavily on foreigners. The system also often fails to 
train graduates in fields that correspond to Kuwait's most press- 
ing labor needs. Especially in higher education, the system pro- 



55 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

duces many graduates with training in liberal arts and few with 
training in vocational subjects. 

Health and Welfare 

The health care system and health conditions also improved 
dramatically in the years after oil revenues brought wealth to 
the country. Kuwait's first attempts to introduce a modern 
health care system date back to the first years of the twentieth 
century when the ruler, Shaykh Mubarak Al Sabah the Great, 
invited doctors from the Arabian Mission of the Dutch 
Reformed Church in the United States to establish a clinic. By 
191 1 the group had organized a hospital for men and in 1919 a 
small hospital for women. In 1934 the thirty-four-bed Olcott 
Memorial Hospital opened. Between 1909 and 1946, Kuwait 
experienced gradual, albeit limited, improvement in health 
conditions. General mortality stood between twenty and 
twenty-five per 1,000 population and infant mortality between 
100 and 125 per 1,000 live births. After the government began 
receiving oil revenues, it expanded the health care system, 
beginning with the opening of the Amiri Hospital in 1949. The 
Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) also opened some small health 
facilities. By 1950 general mortality had fallen to between sev- 
enteen and twenty-three per 1,000 population and infant mor- 
tality to between eighty and 100 per 1,000 live births. 

In the 1950s, the government introduced a comprehensive 
health care system offering free services to the entire popula- 
tion. Free health care was so extensive that it even included vet- 
erinary medicine. Expenditures on health ranked third in the 
national budget, after public works and education. As with edu- 
cation, the system relied heavily on foreigners. Most of the phy- 
sicians were foreigners, particularly Egyptians. Critics charged 
the designers of the system with paying undue attention to 
acquiring the most modern and expensive medical equipment, 
without regard to the country's health priorities, and favoring 
treatment over prevention. Nonetheless, improvements in 
available health care and in public health were dramatic (see 
table 5, Appendix). The number of doctors grew from 362 in 
1962 to 2,641 in 1988. The doctor-to-patient ratio improved 
from one to 1,200 to one to 600. Infant and child mortality 
rates dropped dramatically; in 1990 the infant mortality rate 
was fifteen per 1,000 live births. Life expectancy increased ten 
years in the postindependence years, putting Kuwait at a level 
comparable to most industrialized countries. In 1990 life 



56 



Kuwait 



expectancy for males was seventy-two years and for females sev- 
enty-six years. 

In addition to a comprehensive system of health care, the 
government provides residents with one of the world's most 
encompassing social service systems. Not only does it indirectly 
support the national population through guaranteed state 
employment and subsidized services (such as water and elec- 
tricity), but it also supports those most in need through direct 
subsidies. These include the disabled, the elderly, the unem- 
ployed, students and their families, the widowed, the unmar- 
ried, and even the families of prisoners. 

By 1990 Kuwait had an extensive welfare program, exceeded 
perhaps by no other country. Citizens receive free medical ser- 
vices from highly trained practitioners in modern facilities; free 
education through the university level; subsidized food, hous- 
ing, utilities, and transportation; and various other benefits. 
For all this, they pay no taxes: the system is supported by oil rev- 
enues from outside the country. On the eve of the Iraqi inva- 
sion, the United Nations Development Programme placed 
Kuwait at the top of its annual human development index with 
a life expectancy of 73.4 years, an adult literacy rate of 73 per- 
cent, and a real per capita gross domestic product (GDP — see 
Glossary) of US$15,984. The benefits of the welfare system, 
however, are unevenly distributed among the population. Non- 
citizens in particular benefit much less, and many, especially 
those from Arab states and those who have worked many years 
in Kuwait, resent their disadvantaged position. 

Economy 

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Kuwait's econ- 
omy was based on trade. The city of Kuwait rivaled Basra in Iraq 
as an entrepot for trade between India and parts of the Middle 
East. Kuwait became a conduit for commerce from the gulf to 
Asia, Africa, and Europe. It was Kuwait's fine natural harbor 
that first attracted the Bani Utub settlers, and they made much 
of this maritime advantage. In the nineteenth and early twenti- 
eth centuries, the economy relied primarily on pearl diving, 
and merchants and sailors harvested the gulfs natural pearl 
banks, which were among the richest in the world. In the first 
decades of the twentieth century, Kuwait had about 700 boats, 
employing approximately 15,000 men. When the pearl-diving 
season (mid-May to mid-September) ended, Kuwaiti merchants 
used their ships for long-distance trade. From this trade, a ship- 



57 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

building industry developed, and Kuwaiti craft became known 
throughout coastal Arabia for their quality. Fishing was also a 
small but important industry. The tradition of seafaring and 
trade gave Kuwait a thriving merchant class and an outward ori- 
entation that remained important into the 1990s. 

Although prosperous by regional standards, Kuwait's econ- 
omy offered only a meager existence to most of the population, 
especially those outside the ruling families and the merchant 
families. Even this meager existence began to suffer with the 
decline of pearling. That industry, the basis of Kuwait's econ- 
omy, came to a sudden end in the 1920s with the development 
of the process of making cultured pearls in Japan and then the 
Great Depression. Fortuitously, the pearl industry declined just 
as a new source of revenue was emerging. In 1938 oil was dis- 
covered in Kuwait. Once oil exports began in the immediate 
post-World War II years, economic development became nearly 
continuous. 

Oil Industry 

For centuries, oil seepages in the desert had indicated oil 
below the surface. This oil came to the attention of European 
and United States developers. In 1911 the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company (APOC), which was developing oil fields in Iran, 
requested permission to negotiate a concession from Kuwait. 
The British government refused the request (as it was entitled 
to do so under an 1899 treaty that granted Britain substantial 
control of Kuwait's foreign policy), but two years later the Brit- 
ish government commissioned a geological survey of the area. 
In 1913 the British government signed an agreement with 
Kuwait's Shaykh Mubarak the Great in which he promised to 
grant concessions only to companies approved by the British 
government, clarifying and reaffirming the agreement of 1899. 
World War I interrupted another effort to negotiate a conces- 
sion. By this time, the British government had purchased 51 
percent ownership in APOC as part of an effort to ensure oil 
supplies for the Royal Navy. 

After W T orld War I, interest in oil grew. APOC continued 
attempts to obtain a Kuwait concession. Meanwhile, in the 
1920s, Gulf Oil of the United States began to seek concessions 
in the gulf to overcome its lack of crude oil sources. British 
treaties with most rulers in the gulf, including Kuwait, made it 
difficult for non-British companies to gain access, although the 
United States government pressured the British to provide 



58 



Kuwait 



equal treatment to United States oil firms. In 1932 Gulf Oil and 
APOC formed a joint company to negotiate a concession in 
Kuwait, and this effort received British government approval. 
In 1934 Kuwait's ruler, Shaykh Ahmad al Jabir Al Sabah, signed 
a concession agreement with the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), 
the firm jointly owned by APOC and Gulf Oil. 

KOC began surveying in 1935. Drilling started in 1936 on 
the north shore of Kuwait Bay, but no oil was found. The sec- 
ond attempt, in the desert, struck a gusher in 1938 in an area 
that subsequently was called the Al Burqan field, one of the 
largest and most productive fields in the world (see fig. 4). 
World War II slowed the development of the industry, but at 
the end of the war, pipelines and other facilities were com- 
pleted that could handle 30,000 barrels per day (bpd — see 
Glossary) of crude oil. Commercial export of crude oil began 
in June 1946. Production amounted to 5.9 million barrels in 
1946 and 16.2 million barrels in 1947. KOC subsequently dis- 
covered seven additional oil fields, and production continued 
to increase until it peaked in 1972. (In 1954 KOC's parent com- 
pany, APOC, was renamed British Petroleum — BP.) 

In the years after World War II, other companies received 
smaller concessions, in particular for offshore oil, but KOC, 
which the government nationalized in 1976 (retroactively to 
1975), retained the lion's share. Subsequent concessions con- 
tained progressively better terms for Kuwait, partly because of 
the entrance of small oil companies anxious to acquire crude 
oil sources and partly because of the activities and exchanges of 
information among oil-producing states. Payments were sub- 
stantially higher, the length of concessions was shorter, sched- 
ules for relinquishing underdeveloped areas were established, 
and opportunities for Kuwaiti participation in the companies 
were increased. 

The American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil) was 
the successful bidder for Kuwait's rights in the Neutral Zone, 
receiving in June 1948 a sixty-year concession for exploration 
and production. Aminoil, which was owned by a number of 
small United States oil companies, had a joint operation with 
the Getty Oil Company, which held the Saudi rights in the Neu- 
tral Zone. The Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco, the 
main developer of Saudi Arabia's oil fields) reportedly viewed 
the terms given Kuwait by Aminoil as unfavorable and relin- 
quished its concession in the Neutral Zone, which Getty won. 
Aminoil started exploratory drilling in 1949 but did not strike 



59 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 




Figure 4. Kuwait: Oil Fields, Gas Fields, and Refineries, 1993 

oil until 1953. Production began in 1954. Production from the 
Neutral Zone was shared between the two countries, and Amin- 
oil paid royalties and taxes to Kuwait, whereas Getty paid royal- 
ties and taxes to Saudi Arabia. The zone was partitioned in 
1969, but the partitioning did not affect the concession 
arrangements. 

A group of Japanese companies formed the Arabian Oil 
Company (AOC), which obtained concessions from both Saudi 
Arabia (1957) and Kuwait (1958) for exploration and produc- 
tion in the offshore area of the zone. AOC started drilling in 
1959, and production of crude oil began in 1961. Production 
was shared between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Some AOC pro- 
duction was from the northern tip of Saudi Arabia's As Saf- 
faniyah field, the world's largest offshore field. Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait each purchased 10 percent ownership of AOC soon 
after its formation. 

From the beginning of the development of the oil industry, 
Kuwait's leaders had wanted to participate actively in oil policy 
and company management. BP and Gulf Oil rejected the 
demands of the amir (see Glossary) for a Kuwaiti on the KOC 



60 



Kuwait 



board of directors, but the Kuwaiti government obtained some 
participation in the AOC concession agreement, although it 
was more symbolic than real. 

Frozen out of oil operations by the major oil companies, 
Kuwait started to develop its own proficiency in the oil indus- 
try. The Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) was 
formed in 1960 with the expressed intention of becoming an 
integrated oil company. Its founding charter allowed it to 
engage in almost any activity concerning oil at home or 
abroad. It began with 60 percent government ownership; the 
remaining shares were held by private Kuwaiti investors. The 
government bought out private investors in 1975. 

KNPC started operations on a small scale, in part because of 
Kuwait's acute shortage of skilled workers. It bought out KOC's 
local oil distribution facilities and became the sole supplier of 
oil in Kuwait. It participated in foreign refinery operations and 
established subsidiaries and facilities abroad for marketing oil 
products. Departments for exploration and other aspects of 
field operations were established within KNPC to work with for- 
eign companies in the concession area that KNPC had received 
from the government. 

Using foreign expertise and equipment, KNPC built a mod- 
ern refinery to use gas in the Al Burqan field, which would 
otherwise have been flared, in a hydrogenation process to con- 
vert crude oil into products and to produce sulfur as a useful 
by-product. Kuwait's crude is heavy and contains considerable 
sulfur, so the design of the refinery was excellently fitted to the 
local circumstances to turn out a product superior to that of a 
regular refinery. The refinery at Ash Shuaybah was completed 
in 1968, but technical problems initially caused an unprofitable 
mix of products. Between cost overruns during construction 
and a poor range of products, KNPC lost money until the prob- 
lems were corrected. Nonetheless, KNPC provided useful train- 
ing for Kuwaitis in upper levels of oil company management. 

As oil revenues began to mount, officials increasingly 
favored investing a larger part of the funds in downstream (see 
Glossary) and upstream (see Glossary) oil operations. The 
petrochemical industry offered fewer obstacles to industrial 
development than most other industries. It needed relatively 
few workers, large capital investments, and substantial oil and 
gas sources — requirements that fit the country's circumstances 
well. Yet despite the apparent advantages, the government 
moved slowly, perhaps for good reason. In 1963 the Petrochem- 



61 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

icals Industries Company (PIC) was formed, with 80 percent 
state ownership. It began with modest facilities but acquired 
additional plants over the years through purchase of other 
companies and construction of new facilities. In 1976 the gov- 
ernment bought out private investors, and PIC became wholly 
government owned. PIC's chemical complexes were the coun- 
try's largest manufacturing plants. A key ingredient was a gas- 
gathering system to use the gases produced in association with 
crude oil. Until the late 1970s, a considerable part of the gases 
had been flared. In addition to the gas-gathering system, the 
government expanded its investment in oil-refining capacity 
and petrochemical facilities. 

Kuwait's goal of real participation in and control over its oil 
industry was achieved in 1976 when the government bought 
KOC, including the refinery and other installations. BP and 
Gulf Oil continued to provide technical services and personnel 
in return for access to oil supplies and service fees. In 1976 
Kuwait concluded negotiations to purchase 60 percent of its 
one-half share of AOC's offshore operations. Negotiations for 
60 percent of Aminoil foundered over the value of assets. In 
1977 Kuwait nationalized the firm, paying compensation on 
the basis of an official estimate of the value of assets. Aminoil 
became the Kuwait Wafrah Oil Company. In 1978 operations of 
the Al Wafrah field passed to KOC, and KNPC took over the 
former Aminoil refinery and shipping terminal at Mina Abd 
Allah. 

As oil revenues rose in the 1970s, the Kuwaiti government 
continued its upstream and downstream expansion, establish- 
ing the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) as a semiautono- 
mous state organization in January 1980 to rationalize the 
organizational structure of its oil industry. KPC became the 
country's national integrated oil company, with KOC, KNPC, 
PIC, the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company, and the Kuwait Foreign 
Petroleum Exploration Company among its more important 
wholly owned subsidiaries. KOC remained primarily responsi- 
ble for domestic exploration and production of oil and gas, 
and KNPC was mainly the refining subsidiary. KPC also entered 
into joint ventures with and purchased shares in foreign com- 
panies involved in various aspects of the oil business. In 1981 
KPC bought the Santa Fe International Corporation, a United 
States drilling and energy engineering firm. Other KPC activi- 
ties abroad included part ownership in refineries and petro- 
chemical plants, exploration and drilling in foreign concession 



62 



Laboratory technician 
at the Kuwait Foundation 
for the Advancement 
of Sciences 
Courtesy Embassy 
of Kuwait, Washington 



areas, and purchase of retail outlets for petroleum products. By 
the late 1980s, Kuwait was producing 20,000 bpd in overseas 
holdings, primarily in the United States and in the North Sea. 
It was exporting 614,000 bpd as refined products. Initially, 
Kuwait sold this oil primarily to Japan and Pakistan, but begin- 
ning in the late 1980s, it also sold through a large West Euro- 
pean retail network it purchased, selling oil under the logo Q8. 

Oil production levels fluctuated in the period after World 
War II (see table 6, Appendix). At first, production of crude oil 
rose rapidly, peaking at nearly 1.1 billion barrels in 1970 before 
falling to more modest levels. Until 1972 much of the expan- 
sion resulted from increasing crude oil production. For the 
rest of the 1970s, oil production was substantially lower, but 
higher revenues per barrel financed continued economic 
growth. 

With regard to prices, Kuwaiti officials followed moderate 
policies between conflicting objectives. Initially, Kuwait actively 
supported the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries (OPEC), which at times required oil production levels 
below that necessary to cover government expenditures. 
Kuwait, for example, reduced oil production and exports dur- 
ing the Arab oil embargo associated with the October 1973 
War. The Kuwaiti government believed that oil in the ground 




63 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

was worth more to future generations than holding such paper 
claims as securities and corporate shares that were subject to 
price inflation, exchange-rate risks, and sequestration. In 1973 
the Kuwaiti government set an oil production limit of 3 million 
bpd under pressure from the National Assembly. In 1976 the 
production ceiling was reduced to 2 million bpd. In the 1980s, 
a surplus of oil relative to demand began to emerge on the 
world market, and oil prices fell dramatically. As surplus oil 
supplies grew, Kuwait's production ceiling was further reduced 
to 1.5 million bpd, although actual production was appreciably 
lower. But as oil prices fell, and with it revenues, Kuwait increas- 
ingly resisted OPEC's efforts to limit its production. In 1986 
Kuwait reluctantly agreed to an OPEC limit of 1.25 million bpd 
(not counting, however, output of the Divided Zone that, dur- 
ing this period, was earmarked as aid for Iraq). In 1989 it 
refused an OPEC level of just under 1.1 million bpd. In early 
1990, Kuwait produced nearly 2 million bpd, a factor that the 
Iraqi government cited in its decision to invade Kuwait in 
August. 

In the 1950s and 1960s, Kuwait economically had been little 
more than an oil well: oil was the source of most of its revenues, 
and the bulk of its exports were oil, mostly crude oil. But in the 
1970s, officials increased refining capacity, and by the 1980s, 
refined products gained in value relative to crude oil exports. 
By the 1980s, Kuwait controlled its hydrocarbon resources and 
had created an international oil company, KPC, that was 
among the world's largest corporations. Through its subsidiar- 
ies, KPC was involved in all aspects of the oil industry and in 
many countries of the world. This was a remarkable achieve- 
ment in view of the fact that only twenty-five years had passed 
since Kuwait entered the oil industry. 

Diversification 

Industrial development in Kuwait has always faced formida- 
ble obstacles. Kuwait, so rich in oil, is poor in most other 
resources, which limits the manufacturing industries that can 
be established. No metallic minerals and few suitable non- 
metallic minerals are locally available. Most raw materials for 
the early industries — for example, cement — had to be 
imported. The limited supply of fresh water is another con- 
straint. In a country without streams and with few under- 
ground sources, water is crucial to industrial development. The 
pre-oil system, where local sailing boats carried water from Iraq 



64 



Waterfront project that extends along twenty-one kilometers 

of the Kuwaiti coast 
Courtesy Embassy of Kuwait, Washington 



65 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

to Kuwait, could not meet manufacturing needs. The small size 
of the domestic market restricts production for local consump- 
tion to small-scale operations. The open economy, which was 
maintained before and after the discovery of oil, provided little 
protection from foreign competition. The small Kuwaiti labor 
force, possessing limited skills, is another constraint. After the 
discovery of oil, labor costs escalated, and in a few years wages 
in Kuwait were higher than those in almost any other area of 
the Middle East, further hindering industrial development. 
Also, the commercial tradition in the country predisposes most 
entrepreneurs to invest in trade rather than manufacturing. As 
a result of these obstacles, industry, excluding oil-related indus- 
try, expanded very slowly. 

The discovery of oil created a demand for new industries, 
initially satisfied by the oil company itself. Oil operations par- 
ticularly needed water, electricity, and refined petroleum prod- 
ucts, and these were the first modern industries created in the 
state. The government took over production of water and elec- 
tricity, expanding the systems and subsidizing their use. Air 
conditioning provided the largest demand, with peak summer 
loads more than five times minimum winter loads, creating 
substantial idle capacity for about six months of the year. The 
need for larger and more regular supplies of water, no matter 
how costly, compelled KOC to install the first desalination 
plant. In 1953 the government installed the first unit, which 
had a capacity of 3.8 million liters per day. Subsequently, the 
government claimed that it had developed the most advanced 
continuously operating desalination facilities in the world. 

Although oil spurred the first industries in Kuwait, after the 
initial push, oil did not generate much in the way of new indus- 
tries locally. As a result of the many obstacles that industry 
faced and in light of the massive oil revenues, the government 
began to play a major role in all industrial development. The 
government undertook some efforts at diversification in the 
1950s, but the first major push for industrialization occurred 
with the establishment of the Ash Shuaybah Industrial Zone in 
1964. The zone comprised electricity and water distillation 
plants, expanded port facilities, metalworks, and plants manu- 
facturing chlorine, asphalt, cement, pilings, and prefabricated 
housing. The government provided such necessary facilities as 
roads, gas, electricity, water, sewerage, port facilities, communi- 
cations, and rented or leased industrial sites at nominal rates. 
Most of the larger industrial facilities were located in the zone. 



66 



Kuwait 



Other small manufacturing establishments were located in the 
populated parts of the country. 

The government provided a range of incentives to private 
manufacturers, who were predominantly local; 51 percent 
Kuwaiti ownership was required of all businesses. In addition to 
infrastructural support, financial aid included equity capital 
and loans. In 1974 the government created the Investment 
Bank of Kuwait to provide medium- and long-term industrial 
financing at low interest rates. The government also gave local 
industry preference in government purchases, protection from 
imports in some cases, and exemption from customs duties and 
taxes. In the 1970s, the government's Industrial Development 
Committee and the Industrial Bank of Kuwait established a 
number of incentives for private-sector participation, such as 
technical aid and preferential guaranteed markets in state 
industry. Nonetheless, industry in Kuwait never enjoyed the 
same level of state support that it did in other gulf states. The 
government, having made a conscious decision to invest its rev- 
enues overseas and locally in such human resources as educa- 
tion and health care, gave only minimal support, by the 
standards of other oil-producing countries, to non-oil manufac- 
turing. 

Agriculture and Fishing 

Agriculture has also seen minimal development. Kuwait's 
desert climate sustains little vegetation. Kuwait has no rivers, 
only a few wadis that fill with winter and spring rain. Scant rain- 
fall, little irrigation water, and poor soils have always limited 
farming in Kuwait. Before the discovery of oil, several occupa- 
tions contributed to the economy — nomads moving livestock 
to the sparse forage in the desert, pearling, and fishing — but 
none of these occupations provided much beyond subsistence. 
Once the government began receiving oil revenues, the contri- 
bution of other sectors to national income was reduced still fur- 
ther (see table 7, Appendix). Economic growth and welfare 
measures since World War II drew workers away from historical 
pursuits and lessened the role of agriculture. In the late 1980s, 
fewer than 10,000 people were employed in agriculture. The 
government invested some money in developing hydroponics 
to increase vegetable production. Kuwait's most important 
crops in 1989 were tomatoes (40,000 tons), dried onions 
(25,000 tons), melons (7,000 tons), dates (1,000 tons), and 
smaller amounts of cucumbers and eggplants. Some of these 



67 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

crops are grown hydroponically. Although Kuwait manages to 
export some vegetables, its agricultural potential remains lim- 
ited. 

Fishing provides a minor but important economic contribu- 
tion. Much of the fishing for the local market was historically 
from small boats, including many native dhows. Large-scale 
commercial fishing is mostly confined to the United Fisheries 
of Kuwait, which operates a fleet of vessels as far afield as the 
Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean. United 
Fisheries is a large, international firm that processes and 
exports part of its catch, particularly frozen shrimp. However, 
in the 1970s overfishing in the gulf by many states considerably 
reduced catches of fish and shrimp. In 1989 Kuwait had a catch 
of approximately 4,700 tons of fish and 3,000 tons of shrimp 
and prawns. In the late 1980s, war and environmental damage, 
including oil spills, also reduced the attractiveness of the gulf 
fishing industry 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Kuwait has a modern, well-maintained transportation sys- 
tem. The entire system suffered extensive damage in the Per- 
sian Gulf War, but by 1993 repairs had brought most facilities 
back to their prewar condition. The highway system comprised 
more than 3,900 kilometers of roads in 1993. About 3,000 kilo- 
meters are paved, and the rest are gravel or graded earth. 
Expressways extend south and west from the city of Kuwait to 
neighboring cities. Paved highways link Kuwait with Iraq to the 
north and Saudi Arabia to the west and south. Despite the 
excellent network of roads in populated areas, traffic conges- 
tion is a growing problem. Plans to build a causeway across 
Kuwait Bay were delayed by the Iraqi invasion in 1990. 

Three ports handle all commercial shipping and petroleum 
exports. The principal port for nonpetroleum products in 1993 
was Ash Shuwaykh, several kilometers west of the downtown 
section of the city of Kuwait. Built in 1960, Ash Shuwaykh is one 
of the busiest ports in the Middle East, with twenty-one deep- 
water berths. In 1988 more than 1,100 vessels carried 3.7 mil- 
lion tons of cargo through Ash Shuwaykh. Ash Shuaybah was 
built in 1967, fifty kilometers south of the city of Kuwait, to 
develop the Ash Shuaybah Industrial Zone. By 1988, however, it 
rivaled Ash Shuwaykh in size and traffic with twenty berths and 
3.5 million tons of cargo transported. Mina al Ahmadi, just 
north of Ash Shuaybah, handles most of Kuwait's petroleum 



68 



Kuwait 



exports. Twelve offshore berths can load more than 2 million 
bpd of oil and can accommodate the largest oil tankers. 

Kuwait International Airport, sixteen kilometers south of 
the city of Kuwait, handles all international flights. The latest 
expansion to the airport, a new terminal, was completed in 
1979. Kuwait Airways, the national carrier, has regularly sched- 
uled service to more than twenty-four cities worldwide. 

Like its transportation system, Kuwait's modern telecommu- 
nications system was heavily damaged during the Iraqi occupa- 
tion. The government has made strides at reconstruction, but 
in 1993 work remained to restore the system to its prewar level 
of excellence. In 1989 there were 285,000 telephones, or four- 
teen telephones per 100 inhabitants. High-capacity coaxial 
cables and radio-relay systems linked Kuwait with its neighbors. 
In 1993, however, the coaxial cable to Iraq was still inoperable. 
Before the war, the country had four ground satellite stations 
working with the International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization (Intelsat) and the Arab Satellite Communication 
Organization (Arabsat) system. All four stations were destroyed 
in the war, however, and smaller mobile satellite ground sta- 
tions currently handle international telephone calls, data trans- 
mission, and live television broadcasts. The city of Kuwait has 
three AM radio stations, three FM radio stations, three televi- 
sion transmitters, and a powerful shortwave transmitter for 
international service. 

Banking and Finance 

Before independence in 1961, foreign monies, largely the 
Indian rupee in the period between 1930 and 1960, circulated 
in Kuwait. At independence the Kuwaiti dinar was introduced, 
and a currency board was established to issue dinar notes and 
to maintain reserves. In 1959 the Central Bank of Kuwait was 
created and took over the functions of the currency board and 
the regulation of the banking system. 

The first bank in Kuwait was established in 1941 by British 
investors. Subsequent laws prohibited foreign banks from con- 
ducting business in the country. When the British bank's con- 
cession ended in 1971, the government bought 51 percent 
ownership. In 1952 another bank, the National Bank of Kuwait, 
the largest commercial bank, was founded. The establishment 
of several other banks, all under Kuwaiti ownership, followed. 
Some specialized financial institutions also emerged: the 
Credit and Savings Bank, established in 1965 by the govern- 



69 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

ment to channel funds into domestic projects in industry, agri- 
culture, and housing; the Industrial Bank of Kuwait, 
established in 1974 to fill the gap in medium- and long-term 
industrial financing; and the private Real Estate Bank of 
Kuwait. By the 1980s, Kuwait's banks were among the region's 
largest and most active financial institutions. Then came the 
Suq al Manakh stock market crash in 1982. 

The large revenues of the 1970s left many private individu- 
als with substantial funds at their disposal. These funds 
prompted a speculation boom in the official stock market in 
the mid-1970s that culminated in a small crash in 1977. The 
government's response to this crash was to bail out the affected 
investors and to introduce stricter regulations. This response 
unintentionally contributed to the far larger stock market 
crash of the 1980s by driving the least risk-averse speculators 
into the technically illegal alternate market, the Suq al 
Manakh. The Suq al Manakh had emerged next to the official 
stock market, which was dominated by several older wealthy 
families who traded, largely among themselves, in very large 
blocks of stock. The Suq al Manakh soon became the market 
for the new investor and, in the end, for many old investors as 
well. 

Share dealings using postdated checks created a huge 
unregulated expansion of credit. The crash of the unofficial 
stock market finally came in 1982, when a dealer presented a 
postdated check for payment and it bounced. A house of cards 
collapsed. Official investigation revealed that total outstanding 
checks amounted to the equivalent of US$94 billion from 
about 6,000 investors. Kuwait's financial sector was badly 
shaken by the crash, as was the entire economy. The crash 
prompted a recession that rippled through society as individual 
families were disrupted by the investment risks of particular 
members made on family credit. The debts from the crash left 
all but one bank in Kuwait technically insolvent, held up only 
by support from the Central Bank. Only the National Bank of 
Kuwait, the largest commercial bank, survived the crisis intact. 
In the end, the government stepped in, devising a complicated 
set of policies, embodied in the Difficult Credit Facilities Reset- 
tlement Program. The implementation of the program was still 
incomplete in 1990 when the Iraqi invasion changed the entire 
financial picture (see Economic Reconstruction, this ch.). 



70 



Kuwait 



Foreign Investment 

From the very beginning, government officials were keenly 
aware that oil was a depletable asset, that the country had few 
other resources, and that preparations had to be made for the 
day when there would be no more oil. As soon as the govern- 
ment began to receive oil revenues, officials spent less than the 
treasury received, leaving a surplus in the state's general 
reserve to be invested. Because of limited domestic investment 
opportunities, most investments were made abroad. World 
Bank (see Glossary) economists estimate that about 25 percent 
of revenues were placed in foreign assets during the 1950s, 
although the Kuwaiti government's published data have always 
been vague about reserves as well as about some other eco- 
nomic variables. 

In the 1950s and 1960s, Kuwait began investing overseas in 
property and businesses in Britain. In 1952 Kuwait established 
an office in London, staffed with experienced British invest- 
ment counselors who guided the government's placement of 
funds. In the same year, Kuwait created investment relations 
with a large New York bank. Because of the vastly expanded oil 
revenues of the 1970s, Kuwait's overseas investment program 
grew tremendously. In 1976 the government established the 
Reserve Fund for Future Generations, into which it placed an 
initial US$7 billion. It resolved to invest 10 percent of its reve- 
nues annually in the reserve fund. Money from the fund, along 
with other government revenues, was invested in overseas prop- 
erty and industry. In the 1970s, most of these funds were 
invested in the United States and in Western Europe: in Ger- 
man firms (such as Hoechst and Daimler-Benz, in each of 
which Kuwait owned 25 percent), in property, and in most of 
the United States Fortune Five Hundred firms. In the 1980s, 
Kuwait began diversifying its overseas investments, placing 
more investments in Japanese firms. By the late 1980s, Kuwait 
was earning more from these overseas investments than it was 
from the direct sale of oil: in 1987 foreign investments gener- 
ated US$6.3 billion, oil US$5.4 billion. The Financial Times of 
London estimated Kuwait's overseas investments in early 1990 
at more than US$100 billion, most of it in the Reserve Fund for 
Future Generations. 

The Iraqi invasion proved the importance of these invest- 
ment revenues. With oil revenues suspended, the government 
and population in exile relied exclusively on investment reve- 
nues, including sales of investments for sustenance, for their 



71 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

share of ongoing coalition expenses and for postwar recon- 
struction and repair of the vital oil industry. 

Foreign Aid and Trade 

Foreign trade has always dominated Kuwait's economy. 
Before the discovery of oil, merchants developed large trans- 
shipment and reexport businesses that, along with the sale of 
pearls to foreign dealers, yielded a substantial part of the popu- 
lation's income. The discovery of large quantities of oil pro- 
vided a new and increasingly important export because Kuwait 
needed only small amounts of oil products domestically. None- 
theless, even after the discovery of oil, Kuwait's merchants con- 
tinued to develop transshipment and reexport businesses with 
neighboring countries. During the Iran-Iraq War, goods for 
Iraq passed through Kuwaiti ports. Oil, however, overwhelm- 
ingly dominated Kuwait's exports (see table 8, Appendix). 

Kuwait's significant foreign-exchange earnings from oil 
exports and investment income largely removed any con- 
straints on imports in the pre-invasion period. Almost any com- 
modity could be imported, and most import duties were 
modest. Imports for Kuwait's high-income economy were 
mainly finished products because of the small domestic manu- 
facturing sector (see table 9, Appendix). These imports came 
predominantly from Asian countries, followed by those from 
European countries. Imports of all kinds came primarily from 
Japan and the United States. After the Persian Gulf War, 
imports from the United States increased dramatically (see 
table 10, Appendix). Huge oil revenues, paid in foreign cur- 
rencies, freed Kuwait for the most part from balance of pay- 
ments worries (see table 11, Appendix). The government 
accumulated surplus funds that were invested abroad. A large 
part of these reserve investments abroad, however, were cashed 
in during the Iraqi occupation and the liberation period that 
followed in order to pay the expenses of Kuwait and the allied 
coalition. 

Historically, Kuwait also invested part of its revenues in for- 
eign aid, primarily to Arab states. This foreign aid increased 
substantially as oil revenues rose in the 1970s. It took many 
forms, such as loans, joint financing, equity participation, and 
direct grants, particularly in support of Arab causes. In the 
1960s, the government began placing funds in the Kuwait 
Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), established 
in 1961. The best known of Kuwait's investment organizations 



72 



Kuwait 



and one that was used as a model by other oil exporters, 
KFAED functioned as both an investment and an aid agency, 
providing loans for specific projects, often on concessionary 
terms. KFAED's charter was changed in 1974, when capitaliza- 
tion was increased to KD1 billion (for value of the Kuwaiti 
dinar — see Glossary), and the fund began expanding its provi- 
sion of funds to developing countries worldwide. Most KFAED 
aid went to development projects, especially in agriculture, to 
provide basic services such as electricity, water, and transporta- 
tion and to develop human resources through education and 
health care. A large amount of aid went directly from the gov- 
ernment to other states. In per capita terms, Kuwait's aid pro- 
gram was one of the most generous in the world. In the early 
1980s, when oil prices were high, nearly 4 percent of Kuwait's 
gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) went to the aid 
program. But in the late 1980s, the levels of aid declined along 
with declining revenues. After the Iran-Iraq War started, in 
1980, Kuwait increasingly directed its aid toward Iraq. During 
the 1980s, Kuwait lent Iraq an estimated US$13 billion. 
Kuwait's foreign aid slowed considerably after the Iraqi inva- 
sion in August 1990 and is expected to remain limited as 
Kuwait deals with the costs of reconstruction. 

Political System 
Ruling Family 

The modern political history of Kuwait began in the early 
eighteenth century when a number of families of the Bani 
Utub section of the Anaizah tribe migrated from central Ara- 
bia, settling eventually in Kuwait. Once in Kuwait, they estab- 
lished a self-governing political unit. The date of 1756 is 
conventionally chosen as the year when the settlers decided to 
select as their leader Sabah, an Al Sabah shaykh (see Glossary), 
who was succeeded by his son Abd Allah, in turn succeeded by 
his son Jabir. All subsequent rulers historically have come from 
the Al Sabah line, chosen by family council, in consultation 
with the leading merchant families who, along with the tribal 
elite, exercise some restriction over the shaykhs" political 
autonomy. 

The shaykh's primary task was to represent his community 
in foreign policy, negotiating with Ottoman Turkey and with 
neighboring tribes. The one major and unsuccessful challenge 
to this system of rule occurred in the 1760s when the Al Khalifa 



73 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

family disagreed with the Al Sabah and in consequence left 
Kuwait for Qatar, and then Bahrain, where the Al Khalifa con- 
tinue to rule. Despite the rift, the two settlements maintained 
good relations, including close trade ties. 

In the nineteenth century, members of the Al Sabah over- 
saw the growing trade and pearling settlement in Kuwait. The 
rulers also developed a cordial relationship with Britain, begin- 
ning with the first contacts with the British East India Company 
in 1775. As members of a small, vulnerable settlement, Kuwait's 
rulers attempted to maintain a polite but distant relationship 
with all the local powers, notably the British, the Wahhabis (see 
Glossary) of Arabia, and the Ottomans. It was only under Abd 
Allah Al Sabah II, who ruled from 1866 to 1892, that Kuwait 
began to edge away from this policy of neutrality. Abd Allah 
developed close ties with the Ottomans, even taking the Otto- 
man title, albeit largely as a formality, of provincial governor 
(qaimaqam) in 1871. In practical terms, Kuwait's domestic poli- 
tics remained unchanged because the Ottoman government 
did not interfere in the selection of rulers and laws. In any 
event, this tilt was completely reversed when, following the 
four-year rule of Muhammad Al Sabah, Mubarak Al Sabah the 
Great ruled from 1896 to 1915. 

Kuwait came into the British sphere of influence at the end 
of the nineteenth century when Mubarak sought British sup- 
port against Ottoman forces. The Ottomans were backing allies 
of Mubarak's brothers, Kuwait's previous rulers, whom 
Mubarak had killed on taking power in 1896. Uneasy about 
Ottoman intentions, Mubarak reversed his predecessors' pro- 
Ottoman policy and approached Britain, seeking a more for- 
mal alliance. Britain, concerned with growing European inter- 
ests and notably with an Ottoman concession to Germany for 
construction of a Berlin-to-Baghdad railroad — with a proposed 
spur line to Kuwait — agreed. Britain signed a treaty with Kuwait 
in 1899 that promised Mubarak British support and, in return, 
gave Britain control of Kuwait's foreign policy. This treaty gov- 
erned relations between the two states until Kuwait's indepen- 
dence in 1961. It granted Britain tremendous influence, most 
notably in foreign and economic policy. 

After Mubarak's death, Kuwait was ruled by two of his sons, 
JabirAl Sabah (1915-17) and Salim Al Sabah (1917-21) (see 
fig. 5). Thereafter, with one exception, only descendants of 
Mubarak through these two sons would rule Kuwait, thus form- 
ing a major cleavage within the ruling family. After Salim's 



74 



Kuwait 



death in 1921, Kuwait was ruled for nearly three decades by 
Ahmad al Jabir Al Sabah. Ahmad al Jabir's rule witnessed a seri- 
ous effort to constrain ruling family power. In 1938 a rebellion, 
known locally as the Majlis Movement, developed. New issues 
arose. Kuwait was in the midst of a serious recession as a result 
of the general decline of the pearling industry, the Great 
Depression, and a trade dispute with Saudi Arabia that 
prompted a Saudi embargo. Simultaneously, the recently 
signed oil concession with KOC promised better times ahead if 
the resulting income were not monopolized by the ruling fam- 
ily. To prevent that from happening, the leading merchants 
began petitioning the ruler for a series of reforms. In June the 
merchants took their protest a step further, holding elections 
for a legislative assembly to implement the desired reforms 
using these new revenues. The Legislative Assembly ruled for 
six months until finally abolished by the ruler and his tribal 
backers. The assembly, however, came to be viewed as Kuwait's 
first prodemocracy movement. Its popularity gave the idea of 
formal representation a place in Kuwaiti popular history. 

Ahmad al Jabir was succeeded by his cousin Abd Allah as 
Salim Al Sabah (1950-65), who oversaw the distribution of now 
substantial oil revenues, the consequent emergence of a large 
bureaucratic state, and the transformation of Kuwait into a 
wealthy oil-producing shaykhdom. In terms of internal devel- 
opments, Abd Allah as Salim made two transformative political 
decisions. The first was to distribute these new revenues 
broadly throughout the population, primarily through wide- 
ranging social services, notably education and health care. The 
second was to introduce a greater degree of political participa- 
tion to Kuwait in the form of the newly elected National Assem- 
bly. This body held its first elections in 1963. Abd Allah as Salim 
also oversaw Kuwait's transformation into a formally indepen- 
dent state on June 19, 1961, when he and British representa- 
tives signed new letters of friendship to replace the treaty of 
1899. 

When Abd Allah as Salim died in 1965, he was succeeded by 
his brother Sabah as Salim Al Sabah — a somewhat unusual 
choice in that he, like Abd Allah as Salim, came from the Salim 
line rather than the Jabir line of the family, breaking the alter- 
nation between the two sides of the family that had existed 
since the rule of Mubarak's sons Jabir and Salim. Nonetheless, 
Sabah as Salim's rule proved to be largely a continuation and 
consolidation of policies set in place by Abd Allah as Salim. 



75 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



SABAH 

(1756-62) 



ABD ALLAH 

(1762-1812) 



JABIR 

(1812-59) 



SABAH 

(1859-66) 



ABD ALLAH 

(1866-92) 



MUHAMMAD 

(1892-96) 



ABD AL AZIZ 



JABIR MUBARAK 



JABIR 

(1915-17) \ 











AU 



AHMAD 

(1921-50) 



SALIM AHMAD 



SAUD 6 SABAH 



KHALID MISHAAL FAHD NAWWAF ' MUHAMMAD ABD ALLAH SABAH 



JABIR 

(1977- ) 



1 


Governor, Central Bank of Kuwait 


5 


Minister of defense 


2 


Minister of interior 


6 


Ambassador to the United States 


3 


Prime minister, crown prince, and heir apparent 


7 


Minister of social affairs and labor 


4 


Deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs 


8 


Minister of amiri affairs 



Source: Based on information from Alan Rush, Al-Sabah: Genealogy and History of 
Kuwait's Ruling Family, 1752-1986, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1987; and 
United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of 
Foreign Governments, Washington, 1992, 48-49. 

Figure 5. Kuwait: Abbreviated Genealogy of the Al Sabah, with 
Government Positions, Mid-1992 



76 



Kuwait 



MUBARAK 

{1896-1915) 



4 OTHER 
BROTHERS 





SALIM 
(1917-21) 









ABD ALLAH 

(1950-65) 



SALIM |j JABIR | 



SAAD 3 



][ 



HAMAD ABD ALLAH SALMAN 



SABAH MUBARAK MUBARAK 



SABAH 

(1965-77) 



DUAIJ | | MUHAMMAD 



SALIM JABIR 



SALIM ALI 



SALMAN IBRAHIM 



AHMAD 


Ruler 


( ) 


Rulership period 



77 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

When Sabah as Salim died in December 1977, he was suc- 
ceeded by Shaykh Jabir al Ahmad aljabir Al Sabah, a succes- 
sion that returned the former pattern of alternation between 
the lines of Jabir and Salim. 

The influence of external events has dominated Jabir al 
Ahmad's rule. The first was the Iran-Iraq War, which rapidly 
increased the level of political violence in this historically rela- 
tively peaceful shaykhdom. Major events included the 1983 
bombing of the United States embassy and, probably most 
notable, the dramatic public assassination attempt on the amir 
in 1985. The tension associated with the war also exacerbated 
divisions within Kuwaiti society, notably that between Sunnis 
and Shia, and prompted the amir increasingly to limit public 
participation in political life. Although in 1980 Shaykh Jabir al 
Ahmad restored the National Assembly (which Sabah as Salim 
had abolished in 1976), the increasing political tension 
prompted him to do away with it again in 1986 and to intro- 
duce new measures curtailing civil and political rights. These 
measures prompted a wide range of opposition leaders — 
including old parliamentarians, Islamists (sometimes seen as 
fundamentalists), and merchants — to form the Constitutional 
Movement of 1989-90, a prodemocracy movement calling for 
the restoration of the National Assembly. 

The second external event was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
in August 1990, which, for the first time in Kuwait's history, 
placed the state under direct foreign rule. Although sover- 
eignty was restored in February 1991, events leading up to the 
invasion and the amir's behavior during and after the occupa- 
tion prompted open grumbling about the ruling family itself. 
The criticism centered on the amir and the fact that most of 
the ruling family spent the time of the Iraqi occupation in com- 
fortable exile abroad and delayed their return to the country 
after the war ended. 

In 1993 Shaykh Jabir al Ahmad still ruled Kuwait; his desig- 
nated successor, Prime Minister Saad al Abd Allah as Salim Al 
Sabah, also came from the Al Sabah ruling family. Although 
the Al Sabah remained paramount, the family as a ruling insti- 
tution had changed dramatically since it assumed its leading 
role in the mid-eighteenth century. First, succession patterns 
within the family had changed. In the nineteenth century, rule 
passed regularly from father to son. With the accession of 
Mubarak in the late nineteenth century, a new pattern was 
established that excluded all but Mubarak's line from the top 



78 



Kuwait 



position. This custom is formalized in the Kuwaiti constitution 
and in practice created a new pattern of alternation of rulers 
between the two lines of Mubarak's sons, Jabir and Salim. It was 
in keeping with this pattern that Shaykh Jabir al Ahmad (from 
the Jabir line) named as his crown prince and heir apparent 
Saad al Abd Allah as Salim, from the Salim line. 

The relationship between the ruling family and Kuwaiti soci- 
ety also changed in more subtle ways. Members of the family 
other than the ruler, once first among equals in a society where 
merchants and other elites played an important role in deci- 
sion making, became in the years after oil was discovered far 
wealthier because their wealth was guaranteed by a civil list — a 
list of sums appropriated to pay the expenses of a ruler and his 
household. Ruling family members also became socially more 
prominent and politically more important as they took over 
many of the state's highest posts. In part, this transformation 
occurred as a result of the emergence of a large state bureau- 
cracy and the need Kuwaiti rulers felt to fill the state's highest 
posts with loyal supporters, notably kin. 

Bureaucracy 

Kuwait's large state bureaucracy emerged in the post-World 
War II period as a result of the vast government revenues gen- 
erated by oil. Under the first oil concession, oil payments went 
directly from the oil companies to the amir, who, along with his 
advisers, decided — initially, rather informally — how much of 
the oil revenues would be spent and in what ways. The histori- 
cal elite, especially the merchants, objected to this arrange- 
ment, most notably in the Majlis Movement of 1938. In time 
the government instituted ministries, budgets, financial con- 
trols, and other aspects of modern public administration, 
partly in response to such public protests and partly from the 
practical necessities of carrying out a variety of new state func- 
tions related to oil and to popular distribution of revenues 
through state services. 

At the top of this bureaucracy is the cabinet, under the 
prime minister, a post that historically has been held by the 
crown prince. The cabinet is appointed by the amir, who has 
the power to dismiss it along with almost every senior executive 
official, including the crown prince, local governors, and offic- 
ers in the armed forces. Members of the Al Sabah play an 
important role in the cabinet. Twelve of the fifteen members in 
the original postindependence cabinet appointed in January 



79 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

1962 were from the ruling family. Although public criticism led 
to a reduction in their numbers, in the 1970s and 1980s a large 
number of ministers, including those in the most important 
posts, came from the ruling family. The remaining cabinet 
ministers often came from prominent families and from mem- 
bers of the National Assembly (see Legislature, this ch.). These 
ministers were generally young (in their thirties and forties), 
highly educated (nearly half with college degrees, some with 
advanced degrees, especially in economics and business, often 
from United States universities), and mostly Sunni. 

In addition to the cabinet, Kuwait has several autonomous 
agencies and public corporations. Their employees and those 
of the various ministries comprise the bulk of the nation's civil 
servants. The civil service grew tremendously in the years after 
independence as the state developed a large bureaucracy 
devoted to spending oil revenues. The largest state institutions 
are those providing social services, notably education. Histori- 
cally, this bureaucracy has been staffed largely by foreigners. 
Although the government's policy has been to staff the civil ser- 
vice with Kuwaitis to the extent possible, and although most 
employed Kuwaitis work for the state, the government none- 
theless relied heavily on foreigners to fill positions at all levels 
before the Iraqi invasion. 

A second factor contributing to the growth of the bureau- 
cracy is the government's guarantee of jobs to all citizens. Not 
only does the state guarantee jobs, but it also offers Kuwaitis 
preferential treatment in employment, including higher sala- 
ries and preference in advancement over non-Kuwaitis. The 
government is the largest employer in the country. Many 
Kuwaitis prefer government employment to other positions 
even when it means undertaking routine tasks that underuse 
their skills and time. Others hold jobs in both the public and 
the private sectors, working in a government office in the 
morning and working privately in the afternoon. Observers fre- 
quently have commented on the country's excessive bureau- 
cracy and overstaffing, to the extent that several people are 
often assigned to what could be one job. Several efforts to 
reform the civil service have not reduced the inefficiency and 
underuse of available labor. 

Legislature 

One of the most remarkable aspects of Kuwaiti politics in 
the postindependence period is the National Assembly — one 



80 



Jabir al Ahmad 
al Jabir Al Sabah, 
ruler of Kuwait 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Kuwait, Washington 



of the few elected legislative bodies in the region. Pre-invasion 
Kuwait was one of the most politically open states in the region 
and the most open in the gulf. It had a relatively free press and 
an assembly elected by a small electorate of adult male citizens. 
The authors of the postindependence constitution of 1962, 
aware of the precedent set in the 1938 Legislative Assembly, saw 
the creation of an elected legislative body as an important 
means to widen the popular consensus and thereby further 
legitimize the rule of the Al Sabah, especially at a time when 
the family's position was threatened by the Iraqi claim to the 
entire territory of the new state. After the January 1963 elec- 
tion of the first National Assembly, the body evolved to serve as 
a broad forum for discussion and dissent. The men who domi- 
nated this assembly, however, were not the historical elite but, 
with some exceptions, were Kuwaitis who benefited from the 
state's generous welfare system. The historical opposition, the 
merchants on whom the amir relied for money in the lean pre- 
oil years, refrained from politics, devoting themselves instead 
to investing the money the amir sent their way. 

Although the constitution affords the assembly considerable 
power, the body is limited by two major restrictions: the small 
size of the electorate as defined by law, which restricts suffrage 
to most adult male nationals whose ancestors were present in 
Kuwait in 1920; and the power of the amir to dissolve the 



81 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

assembly virtually at will. Nonetheless, the assembly plays a 
prominent role in raising issues of public importance, review- 
ing and challenging government policies and programs, and 
responding to constituent concerns. It helps give Kuwait a 
much more open and public political life than that in other 
gulf states. 

The roots of the National Assembly began in the 1961 elec- 
tions for the Constituent Assembly, which drafted a constitu- 
tion and laid the groundwork for elections in 1963 to the first 
National Assembly. The 1963 elections produced a solid oppo- 
sition in the National Bloc, which challenged government pol- 
icy in a number of areas. The opposition was so volatile that 
when elections were next held in 1967, opponents charged the 
government with widespread election fraud in an effort to 
restrict the contentious body. The new assembly indeed proved 
more pliable. However, the 1971 elections returned a more 
confrontational assembly, one that devoted much of its ener- 
gies to the nationalization of the oil company. Elections for the 
fourth assembly took place in 1975 and produced a body more 
strongly opposed to the government than its predecessor. In 
August 1976, Sabah as Salim dissolved the assembly and intro- 
duced new restrictions on public assembly and speech. But in 
1980, because of renewed concern for popular support in light 
of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the regional tension that 
accompanied the subsequent Iran-Iraq War, the new amir, 
Shaykh Jabir al Ahmad, allowed elections to be held. The fifth 
assembly was highly confrontational, as was the sixth, elected in 
1985. When in 1986 the assembly began attacking members of 
the ruling family, primarily in connection with the handling of 
the 1982 Suq al Manakh stock market crash, the amir again sus- 
pended the assembly. The minister of justice, a member of the 
ruling family, was forced to resign because of allegations he 
had used public influence for personal gain in resolving the 
crash. As in 1976, external pressures from Saudi Arabia, which 
was highly critical of Kuwait's more participatory system, proba- 
bly played a role in the amir's decision. 

Opposition to the decision again to suspend the assembly 
manifested itself in the Constitutional Movement of 1989-90. 
In 1989 members of the dissolved assembly began organizing 
and calling for reinstitution of the assembly and articles of the 
1962 constitution that the amir had suspended as well in 1986. 
They were joined by many merchants, previously politically qui- 
escent — but now alienated by the ruler's inability to provide 



82 



City of Kuwait, 
capital of Kuwait 
Courtesy Embassy of * 
Kuwait, Washington 

■ - • * <i 

the level of economic support they had come to expect owing 
to the fall in oil prices — and by such others as professionals, lib- 
erals, and Islamists. The movement quickly spread through the 
diwaniyat (sing., diwaniyah) , private weekly social meetings in 
the homes of prominent families, until it became a series of 
popular antigovernment demonstrations. As the movement 
developed, the amir and the crown prince responded with 
both carrots and sticks. In an effort to divide the opposition, 
the government announced in 1990 that although it would not 
restore the National Assembly it would establish a National 
Council comprising fifty elected members and twenty-five 
appointed members. The new body would thus be less repre- 
sentative than the old assembly. It would also have less power: 
for example, it could not enact legislation directly. The opposi- 
tion opposed such an extra-constitutional council, viewing it 
not only as an effort to preclude a genuinely representative 
assembly but also as a way for the government to prepare loyal- 
ist candidates in the event that genuine assembly elections were 
held. (Indeed, when National Assembly elections were eventu- 
ally scheduled in the postinvasion period, a large number of 
National Council members announced they would run.) 
Although opposition leaders and others boycotted the elec- 
tions, the new body was nonetheless constituted following elec- 
tions for the nonappointed seats in June 1990. This new body 



83 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

had just begun meeting when the Iraqi invasion rendered it 
obsolete. The National Council met again on several occasions 
after the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 but was elimi- 
nated when the National Assembly was reconstituted by elec- 
tions in October 1992. 

Elections for the National Assembly were held on October 
5, 1992, by amiri decree, in accordance with the 1962 constitu- 
tion. Seven political groups (parties remained banned) backed 
candidates in the campaign. The groups included the Islamic 
Constitutional Movement, the Islamic Parliamentarian Alli- 
ance, the Islamic National Alliance (a Shia group), and the 
Democratic Forum (progressive former Arab nationalists) . The 
election proceeded without major incident. Opposition and 
independent candidates, including many associated with the 
prodemocracy movement, won the majority, thirty to thirty-five 
of the assembly's fifty seats. Progovernment candidates won the 
remaining fifteen to twenty seats, primarily in tribal constituen- 
cies. Islamist candidates won nineteen seats, a dramatic 
increase over the nine they had held in the former assembly. 
Seventeen of the elected members had served in previous 
assemblies. 

Among the issues the members promised to raise in the new 
assembly were public spending and related financial concerns, 
foreign policy and the events leading up to the Iraqi invasion, 
the political status of women (many of whom demonstrated for 
suffrage during the elections), and Islamic law. Following the 
elections, Prime Minister and Crown Prince Saad al Abd Allah 
announced the formation on October 17 of the new cabinet. 
The cabinet included fewer members of the ruling family than 
had previous cabinets and six National Assembly opposition 
members among the sixteen ministers. The new cabinet, how- 
ever, still left family members holding key posts, including that 
of minister of foreign affairs, which was returned to the long- 
serving but unpopular Sabah al Ahmad Al Sabah. 

Constitution 

In June 1961, following independence and under the 
shadow of an Iraqi threat, Amir Abd Allah as Salim announced 
that he would establish a constitution for Kuwait. In December, 
elections were held for a Constituent Assembly, which then 
drafted a constitution promulgated as Law Number 1 on 
November 11, 1962. Although articles of the constitution have 
since been suspended twice, the document nonetheless 



84 



Kuwait 



remains the basic statement of intent for the Kuwaiti political 
system. 

The constitution opens with the declaration that Kuwait is 
"an independent sovereign Arab State," and its people are "a 
part of the Arab Nation." Islam is "the religion of the state," 
and the sharia (Islamic law) is "a main source of legislation." 
The latter phrase has been the source of much debate, with 
Islamist opposition members pressing to have Islam made "the" 
source of legislation. 

The constitution defines Kuwait as "a hereditary Amirate, 
the succession to which shall be in the descendants of the late 
Mubarak Al Sabah." This clause codifies what has become prac- 
tice: the semiformal alternation of power since 1915 between 
the lines of Mubarak's two ruling sons: Jabir and Salim. 

Although granting the amir substantial power, the constitu- 
tion also provides for political participation by the citizens. The 
system of government is defined in Article 6 as "democratic, 
under which sovereignty resides in the people, the source of all 
powers." Articles 79 to 122 establish the National Assembly and 
lay out the rules governing its formation, rights, and duties. 

Individual rights protected by the constitution are extensive 
and include personal liberty and equality before the law, free- 
dom to hold beliefs and express opinions, and freedom of the 
press. The residences of citizens are inviolable, the torture and 
the deportation of Kuwaiti citizens are prohibited, and the 
accused are assumed innocent until proven guilty. Also guaran- 
teed is the freedom to form associations and trade unions. The 
constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary and 
designates the Supreme Council of the Judiciary as its highest 
body and guarantor of judicial independence. 

The constitution also grants citizens a number of social 
rights, which form the basis for Kuwait's extensive welfare sys- 
tem. The state is constitutionally obligated to care for the 
young and to aid the old, the ill, and the disabled. It is obliged 
to provide public education and to attend to public health. 
The constitution provides for state involvement in the national 
economy to the degree that these obligations necessitate. How- 
ever, Articles 16 through 19 protect private property, stating 
that "private property is inviolable" and reminding citizens that 
"inheritance is a right governed by the Islamic Sharia." Article 
20 stipulates that "the national economy shall be based on 
social justice. It is founded on fair cooperation between public 
and private activities. Its aim shall be economic development, 



85 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

increase of productivity, improvement of the standard of living 
and achievement of prosperity for citizens, all within the limits 
of the law." Duties of citizens include national defense, obser- 
vance of public order and respect for public morals, and pay- 
ment of taxes. These rights and obligations, however, apply 
only to Kuwaiti citizens. The remainder of the population have 
few political and civil rights and enjoy only restricted access to 
the benefits of the state welfare system. 

In August 1976, in reaction to heightened assembly opposi- 
tion to his policies, the amir suspended four articles of the con- 
stitution concerned with political and civil rights (freedom of 
the press and dissolution of the legislature) and the assembly 
itself. In 1980, however, the suspended articles of the constitu- 
tion were reinstated along with the National Assembly. In 1982 
the government submitted sixteen constitutional amendments 
that, among other things, would have allowed the amir to 
declare martial law for an extended period and would have 
increased both the size of the legislature and the length of 
terms of office. In May 1983, the proposals were formally 
dropped after several months of debate. Nonetheless, the issue 
of constitutional revisions continued as a topic of discussion in 
both the National Assembly and the palace. In 1986 the consti- 
tution was again suspended, along with the National Assembly 
As with the previous suspension, popular opposition to this 
move emerged; indeed, the prodemocracy movement of 1989- 
90 took its name, the Constitutional Movement, from the 
demand for a return to constitutional life. This opposition 
became more pronounced following the Iraqi occupation, 
which abrogated all constitutional rights, and following 
Kuwait's return to sovereignty in 1991. In early 1992, many 
press restrictions were lifted. After the October 1992 election, 
the National Assembly exercised its constitutional right to 
review all amiri decrees promulgated while the assembly was in 
dissolution. 

The Media 

According to Kuwait's 1991 constitution, "freedom of opin- 
ion is guaranteed to everyone . . . within the limits of the law." 
The 1961 Press and Publishing Law establishes fines and prison 
terms for the publication of banned material, which includes 
reports critical of the government. In practice, this provision 
has been used only rarely, and Kuwait is known for its press 
freedom. In 1986, however, the government took a number of 



86 



Kuwait 



measures to repress political dissent. New censorship regula- 
tions formed a part of these measures. The Ministry of Infor- 
mation requires all publications to submit copy to the ministry 
in advance for approval and forbids criticism of the ruler and 
his family, other Arab leaders, or Islam, as well as the accep- 
tance of foreign funding. 

As a result of the Iraqi invasion, Iraqi forces took over all 
media. A few Kuwaiti newspapers and Radio Kuwait managed 
to operate outside the country. After the war, in April 1991 the 
six opposition groups joined in calling for a free press. In Janu- 
ary 1992, the government lifted censorship, but journalists con- 
tinued to experience various restrictions. As of 1993, the press, 
radio, and television were gradually recovering and rebuilding 
facilities the Iraqis had destroyed. 

The Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) is theoretically indepen- 
dent but in practice is an arm of the Ministry of Information. 
Newspapers are generally privately owned and consist of seven 
dailies, five in Arabic and two in English (the Arab Times and 
Kuwait Times), as well as a number of weeklies. The largest daily 
is Al Qabas (Firebrand), which is independent and had a circu- 
lation of about 120,000 before the war. Two smaller dailies, Al 
Anba (News) and Ar Ray alAmm (Public Opinion), each with a 
prewar circulation of 80,000, are more conservative and sup- 
port the government. With regard to other information media, 
the Ministry of Information operates the three stations of 
Radio Kuwait and the Kuwait Television station. 

Foreign Relations 

As the Iraqi invasion demonstrated, Kuwait's large oil reve- 
nues and inherently small defense capabilities gave it tremen- 
dous vulnerability. Historically, until the Iraqi invasion, Kuwaiti 
leaders had always dealt with that vulnerability through diplo- 
macy, trying to find allies that would protect them while main- 
taining as much independence as possible from those allies by 
playing them off against each other. Historically, the most 
important ally was Britain. Kuwait's relationship with Britain 
came about at the bidding of the early Kuwaiti leader Shaykh 
Mubarak in an effort to deter a still more troublesome actor, 
the Ottoman Empire. As one consequence of the 1899 treaty, 
which gave Kuwait a better status than was the case in British 
treaties with other possessions, the British presence remained 
somewhat distant, and British officials meddled less frequently 
in local politics. 



87 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

The relationship with Britain continued beyond indepen- 
dence on June 19, 1961, and the new agreement between inde- 
pendent Kuwait and Britain promised continued British 
protection as necessary. That protection did prove necessary 
when Iraq, six days after Kuwait's independence, declared 
Kuwait a part of Iraq and sent troops toward the amirate in sup- 
port of that claim. Because Kuwait's army was too small to 
defend the state, British troops arrived, followed soon after by 
forces from the League of Arab States (Arab League) , in the face 
of which Iraqi forces withdrew. 

As Britain increasingly withdrew from the gulf in the 1970s 
and 1980s, Kuwait was forced to look for other sources of sup- 
port. Although Kuwaiti leaders tried to maintain a degree of 
neutrality between the superpowers — Kuwait had an early and 
sustained economic, military, and diplomatic relationship with 
the Soviet Union — in the end it was obliged to turn to the 
United States for support. The Iran-Iraq War was the decisive 
factor in consolidating closer ties with the United States. 
Although at the outset of the war Kuwait was an outspoken 
critic of United States military presence in the gulf, during the 
war this position changed. When Kuwaiti ships became the tar- 
get of Iranian attacks, Kuwait's security situation deteriorated, 
and Kuwait approached the Soviet Union and the United 
States with requests to reflag and thus protect its beleaguered 
tankers. As soon as the Soviet Union responded positively to 
the request, the United States followed. The ground was thus 
laid for subsequent United States support. 

Persian Gulf War 

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied 
Kuwait. On February 26, 1991, United States-led coalition 
forces restored Kuwaiti sovereignty. These paired events repre- 
sented both the failure and the success of Kuwait's foreign pol- 
icy. 

The primary impetus for the invasion lay in the dynamics of 
internal Iraqi politics — economic and political concerns after 
the long, debilitating, and ultimately unsuccessful Iran-Iraq 
War. However, economic and political relations between Iraq 
and Kuwait provided the context for conflict. 

Iraq's first financial disagreement with Kuwait related to oil 
policy. Iraq objected to Kuwait's production beyond OPEC 
quotas and the consequent contribution that overproduction 
made to lowering oil prices internationally. Iraq also claimed 



88 



Kuwait 



Kuwait was siphoning oil from the shared Ar Rumaylah oil field 
straddling the Iraq-Kuwait border. During the Iran-Iraq War, 
Iraq ceased production from its side of the field while Kuwait 
continued operations. Kuwait asserted it had taken oil only 
from its own side of the field; Iraq claimed its oil had been 
poached. Another financial disagreement with Kuwait con- 
cerned the estimated US$13 billion that Kuwait had lent Iraq 
during the Iran-Iraq War, a debt that Iraq wished Kuwait to for- 
give. These financial claims were set in a broader context. The 
Iraqi government experienced serious financial strains follow- 
ing the war with Iran; nearby Kuwait had apparently ample 
resources. To obtain these resources, Iraq put forward what- 
ever financial claims it could. 

In addition to economic issues, Iraq also disagreed with 
Kuwait over borders. This claim had two somewhat contradic- 
tory dimensions. Iraq first disputed the location of the border 
and then reaffirmed its claim to all of Kuwait. The latter claim 
rested on the argument that Iraq had once ruled Kuwait. This 
assertion to historical sovereignty over Kuwait was not solidly 
grounded: Kuwait had always been a self-governing political 
entity. Despite Ottoman Iraq's historic interest in Kuwait, it had 
never ruled the shaykhdom. When Kuwait was first established, 
the area was under the control of the Bani Khalid of Arabia, 
not the Ottomans. For a brief period in the late nineteenth 
century, Kuwait moved closer to the Ottomans, and for a short 
time Abd Allah as Salim held the Ottoman title of qaimaqam, or 
provincial governor; part of the Iraqi claim invoked this fact 
(see Ruling Family, this ch.). After Britain and Kuwait signed 
the 1899 treaty, Ottoman forces, anxious to overthrow 
Mubarak, had no place in the shaykhdom. British forces came 
to Mubarak's support as needed in favor of Kuwaiti indepen- 
dence. 

Kuwait's status was again a matter of international discus- 
sion in the period around World War I. In 1913 British and 
Ottoman representatives drew up the draft Anglo-Ottoman 
Convention in which Britain recognized Ottoman suzerainty 
over Kuwait but at the same time declared Kuwait an autono- 
mous district of the Ottoman Empire. The convention condi- 
tioned recognition of Ottoman interests in Kuwait on the 
promise of Ottoman noninterference in the internal affairs of 
Kuwait. The Iraqi government's later assertion that this consti- 
tuted British recognition of Iraqi jurisdiction in Kuwait was 
weak. The document specifically recognized Kuwait's historical 



89 



Persian Gulf States: County Studies 

political autonomy and disallowed Iraqi interference in 
Kuwait's domestic affairs. In any event, the document was never 
ratified, and at the beginning of World War I, Britain moved 
closer to Kuwait, not farther away. At the end of World War I, 
the Ottoman Empire was dissolved. In the 1923 Treaty of Lau- 
sanne, Turkev renounced claims to all former Ottoman prov- 
inces. 

In the interwar years, the border question again arose. In 
1922 the British convened a conference at Al Uqayr in Saudi 
.Arabia that set Saudi .Arabia's borders with Kuwait and Iraq but 
not Kuwait and Iraq's border with each other. However, in 1923 
the British high commissioner in Iraq sent a memorandum to 
the political agent in Kuwait laving out the border between 
Kuwait and Iraq. When in 1932 Iraq applied to the League of 
Nations for membership as an independent state, it included 
information on the borders from the memorandum. 

Iraq thus seemed to be moving toward acceptance of its bor- 
der with Kuwait when the discovery of oil, the promise of more 
Kuwaiti oil revenues, and the related Majlis Movement 
occurred. As the Majlis Movement grew, Iraq began to support 
dissidents in Kuwait and simultaneously put forward claims to 
Kuwait. Iraq also explored the idea of building a port on 
Kuwait's coast to give Iraq an alternative to its port of Basra. 
Iraq began expressing interest in the islands of Bubivan and 
Warbah as well. The Majlis Movement in Kuwait failed, how- 
ever, and Iraq had to await another opportunity. 

.As long as Britain was there to support Kuwait, Iraq could 
do little more than assert a verbal claim. When Kuwait became 
independent in 1961. the Iraqi government tested Britain's 
resolve bv bringing forces to Kuwait's border in support of its 
claims on the shaykhdom. British and Arab League forces, 
however, forestalled any Iraqi military action. 

In 1963 a new government came to power in Iraq. Anxious 
to mend fences, this government formally recognized Kuwait 
and sigmed an agreement recognizing the borders between the 
two states as those set forth in Iraq's 1932 application to the 
League of Nations. Iraq then dropped its objection to Kuwait's 
membership in the UN and in the Arab League and estab- 
lished diplomatic relations, including the exchange of ambas- 
sadors, with Kuwait. 

Nonetheless, tensions lingered. During the 1960s and 
1970s, a series of border incidents took place, and there was 
continuing Iraqi pressure for Kuwait to relinquish, or at least 



90 



Kuwait 



offer long-term leases on, the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. 
In the 1980s, relations between the two states appeared to 
improve as Iraq, desperate for Kuwaiti financial support in its 
war with Iran, was careful not to press its unpopular claims. 
Both sides claimed sincerity in their historical effort to negoti- 
ate the border issue. When the war ended, however, the border 
issue reappeared. 

The dispute itself does not seem to have been a precipitat- 
ing factor in the invasion. When Iraq entered Kuwait in August 
1990, it claimed to do so in support of a Kuwaiti rebellion. 
When no pro-Iraqi rebellion (or even bloc) emerged, and Iraq 
found itself unable to set up a pliable Kuwaiti government, it 
was forced to resort to direct occupation. It was only at this 
point that the Iraqi claim to Kuwait resurfaced. On August 9, 
one week after the invasion, Iraq formally annexed Kuwait, 
adding the northern part of the country, including the Ar 
Rumaylah oil field and the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, to 
Iraq's province of Basra and creating a separate province out of 
the rest of Kuwait. 

After Kuwait's liberation, the UN established a five-member 
boundary commission to demarcate the Kuwait-Iraq boundary 
in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 687, which 
reaffirmed the inviolability of the Iraq-Kuwait border. In April 
1992, the commission announced its findings, which demar- 
cated the Kuwaiti border with Iraq about 570 meters to the 
north of the old border near the Iraqi town of Safwan and 
slightly north in the region of the contested Ar Rumaylah oil 
field. These modifications gave Kuwait six oil wells in the field 
and part of the Iraqi naval base of Umm Qasr. Kuwait accepted 
the commission's finding and announced it intended to build a 
security fence along its border with Iraq as an advance warning 
system. Iraq responded to the findings with an angry letter in 
May to the UN secretary general rejecting the commission's 
findings. Domestically, it continued to refer to Kuwait's terri- 
tory as an integral part of Iraq. Physical demarcation of the 
land boundary was completed in November 1992. 

The postwar period thus opened with many of the issues still 
unresolved that had played a role in precipitating the invasion 
and war. In Iraq the government of Saddam Husayn continued 
to assert its prewar claim to Kuwait, coloring Kuwait's postwar 
foreign policy. As long as Saddam Husayn remains at the helm 
in Iraq, Kuwait can feel no real security. Even were he to be 
replaced, much of the insecurity that haunts Kuwait and drives 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

its foreign policy would remain. Kuwaitis see the war as one 
waged by the Iraqi people and remember previous Iraqi prom- 
ises to respect Kuwait's sovereignty. Kuwait will continue to see 
Iraq as a serious threat, regardless of what transpires in Iraq's 
leadership. 

Post-Persian Gulf War Foreign Policy 

Kuwait's postwar foreign policy is therefore based on two 
assumptions. The first is that security, notably with regard to 
Iraq, is its primary concern. The second is that security ulti- 
mately can be guaranteed only by the United States. It is clear 
that Kuwait alone, or even Kuwait with the support of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), established in May 1981, and 
other Arab members of the coalition — a formal plan, known as 
the 1991 Damascus Declaration, to include Egypt and Syria in 
gulf defense arrangements was moribund soon after its issu- 
ance — cannot provide for its own defense needs (see Collective 
Security under the Gulf Cooperation Council, ch. 7). In August 
1991, Kuwait and the United States signed a US$81 million For- 
eign Military Sales agreement. In September 1991, Kuwait 
signed a formal ten-year defense agreement with the United 
States that permits the United States to pre-position weapons 
and conduct military exercises in Kuwait at Kuwaiti expense. 
However, the agreement does not provide for establishing a 
permanent United States base there. In 1992 Kuwaiti and 
United States forces carried out joint exercises under the 
defense agreement. Kuwait has backed up its formal security 
arrangements with a close political and economic relationship 
with the United States. It has given much of its postwar recon- 
struction business to United States firms, including civil recon- 
struction contracts that have been awarded through the United 
States Army Corps of Engineers and many contracts directly 
related to defense needs. The new pro-United States policy is 
not without its detractors. In the summer of 1992, the speaker 
of Kuwait's since-disbanded National Council asserted that the 
United States ambassador was interfering in internal Kuwaiti 
affairs. The Kuwaiti government and numerous Kuwaitis, how- 
ever, condemned these remarks. 

Kuwait maintains similarly close des with other members of 
the coalition, signing defense agreements with Britain and in 
1992 negotiating an agreement with France. It is seeking simi- 
lar agreements with the remaining Security Council perma- 
nent members, Russia and China. It remains very close to 



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Kuwait 



Saudi Arabia. Relations with a regionally resurgent Iran remain 
ambivalent. Kuwait's relationship with Iran improved dramati- 
cally after the Iraqi invasion, which, in drawing attention to 
Iraq's expansionist ambitions, seemingly vindicated Iran's war- 
time position. An inevitable conflict remains, however, between 
Kuwait's postwar aim of maintaining a high and visible level of 
United States support and Iran's desire to limit United States 
presence in the gulf. In mid-1992 this tension was seen in a 
minor dispute over the fate of Kuwait Airways passenger air- 
craft flown by Iraq to Iran during the war. Kuwait demanded 
the swift return of the aircraft, whereas Iran demanded US$90 
million for servicing them while they remained in Iran. 

Kuwaiti policy toward states that had supported Iraq has 
been unforgiving. One of the hard lessons Kuwait's rulers 
learned from the Iran-Iraq War is that foreign aid does not buy 
popularity or enduring political support. Some of its largest aid 
was to Jordan, Sudan, and Yemen, countries that nonetheless 
failed to support the coalition. Kuwait cut those countries from 
its foreign aid program once sovereignty was restored. Kuwait 
was also a major donor to the Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion (PLO). The PLO's wartime support of Iraq also resulted in 
severance of Kuwaiti monetary and political support. In June 
1992, the National Council approved denying economic aid to 
Arab countries that supported Iraq's invasion. Although for- 
eign aid will continue as a feature of Kuwait's foreign policy, 
Kuwait's limited postinvasion revenues and its experience dur- 
ing the occupation indicate that such aid would decrease. 

Reconstruction after the Persian Gulf War 

Postwar Society 

The invasion and occupation had a transformative effect on 
virtually every aspect of Kuwaiti life. Iraqi troops plundered 
and looted the city of Kuwait. Iraqi occupation forces, accord- 
ing to reports of human rights monitoring groups, tortured 
and summarily executed those suspected of involvement in the 
underground opposition movement that quickly emerged. 

In the course of the occupation, more than half the popula- 
tion, foreigner and citizen alike, fled Kuwait. After the reestab- 
lishment of Kuwaiti sovereignty in February 1991, and the 
restoration of basic services soon afterward, the population 
began to return. In May 1991, the government opened the 
doors to all Kuwaiti citizens who wished to return. The govern- 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

ment was far more reluctant to readmit nonnationals, whom it 
considered a security risk and whom it regarded as not needed 
in prewar numbers owing to the postwar constriction of the 
economy. Consequently, relatively fewer nonnationals were 
allowed to return. A National Bank of Kuwait report estimated 
the total population of Kuwait in March 1992 at 1,175,000 peo- 
ple, 53 percent of whom were Kuwaitis, compared with an esti- 
mated 27 percent Kuwaitis of the 2,155,000 population on the 
eve of the Iraqi invasion in 1990. 

The postoccupation Kuwaiti population differs sharply from 
that before the invasion. The population is divided psychologi- 
cally between those who experienced the direct horror of the 
Iraqi occupation and survived and those who spent the war 
abroad in what seemed a relatively comfortable exile to many 
of those who stayed in Kuwait. But the shared experience has 
unified the country in other ways. Because Kuwait is a small 
country with large family groups, almost every Kuwaiti lost fam- 
ily members to the Iraqi forces, and there is continuing uncer- 
tainty over the 600 or more Kuwaitis that remain prisoners in 
Iraq. The fate of those who disappeared is an issue of national 
concern. Regardless of personal losses and experiences during 
the occupation, the society as a whole has been traumatized by 
the memory of the invasion and by the uncertain future. A gov- 
ernment led by a ruling family that fled in the face of the Iraqi 
danger can do little to dispel this ambient fear. One expression 
of the insecurity is a general concern about lawlessness, both a 
breakdown in some of the peaceable norms that had united 
prewar Kuwait and a breakdown in the government's ability to 
enforce those norms owing to the widespread possession of 
guns (a result of the war) and the reluctance of a still fearful 
population to return those guns to the state. After the initial 
lawless months following liberation, the government recovered 
control of internal security and reinstituted the rule of law. 

The position of nonnationals in postwar Kuwait is very dif- 
ferent from that of citizens. Perhaps two-thirds of the foreign 
population fled during the invasion and occupation. Most of 
those who fled have not been allowed to return, notably the 
large Palestinian population, who, owing to the public support 
of Iraq by many prominent Palestinians outside Kuwait, 
became the target of public and private animosity in the 
months after liberation. Before the war, Palestinians composed 
Kuwait's largest foreign population, numbering perhaps 
400,000. By 1992 that number had fallen to fewer than 30,000. 



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Kuwait 



In the first postwar days, many Palestinians who remained 
became victims of private vigilante groups, of which some were 
apparently linked to members of the ruling family. Human 
rights monitoring organizations such as Amnesty International 
and Middle East Watch have reported the murder of dozens of 
Palestinians and the arrest and torture of hundreds more. The 
most dramatic transformation is the exodus of the bulk of the 
Palestinian population. The reaction against Palestinians and 
other members of groups or states whose leaders had sup- 
ported Iraq expressed itself in 1991 in a series of show trials of 
alleged collaborators, carried out, according to international 
observers and human rights monitoring groups, with little 
regard for due process. In the face of international criticism, 
the amir commuted the many death sentences, some given for 
rather small offenses, that the court had handed down. Trials 
that took place in late 1992, however, were regarded by interna- 
tional human rights groups as being fair and respecting due 
process. 

One of the first policy decisions the government made on 
returning to Kuwait was to reduce Kuwait's dependence on for- 
eign labor in an effort to ensure that Kuwaitis would hence- 
forth remain a majority in their country. Former foreign 
workers are unhappy with this policy, but there is little they can 
do. Divided between those who oppose Iraq and those who do 
not, they pose no unified threat. Their energy has been dissi- 
pated by individual efforts to arrange to stay. The government 
and population alike remain deeply suspicious of the nonna- 
tional population. 

After the war, the government announced it planned to 
restrict the number of resident foreigners, to keep the nonna- 
tional population below 50 percent of the total population, 
and to ensure that no single non-Kuwaiti nationality would 
make up more than 10 percent of the total population. In 
December 1991, the government closed most domestic staff 
employment agencies and drew up new regulations covering 
the licensing of domestic staff. In early 1992, the Ministry of 
Interior announced new rules for issuing visas to dependents 
of expatriate workers, limiting them to higher wage earners. 
Looking further into the future, the government approved a 
resolution in March 1992 doubling to US$14,000 the sum given 
to young men at marriage in an effort to encourage local popu- 
lation growth. In June 1992, the government announced it had 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

set aside US$842 million for end-of-service payments to for- 
eigners. 

The new policy of limiting the number of foreign workers 
has had serious economic consequences. Foreigners represent 
many of Kuwait's top technical and managerial workers. The 
exodus of most of the nonnational population has created spe- 
cial problems for an education system that in 1990 was still 
heavily dependent on foreign teachers. The direct damage 
inflicted on school property and looting by Iraqi forces aggra- 
vated the education problem. Nonetheless, in September 1991 
the university and vocational schools reopened for the first 
time since the occupation. 

The exodus of foreigners also has hampered the health care 
system, as did the systematic looting of some the country's 
modern medical equipment by Iraqi forces. The invasion and 
war added some new health concerns, which include long-term 
deleterious health effects owing to the environmental damage 
and to the psychological impact of the war. 

Nevertheless, the same forces that generated a prewar need 
for labor remain operative. A number of years are needed to 
train Kuwaitis for many of the positions held by foreigners. In 
the interim, indications are that the preinvasion shift away 
from Arab and toward Asian labor will continue. One small 
benefit of the new labor policy is that the government will save 
some money on services previously provided to the larger for- 
eign population. The basic shortage of sufficient quantities of 
national manpower, coupled with a political and social reluc- 
tance to increase womanpower, limit the extent to which the 
government can do without imported labor. 

Economic Reconstruction 

Despite the devastation of the Kuwaiti economy during the 
invasion and occupation, recovery has proceeded with surpris- 
ing speed. This was partly because some damage, particularly 
of the infrastructure, was not as serious as first feared and 
partly because the government, anxious to restore the popula- 
tion's weakened confidence in its ability to administer, has 
given reconstruction and recovery of basic services a high pri- 
ority. 

The oil industry, which was badly damaged, has been a top 
priority because it is the source of revenues to sustain other 
government spending programs. The most dramatic economic 
reconstruction effort went toward capping the more than 700 



96 



Kuwait 



oil wells set afire by retreating Iraqi forces. In addition to an 
estimated 2 percent of the country's 100 billion barrels of 
reserves lost in the oil fires, Kuwait had to pay for putting out 
fires and repairing damaged refineries, pipelines, and other oil 
infrastructure. Byjanuary 1992, oil output had risen to 550,000 
bpd. By June 1992, it was back to nearly 1 million bpd. Nine- 
teen new wells were drilled to replace those damaged by the 
occupation. 

The government hoped to raise production to 2 million 
bpd by the end of 1993. During the invasion, Iraq destroyed or 
incapacitated Kuwait's entire 700,000 bpd refining capacity at 
its three refineries. But by April 1992, production levels rose to 
300,000 bpd. Nonetheless, there was concern that the rapid 
return to production might have damaged Kuwait's oil reser- 
voirs beyond the damage done by retreating Iraqi forces, lower- 
ing its total future reserves. Accordingly, KOC contracted with 
several international companies to assess reservoir damage. 
However, the government also has been under tremendous 
pressure to increase oil production quickly to pay for war and 
postwar expenses. In the mid-1980s, overseas investments out- 
stripped oil as the primary source of revenues. The expenses of 
war, postwar reconstruction, and investment irregularities that 
were being uncovered in late 1992 have forced the government 
to use substantial portions of its investment principal, and in 
the 1990s oil is again expected to be the major revenue source. 

Restoring oil operations was expensive. In January 1992, the 
oil minister announced Kuwait had already spent US$1.5 bil- 
lion for putting out fires and planned to spend another US$8 
to US$10 billion to repair further damage. A National Bank of 
Kuwait report in mid-1992 estimated that reconstruction 
expenses in the oil sector for the 1992-95 period would reach 
US$6.5 billion. 

The rest of the economy also suffered, although the effects 
were not as severe as the oil-well fires. The banking sector, suf- 
fering the shock waves of the Suq al Manakh stock market 
crash in 1982, recovered slowly from the combined effects of 
that crash and the invasion. The agenda of the returned gov- 
ernment included bank reform. In December 1991, the gov- 
ernment announced a comprehensive settlement plan for bad 
debts, the outstanding issue of the Suq al Manakh crash. The 
plan involved government purchase of the entire domestic 
loan portfolio of the country's local banking system. The gov- 
ernment agreed to buy US$20 billion of domestic debt from 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

eleven commercial banks and investment companies in 
exchange for bonds. This plan removed the concerns of 
Kuwaitis, who would be obliged to repay debts, if at all, on 
more modest terms, and of banks, concerned about nonper- 
forming loans. Although Shaykh Salim al Abd al Aziz Al Sabah, 
governor of the Central Bank of Kuwait, said the plan is 
needed to prevent the collapse of banks, it clearly also is 
intended as part of a series of government payments to Kuwaiti 
nationals and businesses aimed at restoring confidence in the 
government prior to the October election. The plan, 
announced but as yet incomplete, left the entire banking sys- 
tem in a state of limbo in late 1992. 

Banks have suffered less from the physical damage of the 
war and more from the sudden reduction in the number of 
employees, many of whom in the prewar period were foreign- 
ers. Some banks reported postwar staff levels at half those 
before the invasion. Although there has been speculation that 
postwar reform will include mergers involving state-controlled 
banks (notably the Kuwait Investment Company, the Kuwait 
International Investment Company, and the Kuwait Foreign 
Trading, Contracting, and Investment Company, known 
together as the three Ks) and private-sector banks, no formal 
action had been taken as of late 1992. The bank that survived 
the invasion in the best shape was the largest commercial bank, 
the National Bank of Kuwait. It handled the exiled govern- 
ment's finances during the crisis. 

According to a National Bank of Kuwait report issued in 
mid-1992, several additional factors hurt the private sector's 
recovery. The first was the government's decision to restrict the 
number of nonnationals, which hampered efforts to import 
skilled and unskilled labor and left Kuwait with a smaller mar- 
ket. The second was the lower level of government investment 
in industry as a result of reduced government income and the 
government decision to invest more in defense and focus in 
the short run on restoring basic services. The non-oil manufac- 
turing sector, although small, was hurt by the looting and dam- 
age done by Iraqi troops. The government has been in no 
position to subsidize industries at the level it had in the past. 
Infrastructure projects incomplete before the invasion have 
not been resumed or have been delayed. 

The only sector of the economy to prosper in the immediate 
postwar period is trade because of the need to replace inven- 
tory emptied during the occupation. Returning Kuwaitis and 



98 



Kuwait 



the government have created a small boom for investors. By 
mid-1992, however, the return demand largely had been met, 
and many goods, notably automobiles and consumer durables, 
were available in excess supply. In an effort to boost the private 
sector, the government approved an offset program in July 
1992 requiring foreign companies to reinvest part of their gov- 
ernment-awarded contracts locally. Companies with contracts 
valued at more than US$17 million have been obliged to rein- 
vest 30 percent of the contract sum. 

Despite some speculation that the government would turn 
more functions over to the private sector following its return, 
widespread privatization has not occurred. In February 1992, 
the government announced plans to start privatizing the public 
telecommunications network, a move that was expected to gen- 
erate US$1 billion for the government. In May the government 
announced it would privatize seventy-seven local gas stations. 
There have been, however, no indications of more substantial 
denationalizations. 

Reconstruction costs, which some foreign observers initially 
put as high as US$100 billion, appear to be more modest, per- 
haps in the range of US$20 to US$25 billion. The largest post- 
war expense the government faces is not reconstruction, but 
the debt it incurred to coalition allies to help pay for Opera- 
tion Desert Storm, an amount that came to at least US$20 bil- 
lion, and continuing high defense expenditures (see table 12, 
Appendix). Reconstruction costs have been met largely from 
Kuwait's reduced investments (the Financial Times estimated in 
February 1992 that Kuwait had lost as much as US$30 billion of 
its prewar investment portfolio); from returning oil revenues, 
which for fiscal year 1992 were only expected to generate 
US$2.4 billion; and from borrowing on international money 
markets. In October 1991, the government announced plans to 
borrow US$5 billion for the first phase of a five-year loan pro- 
gram. The loan would be the largest in history. In mid-1992 
one study indicated that as much as 30 percent of 1993 revenue 
will be needed to pay interest on various government debts, 
which were expected to exceed US$37 billion by the end of 
1992. 

Despite the apparently dire economic situation, the govern- 
ment has felt politically obliged to sustain insofar as possible 
the prewar standard of living. Some of the largest domestic 
postwar government expenditures have gone directly to 
Kuwaiti households. The banking debt buyout was but one of a 



99 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

series of measures taken by the government to help nationals 
hurt by the invasion. The government decided to pay all gov- 
ernment employees (the majority of working nationals) their 
wages for the period of the occupation. In March 1992, the 
government raised state salaries. The government also agreed 
to write off about US$1.2 billion in consumer loans, a measure 
benefiting more than 120,000 Kuwaitis. It wrote off US$3.4 bil- 
lion worth of property and housing loans made before the inva- 
sion. Each Kuwaiti family that stayed in Kuwait through the 
occupation received US$1,750. In July 1992, the government 
exempted Kuwaitis from charges for public services due as a 
result of the occupation, such as bills for electricity, utilities, 
and telephone service and for rents on housing. 

Politics 

The invasion also changed the dynamics of Kuwaiti politics. 
The crisis of invasion, occupation, and exile further solidified 
the Kuwaiti opposition, which had begun emerging in the Con- 
stitutional Movement before the invasion. During the invasion, 
much of the opposition and the government regrouped in 
exile in Saudi Arabia. There, opposition leaders reiterated 
their preinvasion concerns and called on the amir to promise a 
return to a more democratic system in restored Kuwait. 

The showdown came in October 1990 when the ruler met 
with 1,200 opposition leaders in Saudi Arabia and publicly prom- 
ised liberalization following liberation. The elite opposition, 
however, finally unified just as it was losing its popular base to 
the resistance groups inside Kuwait. Kuwaitis who spent months 
fighting the occupation had little need for those who spent the 
war in relatively comfortable exile. To them, opposition leaders 
in exile became figures as distant as the amir. These divisions sur- 
faced as goods waited in warehouses while resistance leaders 
argued with returned administrators over the right to feed the 
population. The opposition, so briefly united, redivided. Several 
identifiable factions emerged. These included the Democratic 
Forum, representing the liberal progressives. In defiance of the 
law, the Democratic Forum declared itself a political party in 
1991. The Sunni Islamist opposition broke into the historically 
Muslim Brotherhood-oriented Islamic Constitutional Movement 
and the Islamic Alliance. The National Islamic Coalition repre- 
sented Shia. 

Had the amir returned quickly to Kuwait, stood above the 
factions, and appealed to the natural desire of a population 



100 



Kuwait 



tired by war to retreat from politics to the private world of 
reunited families, he might have scuttled the prodemocracy 
movement and reimposed a relatively benign authoritarianism. 
Instead, the amir hesitated and unwittingly forged a broad 
united prodemocratic front that could truly challenge his rule. 
Instead of fracturing, the Kuwaiti opposition came together, 
voicing a unified demand for a more open, participatory politi- 
cal system. The amir finally agreed to hold elections for the 
National Assembly in October 1992 (see Legislature, this ch.). 
In the interim, the National Council continued to meet. 

There is little postwar change in the ruling family's dominant 
position in the country, although probably more grumbling 
occurs in private about the family's behavior. The Al Sabah con- 
tinue to control the highest posts, although there have been 
changes in personnel. In April 1991, the government 
announced a new cabinet. Whereas the overall presence of the 
ruling family changed little, the number of cabinet members 
from the Salim branch rather than the Jabir branch increased, a 
shift that usually had occurred only after a succession. In the cab- 
inet, Sabah al Ahmad Al Sabah, minister of foreign affairs since 
the 1960s, was replaced by Salim as Salim Al Sabah, formerly 
minister of interior. In addition, Minister of Finance Ali al Khal- 
ifa Al Sabah stepped down, and Minister of Defense Nawwaf al 
Ahmad Al Sabah was appointed to the less significant post of 
minister of social affairs and labor. The opposition hoped that 
the primary check on the royal family and the cabinet would be 
the National Assembly. Following the October 1992 election, the 
Salim and Jabir branches' representation in the cabinet became 
more balanced. 

In 1993 the government continued to express a profound 
ambivalence about political liberalization. Although it lifted 
press censorship in January 1992, the government still imposed 
restrictions on coverage critical of the government. The gov- 
ernment has banned several public meetings by opposition 
groups and private associations. The October 1992 election 
revealed the basic forces that are likely to continue to shape 
Kuwait's political future into the twenty-first century. The first 
force is an historically grounded and popular impulse toward 
political liberalization. Although the prodemocracy movement 
may experience times of relative quiescence as it has in the 
past, it is unlikely to be extinguished. The second is what 
appeared in the immediate postinvasion period to be a grow- 
ing impulse toward more authoritarian rule. Whereas Kuwait 



101 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

historically has not experienced heavy-handed government, 
pockets of its population (some foreigners and Shia) have felt 
the heavier hand of the state at times. The amir's efforts to 
develop a larger internal security apparatus to use first against 
the resident Palestinian population and then against the 
national opposition threatens Kuwait's prodemocracy move- 
ment. These efforts also ran into strong opposition when the 
National Assembly convened in October 1992. Like the pro- 
democracy movement, the new security force will not vanish 
unless compelled to do so. The invasion thus appears to have 
activated both a more authoritarian impulse in the government 
and a more prodemocratic impulse among the population. 
The postinvasion period has seen the struggle between these 
two forces. 

* * * 

Ahmad Abu-Hakima's Modern History of Kuwait provides a 
good historical overview. Jill Crystal's Kuwait: The Transforma- 
tion of an Oil State offers a general overview of Kuwait; her Oil 
and Politics in the Gulf provides a more analytical survey of 
Kuwaiti politics. On politics, Hassan Ibrahim's Kuwait: a Politi- 
cal Study and John E. Peterson's The Arab Gulf States are helpful. 
On the ruling family, a most useful book is Alan Rush's Al- 
Sabah: Genealogy and History of Kuwait's Ruling Family, 1752- 
1986. The best general introduction to Kuwait's foreign policy 
environment is Abdul-Reda Assiri's Kuwait' s Foreign Policy. 

A general sociolooqcal introduction to Kuwait is found in 
Jacqueline Ismael's Kuwait: Social Change in Historical Perspective. 
Suad al-Sabah's Development Plan ning in an Oil Economy and the 
Role of the Woman looks at women's issues in Kuwait. With 
regard to expatriates, Shamlan Alessa's The Manpower Problem in 
Kuwait is helpful. 

Books on Kuwait's economy include M.W. Khouja and P.G. 
Sadler's The Economy of Kuwait; YS.F. al-Sabah's The Oil Economy 
of Kuwait: Ragaei El Mallakh and Jacob Atta's The Absorptive 
Capacity of Kuwait: and Suad al-Sabah's Kuwait: Anatomy of a Cri- 
sis Economy. Fida Darwiche covers Kuwait's stock market crash 
in The Gu If Stock Exch a nge Crash . 

A wealth of statistical information is available in the annual 
reports put out by the Kuwait Ministry of Planning's Central 
Statistical Office in its Annual Statistical Abstract. Current eco- 
nomic events can be followed in the Middle East Economic Digest, 
Economist, Wall Street Journal, and Financial Times (which usually 



102 



Kuwait 

surveys Kuwait in February). (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



103 



Chapter 3. Bahrain 




Crest of the State of Bahrain 



Country Profile 



Country 

Formal Name: State of Bahrain. 
Short Form: Bahrain. 

Term for Citizens: Bahraini(s); adjectival form, Bahraini. 
Capital: Manama. 

Date of Independence: August 15, 1971 . 

Geography 

Size: 694 square kilometers. 

Topography: Archipelago of low desert islands, of which largest 
is Bahrain. 

Climate: Hot and humid, little rainfall. 

Society 

Population: About 550,000 in early 1992, of which 66 percent 
Bahrainis; 1992 growth rate 3.1 percent. 

Education: Almost all children in six- to eleven-year-old age- 
group enrolled in primary school system; about two-thirds of 
all twelve- to fourteen-year-olds enrolled in intermediate 
schools. 

Health: Free, comprehensive public health care system. Two 
private hospitals and one military hospital. Life expectancy for 
Bahraini children born in 1990 seventy years for males and 
seventy-five years for females. 

Ethnic Groups: Most Bahrainis are Arabs, although fairly large 
number of Iranian origin. Foreign residents include other 
Arabs, Iranians, Indians, Pakistanis, and small groups of East 
Asians and Europeans. 

NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



107 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Religion: Population 85 percent Muslim, including about 70 
percent Shia and 30 percent Sunni. Non-Muslim foreigners 
include 7.3 percent Christians and 7.7 percent Hindus and 
others. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1990 about US$4.0 billion; 
per capita GDP US$7,500; real growth rate 6.7 percent (1988). 

Agriculture: Contributed 1.0 percent of GDP (at current prices) 
in 1990. 

Mining and Manufacturing: Hydrocarbons and related 
industries, mining, and manufacturing contributed 36.3 percent 
of GDP (at current prices) in 1990. 

Electricity, Water, and Construction: Contributed 7.7 percent 
of GDP (at current prices) in 1990. 

Trade, Transportation, and Communications: Wholesale and 
retail trade, restaurants and hotels, and transportation and 
communications contributed 18.1 percent of GDP (at current 
prices) in 1990. 

Services: Financial, government, and other services contributed 
36.9 percent of GDP (at current prices) in 1990. 

Exports: Total exports about US$3.5 billion in 1991. Major 
exports included crude oil, refined oil products, and aluminum. 

Imports: Total about US$3.6 billion in 1991. Major imports 
included crude petroleum, machinery and transportation 
equipment, and food. 

Currency and Exchange Rate: Bahraini dinar. In 1994 
exchange rate US$1 = BD0.376 (fixed rate). 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Transportation: In 1994 more than 200 kilometers of paved 
roads; also twenty-five-kilo meter causeway to Saudi Arabia; two 



108 



Bahrain 



major ports: Mina Salman and Sitrah; Bahrain International 
Airport for airline service. 

Telecommunications: In 1994 excellent domestic and 
international service — telephones, submarine cables, three 
satellite ground stations, television station, two AM and three 
FM radio stations. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Ruler (amir) is head of state and head of 
government. Shaykh Isa ibn Salman Al Khalifa became amir in 
1961; his son and designated successor, Shaykh Hamad ibn Isa 
Al Khalifa, continued to serve as deputy prime minister in 
1993. National Assembly elected in 1973, dissolved in 1975; no 
plans in 1993 to reestablish it. 

Politics: No political parties. Senior members of Al Khalifa and 
other notable families dominate political and economic 
decision making. 

Foreign Relations: Shaykh Isa ibn Salman continued in 1993 to 
maintain friendly relations with most countries, Iraq being the 
principal exception. Major diplomatic activities channeled 
through Gulf Cooperation Council. Member of United 
Nations, League of Arab States, Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, and Organization of the Islamic 
Conference. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In mid-1993 personnel strength 7,150: army, 
6,000; navy, 500; and air force, 650. Service voluntary. Army in 
1991 had eighty-one M-60A3 main battle tanks and armored 
cars. Navy had two corvettes and four missile craft. Air force 
had McDonnell Douglas F-5 Tigers, General Dynamics F-16 
Fighting Falcons, and Agusta/Bell-212 armed helicopters. 

Paramilitary: In mid-1993 coast guard about 400 personnel; 
police about 9,000. 



109 



IN 1993 BAHRAIN CONTINUED to be ruled by the Al Khalifa 
family. The amir, Shaykh Isa ibn Salman Al Khalifa (b. 1933), 
was the eleventh ruler of the Al Khalifa dynasty, which has 
ruled the country since 1783. Originally, the Al Khalifa were a 
prominent family among the Bani Utub beduin tribes from the 
interior of the Arabian Peninsula who had settled on the Per- 
sian Gulf coast during the eighteenth century. The Al Khalifa 
initially established a successful commercial port at Az Zubarah 
on the western coast of the Qatar Peninsula, but this was 
attacked several times by rulers of Bahrain, at that time part of 
the Iranian Empire, which intermittently controlled Bahrain 
from 1602 to 1782. Eventually, with the assistance of a tribal 
coalition that included the Al Sabah (another Bani Utub fam- 
ily) of Kuwait, the Al Khalifa captured Bahrain from Iran. The 
first Al Khalifa ruler, Ahmad ibn Muhammad (r. 1783-96), 
adopted policies that enabled Bahrain's ports to develop into 
prosperous trade and pearling centers. 

During the reign of subsequent Al Khalifa rulers, dynastic 
feuding among heirs, as well as wars with Oman, adversely 
affected Bahrain's economy and the security of regional trade. 
The family rivalries prompted Britain, then the paramount 
power in the area, to impose a series of treaties that made Bah- 
rain a British protectorate by 1868. An important consequence 
of Britain's intervention was the regulation of the Al Khalifa 
succession on the basis of primogeniture. After the death of 
Shaykh Ali ibn Khalifa Al Khalifa (r. 1868-69) in a dynastic war 
instigated by his brother and nephew, Britain refused to accept 
the legitimacy of the victor's rule and forced all factions to 
acknowledge Ali's son, Shaykh Isa ibn Ali Al Khalifa (r. 1869- 
1923), as the rightful heir. Since that time, each Al Khalifa 
ruler has been succeeded by his eldest son. This practice was 
unlike succession in most other Arab dynasties, which chose 
the heir apparent from among several able males within the 
royal family. The principle of primogeniture was codified in 
the 1973 constitution. 

In early 1993, Isa ibn Salman had ruled Bahrain for thirty- 
two years, having succeeded to the throne in 1961 on the death 
of his father, Shaykh Salman ibn Hamad Al Khalifa (r. 1942- 
61). At the time of Isa ibn Salman's accession, Bahrain was still 
a British protectorate. Isa ibn Salman negotiated the termina- 



111 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

tion of the country's dependent status after Britain announced 
in 1968 that it would withdraw all its defense forces from the 
Persian Gulf region. When Bahrain achieved complete inde- 
pendence in 1971, Isa ibn Salman assumed the title of amir. 

The Al Khalifa continued to dominate Bahrain's govern- 
ment and society after independence. The amir's brothers, 
sons, nephews, and cousins controlled the major decision-mak- 
ing positions. For example, Isa ibn Salman's brother, Shaykh 
Khalifa ibn Salman Al Khalifa, was prime minister and head of 
government in late 1992; the amir's eldest son, Shaykh Hamad 
ibn Isa Al Khalifa, was deputy prime minister and heir appar- 
ent; and six other members of the ruling family served in the 
cabinet, including Major General Khalifa ibn Ahmad Al Khal- 
ifa, who was minister of defense. 

In 1993 Bahrain's economy continued to experience rela- 
tive prosperity. Before the discovery of oil in 1932, the coun- 
try's economy had been based on trade and pearling. 
Fortuitously, oil was discovered in commercial quantities just as 
the development of the cultured pearl by the Japanese caused 
the collapse of the Persian Gulf pearling industry. By 1935 oil 
wells and a small refinery were in operation, thus enabling 
Bahrain to claim distinction as the first Arab state in the region 
to benefit from the presence of oil resources. Both Shaykh 
Hamad ibn Isa Al Khalifa (r. 1923-42) and his son, Shaykh Sal- 
man ibn Hamad, used revenues obtained from oil concessions 
and production royalties to institute education and health care 
programs and various public services. 

Although oil revenues accounted for more than one-half 
the government budget until the 1980s, the ruling family rec- 
ognized that Bahrain's oil wells had a limited productive capac- 
ity and that oil reserves probably would be exhausted by the 
end of the twentieth century. Consequently, the government 
decided to base the country's long-term economic well-being 
on commercial and industrial diversification. Official efforts to 
encourage joint-venture projects resulted in the construction 
of several enterprises, including an aluminum plant (opened 
in 1972), a ship repair yard (1977), an iron foundry (1984), a 
chemical factory (1985), and a pharmaceutical facility (sched- 
uled to open in 1993). In addition, Bahrain's efficient commu- 
nications system and relatively liberal financial policies enabled 
the island state to emerge in the 1980s as a principal center for 
regional banking, insurance, and business operations. 



112 



Bahrain 



The transformation of Bahrain's economy created new 
occupational groups, in particular an industrial working class 
and a highly educated professional class. Bahrain's large indig- 
enous labor force was unique in the immediate area because 
foreign workers constituted the vast majority of the labor force 
in the neighboring countries of Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Although trade unions 
and other labor associations were illegal in Bahrain, workers 
organized their first strike as early as 1943. Labor unrest 
erupted periodically during the next thirty years but declined 
after 1974, when the percentage of foreign workers in the 
industrial labor force began to increase significantly. The 
growth of an indigenous class of professionals tended to shift 
societal interest away from working conditions and wages in the 
oil industry and toward the issue of political participation. Bah- 
rain's professionals were among the most enthusiastic support- 
ers of the brief experiment with an elected legislature in the 
early 1970s; since the dissolution of the National Assembly in 
1975, professionals have been consistent advocates of a return 
to democratic political institutions. 

Two generations of economic and social changes failed to 
lessen sectarian tensions in Bahrain. The Al Khalifa and their 
historical political allies are Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims. 
However, at least two-thirds of Bahrain's population identify 
themselves as Shia (see Glossary) Muslims. Shia were the origi- 
nal inhabitants of the archipelago when the Al Khalifa seized it 
from Iranian control in the 1780s. Although the Al Khalifa 
have not persecuted the Shia, they have habitually excluded 
them from political power. Shia generally resent their subordi- 
nate political status; periodically this resentment flares up as 
incidents of religious strife. The Iranian Revolution of 1979, 
which resulted in Shia clergy controlling that country's govern- 
ment, tended to exacerbate Shia-Sunni tensions in Bahrain 
because events in Iran inspired Shia activists in Bahrain to 
demand more equitable political representation for their com- 
munity. 

The Iranian Revolution and the subsequent Iran-Iraq War 
(1980-88) demonstrated how much Bahrain's political stability 
and economic prosperity depended on overall regional secu- 
rity. The government sought to contain the spillover effects of 
these crises by joining with Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and 
Saudi Arabia in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981. 
As a result of its membership, Bahrain obtained GCC intelli- 



113 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

gence assistance in monitoring the activities of local dissident 
groups suspected of receiving support from Iran and profited 
from inclusion in regional economic development plans. In 
addition, it received GCC approval for a program of enhancing 
its military capability through the purchase of advanced United 
States weapons. During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Bahrain 
participated in the GCC coalition that sent troops to Saudi Ara- 
bia to fight against Iraq and permitted the United States Navy 
to use its port facilities. 

Geography and Population 

Geography 

Bahrain (from the Arabic word for "two seas") comprises an 
archipelago of thirty-three islands situated midway in the Per- 
sian Gulf close to the shore of the Arabian Peninsula. The 
islands are about twenty-four kilometers from the east coast of 
Saudi Arabia and twenty-eight kilometers from Qatar. The total 
area of the islands is 694 square kilometers, or about four times 
the size of the District of Columbia. The largest island, account- 
ing for 83 percent of the area, is Bahrain (also seen as Al Bah- 
rayn), which has an extent of 572 square kilometers. From 
north to south, Bahrain is forty-eight kilometers long; at its wid- 
est point in the north, it is sixteen kilometers from east to west 
(see fig. 6). 

Around most of Bahrain is a relatively shallow inlet of the 
Persian Gulf known as the Gulf of Bahrain. The seabed adja- 
cent to Bahrain is rocky and, mainly off the northern part of 
the island, covered by extensive coral reefs. Most of the island 
is low-lying and barren desert. Outcroppings of limestone form 
low rolling hills, stubby cliffs, and shallow ravines. The lime- 
stone is covered by various densities of saline sand, capable of 
supporting only the hardiest desert vegetation — chiefly thorn 
trees and scrub. There is a fertile strip five kilometers wide 
along the northern coast on which date, almond, fig, and 
pomegranate trees grow. The interior contains an escarpment 
that rises to 134 meters, the highest point on the island, to 
form Jabal ad Dukhan (Mountain of Smoke), named for the 
mists that often wreathe the summit. Most of the country's oil 
wells are situated in the vicinity of Jabal ad Dukhan. 

Manama (Al Manamah), the capital, is located on the north- 
eastern tip of the island of Bahrain. The main port, Mina Sal- 
man, also is located on the island, as are the major petroleum 



114 



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V 

ati 



MUHARRAQ 

Hadd 




im al Bayd 

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s 

Tersian 

gulf 

YYAH 



26°00' — 



25°50'- 



°40' 



Bahrain 



refining facilities and commercial centers. Causeways and 
bridges connect Bahrain to adjacent islands and the mainland 
of Saudi Arabia. The oldest causeway, originally constructed in 
1929, links Bahrain to Al Muharraq, the second largest island. 
Although the island is only six kilometers long, the country's 
second largest city, Al Muharraq, and the international airport 
are located there. A causeway also connects Al Muharraq to the 
tiny island of Jazirat al Azl, the site of a major ship-repair and 
dry-dock center. South of Jazirat al Azl, the island of Sitrah, site 
of the oil export terminal, is linked to Bahrain by a bridge that 
spans the narrow channel separating the two islands. The 
causeway to the island of Umm an Nasan, off the west coast of 
Bahrain, continues on to the Saudi mainland town of Al Khu- 
bar. Umm an Nasan is the private property of the amir and the 
site of his personal game preserve. 

The other islands of significance include Nabi Salah, which 
is northwest of Sitrah; Jiddah, to the north of Umm an Nasan; 
and a group of islands, the largest of which is Hawar, near the 
coast of Qatar (see Geography; Foreign Relations, ch. 4). Nabi 
Salah contains several freshwater springs that are used to irri- 
gate the island's extensive date palm groves. The rocky islet of 
Jiddah houses the state prison. Hawar and the small islands 
near it are the subject of a territorial dispute between Bahrain 
and Qatar. Hawar is nineteen kilometers long and about one 
and one-half kilometers wide. The other islands are uninhab- 
ited and are nesting sites for a variety of migratory birds. 

Climate 

Bahrain has two seasons: an extremely hot summer and a 
relatively mild winter. During the summer months, from April 
to October, afternoon temperatures average 40°C and can 
reach 48°C duringjune and July. The combination of intense 
heat and high humidity makes this season uncomfortable. In 
addition, a hot, dry southwest wind, known locally as the qaws, 
periodically blows sand clouds across the barren southern end 
of Bahrain toward Manama in the summer. Temperatures mod- 
erate in the winter months, from November to March, when 
the range is between 10°C and 20°C. However, humidity often 
rises above 90 percent in the winter. From December to March, 
prevailing winds from the southeast, known as the shammal, 
bring damp air over the islands. Regardless of the season, daily 
temperatures are fairly uniform throughout the archipelago. 



117 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Bahrain receives little precipitation. The average annual 
rainfall is seventy-two millimeters, usually confined to the win- 
ter months. No permanent rivers or streams exist on any of the 
islands. The winter rains tend to fall in brief, torrential bursts, 
flooding the shallow wadis that are dry the rest of the year and 
impeding transportation. Little of the rainwater is saved for 
irrigation or drinking. However, there are numerous natural 
springs in the northern part of Bahrain and on adjacent 
islands. Underground freshwater deposits also extend beneath 
the Gulf of Bahrain to the Saudi Arabian coast. Since ancient 
times, these springs have attracted settlers to the archipelago. 
Despite increasing salinization, the springs remain an impor- 
tant source of drinking water for Bahrain. Since the early 
1980s, however, desalination plants, which render seawater suit- 
able for domestic and industrial use, have provided about 60 
percent of daily water consumption needs. 

Population 

In 1992 an estimated 550,000 people lived in Bahrain. This 
number included 363,000 Bahraini citizens and 187,000 for- 
eign nationals. Citizens accounted for 66 percent of the total 
population, a decline from the 70 percent they represented in 
the 1981 census and the 82.5 percent they represented in 1971. 
The unofficial estimate indicated that the population had 
increased by 57 percent, or at an average annual growth rate of 
5.2 percent, since 1981. In 1992 the growth rate was 3.1 per- 
cent. The non-Bahraini community, which grew from 112,000 
in 1981 to 187,000 in 1992, increased by 67 percent, while the 
number of citizens increased by 52.5 percent in the same 
eleven-year period. 

In 1992 an estimated 58 percent of the population was male 
and only 42 percent female. The gender disparity resulted 
from the exceptionally high number of men among Bahrain's 
foreign residents: 76 percent of foreign residents were male. 
The male-to-female ratio was more balanced among Bahraini 
citizens: about 50.3 percent were male and 49.7 percent 
female. The age distribution also was skewed: about 80 percent 
of the foreign population was more than fourteen years of age, 
but less than 60 percent of citizens were more than fourteen. 
For the total population, 33.4 percent were in the age-group of 
zero to fourteen; 62.8 percent were in the age-group of fifteen 
to fifty-nine; and a mere 3.8 percent were in the age-group of 
sixty years and older. Life expectancy for Bahraini children 



118 



Bahrain 



born in 1990 was seventy years for males and seventy-five years 
for females. 

The population of Bahrain is overwhelmingly urban. About 
85 percent of the people live in cities or suburbs. Most working- 
age men who reside in villages commute to jobs in urban areas. 
The largest city, Manama, is the principal commercial and cul- 
tural center. It had an estimated population of 152,000 in 1992. 
Manama's expansion since 1960, when its population was only 
62,000, resulted in entire villages, fields, and palm and fruit 
groves — located to the east, north, and south of the city — 
being incorporated as part of the urban sprawl. Manama also 
spread to the west through the reclamation of hundreds of 
hectares from the sea. Traditional brick houses, built with cen- 
tral courtyards and wind towers in the architectural style of 
southern Iran, and covered bazaars are found in the old sec- 
tions of the city. In the newer and less congested neighbor- 
hoods, multistory apartment complexes, high-rise hotels and 
office buildings, and supermarkets predominate. Because most 
of Bahrain's foreign workers tend to live in the city, their pres- 
ence provides Manama with a cosmopolitan atmosphere. 

The city of Al Muharraq, which had an estimated popula- 
tion of 75,000 in 1992, is the country's only other major city. 
Until the 1930s, the ruler lived in Al Muharraq; thus, for more 
than a century, the city served as Bahrain's political center, and 
its commercial importance rivaled that of Manama. Al Muhar- 
raq declined after the Al Khalifa family moved to the island of 
Bahrain, and for nearly forty years the city stagnated. During 
the 1970s, however, the construction of the US$60 million Arab 
Shipbuilding and Repair Yard adjacent to the fishing village of 
Al Hadd, located southeast of Bahrain International Airport, 
helped to stimulate an investment and development boom in 
the city. 

Bahrain's main towns are Jidd Hafs, Ar Rifaa, Sitrah, and 
Madinat Isa. Throughout the nineteenth century and during 
the first half of the twentieth, Jidd Hafs was a relatively prosper- 
ous village renowned for its extensive date palm groves and the 
manufacture of medicinal drugs from the buds, flowers, and 
pollen of palm trees. By 1975, however, Jidd Hafs had been 
transformed into Manama's largest suburb. Ar Rifaa, which 
originally consisted of two adjacent villages — Ar Rifaa ash 
Sharqi and Ar Rifaa al Gharbi, established in the nineteenth 
century near natural springs in the central region of Bahrain — 
grew rapidly after 1952 when Shaykh Salman ibn Hamad estab- 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

lished his official residence there. Ar Rifaa's importance as the 
country's political center has continued under Shaykh Isa ibn 
Salman, who constructed his palace in the town, as did several 
other members of the Al Khalifa. The town of Sitrah formerly 
consisted of several palm-cultivating villages, but extensive resi- 
dential construction during the 1970s fused the villages into 
one large suburban town. Madinat Isa was a planned commu- 
nity built to relieve the congestion in Manama and such close 
suburbs as Jidd Hafs and Sanabis. 

Society 
Education 

Bahrain has the oldest public education system in the Ara- 
bian Peninsula. The system was established in 1932 when the 
government assumed responsibility for operating two preexist- 
ing primary schools for boys. Subsequently, separate facilities 
for girls and various secondary programs were established. 
Since the 1970s, education has been one of the largest current 
government expenditures. Despite the intensity of government 
efforts, however, the literacy rate for adult citizens was only 
about 75 percent as recently as 1985. The literacy rate for 1990 
was estimated by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization to be 77 percent for adults (82 per- 
cent for males and 69 percent for females) . Nevertheless, liter- 
acy levels among Bahrainis born since independence in 1971 
were high because an estimated 70 percent of primary and sec- 
ondary school-age children attended school. 

In the 1991-92 academic year, 99,348 students attended 129 
public schools (see table 13, Appendix). Education in the pub- 
lic system, which included six-year primary schools, three-year 
intermediate schools, and three-year secular secondary 
schools, is free. Students receive supplies, uniforms, meals, and 
transportation to and from school at no charge. Almost all chil- 
dren in the six- to eleven-year-old age-group attend primary 
school, and about two-thirds of all twelve- to fourteen-year-olds 
are enrolled in intermediate schools. The number of girls 
attending public primary and intermediate schools was slightly 
less than the number of boys but exceeded the number of boys 
in secondary and vocational public schools. 

In addition to the public education system, there are forty- 
eight private and religious schools, including the United States- 
operated and accredited Bahrain International School, which 



120 



Bahrain 



offers classes from primary school through secondary school. 
There were 6,400 public school teachers in the 1988-89 aca- 
demic year, of whom 65 percent were native Bahrainis. Egyp- 
tians constituted the largest group of foreign teachers. 

In 1927 the first group of Bahrainis to receive a university 
education enrolled at the American University of Beirut in 
Lebanon. The first institution of higher education in Bahrain, 
the Gulf Polytechnic, was established in 1968 as the Gulf Tech- 
nical College. In 1984 Gulf Polytechnic merged with the Uni- 
versity College of Art, Science, and Education, founded in 
1979, to create a national university, the University of Bahrain, 
offering bachelor of arts and bachelor of science degrees. Dur- 
ing the 1991-92 academic year, more than 4,000 students, of 
whom more than one-half were women, studied at the Univer- 
sity of Bahrain. 

Bahrain had two additional institutions of higher education 
in 1993. The College of Health Sciences, established in 1976, 
offers various medical technology and nurses' training pro- 
grams. The Hotel and Catering Training Center, established in 
1974, offers postsecondary vocational courses in management 
and culinary arts. No longer an independent entity, the Ara- 
bian Gulf University (AGU) was established outside Ar Rifaa in 
1984 and funded by the six member countries of the GCC. 
Construction of AGU facilities, however, was delayed by the 
decline in oil revenues experienced by all GCC states in the 
mid-1980s. The first students graduated in 1989. All courses 
were discontinued in 1991 except for the College of Medicine, 
which accepted no new students for the 1991-92 academic 
year. 

Health and Welfare 

In 1925, when Bahrain was a British protectorate, the gov- 
ernment established free medical service, including immuniza- 
tion, outpatient treatment, and hospitalization. The availability 
of preventive and curative health care led to the virtual eradica- 
tion of such endemic and infectious diseases as smallpox, tra- 
choma, and dysentery. By the 1980s, life expectancy was 
estimated at sixty-five years. In 1993 Bahrain's comprehensive 
health care system included facilities for inpatient and outpa- 
tient dental care, general medical care, maternity care, ortho- 
pedic care, pediatric care, and psychiatric care. Almost all 
primary and secondary treatment within the public health sys- 
tem is free to citizens and foreign residents. 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

The largest public hospital is the 1,000-bed Salmaniya Medi- 
cal Center, which opened in 1978. The center is a general 
teaching hospital that has accident and emergency facilities 
and fully equipped laboratories. More than one-half of Bah- 
rain's 400 physicians work at Salmaniya. The public health sys- 
tem also includes twenty-seven regional health centers that 
provide such primary care as diagnostic services, minor sur- 
gery, dentistry, prenatal and postnatal care, and general family 
medical care. In addition, the system includes sixteen child wel- 
fare centers. The government also maintains the 135-bed Bah- 
rain Military Hospital, which is reserved for members of the 
armed forces and their families. 

In 1992 there were two small private hospitals in Bahrain. 
The forty-five-bed American Mission Hospital, operated by the 
United States-based Arabian Mission of the Dutch Reformed 
Church, is the oldest hospital in the country and is one of the 
oldest on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf. Many members of 
the country's ruling elite were born at this hospital, and they 
continue to come to it for medical care. The newer, twenty- 
three-bed International Hospital caters to very wealthy 
patients. 

The government established a social security system in 1976. 
The General Organization of Social Insurance (GOSI) was set 
up to administer the program, which provides pensions (since 
1986) and compensation for work-related accidents. Only Bah- 
raini citizens are eligible for retirement pensions, but both 
nationals and foreign workers are covered against accidents. 
GOSI requires all companies employing at least ten persons to 
participate in the program. GOSI collects 7 percent of an 
employee's monthly salary for the pension program and 
requires employers to contribute an additional amount equiva- 
lent to 1 1 percent of a Bahraini's monthly pay. Employers pay 
an extra 3 percent of their payrolls to cover all employees 
against accidents. 

The Economy 

Agriculture and Fishing 

Despite the scant rainfall and poor soil, agriculture histori- 
cally was an important sector of the economy. Before the devel- 
opment of the oil industry, date palm cultivation dominated 
Bahrain's agriculture, producing sufficient dates for both 
domestic consumpdon and export. At least twenty-three variet- 



122 



Bahrain 



ies of dates are grown, and the leaves, branches, buds, and flow- 
ers of the date palm also are used extensively. From the 1950s 
through the 1970s, changing food consumption habits, as well 
as the increasing salinity of the aquifers that served as irriga- 
tion sources, led to a gradual decline in date cultivation. By the 
1980s, a significant number of palm groves had been replaced 
by new kinds of agricultural activities, including vegetable gar- 
dens, nurseries for trees and flowers, poultry production, and 
dairy farms. 

By 1993 Bahrain's cultivated area had been reduced from 
6,000 hectares before independence to 1,500 hectares. The cul- 
tivated land consists of about 10,000 plots ranging in size from 
a few square meters to four hectares. These plots are distrib- 
uted among approximately 800 owners. A minority of large 
owners, including individuals and institutions, are absentee 
landlords who control about 60 percent of all cultivable land. 
The ruling Al Khalifa own the greatest number of plots, includ- 
ing the largest and most productive ones, although public 
information pertaining to the distribution of ownership among 
family members is not available. Absentee owners rent their 
plots to farmers, generally on the basis of three-year contracts. 
There are approximately 2,400 farmers, 70 percent of whom 
do not own the land they cultivate. 

The small size of most plots and the maldistribution of own- 
ership has tended to discourage investment in agriculture. In 
addition, the number of skilled farmworkers progressively 
declined after 1975 because an increasing number of villagers 
obtained high-paying, nonagricultural jobs. Despite these 
impediments, official government policy since 1980 has aimed 
at expanding domestic production of crops through such pro- 
grams as free distribution of seeds, technical assistance in 
adopting new and more efficient irrigation technologies, and 
low-interest credit. Although these programs have contributed 
to significant increases in the production of eggs, milk, and 
vegetables, the circumscribed extent of Bahrain's cultivable 
area limits the island's potential productive capacity. Conse- 
quently, agricultural imports remain a permanent aspect of the 
country's international trade. In 1993 the main food imports 
included fruits, vegetables, meat, live animals (for slaughter), 
cereals, and dairy products. 

The waters surrounding Bahrain traditionally have been 
rich in more than 200 varieties of fish, many of which consti- 
tute a staple of the diet. Before the development of the oil 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

industry, most males engaged in some form of fishing. In addi- 
tion, the pearl industry constituted one of the most important 
bases of the island's wealth, and more than 2,000 pearling boats 
operated during the late 1920s. After 1935 both fishing and 
pearling as occupations steadily declined. Although the pros- 
pect of steady wages attracted many pearl divers to oil-related 
jobs, pearling was even more adversely affected by the develop- 
ment in Japan of the cultured pearl. By 1953 only twelve pearl- 
ing boats remained, and these all disappeared within a decade. 
Fishing declined more gradually, but by the early 1970s fewer 
than 1,000 fishermen continued to ply their trade. Fewer fish- 
ermen meant less fish available in the market despite rising 
consumer demand, and this situation led to the annual impor- 
tation of tons of fish to supplement the local catch. In 1981 the 
government launched a program to revitalize the fishing indus- 
try by introducing trawlers, motorizing the traditional dhows, 
expanding jetties, constructing cold storage facilities, and 
offering training courses on the use and maintenance of mod- 
ern fishing equipment. These initiatives contributed to an 
increase in the total fish catch, which, according to estimates of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
was 9,200 tons in 1989. 

Pollution in the Persian Gulf became a problem in the 
1970s. Shrimp in the northern gulf seemed particularly sensi- 
tive to marine pollution, and by 1979 they had almost disap- 
peared from waters near Bahrain. Pollution was seriously 
aggravated in 1983 and again in 1991 by major oil slicks that 
emanated from war-damaged oil facilities and covered several 
thousand square kilometers of water in the northern Persian 
Gulf. The slicks were detrimental to the unique marine life in 
the vicinity of Bahrain, including coral reefs, sea turtles, dug- 
ongs (herbivorous sea mammals similar to manatees), oyster 
beds and shrimp beds, numerous fish species, and water fowl. 
The oil slicks, especially those of 1991, adversely affected the 
fishing industry, but as of early 1993, marine biologists 
remained uncertain about the long-term ecological impact of 
the pollution. 

Petroleum Industry 

In 1929 the San Francisco-based Standard Oil Company of 
California (Socal) — now known as Chevron — set up a subsid- 
iary to acquire an oil exploration and production concession 
on the island of Bahrain. Socal drilling crews discovered oil in 



124 



Bahrain 



1932, and two years later the first shipment of crude oil was 
exported from Sitrah. By 1935, when sixteen oil wells were in 
production and construction of the Bahrain refinery com- 
menced, the royalties that Socal paid to the government consti- 
tuted more than 40 percent of the state budget. In 1936 Socal 
sold half of its oil interest to the Texas Oil Company (Texaco) 
and, with its new corporate partner, formed the Bahrain Petro- 
leum Company (Bapco). In the years up to independence in 
1971, Bapco oil revenues annually averaged 60 percent of gov- 
ernment income and helped to finance major development, 
education, and health programs. The government of Bahrain 
acquired a 60 percent interest in Bapco in 1975 and assumed 
control of the remaining 40 percent in 1980. 

Bahrain's proven oil reserves are limited in comparison with 
the other lower Persian Gulf states (see fig. 7). As early as 1965, 
Bapco estimated that one-half of the island's total oil had been 
depleted. Oil production peaked in 1977 at 77,000 barrels per 
day (bpd-see Glossary) and steadily declined thereafter. 

During the 1970s and early 1980s, two developments helped 
to maintain the government's relatively high income from oil 
revenues despite declining production. First was Bahrain's 
share of profits from the offshore Abu Safah oil field in the Per- 
sian Gulf between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. When the two 
countries demarcated their marine boundaries in 1958, Bah- 
rain ceded its claims to an area of the gulf north of the island 
in return for a Saudi agreement to share the profits from any 
oil that might be discovered there. Subsequently, oil in com- 
mercial quantities was found in the seabed, and from 1968 to 
1986, revenues from the Abu Safah field contributed signifi- 
cantly to Bahrain's overall oil income. Since production from 
the Abu Safah field ceased in early 1987, Saudi Arabia has pro- 
vided Bahrain with 75,000 bpd of crude oil as compensation 
for this loss. 

The second development was the more than tenfold 
increase in oil revenues that followed the December 1973 deci- 
sion by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries (OPEC) to triple the international price of crude oil. 
During 1974 and 1975, income from oil accounted for an 
unprecedented 80 percent of government revenues, although 
this percentage gradually declined in subsequent years. Never- 
theless, as long as oil prices remained high, oil revenues 
remained high. At the end of 1985, however, Saudi Arabia sig- 
nificantly increased its own oil production, which resulted in a 



127 




Figure 7. Lower Gu lf States: Oil Fields, Gas Fields, a nd Refi neries, 1993 
126 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

glut of oil on international markets and caused prices to fall by 
more than 50 percent in just a few months. Bapco could not 
increase production from its declining oil fields beyond 42,000 
bpd, and consequently Bahrain's oil revenues in 1986 were 65 
percent less than in 1985. Oil revenues did not increase sub- 
stantially until 1990, when the regional political crisis that 
accompanied Iraq's invasion of Kuwait precipitated a rise in oil 
prices. In 1991 oil revenues constituted about 62 percent of 
revenues in the government's budget (see table 14, Appendix). 

Although Bahrain has had an oil-based economy since 1935, 
by 1993 proven reserves were estimated at 200 million barrels, 
and the government anticipated that all oil would be depleted 
by 2005. Nevertheless, the country's economists expected oil to 
remain important long beyond that date because of the large 
refinery Bapco has operated at Sitrah since 1937. Periodically 
expanded and modernized, the refinery has the capacity to 
process 250,000 bpd of crude oil, at least five times the amount 
produced by the island's oil wells (see table 15, Appendix). 
During 1992 the United States firm Bechtel Corporation began 
expanding the refinery's capacity to 360,000 bpd. More than 80 
percent of the petroleum that the refinery processes comes via 
pipeline from Saudi Arabia. The Sitrah refinery has been refin- 
ing Saudi crude oil since 1938 and expects to continue to do so 
well into the twenty-first century. Its refined petroleum prod- 
ucts, most of which are exported, include aviation fuel, fuel oil, 
and gasoline. 

Substantial deposits of natural gas are associated with Bah- 
rain's oil fields. Before 1979, when the government established 
the Bahrain National Gas Company (Banagas), an estimated 3 
million cubic meters per day of this gas were being vented to 
the atmosphere. Banagas opened a gas liquefaction plant that 
collected this gas and processed it into propane, butane, and 
naphtha. There are also large deposits of natural gas in the 
Khuff field, which is separate from the oil fields. Banagas has 
drilled more than fifteen wells to tap this gas, which is used for 
fuel to power the oil refinery, electric generators, and the water 
desalination plant. Some of the gas is reinjected into the oil 
fields to maintain reservoir pressure and stimulate production. 
In 1990 Banagas estimated total natural gas reserves at 209 tril- 
lion cubic meters; daily production averaged about 20 million 
cubic meters. 



128 



Bahrain 



Other Industry 

By 1965 the government recognized that the island's long- 
term prosperity could not depend on the limited extent of its 
oil reserves. Accordingly, the government adopted industrial 
diversification as a primary objective of its economic policy. 
Tax incentives and low-interest loans encouraged private entre- 
preneurs to construct several small-scale manufacturing plants, 
including factories producing plastics, ceramic tiles, paper 
products, and carbonated beverages. The government 
assumed a more active role in the establishment of large-scale 
industry, as a result of which manufacturing contributed 13 
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) in 
1986 (see table 16, Appendix). The two most important exam- 
ples of large-scale industry were the aluminum plant and the 
ship-repair yard. 

Aluminium Bahrain (Alba) was incorporated in 1968 as a 
joint government and private investment company for the con- 
struction of a mill to process imported raw alumina. Located 
near the Bapco refinery, the Alba plant began production in 
1971 with an initial capacity of 99,000 tons of aluminum ingots. 
Since commencing operations, the Alba facilities have 
expanded considerably and by 1990 had an annual productive 
capacity of more than 215,000 tons. Associated with Alba are 
two other aluminum plants built during the 1980s. The Gulf 
Aluminium Rolling Mill Company (Garmco), a joint venture of 
the six member countries of the GCG, produces aluminum 
strip and sheet. The Bahrain Aluminium Extrusion Company 
(Balexco), owned 100 percent by the government, produces 
aluminum doors, window frames, and other products used by 
the construction industry. A third concern, the jointly owned 
Bahrain-Saudi Aluminium Marketing Company (Balco), mar- 
kets Alba's products throughout the Middle East and Asia. 

In 1977 the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard Company 
(ASRY) was inaugurated near Al Hadd. ASRYwas a joint ven- 
ture of Bahrain and the six other members of the Organization 
of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). This large 
dry-dock facility has accommodations for up to ten supertank- 
ers simultaneously, and it annually repairs an average of seventy 
ships. 

Labor 

Bahrain's total labor force was estimated at 160,000 in 1992. 
Foreign workers constituted about 55 percent of the labor 



129 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

force, a slight decline from the 58 percent they had constituted 
in 1981. Foreign participation in the labor force increased dra- 
matically after 1971, when such workers had constituted 37 per- 
cent of the economically active population. The composition 
of the foreign work force also has changed significantly. During 
the 1960s, more than one-half of all foreign workers came from 
Oman and Iran. Since the late 1970s, one-half of all foreign 
workers have come from South Asia, predominantly from India 
and Pakistan but also from Bangladesh, the Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, and Thailand. South Asian workers constituted 13 per- 
cent of the total population in 1990 and Iranians, 6 percent. 
Less than 10 percent of foreign workers come from other Arab 
countries. Egyptians, about one-half of whom teach in Bah- 
rain's public schools, constitute the largest group of foreign 
Arabs, followed by Palestinians, most of whom hold Jordanian 
passports, and Lebanese. Arabs are more likely than Asians to 
be accompanied by dependents. 

The government requires all foreign workers to possess 
valid residence and work permits. Although work permits are 
renewable after the expiration of the original contract period, 
authorities do not encourage long-term residency of foreign 
nationals. Most of the foreign workers, who are unskilled and 
semiskilled laborers, have few incentives to live in Bahrain per- 
manently because their families generally remain in their 
home countries. These workers consequently remit a consider- 
able portion of their employment income to their families in 
their countries of origin. 

As the proportion of citizens declined to less than one-half 
the labor force, government planners drew up programs and 
laws designed to replace foreign workers with Bahraini nation- 
als. Within the private sector, which provides jobs for more 
than two-thirds of all foreign nationals, employers have the 
option of designing their own special courses for training citi- 
zens or providing funds to finance government-operated train- 
ing courses. Companies pay a special levy, equal to 4 percent of 
the salary of every employed foreigner but only equal to 2 per- 
cent for every local employee. At the completion of a foreign 
worker's contract, officials of the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs urge the hiring company to take on more nationals. 

Efforts to make employment indigenous encourage the par- 
ticipation of women in the labor force. Women, who consti- 
tuted about 15 percent of all employees in the early 1990s, 
work outside the home in far greater numbers in Bahrain than 



130 



Worker practicing 
traditional craft 
of weaving 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Bahrain, Washington 



Members of an oil- 
drilling rig at work 
Courtesy Embassy of 



Bahrain, Washington 



in any other state of the Arabian Peninsula. The most dramatic 
rise in female employment occurred during the decade of the 
1970s. Between 1971 and 1981, the proportion of women in 
the labor force increased from 3.8 to 13.3 percent. Bahraini 
women predominate in such traditionally female occupations 
as teaching and nursing, but, since the early 1980s, increasing 
numbers of women have been employed in administration, 
banking, commerce, finance, engineering, and the civil ser- 
vice. Despite the trend toward greater female participation in 
the work force, about 82 percent of Bahraini women do not 
work outside the home. The overwhelming majority of working 
women tend to be single women who work for two to five years 
after completing secondary school or university and before 
marriage. 

In an effort to encourage continued participation of women 
in the labor force after marriage, the government has enacted 



131 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

labor legislation favorable to working mothers. For example, 
all employers are required to grant new mothers forty-five days 
of maternity leave at full pay plus fifteen days at half-pay. In 
addition, employers are obligated to provide nursing periods 
for new mothers. The law also forbids discrimination against 
working mothers. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Bahrain's small size and level terrain made the development 
of its excellent road system easy. In 1993 the country had more 
than 200 kilometers of paved roads linking all populated areas 
of the island. Two paved roads and several gravel roads run 
through the sparsely inhabited southern half. A twenty-five- 
kilometer causeway, completed in 1986, allows traffic to cross 
to Saudi Arabia. A second causeway links the capital with the 
international airport on the island of Al Muharraq. With its 
3,660-meter runway, Bahrain International Airport can handle 
the largest airplanes in use. In 1993 it was the eastern terminus 
for British Airways nonstop service from London using the 
Concorde. Gulf Air, jointly owned by Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, 
and Oman, provides regularly scheduled service to more than 
twenty international destinations. 

Bahrain's main port is Mina Salman on the tip of the island 
of Bahrain. Opened in 1962 and expanded several times there- 
after, Mina Salman has sixteen berths and can handle vessels 
with a draught of up to nine meters. Crude and refined petro- 
leum passes through the port of Sitrah, about ten kilometers 
southeast of Manama. A dry dock on the southern end of the 
island of Al Muharraq handles repairs of ships of up to 500,000 
tons. 

The telecommunications system is modern and has good 
domestic service and excellent international connections. In 
1992 the country had some 98,000 telephones, or eighteen per 
100 inhabitants, one of the highest per capita figures in the 
Middle East. Radio-relay and submarine cables link Bahrain 
with all its neighbors. Three satellite ground stations — one 
operating with International Telecommunications Satellite 
Corporation's (Intelsat) Atlantic Ocean satellite, one operating 
with Intelsat's Indian Ocean satellite, and one operating as part 
of the Arab Satellite Communication Organization (Arabsat) 
system — provide excellent international telephone and data 
links and live television broadcasts. Two AM and three FM 
radio stations provide broadcast services in Arabic and English. 



132 



Control tower personnel 
at Bahrain 
International Airport, 
on Al Muharraq, 
Bahrain 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Bahrain, Washington 



Causeway from Bahrain 
to Al Khubar, Saudi Arabia 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Bahrain, Washington 




133 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

A shortwave AM station beams programs in Arabic throughout 
the Middle East. 

Banking and Finance 

Bahrain's first commercial bank, a branch of the British- 
owned Eastern Bank, opened in 1921. Two decades passed 
before a second bank, the British Bank of the Middle East, set 
up an office. It was not until 1957 that the first bank wholly 
owned by Bahraini citizens, the private National Bank of Bah- 
rain, commenced activities. Prior to 1965, when the govern- 
ment introduced the Bahraini dinar (for value of the Bahraini 
dinar — see Glossary), the Indian rupee had functioned as the 
most commonly accepted currency for local transactions. The 
lack of an indigenous currency probably impeded the develop- 
ment of the banking sector. Once the Bahraini dinar replaced 
the Indian rupee and established itself as a strong, internation- 
ally convertible currency, banks began to find the island a more 
attractive location; by 1974 fourteen commercial banks oper- 
ated in Bahrain. 

The increase in the number of banks after independence 
prompted the government to consider creating a central mon- 
etary authority to regulate banking activities. In 1973 Shaykh 
Isa ibn Salman issued a decree that established the Bahrain 
Monetary Agency (BMA) as a legal entity possessing the powers 
of a central bank. In addition to its regulatory responsibilities, 
BMA issues currency, sets the official exchange rates for the 
Bahraini dinar, serves as a depository for government funds 
from petroleum production and its foreign currency reserves, 
and manages the government's investments. 

In 1975 BMA promulgated regulations for the creation of 
offshore banking units (OBUs) modeled on those operating in 
Singapore. OBUs are branches of international commercial 
banks exempted from foreign-exchange controls, cash reserve 
requirements, taxes on interest paid to depositors, and bank- 
ing income taxes that are required of other banks in Bahrain. 
In return for these privileges, OBUs pay the government 
annual license fees, are prohibited from accepting deposits 
from citizens and residents of Bahrain, and must refrain from 
transactions involving Bahraini dinars. The OBU program has 
been successful; twenty-six OBUs were established during the 
first year. The civil war in Lebanon probably stimulated the 
OBU boom because several international banks based in 
Beirut transferred their Middle East operations to Bahrain 



134 



Bahrain 



after 1975. By the early 1980s, a total of seventy-five OBUs hav- 
ing assets in excess of US$62 billion were operating out of Bah- 
rain. 

Beginning in 1985, falling oil prices and a corresponding 
decline in oil revenues dramatically reduced the funds depos- 
ited in both onshore banks and OBUs. Several banks decided 
not to renew their OBU licenses, resulting in a net loss of 
OBUs. Nevertheless, a majority of OBUs, including those that 
are branches of leading United States, Arab, European, and 
Japanese banks, continue to operate from Bahrain-based 
offices. In 1990 a total of fifty-five OBUs were located on the 
island. Despite the fluctuations in Persian Gulf financial mar- 
kets of the 1980s, Bahrain is well established as the principal 
banking and financial center of the gulf region. 

Budget 

The annual budget is the government's principal instru- 
ment of economic development and its barometer of progress. 
It projects total revenues from all sources, including petro- 
leum, taxes, customs duties, investments, and foreign govern- 
ment transfers. It also includes projected expenditures for 
government salaries, services, and development projects. The 
annual budget is supplemented by biennial budgets and six- 
year development plans. The budget indicated that Bahrain's 
GDP for 1990 was about US$4.0 billion, or a per capita GDP of 
US$7,500. 

Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments 

Traditionally, Bahrain was the entrepot and distribution 
center for the northern Persian Gulf region. Since indepen- 
dence it has lost much of its role as a result of the development 
of nearby Saudi Arabian ports and strong competition from 
Dubayy in the UAE in the southern gulf. Oil continues to be 
the most important item in the country's international trade, 
representing well over one-half of the total value of both 
exports and imports. The industrial diversification program 
has resulted in the creation of non-oil manufactured exports, 
while investments in agriculture have reduced significantly the 
importation of certain food commodities. 

The total value of imports in 1989 was about US$2.82 bil- 
lion, a 34 percent decrease from the 1982 total of US$3.7 bil- 
lion (see table 17, Appendix). The cost of crude petroleum, 
imported from Saudi Arabia for processing at the Sitrah oil 



135 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

refinery, declined to US$1.5 billion in 1988, compared with 
US$1.9 billion in 1982 and US$2.5 billion in 1981. This signifi- 
cant drop, however, resulted more from the steady fall in inter- 
national oil prices than from a decrease in the actual number 
of barrels imported. The major non-oil imports included 
machinery and transportation equipment, manufactured 
goods, alumina, chemicals, food, and live animals. 

In 1989 Bahrain's principal trading partners were Britain, 
the United States, and Japan, accounting for approximately 
16.3 percent, 12.4 percent, and 10.5 percent, respectively, of 
total imports (see table 18, Appendix). Other major import 
sources included Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany), Italy, and Saudi Arabia. 

In 1989 the value of Bahrain's exports was US$2.83 billion, 
down 12 percent from 1984. Depressed oil prices, especially in 
the 1986-88 period, continued to erode the value of oil and oil 
products, the principal components of the export trade. Non- 
oil exports consisted of manufactured goods, in particular alu- 
minum products but also some construction materials. The 
chief trading partners were Saudi Arabia, the United States, 
and the UAE, accounting for 18.2 percent, 7.3 percent, and 6.9 
percent, respectively, of all exports in 1989. Other export mar- 
kets included Japan, India, Kuwait, and the Republic of Korea 
(South Korea). 

The value of Bahrain's imports was slightly less than the 
value of its exports in 1989. Preliminary estimates for 1990 indi- 
cated that the trade balance would also have a slight surplus. 
The favorable balance was attributed to the dramatic rise in oil 
prices that followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 

Government and Politics 

In 1993 Bahrain was a constitutional monarchy in the form 
of an amirate with an executive-cabinet form of government 
and a separate judiciary (see fig. 8). The amir is head of state 
and also supreme commander of the Bahrain Defense Force 
(BDF); he exercises ultimate authority in all matters pertaining 
to the government. In addition to the amir, Shaykh Isa ibn Sal- 
man, principal government officials include his eldest son and 
heir apparent, Hamad ibn Isa, who is commander in chief of 
the BDF and deputy prime minister, and several other mem- 
bers of the ruling Al Khalifa. In accordance with the constitu- 
tion adopted in 1973, the office of amir passes from father to 
eldest son unless the amir designates another male relative to 



136 



Bahrain 



succeed him. This clause of the constitution is not subject to 
amendment. 

Although the amir has substantial executive powers, in prac- 
tice he has delegated decision-making authority to a cabinet 
since 1956, when an amiri decree created the Administrative 
Council, an eleven-member body that advised the ruler on pol- 
icy and supervised the growing bureaucracy. In 1970 Shaykh 
Isa ibn Salman issued a decree that transformed the Adminis- 
trative Council into a twelve-member Council of Ministers. The 
president of the Council of Ministers, the prime minister, 
serves as the head of government. The amir appoints the 
prime minister, who then forms a government by selecting 
members of the Council of Ministers, albeit in consultation 
with the amir. The ministers are directly responsible to the 
prime minister, who, like the amir, has authority to veto a deci- 
sion by any member of the council. 

The Council of Ministers gradually expanded to include 
eighteen members, including the prime minister and the dep- 
uty prime minister. In late 1992, the prime minister, deputy 
prime minister, and six of the sixteen ministers were members 
of the ruling Al Khalifa. The prime minister, Khalifa ibn Sal- 
man, is the brother of the amir. The amir's son holds the cabi- 
net rank of deputy prime minister. The amir's uncle, Major 
General Khalifa ibn Ahmad, is minister of defense; and the 
amir's two first cousins, Muhammad ibn Khalifa and Muham- 
mad ibn Mubarak, are minister of interior and minister of for- 
eign affairs, respectively. Khalifa ibn Salman, the son of the 
amir's second cousin, is minister of labor and social affairs. A 
more distantly related cousin, Abd Allah ibn Khalid, a first 
cousin of the amir's grandfather, is minister of justice and 
Islamic affairs. 

The Constitutional Experiment 

On December 16, 1971, the day Bahrain formally became 
independent of Britain (Bahrain technically gained its inde- 
pendence earlier in the year, on August 15), Shaykh Isa ibn Sal- 
man announced that the country would have a constitutional 
form of government. Six months later, he issued a decree pro- 
viding for the election of representatives to a Constituent 
Assembly, charged with drafting and ratifying a constitution. 
The assembly was to consist of twenty-two elected delegates 
plus twenty additional members, including eight delegates 
appointed by the amir and the twelve members of the Council 



137 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 




138 



Bahrain 



of Ministers. The election, which was held in December 1972, 
was the first national election in Bahrain's history. The elector- 
ate was restricted, however, to native-born male citizens aged 
twenty years and older. 

The relative openness of political debate permitted during 
the election campaign for the twenty-two contested Constitu- 
ent Assembly seats encouraged individuals dissatisfied with the 
lack of democratic rights to demand more civil liberties. The 
primary focus of concern was the 1965 Law of Public Security, a 
series of three amiri decrees that authorized the ruler to main- 
tain indefinitely a virtual state of emergency in order to protect 
national security from suspected foreign and domestic ene- 
mies. A group of mostly university-educated professionals, led 
by Abd al Aziz Shamlan, unsuccessfully petitioned the amir to 
rescind the law's harshest provisions, especially those pertain- 
ing to arrest and detention. They believed these measures had 
been used arbitrarily to silence dissent and peaceful opposi- 
tion. Several women's groups also organized to protest the 
exclusion of women from the franchise. They presented a peti- 
tion to the amir requesting support for extending voting rights 
to female citizens, but they failed to receive a positive response. 

The Constituent Assembly was in session during most of 
1973. It approved a constitution of 108 articles. The constitu- 
tion, enacted by amiri decree in December 1973, provided for 
an advisory legislative body, the National Assembly, consisting 
of thirty members elected for four-year terms, plus all the mem- 
bers of the Council of Ministers, whose terms were not fixed. 
The assembly was not empowered to initiate or enact legisla- 
tion, but it was authorized to give advice and consent to laws 
proposed by the Council of Ministers. The assembly had the 
right to question individual ministers about policies and to 
withdraw confidence from any minister except the prime min- 
ister. The constitution stipulated that the amir could dissolve 
the assembly at his discretion, provided he make public the 
grounds for so doing. If the assembly were dissolved by decree, 
new elections had to take place within two months or the disso- 
lution would be invalidated and the dismissed members rein- 
stated. 

Elections for the National Assembly took place in December 
1973, with the franchise restricted, as in the Constituent Assem- 
bly election, to male citizens. In theory, the thirty elected rep- 
resentatives were independents because political parties were 
not permitted; in practice, several of the assemblymen openly 



139 



Persian Gulf States: Cou ntry Studies 

supported the positions and views of banned political organiza- 
tions, including the National Front for the Liberation of Bah- 
rain, which espoused Marxist economic ideas. Consequently, 
two distinct coalitions emerged in the assembly: the People's 
Bloc, consisting of eight members who advocated the legaliza- 
don of labor unions and the abolidon of the 1965 security mea- 
sures; and the Religious Bloc, consisting of six Shia members 
who supported labor reforms and various social restrictions, 
such as a ban on the sale of alcoholic beverages. The majority 
of elected members — sixteen representatives — comprised a 
heterogeneous group of independents whose individual posi- 
tions shifted with the issues. The People's Bloc and the Reli- 
gious Bloc tended to refer to the independents pejoratively as 
the Government Bloc because they usually tried to effect com- 
promises between the ministers and their National Assembly 
critics. 

Although the National Assembly lacked authority to prevent 
the government from enacting legislation that assembly mem- 
bers opposed, this situation did not impede policy debates. The 
unprecedented public debates attracted wide interest and, 
from the perspective of the regime, seemed to erode its legiti- 
macy. During the winter and spring of 1975, a prolonged 
debate over a new state security decree proved especially trou- 
blesome for the government. It appeared that most indepen- 
dents, as well as the Religious Bloc, supported the demand of 
the People's Bloc that the decree, issued in December 1974 
without prior consultation with the assembly, be submitted to 
the legislature for ratification before its implementation. The 
issue was unresolved as of May 1975, when the assembly 
recessed for the summer. In August, before the members 
reconvened, the amir dissolved the National Assembly, citing 
its inability to cooperate with the government. Although the 
constitution stipulated that new elections had to take place 
within two months of a dissolution, this did not occur. One year 
later, in August 1976, Shaykh Isa ibn Salman announced that 
the National Assembly would remain dissolved indefinitely. 

In January 1993, a new elected body, the thirty-member 
Consultative Council, met for the first time. The session dis- 
cussed employment and training matters as groundwork for 
the formulation of a new labor law. 

Although there are no political parties through which citi- 
zens can express views, they can petition the amir for redress of 
grievances. The amir holds a regular majlis, or public meeting, 



140 



Shaykh Isa ibn Salman 
Al Khalifa, ruler of 
Bahrain 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Bahrain, Washington 



Manama, 
capital of Bahrain 
Courtesy Embassy of 
Bahrain, Washington 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

at which he listens to views of citizens and accepts petitions for 
his intervention in dealing with the bureaucracy or some other 
problem. Officials of the islands' eleven municipalities follow 
the amir's example and hold local versions of the national maj- 
lis. 

Legal System 

The legal system of Bahrain in 1993 was based on several 
sources, including customary tribal law (urf), three separate 
schools of Islamic sharia law, and civil law as embodied in 
codes, ordinances, and regulations. Sharia law includes the 
Maliki school of Islamic law (from Abd Allah Malik ibn Anas, 
an eighth-century Muslim jurist from Medina) and the Shafii 
school of Islamic law (from Muhammad ibn Idris ash Shafii, a 
late eighth-century Muslim jurist from Mecca). Both of these 
schools are recognized by Sunni Muslims (see Sunni Islam, ch. 
1). The third school is the eighth-century Jaafari (fromjaafar 
ibn Muhammad, also known asjaafar as Sadiq, the Sixth 
Imam) school of Twelve Imam Muslims, recognized by Shia 
(see Shia Islam, ch. 1). Civil law is heavily influenced by British 
common law, inasmuch as it was developed by British legal 
advisers beginning in the 1920s and continuing up to the eve of 
independence in 1971. 

According to the constitution of 1973, the judiciary is an 
independent and separate branch of government. However, 
the highest judicial authority, the minister of justice and 
Islamic affairs, is appointed by, and responsible to, the prime 
minister. The amir, who retains the power of pardon, is at the 
pinnacle of the judicial system. 

Bahrain has a dual court system, consisting of civil and 
sharia courts. Sharia courts deal primarily with personal status 
matters (such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance). Sharia 
courts of first instance are located in all communities. A single 
sharia Court of Appeal sits at Manama. Appeals beyond the 
jurisdiction of the sharia Court of Appeal are taken to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, which is part of the civil system (see 
Bahrain: Internal Security, ch. 7). 

The civil court system consists of summary courts and a 
supreme court. Summary courts of first instance are located in 
all communities and include separate urf, civil, and criminal 
sections. The Supreme Court of Appeal hears appeals from the 
summary courts. The Supreme Court of Appeal is the highest 



142 



Bahrain 



appellate court in the country and also decides on the constitu- 
tionality of laws and regulations. 

The Media 

In 1965 the government issued a press law that required all 
newspapers to be licensed by the Ministry of Information 
before beginning publication. The same law regulated the con- 
tents of reports that could be published, prohibiting, for exam- 
ple, articles deemed offensive to the reputation of the ruling 
family or harmful to national security. Violations could result 
in the suspension of a publishing license and prosecution. 

In 1993 Bahrain had two daily Arabic newspapers, AlAyam 
(The Days) and Akhbar al Khali] (Gulf News), which had a com- 
bined circulation in excess of 45,000. In addition, there was 
one English-language paper, the Gulf Daily News, with a circula- 
tion of 11,500. Several weekly and monthly periodicals also are 
published. 

Foreign Relations 

Since independence in 1971, one of the most important 
objectives of Bahrain's foreign policy has been to contain per- 
ceived threats to the country's security. As the smallest state in 
the region, Bahrain feels vulnerable to political influences 
emanating from more powerful neighbors, in particular Iran 
and Iraq, and it regards close ties to Saudi Arabia and other 
Arab monarchial regimes as a means of countering these 
potentially harmful influences. During the 1970s, for example, 
the Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party media in Bagh- 
dad frequently denounced Manama as an enemy of Arab 
nationalism and a puppet of Washington's imperialism because 
it allowed United States naval vessels to use a naval base in Bah- 
rain. The government also believes that Baghdad has provided 
financial and other support to Bahraini opposition groups call- 
ing for the overthrow of the Al Khalifa dynasty. Although Iraq 
moderated its policies toward Bahrain in the late 1970s, the Ira- 
nian Revolution of 1979 confronted the government with new 
ideological challenges. Some Shia clergy in Tehran denounced 
the institution of monarchy as un-Islamic, and some Shia politi- 
cal dissidents in Bahrain embraced this message enthusiasti- 
cally. During the 1980s, government officials suspected Iranian 
complicity in four separate plots that it maintained were aimed 
at the overthrow of the regime. 



143 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 aroused security 
concerns that Bahrain shared with the other five Arab monar- 
chies in the gulf: Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and Saudi 
Arabia. During the 1970s, Bahrain lobbied these countries to 
cooperate in defense matters, but, other than bilateral agree- 
ments, little came from these efforts. By early 1981, when the 
fighting between Iran and Iraq appeared to have settled into a 
long-term conflict, attitudes changed, and all five Arabian Pen- 
insula oil-producing states joined Bahrain in the GCC. Ostensi- 
bly, the GCC agreement emphasized economic cooperation, 
but the level of cooperation in security matters increased annu- 
ally. For Bahrain this meant financial assistance for expanding 
its defense forces and facilities and the opportunity to partici- 
pate in joint training maneuvers (see Collective Security under 
the Gulf Cooperation Council, ch. 7). When fellow GCC mem- 
ber Kuwait was invaded by Iraq in 1990, Bahrain joined the col- 
lective military effort against Iraq by sending a small 
contingent of troops to the front lines in Saudi Arabia. It also 
permitted United States military forces to use its naval and air 
facilities (see Bahrain: Role in the Persian Gulf War, ch. 7). 

Since 1981 Bahrain's most important foreign relations have 
been with its GCC allies, although problems with individual 
members of the GCC have developed. The most serious prob- 
lems have been with Qatar. Bahrain and Qatar have unresolved 
territorial disputes stemming from the nineteenth century 
when the Al Thani of Qatar foreswore allegiance to the Al Khal- 
ifa and established a separate amirate. In the twentieth century, 
the two states have contested sovereignty over Hawar and the 
adjacent islands, the closest of which is fewer than two kilome- 
ters from Qatar's west coast. In 1939, when both countries were 
still dependencies of Britain, London ruled that the islands 
belonged to Bahrain. Qatar never accepted this decision and 
periodically has raised the issue. Incidents connected with this 
dispute occurred in 1978, in 1982, and in 1986, but each time 
they were defused by the mediation of other GCC states. The 
most serious crisis, from April to June 1986, involved Qatari 
forces raiding the Fasht ad Dibal coral reef island north of Al 
Muharraq and seizing twenty-nine foreign workers who were 
building a coast guard station for the government of Bahrain. 
The workers were released in May, and installations on the 
island were destroyed. Qatar submitted the dispute to the 
International Court of Justice in The Hague, but Bahrain 
refused the jurisdiction of the court in June 1992. The dispute 



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Bahrain 



was ongoing as of early 1993. In July 1991, according to reports, 
Qatari naval vessels violated Bahraini waters, and Bahraini jet 
fighters flew into Qatari airspace. In August this issue, too, was 
referred to the International Court of Justice to determine 
whether it had jurisdiction over the dispute. Other disputes 
have involved the abandoned town of Az Zubarah on the 
northwest coast of Qatar. These incidents tended to strain over- 
all relations with Qatar (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4; Territorial 
Disputes, ch. 7). 

Outside the Persian Gulf region, Bahrain has cordial rela- 
tions with other countries. The two non-Arab countries with 
which it maintains the closest relations are Britain and the 
United States. After the Persian Gulf War, Bahrain held negoti- 
ations with Washington that culminated in October 1991 in the 
signing of a defense cooperation agreement. The terms of this 
agreement permit the United States to pre-position military 
supplies and equipment in Bahrain and to use its military facil- 
ities. 

Bahrain is a member of several international organizations, 
including the United Nations, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF — see Glossary), and the World Health Organiza- 
tion. It also belongs to several regional organizations, the most 
important of which is the League of Arab States, as well as to 
OPEC and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 

* * * 

Bahrain has not received much scholarly attention but gen- 
erally is covered in books that deal with the Persian Gulf. Nev- 
ertheless, the country has been the focus of two important 
studies since independence. The most important book is Fred 
H. Laws on 's Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy, which 
examines the political economy of the state in the 1970s and 
1980s. Another valuable book is Fuad I. Khuri's Tribe and State 
in Bahrain. Khuri examines the impact of the oil economy on 
Bahraini society from the 1930s through 1975. Angela Clarke 
in Bahrain: Oil and Development, 1929-1989 presents a historical 
retrospective of Bapco that contains useful economic data. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliogra- 
phy.) 



145 



Chapter 4. Qatar 



Crest of the State of Qatar 



Country Profile 



Country 

Formal Name: State of Qatar. 
Short Form: Qatar. 

Term for Citizens: Qatari(s); adjectival form, Qatari. 
Capital: Doha. 

Date of Independence: September 3, 1971. 

Geography 

Size: 11,437 square kilometers. 

Topography: Mostly low-lying, barren terrain. 

Climate: Long, hot summers with alternating periods of high 
and low humidity; mild winters with limited rainfall. 

Society 

Population: July 1992 estimate 484,387; 1992 growth rate 3.2 
percent. 

Education: Free in twelve-year public school system, consisting 
of six-year primary cycle, three-year intermediate cycle, and 
three-year secondary cycle. Total students in three cycles in 
1985-86 academic year 51,350, of whom roughly 50 percent 
female. University of Qatar free. 

Health: Comprehensive system of well-equipped public clinics 
and hospitals staffed by mainly foreign personnel. Most care 
provided free to all residents. Several private clinics located in 
Doha. In 1986 life expectancy at birth 65.2 years for males and 
67.6 years for females. 

Ethnic Groups: Most Qataris are Arabs; some have Iranian or 
African ancestry. Large foreign communities of Indians, 
Iranians, Pakistanis, and Egyptians. Other groups include 
Filipinos, Bangladeshis, Sudanese, Afghans, other Arabs, Sri 
Lankans, and Westerners, mostly British. 

NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Religion: Most Qataris follow Wahhabi interpretation of Sunni 
Islam. Of remaining Muslims, Arabs, Pakistanis, and Afghans 
are Sunni, while Iranians are mainly Shia. Other religious 
groups include Hindus (mostly Indian) and Christians 
(Indians, Filipinos, and Westerners). 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1991 GDP US$6.7 billion; 
per capita GDP US$13,730. 

Industry: In 1989 oil and natural gas extraction and processing 
accounted for 26 percent of GDP and most industrial activity. 
Other major industries fertilizers, petrochemicals, steel, and 
cement. 

Agriculture: Small-scale, state-subsidized farms and fishing 
sector, about 1 percent of GDP in 1989, meets small portion of 
local needs, mostly vegetables and fodder. Some date 
production. Livestock includes goats, camels, sheep, and 
horses; also dairy and chicken farms. 

Exports: US$2.6 billion in 1989 (mostly oil, gas, and petroleum 
products). Main destinations Japan (54.4 percent), Thailand 
(5.0 percent), and Singapore (4.0 percent). Other partners 
include Persian Gulf and European Community countries. 

Imports: US$1.3 billion in 1989 (mostly machinery, 
manufactured goods, and food). Main sources Japan (18.8 
percent), Britain (11.6 percent), United States (8.8 percent), 
Italy (7.8 percent), and Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany) (7.3 percent). Other partners include Persian Gulf 
and European Community countries. 

Currency and Exchange Rate: Qatar riyal. In 1994 exchange 
rate US$1 = QR3.64 (fixed rate). 

Fiscal Year: April 1 to March 31. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Transportation: In 1994 about 1,500 kilometers of roads, of 
which 1,000 kilometers paved and rest gravel. Doha main port 
and Umm Said petroleum export port. Doha has international 
airport. 

Telecommunications: Excellent domestic and international 
telecommunications with twenty-three telephones per 100 



150 



Qatar 



inhabitants in 1992 and satellite ground stations, television, 
and radio stations. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Ruler is Shaykh Khalifa ibn Hamad Al Thani, 
amir since 1972. However, heir apparent, Shaykh Hamad ibn 
Khalifa Al Thani, has taken over much day-to-day decision 
making. Government structure based on 1970 provisional 
constitution with Council of Ministers and Advisory Council. 

Politics: Power held by amir and royal family. Political parties 
banned, and no open opposition tolerated. 

Foreign Relations: Closely allied with Saudi Arabia on regional 
and global issues. Foreign policy efforts channeled through 
Gulf Cooperation Council and other organizations, such as 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, and 
Organization of the Islamic Conference. Member of United 
Nations and League of Arab States. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In mid-1993 personnel strength 9,500: army, 
8,000, of whom 30 percent Qataris; navy, 700; and air force, 
800. Army had twenty-four AMX-30 main battle tanks and 
thirty armored infantry vehicles. Navy had three missile craft. 
Air force had Alpha Jet and Mirage Fl fighters and armed 
helicopters. 



151 



QATAR IS A SMALL COUNTRY dominated by the Persian 
Gulf's largest ruling family, the Al Thani. The amir, Shaykh 
Khalifa ibn Hamad Al Thani, is the country's ruler, but his son, 
Shaykh Hamad ibn Khalifa Al Thani, in addition to being the 
heir apparent and minister of defense, wields considerable 
power in the day-to-day running of the country. The Al Thani 
regime tolerates no political opposition. The social mores of 
the country are shaped by a somewhat milder version of Wah- 
habi (see Glossary) Islam than is found in neighboring Saudi 
Arabia. Women are permitted to drive if they obtain permits, 
for example, and non-Qatari women need not veil in public. 

Occupying a barren peninsula scorched by extreme sum- 
mer heat, Qatar was transformed between the mid-1960s and 
the mid-1980s from a poor British protectorate noted mainly 
for pearling into an independent state with modern infrastruc- 
ture, services, and industries. The state was built using mostly 
foreign labor and expertise, with funding from oil revenues. 
And as in other states where oil dominates the economy, 
Qatar's fortunes have followed those of the world oil market. 
The late 1980s and early 1990s were times of relative austerity, 
with development projects canceled or delayed. But those years 
were also a period of significant transition when Qatar began 
its shift from an economy reliant almost entirely on oil to one 
that would be supported by the exploitation of natural gas 
from the North Field, the world's largest natural gas field. 

The early 1990s also constituted a watershed period in for- 
eign relations because the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 
2, 1990, changed regional and world alignments. Qatar sent 
troops to fight for Kuwait's liberation and, reversing its previ- 
ous opposition to the presence of foreign forces in the region, 
permitted United States, Canadian, and French air force 
fighter aircraft to operate from Doha (also seen as Ad 
Dawhah). This placed Qatar firmly on the anti-Iraq side of the 
great rift that split the Arab world after the invasion and weak- 
ened the full support for the Palestine Liberation Organization 
that the country had previously shown. 

Historical Background 

Human habitation of the Qatar Peninsula dates as far back 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

as 50,000 years, when small groups of Stone Age inhabitants 
built coastal encampments, settlements, and sites for working 
flint, according to recent archaeological evidence. Other finds 
have included pottery from the Al Ubaid culture of Mesopo- 
tamia and northern Arabia (ca. 5000 B.C.), rock carvings, 
burial mounds, and a large town that dates from about 500 
B.C. at Wusail, some twenty kilometers north of Doha. The 
Qatar Peninsula was close enough to the Dilmun civilization 
(ca. 4000 to 2000 B.C.) in Bahrain to have felt its influence. A 
harsh climate, lack of resources, and frequent periods of con- 
flict, however, seem to have made it inevitable that no settle- 
ment would develop and prosper for any significant length of 
time before the discovery of oil. 

The peninsula was used almost continuously as rangeland 
for nomadic tribes from Najd and Al Hasa regions in Saudi Ara- 
bia, with seasonal encampments around sources of water. In 
addition, fishing and pearling settlements were established on 
those parts of the coast near a major well. Until the late eigh- 
teenth century, the principal towns were on the east coast — Al 
Huwayla, Al Fuwayrit, and Al Bida — and the modern city of 
Doha developed around the largest of these, Al Bida. The pop- 
ulation consisted of nomadic and settled Arabs and a signifi- 
cant proportion of slaves brought originally from East Africa. 

The Qatar Peninsula came under the sway of several great 
powers over the centuries. The Abbasid era (750-1258) saw the 
rise of several settlements, including Murwab. The Portuguese 
ruled from 1517 to 1538, when they lost to the Ottomans. In 
the 1760s, the Al Khalifa and the Al Jalahima sections of the 
Bani Utub tribe migrated from Kuwait to Qatar's northwest 
coast and founded Az Zubarah (see fig. 9). Because the Bani 
Utub had important trading connections with Kuwait and were 
close to the rich oyster banks, Az Zubarah became a thriving 
center of trade and pearling, despite hostilities between the Al 
Khalifa and the Al Jalahima. 

In response to attacks on Az Zubarah by an Omani shaykh 
who ruled Bahrain from Bushehr in Iran, the Bani Utub of 
Kuwait and Qatar, as well as some local Qatari tribes, captured 
Bahrain in 1783. The Al Khalifa claimed sovereignty over Bah- 
rain and ruled it for several years from Az Zubarah. This 
angered the Al Jalahima, who felt they were deprived of their 
share of the spoils, and so they moved a few kilometers up the 
Qatari coast to establish Al Khuwayr, which they used as a stag- 



154 




1 



Qatar 



ing point for maritime raids against the shipping of the Al 
Khalifa and the Iranians. 

Most of the Al Khalifa migrated to the more desirable loca- 
tion of Bahrain and established a shaykhdom that endures to 
this day. That they left only a token presence in Az Zubarah 
meant initially that the Al Jalahima branch of the Bani Utub 
could achieve ascendancy in Qatar, with their leader, Rahman 
ibn Jabir Al Jalahima, earning a reputation as one of the most 
feared raiders on the surrounding waters. It also meant that 
with the economic decline of Az Zubarah (because the Al Khal- 
ifa shifted their trade connections to Bahrain), the peninsula 
would once more become a relative backwater. With no domi- 
nant local ruler, insecurity and rivalry characterized tribal rela- 
tions. Settled tribes built walled towns, towers, and small forts 
to keep raiding beduin at bay. 

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, con- 
tinuing bloody conflict involved not only the Al Khalifa, the Al 
Jalahima, and the Iranians but also the Omanis under Sayyid 
Said ibn Sultan Al Said, the nascent Wahhabis of Arabia, and 
the Ottomans. The period also saw the rise of British power in 
the Persian Gulf as a result of their growing interests in India. 
Britain's desire for secure passage for East India Company 
ships led it to impose its own order in the gulf. The General 
Treaty of Peace of 1820 between the East India Company and 
the shaykhs of the coastal area — which became known as the 
Trucial Coast because of the series of treaties between the 
shaykhs and the British — was a way of ensuring safe passage. 
The agreement acknowledged British authority in the gulf and 
sought to end piracy and the kidnapping of slaves. Bahrain also 
became a party to the treaty, and it was assumed by the British 
and the Bahrainis that Qatar, as a dependency, was also a party 
to it. 

When, as punishment for piracy, an East India Company ves- 
sel bombarded Doha in 1821, destroying the town and forcing 
hundreds to flee, the residents had no idea why they were 
being attacked. The situation remained unsettled in 1867, 
when a large Bahraini force sacked and looted Doha and Al 
Wakrah. This attack, and the Qatari counterattack, prompted 
the British political agent, Colonel Lewis Pelly, to impose a set- 
tlement in 1868. His mission to Bahrain and Qatar and the 
peace treaty that resulted were milestones in Qatar's history 
because they implicitly recognized the distinctness of Qatar 
from Bahrain and explicitly acknowledged the position of 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Muhammad ibn Thani Al Thani, an important representative 
of the peninsula's tribes. The Al Thani were originally beduin 
from Najd, but after settling in Qatar, they engaged in fishing, 
pearling, date palm cultivation, and trade. 

With the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into eastern 
Arabia in 1871, Qatar became vulnerable to occupation. 
Muhammad ibn Thani opposed Ottoman designs on Qatar, 
but his son, Qasim ibn Muhammad Al Thani, accepted Otto- 
man sovereignty in 1872. Although Qasim ibn Muhammad pri- 
vately complained of the Ottoman presence, he hoped that 
with Ottoman support he could dominate those shaykhs in 
other towns who opposed him and rebuff Bahrain's claims on 
Az Zubarah. The question of Az Zubarah became moot in 
1878, however, when Qasim ibn Muhammad destroyed the 
town as punishment for the piracy of the Nairn, a tribe that 
resided in the north of Qatar but was loyal to the shaykh of 
Bahrain. Moreover, Qasim ibn Muhammad's ambivalent rela- 
tions with the Ottomans deteriorated to the point that in 1893 
they sent a military force to Doha to arrest him, ostensibly over 
his refusal to permit an Ottoman customhouse in Doha. Fight- 
ing broke out, and Qasim ibn Muhammad's supporters drove 
out the Ottoman force. This defeat, and Qasim ibn Muham- 
mad's embrace after the turn of the century of the resurgent 
Wahhabis under Abd al Aziz ibn Saud, marked the de facto end 
of Ottoman rule in Qatar. 

The Ottomans officially renounced sovereignty over Qatar 
in 1913, and in 1916 the new ruler, Qasim ibn Muhammad's 
son, Abd Allah ibn Qasim Al Thani, signed a treaty with Britain 
bringing the peninsula into the trucial system. This meant that 
in exchange for Britain's military protection, Qatar relin- 
quished its autonomy in foreign affairs and other areas, such as 
the power to cede territory. The treaty also had provisions sup- 
pressing slavery, piracy, and gunrunning, but the British were 
not strict about enforcing those provisions. 

Despite Qatar's coming under British "protection," Abd 
Allah ibn Qasim was far from secure: recalcitrant tribes refused 
to pay tribute; disgruntled family members intrigued against 
him; and he felt vulnerable to the designs of Bahrain, not to 
mention the Wahhabis. Despite numerous requests by Abd 
Allah ibn Qasim — for strong military support, for weapons, 
and even for a loan — the British kept him at arm's length. This 
changed in the 1930s, when competition (mainly between Brit- 
ain and the United States) for oil concessions in the region 



158 



Qatar 



intensified. In a 1935 treaty, Britain made more specific prom- 
ises of assistance than in earlier treaties in return for the grant- 
ing of a concession to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. 

The scramble for oil, in turn, raised the stakes in regional 
territorial disputes and put a dollar value on the question of 
national borders. In 1936, for example, Bahrain claimed rule 
over a group of islands, the largest of which is Hawar, off the 
west coast of Qatar because it had established a small military 
garrison there. Britain accepted the Bahraini claim over Abd 
Allah ibn Qasim's objections, in large part because the Bah- 
raini shaykh's personal British adviser was able to frame Bah- 
rain's case in a legal manner familiar to British officials. The 
question of domain continued in the early 1990s. 

Triggered by a dispute involving the Nairn, the Bahrainis 
once again laid claim to the deserted town of Az Zubarah in 
1937. Abd Allah ibn Qasim sent a large, heavily armed force 
and succeeded in defeating the Nairn. The British political resi- 
dent in Bahrain supported Qatar's claim and warned Hamad 
ibn Isa Al Khalifa, the ruler of Bahrain, not to intervene mili- 
tarily. Bitter and angry over the loss of Az Zubarah, Hamad ibn 
Isa imposed a crushing embargo on trade and travel to Qatar. 

Oil was discovered in Qatar in 1939, but its exploitation was 
halted between 1942 and 1947 because of World War II and its 
aftermath. The disruption of food supplies caused by the war 
prolonged a period of economic hardship in Qatar that had 
begun in the 1920s with the collapse of the pearl trade and had 
increased with the global depression of the early 1930s and the 
Bahraini embargo. As they had in previous times of privation, 
whole families and tribes moved to other parts of the gulf, leav- 
ing many Qatari villages deserted. Even Shaykh Abd Allah ibn 
Qasim went into debt and, in preparation for his retirement, 
groomed his favored second son, Hamad ibn Abd Allah Al 
Thani, to be his successor. Hamad ibn Abd Allah's death in 
1948, however, led to a succession crisis in which the main can- 
didates were Abd Allah ibn Qasim's eldest son, Ali ibn Abd 
Allah Al Thani, and Hamad ibn Abd Allah's teenage son, Khal- 
ifa ibn Hamad Al Thani. 

Oil exports and payments for offshore rights began in 1949 
and marked a turning point in Qatar. Not only would oil reve- 
nues dramatically transform the economy and society, but they 
would also provide the focus for domestic disputes and foreign 
relations. This became frighteningly clear to Abd Allah ibn 
Qasim when several of his relatives threatened armed opposi- 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

tion if they did not receive increases in their allowances. Aged 
and anxious, Abd Allah ibn Qasim turned to the British, prom- 
ised to abdicate, and agreed, among other things, to an official 
British presence in Qatar in exchange for recognition and sup- 
port for Ali ibn Abd Allah as ruler in 1949. 

The 1950s saw the cautious development of government 
structures and public services under British tutelage. Ali ibn 
Abd Allah was at first reluctant to share power, which had cen- 
tered in his household, with an infant bureaucracy run and 
staffed mainly by outsiders. Ali ibn Abd Allah's increasing 
financial difficulties and inability to control striking oil workers 
and obstreperous shaykhs, however, led him to succumb to 
British pressure. The first real budget was drawn up by a British 
adviser in 1953. By 1954 there were forty-two Qatari govern- 
ment employees. 

A major impetus to the development of the British-run 
police force came in 1956 when about 2,000 demonstrators, 
who coalesced over issues such as Gamal Abdul Nasser's pan- 
Arabism and opposition to Britain and to Shaykh Ali ibn Abd 
Allah's retinue, marched through Doha. This and other dem- 
onstrations led Ali ibn Abd Allah to invest the police with his 
personal authority and support, a significant reversal of his pre- 
vious reliance on his retainers and beduin fighters. 

Public services developed haltingly during the 1950s. The 
first telephone exchange opened in 1953, the first desalination 
plant in 1954, and the first power plant in 1957. Also built in 
this period were a jetty, a customs warehouse, an airstrip, and a 
police headquarters. In the 1950s, 150 adult males of the Al 
Thani received outright grants from the government. Shaykhs 
also received land and government positions. This mollified 
them as long as oil revenues increased. When revenues 
declined in the late 1950s, however, Ali ibn Abd Allah could 
not handle the family pressures this engendered. That Shaykh 
Ali ibn Abd Allah spent extravagantly, owned a villa in Switzer- 
land, and hunted in Pakistan fueled discontent, especially 
among those who were excluded from the regime's largesse 
(non-Al Thani Qataris) and those who were not excluded but 
thought they deserved more (other branches of the Al Thani). 
Seniority and proximity to the shaykh determined the size of 
allowances. 

Succumbing to family pressures and poor health, Ali ibn 
Abd Allah abdicated in 1960. But instead of handing power 
over to Khalifa ibn Hamad, who had been named heir appar- 



160 



Qatar 



ent in 1948, he made his son, Ahmad ibn Ali, ruler. Nonethe- 
less, Khalifa ibn Hamad, as heir apparent and deputy ruler, 
gained considerable power, in large part because Ahmad ibn 
Ali, as had his father, spent much time outside the country. 

Although he did not care much for governing, Ahmad ibn 
Ali could not avoid dealing with family business. One of his first 
acts was to increase funding for the shaykhs at the expense of 
development projects and social services. In addition to allow- 
ances, adult male Al Thani were also given government posi- 
tions. This added to the antiregime resentment already felt by, 
among others, oil workers, low-ranking Al Thani, dissident 
shaykhs, and some leading individuals. These groups formed 
the National Unity Front in response to a fatal shooting on 
April 19, 1963, of a member of a crowd protesting against Al 
Thani rule by one of Shaykh Ahmad ibn Ali's nephews. The 
front called a general strike, and its demands included a reduc- 
tion of the ruler's privileges, recognition of trade unions, and 
increased social services. Ahmad ibn Ali cracked down by jail- 
ing fifty leading individuals and exiling the front's leaders. He 
also instituted some reforms, eventually including the provi- 
sion of land and loans to poor Qataris. 

Largely under Khalifa ibn Hamad's guiding hand, the infra- 
structure, foreign labor force, and bureaucracy continued to 
grow in the 1960s. There were even some early attempts at 
diversifying Qatar's economic base, most notably with the estab- 
lishment of a cement factory, a national fishing company, and 
small-scale agriculture. 

In 1968 Britain announced its intention of withdrawing 
from military commitments east of Suez, including those in 
force with Qatar, by 1971. For a while, the rulers of Bahrain, 
Qatar, and the Trucial Coast contemplated forming a federa- 
tion after the British withdrawal. A dispute arose between 
Ahmad ibn Ali and Khalifa ibn Hamad, however, because Khal- 
ifa ibn Hamad opposed Bahrain's attempts to become the 
senior partner in the federation. Still giving public support to 
the federation, Ahmad ibn Ali nonetheless promulgated a pro- 
visional constitution in April 1970, which declared Qatar an 
independent, Arab, Islamic state with the sharia (Islamic law) 
as its basic law. Khalifa ibn Hamad was appointed prime minis- 
ter in May. The first Council of Ministers was sworn in on Janu- 
ary 1, 1970, and seven of its ten members were Al Thani. 
Khalifa ibn Hamad's argument prevailed with regard to the 
federation proposal. Qatar became an independent state on 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

September 3, 1971. That Ahmad ibn Ali issued the formal 
announcement from his Swiss villa instead of from his Doha 
palace indicated to many Qataris that it was time for a change. 
On February 22, 1972, Khalifa ibn Hamad deposed Ahmad ibn 
Ali, who was hunting with his falcons in Iran. Khalifa ibn 
Hamad had the tacit support of the Al Thani and of Britain, 
and he had the political, financial, and military support of 
Saudi Arabia. 

In contrast to his predecessor's policies, Khalifa ibn Hamad 
cut family allowances and increased spending on social pro- 
grams, including housing, health, education, and pensions. In 
addition, he filled many top government posts with close rela- 
tives. 

In 1993 Khalifa ibn Hamad remained the amir, but his son, 
Hamad ibn Khalifa, the heir apparent and minister of defense, 
had taken over much of the day-to-day running of the country. 
The two consulted with each other on all matters of impor- 
tance. 

Geography 

Qatar occupies 11,437 square kilometers on a peninsula 
that extends approximately 160 kilometers north into the Per- 
sian Gulf from the Arabian Peninsula. Varying in width 
between fifty-five and ninety kilometers, the land is mainly flat 
(the highest point is 103 meters) and rocky. Notable features 
include coastal salt pans, elevated limestone formations (the 
Dukhan anticline) along the west coast under which lies the 
Dukhan oil field, and massive sand dunes surrounding Khawr 
al Udayd, an inlet of the gulf in the southeast known to local 
English speakers as the Inland Sea. Of the islands belonging to 
Qatar, Halul is the most important. Lying about ninety kilome- 
ters east of Doha, it serves as a storage area and loading termi- 
nal for oil from the surrounding offshore fields. Hawar and the 
adjacent islands immediately off the west coast are the subject 
of a territorial dispute between Qatar and Bahrain (see Foreign 
Relations, this ch.). 

The capital, Doha, is located on the central east coast on a 
sweeping (if shallow) harbor. Other ports include Umm Said, 
Al Khawr, and Al Wakrah. Only Doha and Umm Said are capa- 
ble of handling commercial shipping, although a large port 
and a terminal for loading natural gas are planned at Ras Laf- 
fan, north of Al Khawr. Coral reefs and shallow coastal waters 



162 



Qatar 



make navigation difficult in areas where channels have not 
been dredged. 

Qatar shares its land border with the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), with which in 1993 it continued to have a dispute in the 
Khawr al Udayd area. The boundary with Saudi Arabia was set- 
tled in 1965 but never demarcated. Qatar's northwest coast is 
fewer than thirty kilometers from Bahrain. 

Doha is the capital of the country and the major administra- 
tive, commercial, and population center. In 1993 it was linked 
to other towns and development sites by a system of about 
1,000 kilometers of paved roads. Doha's international airport 
has an approximately 4,500-meter main runway, capable of 
receiving all kinds of aircraft. 

The long summer (June through September) is character- 
ized by intense heat and alternating dryness and humidity, with 
temperatures exceeding 40°C. Temperatures are moderate 
from November through March, although winter temperatures 
may fall to 17°C, which is relatively cool for the latitude. Rain- 
fall is negligible, averaging 100 millimeters per year, confined 
to the winter months, and falling in brief, sometimes heavy 
storms that often flood the small ravines and the usually dry 
wadis. Sudden, violent dust storms occasionally descend on the 
peninsula, blotting out the sun, causing wind damage, and 
momentarily disrupting transport and other services. 

The scarcity of rainfall and the limited underground water, 
most of which has such a high mineral content that it is unsuit- 
able for drinking or irrigation, restricted the population and 
the extent of agricultural and industrial development the coun- 
try could support until desalination projects began. Although 
water continues to be provided from underground sources, 
most is obtained by desalination of seawater. 

Population 

The population of Qatar before independence must be esti- 
mated because, until oil revenues created a reason to stay on 
the peninsula, individuals and whole tribes migrated when the 
economic or security situation became intolerable. Some 
sought work elsewhere; others joined neighboring branches of 
their tribe. In 1908 a British observer estimated there were 
27,000 inhabitants; 6,000 were described as foreign slaves and 
425 as Iranian boatbuilders. (By 1930 the number of Iranians 
had increased to 5,000, or almost 20 percent of the popula- 
tion.) The population probably remained fairly stable until the 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

1930s and 1940s, when economic hardship and regional inse- 
curity caused people to migrate to other areas, leaving Qatar 
with a population of only 16,000 in 1949, according to one esti- 
mate. 

After oil exports increased in the 1950s, employment oppor- 
tunities attracted Arabs from other Persian Gulf countries and 
foreign workers (mostly Indians at first) to Qatar. In 1970 the 
Qatari government, assisted by British experts, carried out a 
census that reported a population of 111,113, of whom 45,039, 
or more than 40 percent, were identified as Qataris. With the 
oil boom of the 1970s and the resultant influx of foreign work- 
ers came the largest population growth, so that by 1977 it was 
estimated that 200,000 people lived in the country, about 65 
percent of whom were non-Qataris. During the 1960-75 
period, the population grew at an average annual rate of 8.9 
percent; in the 1970-75 period it grew at 12.7 percent. 

The census of March 16, 1986, counted a population of 
369,079. The July 1992 estimate was 484,387, with a 1992 
growth rate of 3.2 percent. The 1989 birth rate was 31.8 per 
1,000 population and the death rate 2.5 per 1,000, for a natural 
increase per 1,000 of 29.3, a high rate for a developing country. 

The 1986 census showed that 84 percent of the population 
was concentrated in Doha and in the neighboring town of Ar 
Rayyan. Other towns included Al Wakrah (population 13,259) 
and Umm Said (population 6,094). In total, 88 percent of the 
population was urban. Reflecting the huge influx of foreign 
workers, about 67 percent of the population was male. The age 
breakdown was as follows: under fifteen, 27.8 percent; fifteen 
to twenty-nine, 29.3 percent; thirty to forty-four, 32.3 percent; 
forty-five to fifty-nine, 8.6 percent; and sixty and over, 2.0 per- 
cent. 

South Asians (mainly Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and 
Filipinos) made up about 35 percent of the population; 
Qataris, 20 percent; other Arabs, 25 percent; Iranians, 16 per- 
cent; and others, 4 percent. Roughly 90 percent of the popula- 
tion was Muslim (mostly Sunni — see Glossary), and the 
remainder were Christian, Hindu, Bahai, and other. 

Education 

Before oil was discovered, there was no formal education 
system in Qatar. Instead, some children in villages and towns 
memorized passages from the Quran and learned to read and 
write in a kuttab, an informal class taught in mosques or homes 



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Qatar 



by literate men and women knowledgeable about Islam. Based 
on the custom of keeping women in a milieu shut off from the 
political, social, and economic opportunities afforded men, the 
development of education in Qatar focused mainly on the 
male population. From 1918 to 1938, for example, an Islamic 
school for adult males was run by Muhammad Abd al Aziz al 
Mana, an eminent scholar who had studied under Muhammad 
Abduh of Egypt and Al Alusi of Baghdad. According to a 1970 
study, only 9 percent of the population born between 1895 and 
1910 were literate, as were 15 percent of those born between 
1910 and 1920 and 14 percent of those born between 1920 and 
1930. 

In 1949 Shaykh Hamad ibn Abd Allah opened a somewhat 
more modern school. The school, the Islah al Muhammad- 
iyyah, had one teacher and fifty boys. In 1951 the school 
received funding from the ruling family, and the number of 
students and teachers increased. Subjects included Islamic reli- 
gion and history, Arabic, arithmetic, geography, and English. 
By 1954 there were four such schools, with a total of 560 male 
students and twenty-six teachers. The first girls' school funded 
by oil money was a small kuttab that had been run by Amina 
Mahmud since 1938. After it was reorganized in 1956 as the 
first public school for girls in Qatar, four teachers taught 122 
students the Quran, Arabic, arithmetic, ethics, and health. In 
the same year, the Department of Education was established. 
The budget for education increased from QR1 million (for 
value of the Qatari riyal — see Glossary) in 1955 to QR25 mil- 
lion in 1960. Not only was all public schooling free, but 
between 1956 and 1962 students received a monthly stipend. 
Despite inequality during the 1950s between the number of 
boys and the number of girls attending school, attendance was 
almost equal by gender in the late 1970s, with girls outperform- 
ing boys academically. 

In the early 1990s, the education system consisted of six 
years of primary school, three years of intermediate school, 
and three years of secondary school (see table 19, Appendix). 
The secondary education program includes schools specializ- 
ing in religion, commerce, and technical studies in which only 
males are allowed. Females, however, may attend teacher-train- 
ing institutions. Instruction throughout the system is in Arabic, 
but English is introduced in the last two years of primary 
school, and there are special language-training programs for 
government personnel. Private facilities are available for kin- 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

dergarten instruction. In addition, many foreign communities 
have established schools for their children; the largest are the 
schools for the Indian community. Although the government 
offers assistance to private schools, they are funded mainly 
through tuition and private sources. 

In the 1975-76 academic year, 21,402 children attended pri- 
mary school; by the 1985-86 academic year, that number had 
risen to 31,844. Students continue to be segregated by gender. 
In 1986 approximately 5.6 percent of the gross national prod- 
uct (GNP — see Glossary) went toward public education. The 
state in the 1990s continued to cover education costs, includ- 
ing school supplies, clothing, meals, and transportation to and 
from school. 

In the 1988-89 academic year, there were 48,097 students in 
ninety-seven primary schools taught by 2,589 teachers and 
22,178 intermediate and secondary students in seventy-eight 
schools taught by 2,115 teachers. At the three secular voca- 
tional schools, there were 924 students and 104 teachers. In the 
1989-90 academic year, there were 5,637 students at the Uni- 
versity of Qatar, which had 504 instructors, mostly Egyptians 
and non-Qatari Arabs. 

The first institutions of higher education in Qatar were sep- 
arate teacher-training colleges for men and women that 
opened in 1973. Before that, those wishing to pursue advanced 
degrees either studied abroad (mainly in Egypt and Lebanon) 
or took correspondence courses. A decree establishing the 
University of Qatar was passed, and in 1977 faculties of human- 
ities, social studies, Islamic studies, and science joined the edu- 
cation faculty of the teacher-training colleges. In the 1985-86 
academic year, about 1,000 Qataris received government schol- 
arships to pursue higher education abroad, mostly in other 
Arab countries and in the United States, Britain, and France. 

Health 

Before oil was discovered, health care consisted of tradi- 
tional medicine: barbers performed circumcisions and other 
minor procedures, and herbalists dispensed natural remedies. 
A one-doctor "hospital" opened in Doha in 1945. In 1951 
Shaykh Ali ibn Abd Allah agreed to a British doctor and a small 
staff. The first state hospital, Rumailah Hospital, opened in 
1959 with 170 beds. A 165-bed maternity hospital was estab- 
lished in 1965. The health budget was abused by Shaykh 
Ahmad ibn Ali's son and minister of health, Abd al Aziz ibn 



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Qatar 



Ahmad Al Thani. He apparently sent thousands of Ahmad ibn 
Ali's supporters abroad for luxurious and, in many cases, 
unnecessary health care in the 1960s. 

The development of social services, including health care, 
accelerated after the accession in 1972 of Shaykh Khalifa ibn 
Hamad, who dramatically altered the allocation of oil revenues. 
This included transferring the ruler's 25 percent of oil reve- 
nues to the state budget. But the health budget suffered 
because of the downturns in oil revenues. In 1986, for exam- 
ple, there were cuts of 10 percent in clinic staff. 

There are three hospitals in Doha, with a total of about 
1,100 beds. Hamad General Hospital, which opened in 1982, 
has modern facilities for emergency care, cardiovascular sur- 
gery, tomography, nuclear medicine, and plastic surgery. 
Rumailah Hospital, once the only general hospital, has become 
a center for geriatric, psychiatric, and rehabilitative care. It also 
has dental and dermatology departments and a burn unit. The 
Women's Hospital has 314 beds. In addition, dozens of clinics 
throughout the country ensure accessible primary care to most 
of the population. For example, 90 percent of births in the late 
1980s were attended by a health professional. There are 752 
government physicians and many other support staff. In the 
1980s, several private clinics also opened in the capital. 

Life expectancy at birth in 1986 was 65.2 years for males and 
67.6 years for females. The infant mortality rate in 1989 was 
thirty-one per 1,000 live births. In the 1988-89 period, 81 per- 
cent of one- to three-year-olds were immunized. Major causes 
of death in 1989 were diseases of the circulatory system, inju- 
ries and poisonings, tumors, and perinatal conditions. 

The Economy 
Oil and Natural Gas 

Oil 

In 1935, after years of behind-the-scenes wrangling involv- 
ing the shaykh, British and United States oil companies, the 
British, and the Saudis, an onshore concession was granted to 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which transferred the conces- 
sion to Petroleum Development (Qatar), an affiliate of the Iraq 
Petroleum Company (IPC). British, French, and United States 
oil companies held shares in IPC. Petroleum Development 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

(Qatar) was renamed the Qatar Petroleum Company (QPC) in 
1953. 

As a result of adequate crude oil supplies at the time, 
exploratory drilling in Qatar did not begin until 1938. Oil was 
discovered in Dukhan, on the west coast, in 1939. By 1940 
about 4,000 barrels per day (bpd — see Glossary) were being 
produced. World War II and its aftermath brought develop- 
ment to a halt between 1942 and 1947, and exports did not 
begin until 1949. The Dukhan field extends south from 
Dukhan along the west coast and has three oil reservoirs lay- 
ered progressively deeper between limestone formations and a 
natural gas field underlying them all. Dukhan crude has an 
American Petroleum Institute (API) rating of 40° and a sulfur 
content of 1.2 percent. A pipeline carries crude oil from the 
Dukhan fields to storage, refining, and terminal facilities on 
the east side of the peninsula at Umm Said. 

In 1952 a Royal Dutch Shell subsidiary, Shell Company of 
Qatar (SCQ), obtained a concession for offshore exploration 
on the continental shelf. Most offshore discoveries centered on 
the island of Halul, about ninety kilometers east of Doha. The 
major offshore fields and the dates they were discovered are 
Idd ash Sharqi (1960) and Maydan Mahzam (1963). Offshore 
production began in 1964. Because both Qatar and Abu Dhabi 
claimed the Al Bunduq field, the two parties agreed to exploit 
it jointly starting in 1969. Another offshore field was discovered 
in the summer of 1991 by Elf Aquitaine Qatar. Offshore crude 
had an API rating of 36° and a sulfur content of 1.4 percent. 
Offshore crude is stored at facilities on the island of Halul, 
which also has pumping stations and two single-buoy moorings 
for loading tankers. Combined offshore and onshore reserves 
as of January 1990 were 4.5 billion barrels, offering thirty-two 
years of production at 1989 levels. 

Both concessions were for seventy-five years and gave the oil 
companies the right to explore, produce, refine, transport, and 
market all oil found in the stipulated area. In addition, the con- 
cessionaire companies were exempt from taxes and duties on 
imports and exports but were required to hire local labor 
where possible. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (after a down 
payment of 400,000 rupees in 1935) was required to pay 
Shaykh Abd Allah ibn Qasim 150,000 rupees annually thereaf- 
ter (see Money and Banking, this ch.). (During World War II, 
when oil operations were suspended, the annual payment was 
300,000 rupees.) Before commercial production could begin, 



168 



View of heavy industry area in Umm Said, south of Doha 

Courtesy Qatar Today 

Khalifa ibn Hamad Al Thani, ruler of Qatar, inaugurates Phase One 
of North Field natural gas development project , September 1991 

Courtesy Qatar Today 



169 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



an industry had to be assembled. The company built a jetty at 
Bir Zikrit and shipped in water, foodstuffs, and almost 100,000 
tons of equipment and supplies from Bahrain before the first 
drop of oil was pumped. Once exports began, oil became 
extremely profitable in Qatar and in the rest of the Persian 
Gulf as a result of favorable concession terms, cheap labor, rela- 
tively inexpensive drilling and pumping costs, and easy access 
to transportation. 

In 1952 the 1935 concession agreement was revised (in line 
with others in the region) to split profits fifty-fifty between the 
company and the ruler. Shaykh Ali ibn Abd Allah's share rose 
from about US$1 million in 1950 to US$61 million in 1958, 
after which his profits dipped to US$53 million in 1959 and did 
not rise to the 1958 level until 1963. Some money reached the 
local economy, but the initial impact of oil exports consisted 
mainly of high incomes for the Al Thani and high inflation on 
basic commodities. 

From its initial concession in 1935, QPC kept aloof from the 
shaykh and was seen by the ruler and workers as high-handed 
and inept; for example, it triggered strikes by forgetting to 
issue workers' coffee rations or inadvertently forcing them to 
work during Muslim holidays. In the 1950s, the company had 
its own infrastructure (power, water, communications, and 
housing) and provided health care to workers and police pro- 
tection to its facilities. 

To gain some leverage over the oil company with regard to 
revenues, pricing, and production, Qatar joined the Organiza- 
tion of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1961, 
one year after it was formed. Qatar has stayed close to its OPEC 
production quota when it has been in its economic interest but 
has often exceeded its quota to compensate for soft markets or 
to take advantage of the price increases that resulted from the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. 

Between 1960 and 1970, annual oil production more than 
doubled, from 60.4 million barrels (165,000 bpd) to 132.5 mil- 
lion barrels (363,000 bpd). Production peaked in 1973 at 208.2 
million barrels (570,000 bpd). Between 1974 and 1980, pro- 
duction leveled off in the range of 410,000 bpd to 520,000 bpd. 
The early 1980s saw a steady decline, apart from a small recov- 
ery in 1984, with an average annual production of 151.5 mil- 
lion barrels (415,000 bpd) . After another flat period in the mid 
1980s, production levels rose once again in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, with 146.7 million barrels (402,000 bpd) produced 



170 



Qatar 



in 1990 (see table 20, Appendix). The 395,000 bpd production 
levels of 1989 and the first eight months of 1990 exceeded 
OPEC quotas. 

After independence in 1971, the Qatar National Petroleum 
Company was created in 1972 to handle oil operations. In 1973 
the government held 25 percent each of QPC and SCQ. Two 
years later, the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation (QGPC) 
was established, and the government signed new agreements 
with the oil companies giving QGPC 60 percent ownership. By 
1977 onshore and offshore operations were fully nationalized, 
and service contracts were given to former concessionaires. 

Production of petroleum products began in 1953 when a 
QPC-owned refinery started up with a capacity of 600 bpd. By 
1975 refining capacity had expanded to 6,000 bpd, and by the 
early 1980s another 4,000-bpd-capacity had been added. A 
refinery opened in 1983 and added 50,000 bpd in capacity, 
bringing the national total to more than 60,000 bpd. The 
National Oil Distribution Company refined an average of 
62,000 bpd in 1990; 75 percent of production was exported. As 
a result of the jump in prices caused by the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, 1990 profits were 40 percent higher (US$1 billion) 
than in 1989. Most of the refined products are consumed 
locally. 

Natural Gas 

The Qatari government celebrated twenty years of indepen- 
dence in September 1991 with the inauguration of Phase One 
of the North Field development project. The gas project, in a 
6,000-square-kilometer field off Qatar's northeast coast, is 
supervised by Bechtel of the United States and by Technip 
Geoproduction of France. The project marks a major step in 
Qatar's switch from a reliance on oil to gas for most of its reve- 
nues. The North Field is the world's largest natural gas field, 
and its exploitation will place Qatar in the top ranks of the 
world's gas producers. Natural gas from other fields provides 
fuel for power generation and raw materials for fertilizers, pet- 
rochemicals, and steel plants. With the expected depletion of 
oil reserves by about 2023, planners hope natural gas from the 
North Field will provide a significant underpinning for the 
country's economic development. 

In the early 1970s, Qatar flared about 80 percent of the 16.8 
million cubic meters of natural gas produced daily in associa- 
tion with crude oil liftings. In that decade, the country made 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

progress in using its natural gas resources despite several set- 
backs. Whereas nearly 66 percent of onshore gas was flared in 
1974, by 1979 that proportion had fallen to less than 5 percent. 

Two natural gas liquids (NGL) plants began operation in 
Umm Said in 1981. NGL-1 used gas produced from the 
Dukhan field, and NGL-2 processed gas associated with off- 
shore fields. The combined daily capacities were 2,378 tons of 
propane, 1,840 tons of butane, 1,480 tons of condensate, and 
2,495 tons of ethane-rich gas. However, repeated difficulties 
prevented the plants from coming on-line as scheduled and 
operating at full capacity. A massive explosion at the precursor 
of NGL-1 in 1977 killed six people and caused US$500 million 
in damage. NGL-2 had problems with the pipelines that con- 
nected the plant with offshore fields. The sharp drop in oil pro- 
duction in the 1980s meant that lack of feedstock caused plant 
shutdowns and underproduction. As a result, downstream (see 
Glossary) users suffered as well. In 1982 the two plants pro- 
duced 500,000 tons of propane and butane — slightly more 
than one-half of plant capacity. Condensate production lagged 
even further at 138,000 tons, or 40 percent of capacity. 

This gloomy outlook is mitigated to some degree by hope 
for development of the massive natural gas reserves in the 
North Field. Discovered in 1972 by SCQ its proven reserves of 
4.6 million cubic meters (as of 1989) will be productive well 
into the twenty-first century. The Qatar Liquefied Gas Com- 
pany (Qatargas) was established in 1984 as a joint venture with 
QGPC and foreign partners to market and export liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) from the North Field. 

Phase One of the US$1.3 billion project was officially inau- 
gurated on September 3, 1991. By the end of the month, it was 
pumping 23 million cubic meters of gas per day from sixteen 
wells. This is expected to meet an estimated 17 million cubic 
meters per day of domestic demand. 

QGPC plans a massive development at Ras Laffan in associa- 
tion with the North Field project. In addition to a new port 
with LNG, petroleum products, and container loading berths, 
project plans include a 2,500-ton per year methanol plant and 
a 450,000-ton per year petrochemical complex. The develop- 
ment is scheduled for completion in the late 1990s. 

In line with its desire to diversify the firms engaged in devel- 
oping its resources, Qatar signed a letter of intent in February 
1991 with Chubu Electrical Power Company of Japan to supply 
4 million tons per year of North Field gas for twenty-five years, 



172 



Qatar 



starting in 1997. This amount represents two-thirds of Qatar- 
gas's expected capacity of about 6 million tons per year. 

Industry 

The government has established heavy industry to diversify 
Qatar's economy. The pattern has been to allow foreign firms 
to provide expertise in planning, construction, management, 
and marketing in return for minority shares in the companies. 
Oil revenues have funded the construction of plants and the 
development of infrastructure; natural gas has been used as a 
source of power and as feedstock. The country's main power 
generation and water desalination plants are at Ras Abu Abbud 
and Ras Abu Fintas. Electrical generating capacity in 1990 was 
1,095 megawatts, and there were plans to add an additional 234 
megawatts in the early 1990s. Power consumption in 1990 
stood at 4,818 million kilowatt-hours and peak demand at 987 
megawatts. Bureaucratic delays stalled many projects, and poor 
market conditions and technical problems doomed others to 
unprofitability. Major construction projects such as factories 
are seldom completed on schedule. 

The Industrial Development Technical Centre (IDTC), 
formed in 1973, directs much of Qatar's industrialization, apart 
from petroleum extraction. The IDTC identifies industries to 
meet Qatar's medium- and long-term needs and coordinates 
industrial planning. In addition, the IDTC monitors the per- 
formance of all industries on a monthly basis. In the early 
1980s, the center began assessing the environmental impact of 
industrial plants and production. The IDTC has also been 
involved in pilot manufacturing programs: in 1989 it 
announced the formation of the Qatar Industrial Manufactur- 
ing Company, owned partly by the government and designed 
to establish small- and medium-sized enterprises and to buy 
shares in existing companies. 

The country's center for heavy industry is Umm Said. 
Smaller industries and businesses are concentrated in the As 
Salwa Industrial Area. The government encourages business 
and industry by offering, among other things, low-interest 
loans; free road, water, and electrical hookups; subsidized elec- 
tricity and water; land leases at minimal cost; and protective tar- 
iffs and tax incentives. 

The three largest enterprises are the Qatar Fertilizer Com- 
pany (Qafco), Qatar Steel Company (Qasco), and Qatar Petro- 
chemical Company (Qapco). Qafco was established in 1969 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

and since 1975 has been owned by QGPC (75 percent) and 
Norsk Hydro of Norway (25 percent). The government took 
over Qafco's management in 1991. The Qafco facility, which 
uses methane-rich natural gas from the Dukhan field as feed- 
stock to produce ammonia and urea, has been less affected by 
periodic drops in oil production than plants relying on off- 
shore natural gas. Production increased steadily in the 1970s, 
and a second plant opened in 1979. Nonetheless, because of a 
steep decline in world fertilizer prices, in 1986 Qafco faced its 
first operating losses since 1977, despite record levels of pro- 
duction (660,000 tons of ammonia and 744,000 tons of urea). 
In 1990 Qafco produced 710,000 tons of ammonia (down from 
714,000 tons in 1989) and 760,000 tons of urea (down from 
778,561 tons in 1989). It had profits of US$40 million in that 
year. India and China are Qafco's main customers. 

Qasco was established in 1974 with 70 percent state owner- 
ship. Kobe Steel Company (20 percent) and Tokyo Boeki (10 
percent) of Japan hold the remaining shares. Japanese compa- 
nies initially handled construction, production, marketing, and 
export. The Qasco plant, which began producing in 1978, has 
consistently outproduced its 330,000-ton per year design capac- 
ity. Its main products are steel bars used to reinforce structural 
concrete. The plant uses imported iron ore and local scrap; its 
direct reduction and rolling stages are rated as highly efficient. 
Despite high levels of output, lack of demand and low prices 
have contributed to millions of dollars in losses. 

Production levels have risen steadily from the outset, with 
1979 production at 378,544 tons of steel bars. Because of 
declines in world steel prices, in 1982 the plant registered its 
first losses despite a 485,000-ton production level. The mid- 
1980s saw a sharp decline in demand and increased foreign 
competition. The company registered a loss of US$13.7 million 
in 1985. In response to cheaper Japanese and Korean imports, 
the government imposed a 20 percent tariff on bars similar to 
those produced domestically. The plant returned to profitabil- 
ity in 1988. Qasco took over management of the plant in 1989; 
Kobe Steel Company remained as consultant. In 1990 Qasco 
produced a record 565,000 tons of steel bars, up from 556,538 
tons in 1989. Plans to expand the plant were approved. Saudi 
Arabia has been the principal customer, followed by the UAE 
and other gulf countries. 

Qapco's petrochemical complex in Umm Said started pro- 
duction in 1981 with an annual output of 132,679 tons of ethyl- 



174 



Qatar 



ene, well below its 280,000-ton capacity. The plant also has a 
capacity to produce 140,000 tons of linear low-density polyeth- 
ylene (LLDPE) and small amounts of sulfur and propylene. 
QGPC holds 84 percent of the company, and ORKEM of 
France holds the remaining 16 percent. 

Shortages in feedstock caused by troubles in 1982 with gas 
pipelines from the offshore fields caused production to drop 
by one-half. Such difficulties, combined with sluggish sales in 
the early and mid-1980s, contributed to large operating losses: 
QR69 million in 1984; QR156 million in 1985; and QR57 mil- 
lion in 1986. The end of the decade, however, saw significant 
improvement, with profits of around QR420 million in 1989 
and production of ethylene at 295,000 tons, LLDPE at 181,000 
tons, and sulfur at 52,000 tons. 

As a result of the 1989 cabinet reshuffle, the Supreme Coun- 
cil for Planning (SCP) was formed to coordinate the diversifica- 
tion of Qatar's economy by, among other things, encouraging 
industries linked to the North Field gas project (see Oil and 
Natural Gas, this ch.). There are plans for a US$500 million 
petrochemical complex and also a 240,000-ton per year alumi- 
num smelter at Umm Said that will use North Field gas. 

Some industries that are smaller but important suppliers of 
the domestic market include a flour mill and several cement 
companies. The Qatar Flour Mills Company processes flour 
and bran from wheat. It began production in 1969, and output 
in the 1980s was 700 tons per day. The Qatar National Cement 
Company (QNCC), owned jointly by the government and pri- 
vate shareholders, uses local gypsum in cement production. 
QNCC was established in 1965 with a production capacity of 
100,000 tons per year. By 1982 the plant had a capacity of 
330,000 tons per year. Annual production varied as a result of 
the competition of cheap imports, and after achieving an out- 
put of 319,740 tons in 1985, production declined steadily. Fol- 
lowing a low of 160,000 tons in 1988, in 1990 the plant 
produced 327,000 tons of cement in 1990. 

Labor 

The discovery of oil brought wage labor to Qatar, removing 
many pearl divers, fishermen, and herders from reliance on a 
subsistence economy that was plagued with privation, debt, and 
other hardships and setting them in a new system of relatively 
steady labor for cash. But the work force did not consist 
entirely of free males. In the early 1950s, there were about 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

3,000 slaves, brought from Africa, in the peninsula. The 250 
slaves who were working for Petroleum Development (Qatar) 
in 1949 turned over 80 to 95 percent of their wages to their 
owners. (After the British political agent expressed his disap- 
proval of the practice to the shaykh, the ruler decreed reluc- 
tantly that slaves could keep 50 percent of their wages.) 

Because there were no labor regulations in the 1940s and 
1950s, hours, conditions, and wages varied widely. Some work- 
ers were paid less than one rupee per day, whereas others 
received as much as four rupees per day. (In contrast, a man 
working on a pearl boat might earn only sixty rupees in six 
months.) Sometimes overtime was compensated; at other times 
it was not. In the late 1930s and into the 1940s, workers put in 
seven-day weeks, with only one day off per month. Workers 
were often dismissed for minor infractions and endured humil- 
iating treatment and difficult, dangerous conditions to hold 
their jobs. 

The special skills of the pearl divers were used to help set up 
offshore rigs. Other workers were employed as drivers, cooks, 
and houseboys for British personnel, and still others were 
employed as roustabouts. There were four levels of salaries and 
amenities in Petroleum Development (Qatar). At the top were 
the British engineers and foremen, next the clerks (mostly 
Indians), then the drivers, and finally the laborers at the bot- 
tom of the pay and accommodation scale. Local merchants 
acted as representatives of the oil company and collected one 
rupee from Qataris and forty to fifty rupees from foreigners for 
work certificates. 

At the outset, the unskilled laborers were Qataris and other 
gulf Arabs. They had frequent disagreements with the oil com- 
pany's management, most of whom were non-Qataris, and 
some disagreements flared into strikes. Early strikes focused on 
wages, conditions, and benefits. In addition, the shaykh often 
encouraged strikes to pressure concessions from the oil com- 
pany at the times he was negotiating new contracts. 

During one strike in 1951, Qatari workers opposed those 
from the Dhofar region in present-day Oman. To resolve the 
matter, the Dhofaris were deported (a solution to labor dis- 
putes that, along with imprisonment, continued to be used in 
the early 1990s). Shaykh Ali ibn Abd Allah freed the slaves in 
1952 and paid 1,500 rupees each to 660 of them. A major strike 
in 1955 by Qatari workers induced the shaykh to form a Qatari 
riot squad to be used against them. In 1956 well-organized oil 



176 



Qatar 



workers joined opposition forces in demonstrations against the 
regime and against the British. In response, the government 
inserted clauses in labor contracts banning political activity. 

In 1959 a labor department was established to deal with oil 
workers. In 1962 a labor law was enacted that gave preference 
in hiring first to Qataris, then to other Arabs, and finally to 
other foreigners. Strict controls existed on foreign workers, 
whose visas stipulated that they must work for a specific Qatari 
sponsor at a specific job. In practice, there was some fluidity in 
employment. Trade unions were banned, but Qatari workers 
had workplace-based organizations, known as workers' commit- 
tees, that dealt with grievances. The country's labor court was 
the first in the Persian Gulf. The government has sought to 
encourage Qataris to take jobs in the industrial work force (the 
process of "Qatarization"). In 1993, however, the majority of 
laborers and middle-level employees were foreigners. 

All foreign workers require sponsorship by a Qatari, some of 
whom illegally charge their employees high fees for renewing 
sponsorship. Other abuses include breach of contract and 
physical or sexual abuse. 

Regulations govern safety in the workplace, but these are 
unevenly enforced. The labor force represents 42 percent of 
the population, with 7 percent of the force made up of women. 
Those women who work outside the home are often teachers, 
nurses, clerks, or domestic servants. Service industries absorb 
69 percent of the work force, industry 28 percent, and agricul- 
ture 3 percent. 

Agriculture and Fishing 

Small-scale farming, nomadic herding, pearling, and fishing 
were the predominant means of subsistence in the region for 
the centuries before the discovery of oil. Although the relative 
importance of these activities has declined as a means of liveli- 
hood (with commercial pearling disappearing completely), the 
government has attempted to encourage agriculture and fish- 
ing to provide a degree of self-sufficiency in food. 

Between 1960 and 1970, agriculture grew. The number of 
farms, for example, increased fourfold to 411. Qataris who own 
agricultural land or properties generally hold government jobs 
and hire Iranians, Pakistanis, or non-Qatari Arabs to manage 
their farms. The government operates one experimental farm. 
Of land under cultivation in 1990, about 48 percent was used 
for vegetables (23,000 tons produced), 33 percent for fruit and 



177 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

date production (8,000 tons), 11 percent for fodder (70,000 
tons), and 8 percent for grains (3,000 tons). In 1990 the coun- 
try had approximately 128,000 head of sheep, 78,000 goats, 
24,000 camels, 10,000 cattle, and 1,000 horses. There are also 
dairy farms and about 2,000 chickens for poultry. All but 20 
percent of local demand for eggs is met domestically. Despite 
the encouragement of agriculture and fishing, these two ele- 
ments of the economy together produced only about 1 percent 
of the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) in 1989 
(see table 21, Appendix). 

Severe conditions, such as extremely high temperatures 
and lack of water and fertile soil, hinder increased agricul- 
tural production. The limited groundwater that permits agri- 
culture in some areas is being depleted so rapidly that 
saltwater is encroaching and making the soil inhospitable to 
all but the most salt-resistant crops. According to estimates, 
groundwater will be depleted about the year 2000. As a par- 
tial solution, the government plans to expand its program of 
using treated sewage effluent for agriculture. Parkland and 
public gardens in Doha are already watered in this way. 

The Qatar National Fishing Company was incorporated in 
1966 to fish for shrimp in territorial waters and to process 
catches in a refrigerated factory. Japan is a large market for 
Doha's commercial fish. The total catch of fish and other 
aquatic animals for 1989 was 4,374 tons. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

In 1993 Qatar had 1,500 kilometers of roads, 1,000 kilo- 
meters of which were paved and the rest gravel. Most paved 
highways are centered in the Doha area or radiate from the 
capital to the northern end of the peninsula, to Dukhan on 
the west coast, or southwest to the border with Saudi Arabia 
to connect with the Saudi highway system. Outside the capi- 
tal and the principal highways, however, large stretches of 
country are accessible only by vehicles with four-wheel drive. 

Facilities for air and water transportation are located in or 
near the capital. Doha is the main port, having four berths 
capable of handling ships up to nine meters in draught and 
five additional berths that can accommodate ships requiring 
7.5 meters of water. Forty kilometers south of Doha, Umm 
Said handles petroleum exports. Doha International Airport, 
with a 4,500-meter runway, accommodates all types of air- 
planes. Qatar is part owner of Gulf Air, the flag carrier for 



178 



Fishing harbor, Doha, capital of Qatar; the fishing industry is a main 
source of food and income for the Persian Gulf states. 

Courtesy Anthony Toth 

Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, and Oman. Most international air 
traffic to and from Qatar is shunted through Bahrain, but 
Gulf Air and a few international carriers offer nonstop ser- 
vice from Doha to other points in the Middle East, South 
Asia, the Philippines, and France. 

Domestic and international telecommunications are 
excellent. In 1992 Qatar had 110,000 telephones, or twenty- 
three per 100 inhabitants, a per capita figure higher than 
many European nations. Radio-relay and submarine cables 
link Qatar with all the Arab states around the Persian Gulf. 
Three satellite ground stations, one operating with the Inter- 
national Telecommunications Satellite Organization's (Intel- 
sat) Atlantic Ocean satellite, one operating with Intelsat's 
Indian Ocean satellite, and one operating as part of the Arab 
Satellite Communication Organization (Arabsat) system, 
provide excellent international telephone and data links and 
live television broadcasts. Seven AM and three FM radio sta- 
tions have programs in Arabic, French, Urdu, and English. A 
powerful shortwave station with broadcasts in Arabic and 
English is heard worldwide. 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Money and Banking 

The Indian rupee was the principal currency until 1959, 
when the government replaced it with a special gulf rupee in 
an effort to halt gold smuggling into India. In 1966 Qatar and 
Dubayy jointly established a currency board to issue a Qatar- 
Dubayy riyal. In 1973 Qatar introduced its own riyal, which was 
pegged to the International Monetary Fund's (IMF — see Glos- 
sary) special drawing rights (SDR — see Glossary). The 
exchange rate is tied to the United States dollar at a rate of 
QR3.64per US$1.00. 

The Qatar Monetary Agency (QMA), established in 1973, 
has most of the traditional powers and prerogatives of a central 
bank. The QMA regulates banking, credit, and finances; issues 
currency; and manages the foreign reserves necessary to sup- 
port the Qatari riyal. Unlike many central banks, the agency 
shares control over the country's reserves with what was in 1973 
the Ministry of Finance and Petroleum. QMA does not act as 
the state's banker, which is the preserve of the Qatar National 
Bank (QNB). 

QMA's long-time governor, Majid Muhammad al Majid as 
Saad, was replaced in January 1990 by Abd Allah Khalid al 
Attiyah, who had been general manager of QNB. The position 
of governor was upgraded to ministerial level, signaling a more 
assertive future role for QMA in the country's banking sector. 

Banks give loans at rates between 7 and 9 percent, and they 
pay 7 percent on deposits. About fifteen local and foreign 
banks operate in Qatar. Two banks — Qatar Islamic Bank, 
licensed in 1989, and Qatar International Islamic Bank, 
licensed in 1990 — reflect a trend toward Islamic banking that 
started in Saudi Arabia. 

Banking in the gulf has been vulnerable to the shaky 
regional security situation. As a result of the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, banks in Qatar lost an estimated 15 to 30 percent of 
deposits in late 1990. 

Budget 

Oil and gas revenues make up 90 percent of government 
revenue, and government spending is the primary means of 
injecting these earnings into the economy. Given the small size 
of the local market, government spending generates most of 
the economic activity. Because of increased involvement in the 



180 



Employees and clients at one of Qatar's numerous commercial banks 

Courtesy Qatar Today 

international economic scene, in April 1989 Qatar's fiscal year 
was changed from the Islamic to the Gregorian calendar. 

Large budget surpluses in the 1970s funded major develop- 
ment projects, with government spending leveling off and 
dropping in the 1980s, years of more modest oil revenues. 
After years of surpluses, the government had a deficit of nearly 
QR8 billion in 1983. The government has attempted to keep 
deficits down by reducing the number of new projects and 
delaying those under way. In addition, the fiscal situation of the 
regime can often be gauged by the amount of time required to 
pay contractors. 

Budgets offer only a rough estimate of actual government 
spending. Many significant items, such as military and amirate 
expenses, do not appear. Projections are consistently conserva- 
tive, and deficits often are lower than predicted. In the 1986- 
87 period, when oil prices plummeted, the government did not 
even announce a budget. Restrained spending in recent years 
has meant frustration for contractors relying on government 
contracts, but the policy has also led to ever-shrinking deficits. 
The budget continued to show a deficit in the early 1990s (see 
table 22, Appendix). 



181 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Overseas assets are estimated at between US$10 and US$14 
billion. These assets have been periodically tapped to make up 
for shortfalls in oil revenues. 

Trade 

The main export and source of revenue is oil, although the 
government's efforts to diversify Qatar's industrial base have 
resulted in the growth of other exports. Crude oil, petroleum 
products, and LNG accounted for 82 percent of exports in 
1989, chemicals (ammonia and urea) accounted for 12.4 per- 
cent, and manufactures (mainly steel) accounted for 5.1 per- 
cent. Total earnings for the year were QR9.7 billion (see table 
23, Appendix). Japan was the largest customer at 54.4 percent 
of purchases, followed by Thailand (5.0 percent) and Singa- 
pore (4.0 percent) (see table 24, Appendix). 

Because imports are financed by oil revenues, the level of 
goods coming into the country rises and falls with the oil econ- 
omy. Between 1969 and 1979, for example, the value of imports 
grew an average of 40 percent annually. Imports declined in 
the early to mid-1980s, sinking to a low of QR4.0 billion in 
1986, then rising gradually until they reached QR4.8 billion in 
1989. 

Machinery and transportation equipment accounted for 
37.0 percent of imports in 1989, manufactured goods for 23.9 
percent, food and live animals for 15.1 percent, and chemicals 
and chemical products for 6.0 percent. The main import 
sources were Japan (18.8 percent), Britain (11.6 percent), the 
United States (8.8 percent), Italy (7.8 percent), and the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany (West Germany) (7.3 percent). 

In keeping with a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agree- 
ment, Qatar raised tariffs from 2.5 to 4.0 percent in 1984. In 
addition, there is a 20 percent duty on steel products similar to 
those produced by Qasco. Qatar plays a small role in the 
region's entrepot trade. Most imports arrive by sea and are for 
local use, with only a small percentage reexported to Saudi Ara- 
bia and the UAE. 

Government and Politics 

The 1970 provisional constitution (sometimes called the 
basic law) declares Qatar a sovereign Arab, Islamic state and 
vests sovereignty in the state. In fact, sovereignty is held by the 
amir, but, although he is supreme in relation to any other indi- 



182 



Qatar 



vidual or institution, in practice his rule is not absolute. The 
constitution also provides for a partially elected consultative 
assembly, the Advisory Council. The first council's twenty mem- 
bers were selected from representatives chosen by limited suf- 
frage. The size of the council was increased to thirty members 
in 1975. Among the council's constitutional prerogatives is the 
right to debate legislation drafted by the Council of Ministers 
before it is ratified and promulgated. 

The amir is also obliged to rule in accordance with Islamic 
precepts, which include fairness, honesty, generosity, and 
mutual respect. Islamic religious and ethical values are applica- 
ble to both the ruler's personal life and his rule. Thus, the 
ruler must retain the support of the religious community, 
which often asserts itself in such areas as media censorship, 
education regulations, and the status of women. 

The state political organs include the ruler, the Council of 
Ministers, and the Advisory Council. The ruler makes all major 
executive decisions and legislates by decree. The constitution 
institutionalizes the legislative and executive processes in the 
functions of the ruler, in effect formalizing his supremacy. 
Among the ruler's constitutional duties are convening the 
Council of Ministers, ratifying and promulgating laws and 
decrees, commanding the armed forces, and appointing and 
dismissing senior civil servants and military officers by decree. 
The constitution provides that the ruler possess "any other 
powers with which he is vested under this provisional constitu- 
tion or with which he may be vested under the law." This means 
that the ruler may extend or modify his powers by personal 
decree. 

The constitution also provides for a deputy ruler, who is to 
assume the post of prime minister. The prime minister is to for- 
mulate government programs and exercise final supervisory 
control over the financial and administrative affairs of the gov- 
ernment. When the constitution was promulgated, Khalifa ibn 
Hamad was concurrently prime minister and heir apparent, 
but the constitution did not specify that the post of prime min- 
ister must be held by the heir apparent. 

The Council of Ministers, which resembles similar bodies in 
the West, forms the amir's cabinet. A major government reshuf- 
fle in July 1989 reorganized several ministries, bringing in 
younger men loyal to Khalifa ibn Hamad's son, Shaykh Hamad 
ibn Khalifa. The Al Thani continued to dominate the govern- 
ment, with the most influential (after the amir and heir appar- 



183 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



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184 



Qatar 



ent) being Shaykh Abd Allah ibn Khalifa, minister of interior; 
Shaykh Ahmad ibn Hamad, minister of municipal affairs and 
agriculture; and Shaykh Muhammad ibn Khalifa, minister of 
finance, economy, and trade (see fig. 10). In October 1992, of 
the eighteen Council of Ministers posts, ten were occupied by 
the Al Thani and eight by commoners. 

The Council of Ministers is responsible collectively to the 
ruler, as is each minister individually. The ruler appoints and 
dismisses ministers (technically on the recommendation of the 
prime minister when that post is occupied by someone other 
than the ruler). Only native-born Qataris can become minis- 
ters, and the constitution prohibits the prime minister and 
other ministers from engaging in business or commercial activ- 
ities while holding state office. 

The Advisory Council debates laws proposed by the Council 
of Ministers before they are submitted to the ruler for ratifica- 
tion. If approved by the ruler, a law becomes effective on publi- 
cation in the official gazette. In 1975 the amir empowered the 
Advisory Council to summon individuals to answer questions 
on legislation before promulgation. The Advisory Council also 
debates the draft budgets of public projects and general policy 
on political, economic, social, and administrative affairs 
referred to it by the prime minister. The Advisory Council can 
request from the Council of Ministers information pertaining 
to policies it is debating, direct written questions to a particular 
minister, and summon ministers to answer questions on pro- 
posed legislation. Ministers have the right to attend and 
address Advisory Council meetings in which policy matters 
within their purview are being discussed; in practice, no use 
has been made of this constitutional guarantee because mem- 
bers of the Council of Ministers are also members of the Advi- 
sory Council. 

As the constitution stipulates, Qatar is divided into ten elec- 
toral districts for the purpose of forming the Advisory Council. 
Each district elects four candidates, of whom the ruler selects 
two, making a total of twenty; they constitute the relatively rep- 
resentative portion of the council. The members represent all 
Qataris, not just those in their districts. The Advisory Council 
was increased to thirty members in December 1975 and to 
thirty-five members in November 1988. Membership is limited 
to native-born citizens at least twenty years of age. The constitu- 
tion states that members are to serve three-year terms, but in 
May 1975 members' terms were extended for an additional 



185 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

three years and then for additional four-year terms in 1978, in 
1982, in 1986, and in 1990. 

Before the implementation of the constitution, the ruler's 
legislative authority frequently overlapped or encompassed 
judicial functions because he personally adjudicated disputes 
and grievances brought before him. The constitution marks 
the beginning of an attempt to organize the judiciary. The sec- 
ular courts include a higher and lower criminal court, a civil 
court, an appeals court, and a labor court. Civil and criminal 
codes, as well as a court of judicial procedure, were introduced 
in 1971. All civil and criminal law falls within the jurisdiction of 
these secular courts. A labor court was created in 1962, prima- 
rily because few of the country's existing judicial customs and 
codes were applicable to contemporary labor relations. 

The sharia court is the oldest element in Qatar's judiciary. 
The court's law is based on the Hanbali legal school of Islam, 
wherein judges (qadis) adhere to a strict interpretation of the 
Quran and sunna, or traditions of the Prophet Muhammad 
(see Sunni Islam, ch. 1). Originally, the sharia court's jurisdic- 
tion covered all civil and criminal disputes between Qataris and 
between all other Muslims. Beginning in the 1960s, the court's 
jurisdiction was successively restricted by decree. In the early 
1990s, its responsibilities were confined primarily to family mat- 
ters, including property, inheritance, divorce, and Islamic eth- 
ics. Non-Muslims were tried in secular courts unless they were 
married to Muslims. 

The constitution establishes the legal presumption of inno- 
cence and prohibits ex post facto laws. It also stipulates that 
"judges shall be independent in the exercise of their powers, 
and no party whatsoever may interfere in the administration of 
justice." The judiciary is nominally independent, not so much 
as a result of a constitutional guarantee but because its jurisdic- 
tion is unlikely to confront the ruler's exercise of power. Secu- 
lar courts adjudicate on the basis of the ruler's past decrees, 
and religious courts are restricted to questions of personal sta- 
tus. No provision exists for judicial review of the constitutional- 
ity of legislation. 

According to the preamble to the 1970 constitution, the 
government was undergoing a transitional stage of develop- 
ment. The constitution was thus provisional and was to be 
replaced with a new constitution after the transitional period 
ended. Shaykh Khalifa ibn Hamad has usually legitimated gov- 
ernment changes that he decrees by reference to the constitu- 



186 



Khalifa ibn Hamad 
Al Thani, 
ruler of Qatar 
Courtesy Embassy of Qatar, 
Washington 




tion. As of early 1993, however, there had been no indication 
that the full implementation of the constitution was imminent 
(for example, the electoral aspects of selection to Advisory 
Council membership) or that the transitional period was end- 
ing and a new constitution forthcoming. 

In addition to describing and delineating governmental 
authority, the constitution sets forth such protections as equal- 
ity among Qataris regardless of race, sex, or religion; freedom 
of the press; sanctity of the home; and recognition of both pri- 
vate and collective ownership of property. Such guarantees, 
however, are limited by the public interest and must be in 
accordance with the law — which is determined by the ruler. In 
practice, freedom of the press means that incoming foreign 
publications are screened by a government office for poten- 
tially objectionable material, and the indigenous press exer- 
cises self-censorship and is subject to sanction if it fails to deal 
appropriately with political and religious issues (see The 
Media, this ch.). 

The constitution also includes a commitment to certain eco- 
nomic, social, and cultural principles, including state provision 
of health care, social security, and education. Housing, pen- 
sion, education, and medical programs were begun in the 
1960s and expanded by Shaykh Khalifa ibn Hamad as oil reve- 



187 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

nues permitted throughout the years. There were no state 
taxes on individuals, and the state subsidized the prices of basic 
commodities to minimize the effects of inflation. Although 
these programs appeared to reflect West European statism, 
they were manifestations of the ruler's sense of duty, based on 
obligations inherent in Islamic ethics. 

The Al Thani 

In the early 1990s, the Al Thani ruling family comprised 
three main branches: the Bani Hamad, headed by Khalifa ibn 
Hamad (r. 1972- ); the Bani Ali, headed by Ahmad ibn Ali; 
and the Bani Khalid, headed by Nasir ibn Khalid (minister of 
economy and commerce in 1984). The family had 20,000 mem- 
bers, according to one estimate. 

The two preindependence rulers, Ali ibn Abd Allah (r. 
1949-60) and his son, Ahmad ibn Ali (r. 1960-72), had no par- 
ticular interest in supervising daily government, content to 
hunt in Iran and Pakistan and spend time at their villa in Swit- 
zerland. Thus, somewhat by default, those duties were 
assumed, beginning in the 1950s, by Ahmad ibn Ali's cousin, 
Khalifa ibn Hamad, the heir apparent and deputy ruler. By 
1971 Khalifa ibn Hamad not only had served as prime minister 
but also had headed the ministries or departments of foreign 
affairs, finance and petroleum, education and culture, and 
police and internal security. 

On February 22, 1972, with the support of the Al Thani, 
Khalifa ibn Hamad assumed power as ruler of Qatar. Western 
sources frequently refer to the event as an overthrow. Qataris 
regarded Khalifa ibn Hamad's assumption of full power as a 
simple succession because leading members of the Al Thani 
had declared Khalifa ibn Hamad the heir apparent on October 
24, 1960, and it was their consensus that Ahmad ibn Ali should 
be replaced. 

The reasons for the transfer of power were not entirely 
clear. Khalifa ibn Hamad reportedly stated that his assumption 
of power was intended "to remove the elements that tried to 
hinder [Qatar's] progress and modernization." Khalifa ibn 
Hamad has consistently attempted to lead and to control the 
process of modernization caused by the petroleum industry 
boom and the concomitant influx of foreigners and foreign 
ideas so that traditional mores and values based on Islam can 
be preserved. He and other influential members of the ruling 
family are known to have been troubled by the financial 



188 



Qatar 



excesses of many members of the Al Thani. Ahmad ibn Ali 
reportedly drew one-fourth, and the entire Al Thani between 
one-third and one-half, of Qatar's oil revenues in 1971. The 
new ruler severely limited the family's financial privileges soon 
after taking power. 

Family intrigue may also have played a part in the change of 
rulers. Factionalism and rivalries are not uncommon, particu- 
larly in families as large as the Al Thani. Western observers 
have reported rumors that Khalifa ibn Hamad acted to assume 
power when he learned that Ahmad ibn Ali might be planning 
to substitute his son, Abd al Aziz, as heir apparent, a move that 
would have circumvented the declared consensus of the Al 
Thani. 

The Merchant Families 

The merchant sector in Qatar differed from other gulf Arab 
countries before the exploitation of oil in its small size (Doha 
was an insignificant port compared with ports in Kuwait, Bah- 
rain, or Dubayy), in the absence of foreigners (the Indians 
were forced out in the late 1800s, leaving Qatar the only gulf 
amirate without Indians until the 1950s), and in the dominant 
role of a single family, the Al Thani. Although there were mer- 
chants before oil, there was no merchant class as in Dubayy or 
Kuwait. Two important families before oil were the Darwish 
and the Al Mana, who made their living through trade, pearl- 
ing, and smuggling and who competed for favor with the ruler. 
The Darwish and the Al Mana maintained their influence by 
trading loans and advice to the shaykh for monopolies and 
concessions. 

With the arrival of Petroleum Development (Qatar), the 
Darwish reaped huge profits through their monopoly on sup- 
plying labor, housing, water, and goods to the oil company. 
This monopoly ended, however, when workers, small mer- 
chants, and anti-British Qataris used Abd Allah Darwish, the 
patriarch of the Darwish family, as one of several convenient 
targets for an antiregime strike in 1956. By this time, however, 
with oil revenues growing, the shaykh could remove himself 
from financial dependence on the merchants, who lost a mea- 
sure of political influence. 

A series of citizenship and commercial laws promulgated in 
the 1960s helped to channel economic benefits in the direc- 
tion of Qatari nationals in general and the merchants and rul- 
ing family in particular. Only Qataris were permitted to own 



189 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

land, for example, and companies were required to be at least 
51 percent Qatari owned. In the 1970s, some laws were enacted 
that worked against merchant interests by limiting prices and 
profits. 

As they had before the discovery of oil, the Al Thani contin- 
ued engaging in trade and in other enterprises. Sometimes 
they used their family connections to win lucrative contracts for 
themselves or for firms in which they had more common busi- 
ness partners, such as the Jaidah, the Attiyah, and the Mannai 
families. 

Opposition 

Because no public dissent is tolerated in Qatar, opposition 
usually manifests itself in royal family intrigue or behind-the- 
scenes grumbling by aggrieved parties. The apparent public 
tranquillity is cultivated by the amir and by the private but 
closely controlled media. Incidents in the 1980s, however, dem- 
onstrated that opposition to the regime existed. 

In September 1983, for example, a conspiracy to assassinate 
the ruler or a GCC head of state was uncovered by Qatari 
authorities, and seventy people were arrested. Contradictory 
press reports said that either some military people were 
involved or that the plot reflected a squabble among members 
of the ruling family. Qatari security forces learned of the plot 
from Egyptian intelligence via the Saudi Arabians. Informed 
that the plotters were backed by Libya, Qatar declared the Lib- 
yan charge d'affaires persona non grata. The target of the plot, 
according to conflicting reports, was either Shaykh Khalifa ibn 
Hamad or one of the GCC heads of state who were coming to 
Doha for a November summit. Since then, there have been 
other reported assassination attempts. 

In August 1985, it was reported that Shaykh Suhaym ibn 
Hamad Al Thani, one of the amir's brothers, disappointed that 
the position of crown prince was given to Shaykh Khalifa ibn 
Hamad's son, Hamad ibn Khalifa, plotted a coup and main- 
tained a cadre of supporters and a cache of weapons in the 
northern part of the country. When Shaykh Suhaym ibn 
Hamad died suddenly, his sons blamed Minister of Information 
and Culture Ghanim al Kuwari for not responding promptly to 
the call for medical help. After supporters of Suhaym ibn 
Hamad and his sons attempted to kill Ghanim al Kuwari, they 
were imprisoned. 



190 



Qatar 



Soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Palestinians and Ira- 
qis living in Qatar came under intense government scrutiny. 
Dozens were deported, and many more were forced to leave 
after their contracts were not renewed. 

The Media 

Qatar has no official censorship, but newspapers recognize 
the need for self-censorship in not publishing material critical 
of the ruling family, the government, or religious issues. The 
privately owned press consists of three Arabic dailies — Ar Rayah 
(The Banner), AlArab (The Arab), and Ash Sharq (The East) — 
and an English daily, Gulf Times. The Ministry of Information 
and Culture operates the Qatar News Agency, the Qatar Broad- 
casting Service, and the Qatar Television Service. 

Foreign Relations 

The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait and the result- 
ing threat to other small Persian Gulf states forced Qatar to 
alter significantly its defense and foreign policy priorities. For 
example, whereas Qatar had supported Iraq financially in its 
1980-88 war against Iran, Qatar quickly joined the anti-Iraq 
coalition after the invasion. Formerly a political and economic 
supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
Qatar bitterly condemned the alliance between the PLO and 
many Palestinians on the one hand and Saddam Husayn on the 
other hand. Moreover, Qatar's previous opposition to super- 
power naval presence in the gulf turned into an open willing- 
ness to permit the air forces of the United States, Canada, and 
France to operate from its territory. 

The GCC, which for years had been aimed, in part, at deal- 
ing with a perceived Iranian threat (both external and, in the 
cases of Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, internal), became a 
forum for condemnation of Iraq and a venue for building a 
concerted defense against further Iraqi advances. After the 
Iraqi defeat, Qatar and other GCC members focused their 
energies on improving cooperation and coordination on 
mutual defense issues while also continuing to work together 
in social, cultural, political, and economic spheres. Qatar, like 
Saudi Arabia, has been historically sensitive to outside military 
intervention in the gulf and was eager to bolster regional secu- 
rity measures. 



191 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

The war also drew Qatar and other GGC members closer to 
Egypt and Syria, the two strongest Arab members of the anti- 
Iraq coalition. The Qatari-Egyptian rapprochement began in 
1987 when the two countries resumed diplomatic relations 
after the League of Arab States (Arab League) summit that 
adopted the resolution allowing members to reestablish diplo- 
matic links at their discretion. After the war, Egypt and Syria 
received large sums from the Persian Gulf states in apprecia- 
tion for their roles. Qatar and Syria signed an agreement on 
trade and economic and technical cooperation in January 
1991. 

Even before August 1990, Qatar historically had close rela- 
tions with its larger and more powerful neighbor, Saudi Arabia. 
Because of geopolitical realities and the religious affinity of the 
two ruling families (both adhere to the conservative Wahhabi 
interpretation of Islam), Qatar followed the Saudi lead in many 
regional and global issues. Qatar was one of the few Arab coun- 
tries that observed the full forty-day mourning period after the 
assassination of Saudi Arabia's King Faisal ibn Abd al Aziz Al 
Saud in March 1975 and the death of King Khalid ibn Abd al 
Aziz Al Saud in 1982. The two countries signed a bilateral 
defense agreement in 1982, and on several occasions Saudi 
Arabia acted as mediator in territorial disputes between Qatar 
and Bahrain. 

Qatar also has had cordial relations with Iran, despite 
Qatar's support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. In 1991 
Shaykh Hamad ibn Khalifa welcomed Iranian participation in 
Persian Gulf security arrangements. Iran was one of the first 
countries to recognize Shaykh Khalifa ibn Hamad in 1972. 
Relations were based partially on proximity (important trade 
links exist between the two countries, including a ferry service 
between Doha and Bushehr) and partly on mutual interests. 
Plans were being formulated in 1992 to pipe water from the 
Karun River in Iran to Qatar. The Iranian community in Qatar, 
although large, is well integrated and has not posed a threat to 
the regime. Iran's claim in May 1989 that one-third of Qatar's 
North Field gas reservoir lay under Iranian waters apparently 
was resolved by an agreement to exploit the field jointly. 

Relations with Bahrain continue to fluctuate between cor- 
rect and strained, with tensions rising regularly over territorial 
disputes dating back for decades. Most of the friction involves 
Hawar and the adjacent islands, which both countries claim. 
Tensions rose most recently in July 1991 when, according to 



192 



Qatar 



reports, Qatari naval vessels violated Bahraini waters, and Bah- 
raini jet fighters flew into Qatari airspace. The issue was 
referred in August to the International Court of Justice in The 
Hague to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the dis- 
pute. Other disputes have involved the abandoned town of Az 
Zubarah, on the northwest coast of Qatar. The most serious cri- 
sis took place in the spring of 1986, when Qatari forces raided 
Fasht ad Dibal, a coral reef in the gulf north of Al Muharraq in 
Bahrain that had been artificially built up into a small island. 
They took into custody twenty-nine workers who were sent by 
Bahrain to build a coast guard station. The workers were 
released in May, and installations on the island were destroyed. 
Qatar submitted the dispute to the International Court of Jus- 
tice at The Hague, but Bahrain refused the jurisdiction of the 
court in June 1992. The dispute was ongoing as of early 1993 
(see Foreign Relations, ch. 3). 

Britain's historical role in the Persian Gulf has guaranteed a 
special relationship with its former protectorates. Qatari-British 
relations are tempered by a complex blend of suspicion and 
cordiality. On the one hand, Qataris are wary of the former 
colonial power because they remember instances when they 
were ill-served by their "protector," especially regarding the 
exploitation of oil. On the other hand, the long-term British 
presence in the gulf has fostered many fruitful political, eco- 
nomic, and cultural ties between the two countries. The British 
Embassy in Doha, for example, is the only foreign mission that 
owns its land outright. In addition, many Britons advise or work 
for the Qatari government at high levels. British banks and 
other businesses are well represented in Doha. Many Qataris 
attend university in Britain, own homes there, and visit regu- 
larly. 

Relations with the United States have been generally proper 
but took a sudden turn for the worse in March 1988 when 
United States-made Stinger missiles (obtained through unsanc- 
tioned channels) were observed at a military parade in Doha. 
When the Qatari government refused to relinquish the weap- 
ons to the United States or to allow an inspection, the United 
States instituted a policy of withholding military and economic 
cooperation. The Stinger issue was settled when Qatar 
destroyed the missiles in question in 1990. Furthermore, both 
sides acknowledged the need to cooperate militarily in the face 
of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Operation Desert Shield and Oper- 
ation Desert Storm greatly improved Qatar's image of the 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

United States as a desirable security partner and resulted in 
changed bilateral military relations. On June 23, 1992, Qatar 
and the United States signed a bilateral defense cooperation 
agreement that provided for United States access to Qatari 
bases, pre-positioning of United States materiel, and future 
combined military exercises. 

Following Saudi Arabia's lead, Qatar refused for many years 
to have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This 
changed in the summer of 1988, when Qatar announced the 
opening of relations at the ambassadorial level with the Soviet 
Union and with China. In the wake of the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, Qatar established relations with newly 
independent Russia. 

Qatar became a member of the United Nations in Septem- 
ber 1971, soon after it proclaimed independence. It is a mem- 
ber of several of its specialized agencies, including the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, the Food and Agri- 
culture Organization, the International Labour Organisation, 
the World Health Organization, the Universal Postal Union, 
and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization. 

* * * 

A number of books on Qatar appeared in the 1980s. The 
most useful, particularly in its interpretation of history and pol- 
itics, based largely on British Foreign Office records, is Jill Crys- 
tal's Oil and Politics in the Gulf. Less analytical but still helpful, 
especially for understanding the disputes concerning Az 
Zubarah and Hawar and the adjacent islands, is Rosemarie Said 
Zahlan's The Creation of Qatar. Information on the oil industry is 
presented uncritically in Qatar: Energy and Development by 
Ragaei El Mallakh. Zuhair Ahmed Nafi gives a similarly san- 
guine appraisal in Economic and Social Development in Qatar. 
Somewhat more enlightening is Sheikha al-Misnad's The Devel- 
opment of Modern Education in the Gulf, which contains a wealth 
of statistical information. Naser al-Othman's With Their Bare 
Hands gives a Qatari's proud view of his country's history and 
includes several fascinating interviews with Qataris who worked 
in the first years of oil exploration. Abeer Abu Saud gives a per- 
sonal view in Qatari Women, Past and Present. 

For an encompassing overview of the country, the "Qatar" 
section in The Middle East and North Africa is an informative 
annual reference. An excellent source of statistics is the "Qatar" 



194 



Qatar 



section in another annual, the Britannica Book of the Year. P.T.H. 
Unwin compiled the Qatar volume of the World Bibliographi- 
cal Series and wrote a helpful historical introduction. Up-to- 
date information on business and economic matters appears in 
the indispensable Middle East Economic Digest. (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



195 



Chapter 5. United Arab Emirates 




Crest of the United Arab Emirates 



Country Profile 



Country 

Formal Name: United Arab Emirates. 
Short Form: UAE. 

Term for Citizens: No generally accepted term. 
Capital: Abu Dhabi. 

Date of Independence: December 2, 1971. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 77,700 square kilometers (excluding 
islands), but land borders undemarcated. 

Topography: Largely flat or rolling desert, although mountains 
in northeast. 

Climate: Hot and dry in desert regions; frequent high humidity 
along Persian Gulf coast. 

Boundaries: Land boundaries with Oman, Qatar, and Saudi 
Arabia mostly undefined; several internal boundaries subject of 
disputes between and among seven constituent amirates. 

Society 

Population: Estimated at 2.0 million in mid-1993; 1993 growth 
rate 5.1 percent. Foreigners, of whom majority male workers, 
accounted for 88 percent of population. 

Education: In 1990-91 academic year, more than 388,000 
students (half of them female) attended primary and secondary 
schools. Education compulsory at primary level and free at all 
levels. Most of 22,000 teachers and administrators foreigners. In 
1990-91 academic year, more than 8,900 students, of whom 65 
percent women, attended United Arab Emirates University. 



Note — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



199 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Health: Comprehensive public health care system, free for 
citizens but charges for some services provided foreigners. 
Majority of medical personnel foreigners, primarily from Egypt, 
India, and Pakistan. In 1990 life expectancy at birth 68.6 years 
for males and 72.9 years for females. 

Ethnic Groups: Almost all citizens indigenous Arabs. Foreign 
population included other Arabs (especially Egyptians, Omanis, 
Palestinians, and Yemenis), Indians, Pakistanis, and Iranians. 

Religion: Most citizens Sunni Muslims. About 60 percent of 
foreign population Sunnis; 20 percent Shia Muslims; 20 percent 
Hindus, Christians, and other. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US$34.9 billion in 1992, about 
US$14,000 per capita. 

Oil Industry: Contribution of petroleum sector to GDP dropped 
from 63 percent in 1980 to 47 percent in 1990. Petroleum 
products accounted for 79 percent of exports in 1990. Abu 
Dhabi had largest reserves and most of production. Crude oil 
production in 1992 averaged 2.3 million barrels per day. 

Industry: Oil refining and gas processing most important, 
followed by petrochemicals, utilities, and cement, all using oil or 
gas as fuel and feedstock. Government owned at least one-half 
interest in these plants. Non-oil manufacturing constituted 7.3 
percent of GDP in 1990. Dubai Dry Docks one of world's largest 
and most modern. Majority of industrial workers foreigners. 

Agriculture and Fishing: Represented less than 2 percent of GDP 
in 1990. Production mostly vegetables, fruit, livestock, and 
poultry. Water shortages restrict farming. Fishing industry being 
developed. 

Exports: US$23.4 billion in 1992, of which US$14.0 billion oil 
and gas. Remainder largely propane and butane and reexports. 
Japan, Singapore, and Republic of Korea (South Korea) primary 
petroleum markets. 

Imports: US$11.2 billion in 1990. Principal imports 
manufactured goods, machinery, transportation equipment, 
food, and live animals. Japan, United States, and Western 



200 



United Arab Emirates 

Europe major sources of imports. 

Currency and Exchange Rate: UAE dirham. In 1994 exchange 
rate US$1 = Dh3.67 (fixed rate). 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Transportation: About 2,000 kilometers of roads, of which 1,800 
kilometers paved as of 1993. Principal road is highway from Ash 
Sham via all main coastal cities to Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 
Dubayy major regional and international sea and air traffic 
center. UAE has several ports, of which largest is Mina Jabal Ali 
near city of Dubayy. Dubayy has major international airport, but 
Abu Dhabi, Al Fujayrah, Ras al Khaymah, and Sharjah also have 
international airports. 

Telecommunications: International telecommunications 
excellent via satellites, radio relay, and telephone. All populated 
areas receive radio and television transmissions. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Federation of seven amirates, as defined in 1971 
provisional constitution. Powers divided between federal and 
amirate governments. Head of state is UAE president, Shaykh 
Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan, chosen by Supreme Council of 
the Union composed of rulers of seven amirates. Federal 
National Council has consultative function. 

Politics: No political parties. Amirs and their families, 
particularly those of Abu Dhabi and Dubayy, most important 
political actors; technocrats and commercial interests play lesser 
role. 

Foreign Relations: Member of United Nations, League of Arab 
States, Organization of the Islamic Conference, Gulf 
Cooperation Council, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, and Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Known as Union Defense Force. In mid-1993 
personnel strength 57,500: army, 53,000; navy, 2,000; and air 



201 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



force, 2,500. Army uses French and Italian main battle tanks and 
wide assortment of other armored vehicles. In addition to 
several gun boats, navy operates six Exocet-equipped guided 
missile boats. Combat aircraft include Mirages, Hawks, and 
Aeromacchi MB-326s. 



202 



THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE) in 1993 was a federa- 
tion of seven separate amirates that had joined together in the 
winter of 1971-72 to form a single independent country. The 
new nation was created out of the British dependencies that had 
been known as the Trucial Coast states (also seen as Trucial 
Oman or Oman Coast) since 1853 when Britain and the local 
rulers signed the Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity, an 
agreement that ceded to London responsibility for foreign 
affairs. The individual amirates of the UAE include Abu Dhabi 
(also seen as Abu Zaby), Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Dubayy (also seen 
as Dubai), Ras al Khaymah, Sharjah (also seen as Ash Shariqah), 
and Umm al Qaywayn. 

The UAE's oil resources make it one of the wealthiest coun- 
tries in the world. The oil and the revenues it generates, how- 
ever, are not equitably distributed. Revenues from petroleum 
exports accrue principally to the government of Abu Dhabi, 
where more than 80 percent of the oil is located. Three other 
amirates — Dubayy, Ras al Khaymah, and Sharjah — account for 
the remainder of the UAE's oil production. Nevertheless, since 
the formation of the UAE, Abu Dhabi has made significant 
annual contributions to the federal budget. Federal expendi- 
tures on development projects in the amirates lacking oil 
enable them to benefit, albeit modestly, from the overall oil 
wealth. 

The UAE's oil-fueled economic growth has been accom- 
plished with the assistance of thousands of foreign workers. Cit- 
izens composed only 12 percent of the 2.0 million people living 
in the UAE in 1993 and constituted only 7 percent of the labor 
force. The foreign workers come from other Arab countries 
and from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Britain, India, Iran, Paki- 
stan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, the United 
States, and Western Europe. The presence of such a large and 
diverse foreign community provides a cosmopolitan atmo- 
sphere in the cities of Abu Dhabi and Dubayy. However, 
throughout the 1980s, there was growing resentment of for- 
eigners among many UAE citizens, who felt uncomfortable 
being a minority, although a very privileged one, within their 
own country. 

The rulers have been conscious that their country's small 
size and population, combined with relatively large oil reve- 



203 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

nues, make the UAE vulnerable in the context of regional poli- 
tics. During the 1980s, the UAE tried to maintain its neutrality 
in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) by providing modest loans for 
the Iraqi war effort and permitting Dubayy to serve as a major 
port of entry for goods being transshipped to Iran. The UAE 
also joined the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a collective 
security and cooperation association, established in 1981, of 
the six oil-producing Arabian Peninsula states. After Iraq 
invaded and occupied fellow GCC member Kuwait in 1990, the 
UAE joined the international military coalition that opposed 
and eventually defeated Iraq. In 1992 tensions with Iran over 
disputed islands in the Persian Gulf induced the UAE to 
expand its military cooperation with the United States. 

Geography 

The UAE lies between 22°50' and 26° north latitude and 
between 51° and 56°25' east longitude. It shares a nineteen- 
kilometer border with Qatar on the northwest, a 530-kilometer 
border with Saudi Arabia on the west, south, and southeast, 
and a 450-kilometer border with Oman on the southeast and 
northeast. The land border with Qatar is one over which in 
1993 the UAE continued to have a dispute in the Khawr al 
Udayd area. The total area of the UAE is approximately 77,700 
square kilometers. The country's exact size is unknown because 
of disputed claims to several islands in the Persian Gulf, 
because of the lack of precise information on the size of many 
of these islands, and because most of its land boundaries, espe- 
cially with Saudi Arabia, remain undemarcated. The largest 
amirate, Abu Dhabi, accounts for 87 percent of the UAE's total 
area (67,340 square kilometers). The smallest amirate, Ajman, 
encompasses only 259 square kilometers (see fig. 11). 

The UAE stretches for more than 1,400 kilometers along 
the southern shore of the Persian Gulf. Most of the coast con- 
sists of salt pans that extend far inland. The largest natural har- 
bor is at Dubayy, although other ports have been dredged at 
Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, and elsewhere. Numerous islands are 
found in the gulf, and the ownership of some of them has been 
the subject of international disputes with both Iran and Qatar. 
The smaller islands, as well as many coral reefs and shifting 
sandbars, are a menace to navigation. Strong tides and occa- 
sional windstorms further complicate ship movements near the 
shore. 



204 



United Arab Emirates 



The UAE also extends for about ninety kilometers along the 
Gulf of Oman, an area known as the Al Batinah coast. The Al 
Hajar al Gharbi (Western Al Hajar) Mountains, rising in places 
to 2,500 meters, separate the Al Batinah coast from the rest of 
the UAE. Beginning at the UAE-Oman border on the Persian 
Gulf coast of the Musandam Peninsula (Ras Musandam), the 
Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains extend southeastward for about 
150 kilometers to the southernmost UAE-Oman frontier on the 
Gulf of Oman. The range continues as the Al Hajar ash Sharqi 
(Eastern Al Hajar) Mountains for more than 500 kilometers 
into Oman. The mountain slopes tend to run right to the 
shore. Nevertheless, there are small harbors at Diba al Hisn, 
Kalba, and Khawr Fakkan on the Gulf of Oman. In the vicinity 
of Al Fujayrah, where the mountains do not approach the 
coast, there are sandy beaches. 

South and west of Abu Dhabi, vast, rolling sand dunes 
merge into the Rub al Khali (Empty Quarter) of Saudi Arabia. 
The desert area of Abu Dhabi includes two important oases 
with adequate underground water for permanent settlements 
and cultivation. The extensive Al Liwa Oasis is in the south 
near the undefined border with Saudi Arabia. About 200 kilo- 
meters to the northeast of the Al Liwa Oasis is the Al Buraymi 
Oasis, which extends on both sides of the Abu Dhabi-Oman 
border. 

Prior to withdrawing from the area in 1971, Britain delin- 
eated the internal borders among the seven amirates in order 
to preempt territorial disputes that might hamper formation of 
the federation. In general, the rulers of the amirates accepted 
the British intervention, but in the case of boundary disputes 
between Abu Dhabi and Dubayy, and also between Dubayy and 
Sharjah, conflicting claims were not resolved until after the 
UAE became independent. The most complicated borders 
were in the Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains, where five of the 
amirates contested jurisdiction over more than a dozen 
enclaves. 

The climate of the UAE generally is hot and dry. The hottest 
months are July and August, when average maximum tempera- 
tures reach above 48°C on the coastal plain. In the Al Hajar al 
Gharbi Mountains, temperatures are considerably cooler, a 
result of increased altitude. Average minimum temperatures in 
January and February are between 10°C and 14°C. During the 
late summer months, a humid southeastern wind known as the 
sharqi makes the coastal region especially unpleasant. The aver- 



207 






International 




boundary 




Administrative line 




Boundary in dispute 




Internal boundary 




Paved road 




National capital 


• 


Populated place 




Airport 




Port 




1 


SO 100 Kilometers 


50 100 Miles 



Umm az Zumul (well) 



1 Ras al Khaymah 

2 Umm al Qaywayn 

3 Al Fujayrah 

4 Ajman 

5 Sharjah 

6 Al Fujayrah and Sharjah 

7 Dubayy 

8 Ajman and Oman 

9 Neutral zone 

10 Abu Dhabi 



SAUDI 



ARABIA 



52 Boundary representation 
| not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 11. United Arab Emirates, 1993 



) 

I 56 



206 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

age annual rainfall in the coastal area is fewer than 120 milli- 
meters, but in some mountainous areas annual rainfall often 
reaches 350 millimeters. Rain in the coastal region falls in 
short, torrential bursts during the summer months, sometimes 
resulting in floods in ordinarily dry wadi beds. The region is 
prone to occasional, violent dust storms, which can severely 
reduce visibility. 

Population 

A harsh environment and marginal economic conditions 
kept the population of the region low and economically 
depressed until the exploitation of oil. According to estimates, 
between 1900 and 1960 there were 80,000 to 95,000 inhabitants 
in the amirates, mostly in small coastal settlements. Although 
the population of the amirates probably did not increase a 
great deal during this period, there were considerable shifts 
within the territories, caused by changes in economic and 
political conditions. Whereas Sharjah was dominant in the 
nineteenth century, by 1939 Dubayy was the most populous 
amirate, with an estimated population of 20,000, one-quarter 
of whom were foreigners. The largest minorities were Iranians 
and Indians in Dubayy and in other amirates. Abu Dhabi's 
onshore oil exports began in 1963, bringing wealth and a 
demand for foreign labor. The 1968 census, conducted under 
the British, was the area's first; it enumerated 180,226 inhabit- 
ants. Ever greater demands for labor and expertise fueled a 
population boom throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, but 
population growth has slowed since 1985. 

The UAE had an officially estimated population of nearly 2.0 
million in early 1993. Only about 12 percent of the total actu- 
ally were UAE citizens. The number of foreign workers has 
increased dramatically since 1968, when they constituted 36 
percent of the total population. By 1975 foreigners accounted 
for 70 percent of the population, increasing to 80 percent in 
1980 and to 88 percent in 1985. Since 1985, the percentage of 
foreigners has leveled at 88 percent. Asian workers from the 
Indian subcontinent (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka) constituted about 45 percent of the total population in 
1993. Iranians, who accounted for an estimated 17 percent of 
the population, were the next largest ethnic group. Non-UAE 
Arabs, primarily Egyptian nationals, accounted for 13 percent 
of the population. Other Asians and Africans made up 8 per- 



208 



United Arab Emirates 



cent of the population, and foreigners from Europe and North 
America accounted for 5 percent. 

Although the population density was about twenty-five per- 
sons per square kilometer in 1991, the population was 
unevenly distributed among the seven amirates. The three 
most populous amirates — Abu Dhabi, Dubayy, and Sharjah — 
together accounted for roughly 84 percent of the total popula- 
tion. The remaining 16 percent lived in Ras al Khaymah, 
Ajman, Al Fujayrah, and Umm al Qaywayn (see table 25, 
Appendix) . 

The population of the UAE is overwhelmingly urban, with 
more than 90 percent of the people living in cities. The largest 
city, Abu Dhabi, the federal capital, had an estimated popula- 
tion of 530,000 in 1993. Dubayy, the second largest city and the 
UAE's main port and commercial center, had an estimated 
population of 402,000. The residential neighborhoods along 
the Persian Gulf coast north of the center of Dubayy were con- 
tiguous with those of the city of Sharjah (estimated population 
of 130,000). Sharjah in turn flowed into the city of Ajman (esti- 
mated population of 60,000). About fifty kilometers north of 
Ajman is the city of Ras al Khaymah (estimated population of 
45,000). The largest inland population concentration is in the 
contiguous villages and residential developments at Al Ayn 
(estimated population of 105,000) in Abu Dhabi's Al Buraymi 
Oasis. 

Religion 

Most of the citizens of the UAE are Sunni (see Glossary) 
Muslims who adhere to the Maliki legal tradition (see Sunni 
Islam, ch. 1). Some Sunnis of the Wahhabi sect (followers of a 
strict interpretation of the Hanbali legal school) live in the Al 
Buraymi Oasis, and some who follow the Shafii legal school live 
along the Al Batinah coast. The foreign population includes 
Sunni and Shia (see Glossary) Muslims, Hindus, and Chris- 
tians. 

Although varying from amirate to amirate, the degree of 
religious freedom afforded non-Muslims is greater in the UAE 
than in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. For example, non-Muslims are 
permitted to worship but not to proselytize. There are several 
large Christian churches and schools in the UAE, primarily in 
Dubayy and Abu Dhabi. 



209 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 
Education 

In the early 1900s, three major schools were established by 
pearl merchants in Dubayy, Abu Dhabi, and Sharjah. The 
schools were staffed by foreign teachers who taught reading, 
writing, and Islamic studies. The economic crises of the 1920s 
and 1930s forced some of these and other schools to close, but 
some reopened when the economy improved. 

The British built the first school offering a comprehensive 
curriculum in Sharjah in 1953. Staffed by teachers from other 
Arab countries, the school had 450 boys between the ages of six 
and seventeen that year. Shortly after, the first modern primary 
school for girls was established in Sharjah. The British govern- 
ment also built schools in Abu Dhabi, Ras al Khaymah, and 
Khawr Fakkan and established an agricultural school in Ras al 
Khaymah in 1955 and a technical school in Sharjah in 1958. In 
1958 Kuwait started to build schools in the amirates, including 
facilities in Ajman and Umm al Qaywayn. Kuwait also funded 
teacher trainees from the amirates to go abroad for training. 
Until the amirates could afford to pay teachers, Bahrain, Qatar, 
and Egypt paid teachers to work in the amirates. 

After Abu Dhabi began earning oil revenues in the early 
1960s, it developed and funded its own educational system, 
while the other amirates continued to rely on outside assis- 
tance. By the 1964-65 academic year, Abu Dhabi had six 
schools attended by 390 boys and 138 girls, taught by thirty- 
three teachers. In the same year, there were thirty-one schools 
outside Abu Dhabi, twelve of which were for girls. Dubayy had 
3,572 students in ten schools and 137 teachers, most of whom 
came from Kuwait and Egypt. 

After the founding of the UAE, there was tremendous 
expansion of public education facilities. Section 17 of the con- 
stitution states that education is fundamental to the progress of 
society and is to be compulsory at the primary level and free at 
all levels. Uniforms, books, equipment, and transportation are 
also free. In the first seven years of the UAE's existence, educa- 
tion was second only to defense in the federal budget. In 1989 
the budget allocated Dh2.0 billion (for value of the the UAE 
dirham — see Glossary) for education. 

The education system in the UAE includes six years of pri- 
mary school and six years of secondary school (see table 26, 
Appendix). By 1972-73, the first full academic year following 
the formation of the UAE, the government operated an esti- 
mated 140 schools, twelve of which offered boarding facilities. 



210 



United Arab Emirates 



Most schools are segregated according to gender, but some 
through the primary level are coeducational. In 1990-91 there 
were about 760 schools with 49,904 pupils in preschool, 
227,083 students in primary school, and 111,611 in secondary 
school. One-third of the pupils attended private or religious 
schools. Beginning in the 1991-92 academic year, military 
courses were compulsory in federal secondary schools. 

United Arab Emirates University opened in 1977 at Al Ayn 
with four faculties: arts, science, education and political sci- 
ence, and business administration. First-year enrollment was 
400. A sharia (Islamic jurisprudence) faculty was added in 
1978; faculties in agriculture and engineering were added in 
1982. In 1988 four higher colleges of technology (two for men 
and two for women) opened. By the 1990-91 academic year, 
enrollment stood at 8,941 students. In the previous academic 
year, 65 percent of university students were women. Many UAE 
nationals go abroad for university and graduate studies to 
other Arab countries and to Britain and the United States. 

In the early 1990s, United Arab Emirates University was 
being expanded, at an estimated outlay of Dh3 to Dh5 billion, 
to accommodate up to 16,000 students by the year 2000. The 
existing campus will become a technical college after the 
expansion is completed. 

The Women's Federation of the UAE provides adult literacy 
classes. There were twenty-six adult education centers in 1992. 
The United Nations (UN) estimated the UAE's literacy rate in 
1988-89 as 53.5 percent overall, 58.4 percent for males and 
38.1 percent for females. The government also operates several 
vocational training centers, which in the 1987-88 academic 
year had 2,614 students. 

Status of Women 

The role of women in UAE society has gradually expanded 
since the discovery of oil. Before 1960 there were few opportu- 
nities for them outside the realm of home and family. The pres- 
ident, Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan, has acknowledged 
the validity of women participating in the work force as well as 
in the home. The president's wife, Shaykha Fatima, heads the 
Women's Federation and promotes training, education, and 
the advancement of the status of women. In the early 1990s, 
there were five women's societies promoting various issues of 
importance to women, including literacy and health. 



211 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Women constituted 6.2 percent of the work force in 1988. A 
study by the Administrative Development Institute found that a 
majority of female workers who are UAE citizens work under 
the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. In 1988 
they accounted for 82 percent of UAE national employees in 
these ministries. Since the late 1980s, women graduates have 
outnumbered men by a ratio of two to one at United Arab 
Emirates University. 

Health and Welfare 

In the years before the discovery of oil, the health situation 
in the amirates was poor. Those who could afford it obtained 
modern treatment abroad; those who could not had to make 
do with traditional remedies. Britain became interested in the 
region's welfare when it perceived that the United States would 
gain local influence in the scramble for oil through the suc- 
cesses of United States missionary doctors, who, in Muscat and 
Bahrain, operated the only hospitals in the region. As a result, 
in 1938 Britain appointed a medical officer for the Trucial 
Coast and sent an Indian physician to serve in a dispensary in 
Dubayy the following year. 

In 1949 the British government built Al Maktum Hospital, a 
small hospital in Dubayy, and appointed a British physician 
from the Indian Medical Service to initiate modern medical 
service. Contributions to health care also came from Kuwait, 
Iran, and the Trucial States Development Fund. Earlier suspi- 
cions by the British notwithstanding, in the 1950s and 1960s 
American Mission hospitals were established in Sharjah, Al 
Ayn, and Ras al Khaymah. 

In 1965 the Abu Dhabi government employed one physi- 
cian; three others were in private practice. The amirate also 
received technical and material assistance from Egypt. After 
federation in 1971, rapid, uncoordinated growth characterized 
the health system. Although cooperation among amirates in 
the health field had improved by the early 1990s, oil compa- 
nies and the military continued to have their own medical facil- 
ities. 

All residents received free medical care until 1982. In that 
year, escalating costs, shrinking oil revenues, and a change in 
attitude toward foreign residents caused the UAE to begin 
charging noncitizens for all services except emergency and 
child and maternity care. 



212 




Student nurses at Abu Dhabi nursing school; the United Arab Emirates 
has stressed academic and professional education. 
Courtesy Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Washington 

In 1985 there were 2,361 physicians, 6,090 nurses, 242 den- 
tists, and 190 pharmacists, almost all of whom were foreigners. 
In 1986 the UAE had forty public hospitals with 3,900 beds and 
119 clinics. In 1990 life expectancy at birth was 68.6 years for 
males and 72.9 years for females. The major causes of death 
registered in Abu Dhabi in 1989 per 100,000 population were 
accidents and poisonings, 43.7; cardiovascular diseases, 34.3; 
cancer, 13.7; and respiratory diseases, 8.1. As of December 
1990, eight cases of acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) were reported in the UAE. Infant mortality declined 
dramatically from 103 per 1,000 live births in 1965 to twenty- 
three per 1,000 live births in 1990. In 1985 a health worker 
attended 96 percent of births. 

In the early 1990s, the UAE had a modern health care sys- 
tem with facilities and professionals capable of providing excel- 
lent care and performing advanced procedures such as organ 
transplants and complex heart surgery. Although facilities are 
concentrated in the cities of Abu Dhabi and Dubayy, most of 
the population has access to at least basic facilities. The federa- 
tion's first hospital specializing in pediatric and maternity care, 
the 374-bed Al Wasl Hospital in Dubayy, opened in the late 
1980s. The New Medical Centre in Abu Dhabi, a private facility, 



213 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

is equipped to treat diving accidents. Most hospitals are run by 
the government. 

The UAE also has created an extensive social welfare net- 
work that includes family care centers aimed at solving domes- 
tic problems and training women in domestic skills and 
handicrafts. Psychological care is available for troubled youths. 
The National Assistance Law provides benefits to victims of cat- 
astrophic illnesses and disasters. Widows, orphans, the elderly, 
the disabled, and others unable to support themselves receive 
social security payments. In 1975 nearly 24,000 citizens bene- 
fited from Dh87.7 million in such social aid; in 1982 approxi- 
mately 121,000 persons received a total of Dh275 million. 

Other benefits given UAE citizens are free housing and sub- 
sidized furnishings. However, the Ministry of Public Works and 
Housing reported in 1992 that 70 percent of 15,000 govern- 
ment-built low-income houses had deteriorated to the point of 
being uninhabitable. Among the causes were damage from 
groundwater salinity, failure to grant proprietary rights, and 
withdrawal of a Dhl0,000 per house maintenance grant. 

Economy 

Before the discovery of oil, the separate amirates that now 
constitute the UAE had similar economies. The raw materials 
of these economies were the fish and pearls of the gulf and the 
meager soil and scarce water onshore. In this forbidding 
milieu, the rich and poor fought heat, disease, and famine to 
make a living. Occupations ranged from slaves who dived for 
pearls and artisans who hammered coffee pots or stitched san- 
dals to wealthy pearl merchants and powerful shaykhs. Among 
the sources of revenue for ruling shaykhs were the collection of 
customs fees, the issuance of fishing licenses, and the imposi- 
tion of levies on date groves. Pearl merchants, many of whom 
were also landholders and moneylenders, gained political 
influence through their wealth and connections. In addition, 
there were cultivators of dates in oases, nomadic livestock herd- 
ers, and small-scale traders. 

Pearls from the rich banks off the amirates' coast were prob- 
ably the single largest source of wealth until the 1930s and 
1940s. In 1905 the pearling trade involved 22,000 men from 
the amirates working in about 1,300 boats, and income 
amounted to £600,000. Trade and fishing were also important 
maritime activities. Sharjah, the principal port and political 
power in the nineteenth century, was in the twentieth century 



214 



United Arab Emirates 



eclipsed by Dubayy. A large boatbuilding industry, using timber 
imported from India, developed along the coast; the industry 
supplied vessels of varying sizes and designs for pearling, fish- 
ing, and transport. The Great Depression of the 1930s, coincid- 
ing with the development of the Japanese cultured pearl 
industry, severely disrupted markets for Persian Gulf pearls. At 
about the same time, large numbers of men from the amirates 
began to migrate to work in the fledgling oil industries of 
Kuwait, Bahrain, and later Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 

Agriculture is limited to those few locations where fresh 
water is available. In the Al Buraymi and Al Liwa oases and the 
plains of Ras al Khaymah, relatively abundant water resources 
permit settled agriculture, especially the cultivation of date 
palms and fodder crops. The wells of the oases also provide 
water for the nomadic population, who migrate with their ani- 
mal herds throughout the desert areas in search of seasonal 
forage. 

British hegemony in the Persian Gulf had positive and nega- 
tive economic consequences for the inhabitants. British sup- 
pression of maritime raiding, for example, meant that pearling 
fleets could operate in relative security. (The fleet had previ- 
ously been unable to sail during periods of unrest, losing vital 
income for divers and merchants alike.) Some shaykhs and 
merchants benefited from regular visits by steamships from 
Britain and from other countries. For a period of time, local 
Indian merchants received deferential treatment as a result of 
Britain's control of India. On the negative side, however, the 
British prohibition on raiding and trading in slaves and arms 
meant an important source of income was lost to some shaykhs 
and merchants. In addition, because non-British powers were 
kept out of the gulf, trade and development opportunities were 
lost. 

British development assistance began piecemeal in the 1940s 
and 1950s, prompted by fears that the United States and other 
countries would gain a foothold in the region and compete for 
oil concessions. Total outlays in 1954-55 were £50,300 and 
funded a water resources study, an irrigation restoration 
project, improvements at the hospital in Dubayy, and school 
construction in Sharjah. In 1961-62 the amount rose to 
£550,000. The total British investment between 1955 and 1965 
was £1 million. Neighboring Qatar provided a freshwater sys- 
tem for Dubayy and the first bridge across Dubayy Creek. Saudi 
Arabia built a road from Sharjah to Ras Al Khaymah. Britain 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

also paid Sharjah's ruler to allow the establishment of a military 
base there in 1966. 

Trade began to grow, especially in Dubayy, in the 1950s and 
1960s. Imports increased from £3 million in 1958 to £8 million 
in 1963 and £41.7 million in 1967. Gold, often smuggled into 
India, greatly enriched Dubayy merchants and bankers during 
this period. An estimated 250 tons of gold brought revenues of 
about £80 million in 1970. 

The discovery and export of petroleum resulted in a major 
transformation of the amirates' economies. Before federation, 
oil revenues enriched the royal families who ruled the amirates 
in which production occurred and provided funding for local 
economic development. After the formation of the UAE, oil 
revenues, especially from Abu Dhabi and Dubayy, continued to 
fuel local development but increasingly became the main 
engine of growth for the national economy. 

Oil revenues became significant in Abu Dhabi in 1963, in 
Dubayy in 1970, in Sharjah in 1975, and in Ras al Khaymah in 
1984. The disparity in resource endowment and timing of oil 
discoveries led to uneven economic development before and 
after federation. The governments of Abu Dhabi and Dubayy, 
which together in 1991 accounted for 99 percent of the UAE's 
production, expend significant portions of their oil revenues 
on infrastructure development, including airports, highways, 
and port facilities. Nonetheless, Abu Dhabi's economic pre- 
dominance has created tensions with the other amirates. Lack 
of coordination in economic development and duplication in 
facilities and industries are problems that political federation 
had not solved as of 1993. 

The rapid pace of development brought other problems. In 
the early and mid-1970s, the distribution system could not keep 
up with the massive amounts of imports. Shortages resulted, 
and inflation exceeded 30 percent per year. By 1982, however, 
the rate of inflation had declined to about 10 percent. Between 
1975 and 1980, the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary) in constant 1980 prices increased by an average of 16 per- 
cent per year. Although oil production declined after 1977, 
sharp increases in world oil prices in the 1979-80 period 
brought windfall revenues to the amirates, pushing per capita 
GDP up to US$29,000 in 1981, one of the world's highest. 

During the early 1980s, the economy began to contract. This 
economic slowdown was caused by several factors, including 
lower oil revenues, the completion of several large industrial 



216 



Offshore oil rig; oil is the 
major revenue source of the 
United Arab Emirates. 
Courtesy Embassy of the 
United Arab Emirates, 
Washington 



Mina Jabal Ali, southwest ofDubayy, 
a major port engaged 
in the transshipment trade 
Courtesy Embassy of the United Arab 
Emirates, Washington 





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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

and infrastructure projects, and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). 
By 1983 GDP had fallen to an estimated US$26.7 billion, down 
from US$32.5 billion in 1981. 

The mid-1980s were a period of recession, with GDP falling 
from a little less than US$29 billion in 1982 to US$21.5 billion 
in 1986, caused in large part by a 40 percent drop in oil reve- 
nues. Exports fell by 33.5 percent in 1986, and the federation's 
trade surplus dropped 58 percent compared with 1985. As a 
result of the austere conditions, the 1986 federal budget allo- 
cated funds mainly for current expenditures, stalling many new 
projects. 

The late 1980s and early 1990s saw improving conditions, 
with oil exports increasing. A spurt in oil prices as a result of 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait helped push GDP to almost US$34 bil- 
lion in 1990. Contracts to help rebuild Kuwait after its libera- 
tion aided the UAE economy. But the invasion also had 
negative effects. Banks lost between 15 and 30 percent of their 
deposits, and development projects were halted. Trade 
declined as a result of uncertainty and higher insurance premi- 
ums. And the UAE paid out about US$6 billion to the United 
States and Britain to help defray the military costs of the war 
and to contribute to a fund that supported countries whose 
economies were severely hurt by the war. 

The collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce Interna- 
tional (BCCI) in the summer of 1991 caused ripples through- 
out the UAE economy (see Banking, ch. 6). The BCCI collapse 
became a major international scandal because the bank had 
become a significant financial institution in several countries, 
including Britain and the United States, and because members 
of Abu Dhabi's ruling family were major shareholders in the 
bank. 

Oil and Natural Gas 

Abu Dhabi became a member of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1966. When the 
amirates federated in 1971, membership was transferred to the 
UAE. Although Abu Dhabi officials represented the other 
amirs, the officials exercised no power over the amirs because 
each maintained control of his amirate's underground wealth. 
Each ruler oversaw arrangements for concessions, exploration, 
and oil field development in his own territory and published 
limited information about such arrangements. Thus, the fed- 
eral Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources has limited 



218 



United Arab Emirates 



power to set policy and engage in overall planning. In 1988 a 
presidential decree abolished the Department of Petroleum 
and dissolved the board of directors of the Abu Dhabi National 
Oil Company (ADNOC). The functions of these bodies 
(administration and supervision of the country's petroleum 
affairs) were taken over by the newly formed Supreme Petro- 
leum Council, whose eleven members were led by Shaykh Khal- 
ifa ibn Zayid Al Nuhayyan. 

Discoveries in the 1980s and 1990s greatly increased the 
UAE's oil and gas reserves. By 1992 the four oil-producing 
amirates had total estimated proven crude oil reserves of 98 bil- 
lion barrels and natural gas reserves of 5.2 trillion cubic 
meters, with the majority of both reserves lying within Abu 
Dhabi. 

Based on the relative size of their reserves and on their long- 
term development plans, Abu Dhabi and the other oil-produc- 
ing amirates have pursued differing policies. Abu Dhabi, with 
massive reserves, has on the whole based its production and 
economic development plans on long-term benefits, occasion- 
ally sacrificing production and price to meet this end. The 
other amirates, less well endowed with oil and gas, have sought 
to exploit their meager resources to produce short-term gains. 

In the early 1980s, Abu Dhabi adhered to OPEC production 
ceilings while Dubayy routinely exceeded them. After 1987, 
however, both Abu Dhabi and Dubayy habitually produced 
above OPEC levels. In early 1987, for example, when Abu 
Dhabi's OPEC quota was set at 682,000 barrels per day (bpd — 
see Glossary) and Dubayy's at 220,000 bpd, Abu Dhabi pro- 
duced 1,058,000 bpd (64 percent above quota) and Dubayy 
produced 365,000 bpd (60 percent above quota) (see table 27, 
Appendix). As a result, OPEC established a committee to pro- 
mote greater adherence to quotas by chronic overproducers 
such as the UAE. For its part, the federation argued that its 
quotas were too small in relation to its large reserves and to the 
quotas of other producers. 

The UAE's quota was raised several times by OPEC, and it 
was at almost 1.1 million bpd in March 1990. Not recognizing 
the OPEC figure, UAE production at the time was 2.1 million 
bpd. By July 1990, oil prices had fallen to US$14 per barrel, 
and the UAE agreed to a compromise proposal that raised its 
OPEC quota to 1.5 million bpd. Meanwhile, among Iraq's pub- 
lic accusations was that both Kuwait and the UAE had deprived 



219 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Iraq of much-needed revenues by driving down world oil prices 
through production above their OPEC quotas. 

After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, OPEC suspended 
quotas to allow member states to compensate for the lost pro- 
duction of Kuwait and Iraq. Producing an average of 2.1 mil- 
lion bpd, the UAE earned US$15 billion in oil revenues in 
1990. In the following year, producing an average of about 2.4 
million bpd, the federation earned US$14 billion. In March 
1992, OPEC raised the UAE's quota to slightly more than 2.2 
million bpd, which the UAE appeared to be observing. In 
March 1991, the UAE announced that it would expand its oil 
production capacity to 4 million bpd by the mid-1990s as part 
of a multibillion dollar development program. 

Abu Dhabi 

Abu Dhabi granted its first oil concession, covering its entire 
territory, in 1939 to the Trucial Coast Development Oil Com- 
pany (renamed the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company, or ADPC, 
in 1962). The company discovered oil in 1960; production and 
export commenced in 1962 offshore and in 1963 onshore. 
ADNOC acquired 60 percent of ADPC in the early 1970s. In 
1978 ADPC was reconstituted as the Abu Dhabi Company for 
Onshore Oil Operations (Adco). In the late 1980s, the remain- 
der of Adco's shares were divided: British Petroleum (BP), 
Royal Dutch Shell Oil, and Compagnie Francaise des Petroles 
(CFP) received 9.5 percent each; Mobil Oil and Exxon, 4.75 
percent each; and Participations and Explorations (Partex), 
2.0 percent. The principal onshore fields were Bu Hasa, Bab, 
and Asab. Onshore production totaled 267 million barrels in 
1980. 

In 1953 the amirate granted a concession to the D'Arcy 
Exploration Company of Britain to look for oil in offshore and 
submerged areas not covered in the ADPC concession. Abu 
Dhabi Marine Areas (AD MA), a multinational consortium, 
took over this concession in 1955. The company made its first 
commercial strike in 1958, and production and export started 
in 1962. In 1977 ADMA and ADNOC agreed to form the Abu 
Dhabi Marine Areas Operating Company (ADMA-Opco) for 
offshore work. In the late 1980s, ADNOC owned 60 percent of 
ADMA-Opco; Japan Oil Development Company, 12.0 percent; 
BP, 14.7 percent; and CFP, 13.3 percent. Offshore fields 
included Umm ash Shayf, Az Zuqum, Sath ar Ras Boot, Dalma, 



220 



United Arab Emirates 



and Umm ad Dalkh. The island of Das, northeast of the island 
of Dalma, became the center for offshore operations. 

Unlike most gulf countries, as of the end of 1992 Abu Dhabi 
had not claimed 100 percent ownership of its oil industry. 
ADNOC was established in 1971 and, in addition to holding 
majority shares in Adco and ADMA-Opco, was involved in pro- 
ducing, refining, distributing, and shipping gas. ADNOC 
owned 51 percent of the Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Com- 
pany, whose Das facility has sent most of its liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to Japan since 
1977. In 1988 the Das facility produced nearly 2.5 million tons 
of LNG from offshore fields. ADNOC also holds 68 percent of 
Abu Dhabi Gas Industries, which extracts propane, butane, and 
condensate at the Ar Ruways plant from associated gas pro- 
duced by the onshore Bu Hasa, Bab, and Asab fields. 

Abu Dhabi's refining, at plants in Umm an Nar and Ar 
Ruways, is also controlled by ADNOC. Total refining capacity in 
1991 was 185,000 bpd, of which 100,000 bp d was available for 
export. Marketing and distribution are carried out by the Abu 
Dhabi National Oil Company for Distribution, an ADNOC sub- 
sidiary. To buy refineries and gas stations in Europe and Japan, 
ADNOC and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority formed a 
joint venture, the International Petroleum Investment Corpo- 
ration (IPIC). In 1989 IPIC held a 20 percent share in a 
Madrid-based refining company. 

The amirate's exports are pumped through terminals at 
Jabal az Zannah and on the island of Das. There is a smaller 
terminal at Al Mubarraz. 

Dubayy 

The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) held a concession for 
Dubayy from 1937 to 1961. CFP and Compahia Espahola de 
Petroleos (Spanish Petroleum Company — Hispanoil) obtained 
an onshore concession in 1954 and formed Dubai Marine 
Areas (Duma). Continental Oil Company acquired the IPC 
concession in 1963 and formed the Dubai Petroleum Company 
(DPC). That same year, DPC acquired 50 percent of Duma and 
released some of its shares to other companies. Oil was discov- 
ered offshore in 1966, and production commenced in late 
1969. The Dubayy government acquired a 60 percent share in 
Duma-DPC in 1975. 

Dubayy's oil reserves in 1991 were estimated at 4 billion bar- 
rels, which will run out by 2016 if 1990 levels of production 



221 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

continue. Dubayy's production policy has been to ignore OPEC 
quotas for the most part, concentrating on exploiting the 
amirate's fields as efficiently as possible. This has meant pro- 
ducing at or near capacity most of the time. The principal 
fields are Fath, Rashid, and Falah offshore, and Margham 
onshore. The amirate has two refineries, with a third planned 
for the mid-1990s. 

The Dubayy government established the Dubai Natural Gas 
Company (Dugas) in 1975 to process gas from offshore oil 
fields. By the early 1990s, the company also planned to process 
associated gas from the onshore Margham field. Dugas's for- 
eign partner was Scimitar Oils (Dubai), a subsidiary of Can- 
ada's Sunningdale Oils. The Dugas processing facilities at Mina 
Jabal Ali came on-line in 1980 with a capacity of 20,000 bpd of 
natural gas liquids (propane, butane, and heavier liquids) and 
2.1 million cubic meters of dry gas (methane) a day. The dry 
gas is piped to the Dubai Aluminum Company (Dubai), where 
it fuels a large electric power and desalination plant. A small 
part of the natural gas liquids is locally bottled and consumed, 
but most is exported to Japan. A special gas terminal at Mina 
Jabal Ali that can handle tankers of up to 48,000 tons opened 
in 1980. The amirate's gas reserves are estimated at 125 billion 
cubic meters. 

Sharjah 

In 1969 the amir of Sharjah granted a forty-year concession 
for offshore exploration and production to a consortium of 
small United States oil companies known as Crescent Oil Com- 
pany. Oil was discovered in 1973 in the Mubarak field off the 
island of Abu Musa, and production began in 1974. Because of 
conflicting territorial claims, Sharjah has production and drill- 
ing rights but shares production and revenue with Iran (50 per- 
cent), Umm al Qaywayn (20 percent), and Ajman (10 percent). 
By 1984, Iran reportedly ceased transferring to Sharjah its half- 
share of oil revenues, presumably because of the financial 
drain of the war with Iraq, as well as Arab support of Iraq. In 
1988 Iran attacked the facilities at Mubarak, causing their clo- 
sure for two months. 

In 1980 the American Oil Company (Amoco — later Amoco 
Sharjah) announced a major discovery onshore of oil and gas 
in the Saghyah field. By late 1983, output reached 35,000 bpd 
of condensate, which was exported. In 1984 total production 
reached 62,000 bpd. In the same year, the Emirates General 



222 



United Arab Emirates 



Petroleum Corporation completed a 224-kilometer pipeline to 
supply dry gas to power plants in the northern amirates. The 
pipeline had a capacity of 60,000 bpd of condensate and 1.1 
million cubic meters per day of gas. After Dubayy and Sharjah 
settled their border dispute in 1985, a pipeline was built to sup- 
ply gas from the Saghyah field to the power and desalination 
plant of the Dubai Electrical Company at Mina Jabal Ali. An 
LPG processing plant that came on-line in 1986 was producing 
11.3 million cubic meters of wet gas per day in 1987. The 
amirate's outlook was optimistic in 1992, with Amoco Sharjah 
announcing a new onshore gas and condensate field and 
increased reserves at existing fields. 

Other Amirates 

Ras al Khaymah has limited oil and gas reserves, which were 
initially exploited in the early 1980s. By 1986 production was 
about 10,000 bpd, with most of the revenues plowed back into 
exploration and development. In that year, the amirate had 
completed pipelines from its offshore As Sila field to the main- 
land and had established separation and stabilization facilities, 
storage facilities capable of holding 500,000 barrels, and a 
1,000-bpd LPG plant. By 1991 production had plummeted to 
800 bpd. 

Exploration and drilling in Ajman, Umm al Qaywayn, and Al 
Fujayrah have not yielded significant finds. Some of this activity 
has been funded by the federal government. 

Industry 

Non-oil industries have had a checkered history. On the pos- 
itive side, federal and local governments have initiated many 
industrial projects that have aided in the development of the 
UAE. Local and foreign private capital found numerous oppor- 
tunities in the friendly business climate of the amirates, with 
the result that by 1987 manufacturing contributed 9 percent to 
GDP (see table 28, Appendix). However, because of the lack of 
a unified planning mechanism and outright competition 
among amirates, redundancy has been a recurring problem. 
For example, there are nine cement factories in the UAE with a 
total capacity of 8.5 million tons per year. Local demand was 
estimated in 1986 at only 2 million tons. In addition, out of 
five steel rolling mills, three have had to close. Plastics and cer- 
tain foods are overproduced. A 1988 study by the Ministry of 
Economy and Industry reported that local industry suffered 



223 




224 



Downtown Dubayy, capital of the amirate ofDubayy 
Courtesy Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Washington 



225 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

from low wage levels, a lack of new technology, and a low level 
of value added in many industries. In 1983 the Emirates Indus- 
trial Bank was established; one of its roles is to assist ailing 
industries financially. 

Dubayy, with its long history of entrepot trading, has the 
most developed non-oil industrial sector. Abu Dhabi, however, 
has focused on using its oil resources in downstream (see Glos- 
sary) facilities. Some of the northern amirates are developing 
their mineral resources. By 1990 total manufacturing output 
had a value of about US$2.6 billion, with 80 percent of the 
UAE's factories located in Abu Dhabi, Dubayy, and Sharjah. 

Dubayy 

The first major factory in the amirate was the aluminum 
smelter opened by Dubai at Mina Jabal Ali in 1979. It had a 
capacity of 135,000 tons of aluminum ingots per year, which 
was reached in 1982. In 1991, after expansion, it produced 
290,030 tons of aluminum ingots. The five gas turbines that 
generate power for the plant are fueled by Dugas's neighboring 
gas treatment plant. A desalination plant associated with the 
turbines supplies 40 percent of Dubayy's drinking water 
requirements. 

Dubayy became a strong magnet for industries, large and 
small, with the opening in 1985 of the Mina Jabal Ali Free 
Zone. Starting with about forty companies in the first year, the 
zone hosted 382 firms by 1992, including multinational giants 
Mitsubishi, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, Union Car- 
bide, and Xerox, and scores of small Indian firms, many pro- 
ducing textiles. Local firms include National Flour Mills and 
the National Cement Company. Among the inducements to 
firms are a large pool of cheap labor, no taxes, no import or 
export duties, the right to 100 percent foreign ownership, and 
the right to repatriate profits and capital. 

Another major facility in the free zone is the Dubai Dry 
Docks, owned by the Dubayy government. One of the largest 
and most modern in the world, the facility has three dry docks 
that can handle vessels up to 1 million deadweight tons. The 
dry docks have well-equipped workshops for plate and pipe, 
machinery, rigging, and electric repair, as well as a sophisti- 
cated laboratory. Completed in 1979, the docks lay idle, incur- 
ring substantial maintenance costs, until 1983 when a contract 
for an operator was signed. The delay was attributed in part to 
indecision and the amir's poor health. 



226 



United Arab Emirates 



By 1985, however, 111 ships with a total capacity of 10 mil- 
lion deadweight tons had been repaired. In 1988 the dock was 
fully occupied by vessels damaged in the Iran-Iraq War. 

Abu Dhabi 

The principal industrial facilities are located at Ar Ruways, 
224 kilometers from the capital. The Ruways Fertilizer Indus- 
tries plant came on-line in 1983 and uses natural gas as fuel 
and feedstock. ADNOC owns two-thirds of the plant, and Total- 
CFP owns the remainder. The plant was built with a capacity to 
produce 100 tons per day of ammonia and 1,500 tons per day 
of urea. Its customers have been mainly India and China. Sul- 
fur extracted through oil and gas processing is exported from a 
special bulk terminal. A smaller industrial area exists at Al Mus- 
allah, just outside the city of Abu Dhabi. 

The Northern Amirates 

According to a 1987 study, Sharjah was the site of 35 percent 
of the UAE's industrial installations. The amirate has an indus- 
trial zone with factories producing a variety of items, including 
furniture and household utensils. A fodder factory at Mina 
Khalid run by the Gulf Company for Agricultural Development 
opened in 1982. Other plants in the amirate include a cement 
factory, a plastic pipe factory, and a rope factory. 

The gulf s first explosives factory opened in Ras al Khaymah 
in 1980. A pharmaceutical plant opened the following year. 
The amirate has several factories that use local stone and min- 
erals. In addition to three cement factories, there is an asphalt 
company, a lime kiln, and a thriving export business by the Ras 
al Khaymah Rock Company in aggregate, the stone used in 
making concrete. 

Al Fujayrah and Ras al Khaymah have capitalized on 
resources from the Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains, building 
plants that produce aggregate, marble, tile, asbestos insulation, 
and concrete blocks. Although lack of local energy sources has 
hindered industrial development, Al Fujayrah's development 
plans for the 1990s include provision for investment by other 
GCC states. 

Umm al Qaywayn has relied on cement and related indus- 
tries as a source of revenue but has suffered because of over- 
production in the UAE. In 1987 it established a free zone 
modeled on that of Dubayy. Among Ajman's facilities are a dry 
dock, a ship repair yard, and a cement factory. 



227 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Electricity and Water 

The demands of a rapidly growing population and a devel- 
oping industrial base have necessitated a concomitantly speedy 
expansion of the capacity to provide electrical power and pota- 
ble water. As in other areas, Abu Dhabi and Dubayy have had 
the funds to provide public utilities at a faster pace than the 
northern amirates. When the UAE was formed and the Minis- 
try of Electricity and Water created, Abu Dhabi, Dubayy, Shar- 
jah, and Ras al Khaymah had their own electric companies. 
The creation of the federation has seen some progress in unify- 
ing the national electrical grid and assisting the smaller 
amirates with power and water supply. 

Abu Dhabi's generating capacity expanded from eight mega- 
watts in 1973 to 845 megawatts in 1982. One study found that 
between 1973 and 1982, Abu Dhabi's demand for electricity 
expanded by 25 percent per year, while Dubayy's grew by 15 
percent per year. The other amirates were not as well supplied 
with electricity and needed additional generating capacity. 
Sharjah and Ras al Khaymah suffered power disruptions in 
1983 because of overloaded facilities. By 1988 installed generat- 
ing capacity for the entire UAE had risen to 3,850 megawatts, 
up from 1,724 megawatts in 1979. 

Unable to meet demand from natural sources of freshwater, 
the UAE has had to use desalination plants, many of which run 
in tandem with power stations. In 1985 there were twenty-two 
desalination plants in the amirates. Water production in 1989 
amounted to about 327 billion liters, up from about 312 billion 
liters in 1987. 

Labor 

There was no significant foreign labor force before the sharp 
rise in oil revenues in the 1970s. Most work was done by local 
Arabs, some by slaves brought from Africa; Indians and Irani- 
ans were mainly merchants. The slave trade, most of which 
ended by about 1945, was a major point of contention in rela- 
tions between Britain and the rulers of the Trucial Coast. For 
example, if the British resident was opposed by a shaykh on a 
specific matter, the resident in some cases might accuse the 
shaykh of violating treaty bans on the slave trade and threaten 
to destroy his pearling fleet or invalidate the travel documents 
of the shaykh and his subjects. 



228 



United Arab Emirates 



The massive influx of foreign workers and professionals in 
the 1970s and 1980s, mainly from other Arab countries and 
from India, Pakistan, and Iran, fundamentally changed the 
face of UAE society. (The UAE's population increased 86 per- 
cent between 1975 and 1980.) Working conditions of foreign 
workers in the UAE vary. Professionals, managers, and clerical 
workers are attracted by contracts offering good salaries, com- 
prehensive benefits, and high living standards. Unskilled and 
semiskilled workers are in a more precarious situation. In their 
home countries, they might be cheated or misled by unscrupu- 
lous labor contractors who supply workers to the gulf coun- 
tries. Although many obtain safe work at reasonable wages 
(much of which they remit to their families abroad), others 
work long hours in conditions not regulated for safety and 
health as stringently as they should be. In the 1980s, however, 
the government attempted to improve the labor law, which cov- 
ered conditions of employment, compensation, inspection of 
the workplace, and enforcement procedures. Job security can 
be capricious, often depending on the whims of the oil market 
and the national mood. In the early 1980s, for example, during 
a period of economic decline, authorities increased their 
efforts to discover foreign workers without proper credentials 
and deported them as illegal aliens. By 1986, however, Dubayy 
tried to reverse the outward flow of labor by encouraging immi- 
grant workers to bring their families with them. 

In addition, labor is not permitted to organize, strike, or 
engage in collective bargaining. Individuals or groups of work- 
ers may bring grievances to the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs, which has been known to settle matters with fairness. 
Although the law prohibits the employment of youths under 
eighteen and restricts hours of work to eight hours per day six 
days per week, the law is widely violated. There is no minimum 
wage. 

In 1986, according to one set of government figures, the size 
of the labor force was 890,941. About 25 percent worked in 
construction, 14 percent in trade, 7 percent in transportation 
and communications, and 6 percent in manufacturing. Accord- 
ing to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, in 1992 UAE cit- 
izens accounted for 7 percent of the total work force and about 
1 percent of the private-sector work force. 

Transportation 

Oil revenues have helped finance a modern transportation 



229 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

infrastructure consisting of roads, ports, and airports. These 
facilities have helped make the UAE, and Dubayy in particular, 
a major hub of regional and international air and sea traffic. 
The UAE has about 2,000 kilometers of roads, of which 1,800 
kilometers were paved as of 1993. The principal road is a high- 
way via the main coastal cities, from Ash Sham to the north- 
western border of the UAE, where it connects with roads to 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 

Dubayy's port at Mina Jabal Ali, with sixty-seven berths in 
1988, is one of the largest man-made harbors in the world. 
Located fifty-three kilometers southwest of the city of Dubayy, it 
handled nearly 10 million tons of cargo in 1989. Mina Rashid, 
also in Dubayy, in 1984 had thirty-five berths. The Dubayy Ports 
Authority was established in 1991 to operate the two ports. In 
addition to Mina Jabal Ali and Mina Rashid in Dubayy, the 
UAE's other ports are Mina Zayid in Abu Dhabi, Mina Khalid 
in Sharjah, Mina Saqr in Ras al Khaymah, Khawr Fakkan, and 
Mina al Fujayrah, the port at Al Fujayrah. 

During periods of regional conflict, such as the Iran-Iraq 
War of 1980-88 and the Persian Gulf War of 1991, high insur- 
ance premiums for gulf shipping periodically reduce the 
amount of traffic handled at the UAE's ports, although Mina al 
Fujayrah and Khawr Fakkan have the advantage of lying out- 
side the Persian Gulf on the Gulf of Oman. Abu Dhabi 
National Tankers Company operates about fifty ships, another 
aspect of UAE port traffic. 

The international airport in Dubayy is the region's busiest, 
serving 4.3 million passengers in 1988 and handling 144,282 
tons of cargo in 1990. Other international airports, which have 
had difficulty attracting traffic, operate in Sharjah, Ras al Khay- 
mah, and Al Fujayrah. The New Abu Dhabi International Air- 
port opened in 1982, and the Al Ayn International Airport was 
scheduled to open in the early 1990s. Emirates Airlines is the 
UAE's international airline. 

Telecommunications 

The UAE has a modern telecommunications network that 
provides its citizens with good telephone and broadcast ser- 
vices. In 1992 the country had 386,000 telephones, or about 
eighteen telephones per 100 inhabitants. About one-third of 
the telephones are in the Dubayy area. Service is entirely auto- 
matic. International direct dial is available to all customers. A 



230 



/ 




Bridge across Dubayy Creek; the United Arab Emirates boasts 

many modern highways. 
Courtesy Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Washington 



231 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

domestic network of high-capacity radio-relay stations and 
coaxial cable links all major towns. 

International telecommunications are excellent. Radio- 
relay and undersea cables link the UAE with neighboring coun- 
tries, and two satellite systems provide links to the rest of the 
world. Telecommunications to Saudi Arabia and to Bahrain go 
via high-capacity radio-relay links. Submarine cables laid in the 
late 1980s carry telephone calls to Qatar, Bahrain, India, and 
Pakistan. Telephone, television, and data communication to 
Europe, Asia, and the Americas go via three satellite groundsta- 
tions, working with the International Telecommunications Sat- 
ellite Corporation's (Intelsat) Atlantic Ocean and Indian 
Ocean satellites. In the early 1990s, television viewers in the 
UAE and throughout the Persian Gulf began receiving the 
twenty-four-hour news broadcasts of the Atlanta-based Cable 
News Network (CNN) via Intelsat. Television transmission and 
telephone calls to other countries in the Middle East are 
routed through a ground station linked to the Arab Satellite 
Communication Organization (Arabsat) satellite. Arabsat pro- 
vides telephone, data transmission, telex, and facsimile service. 
Arabsat also is used for live broadcasts of prayers from Mecca 
and Medina and for viewing inter-Arab sports events. 

In early 1993, broadcast facilities were adequate, and all pop- 
ulated areas of the country received television transmissions 
and radio broadcasts. Eight AM radio stations broadcast in Ara- 
bic, English, Urdu, and Sinhalese, in addition to three FM 
radio stations. Two powerful shortwave stations with broadcasts 
in Arabic and English can be received worldwide. Television 
broadcasts reach throughout the country via twelve large trans- 
mitters. The country has an estimated 400,000 radios and 
170,000 television sets. 

Agriculture and Forestry 

Agriculture, including fishing, was a minor part of the UAE 
economy in the early 1990s, contributing less than 2 percent of 
GDP. Since the formation of the UAE, the availability of capital 
and the demand for fresh produce have encouraged agricul- 
tural development. The main farming areas are Diqdaqah in 
Ras al Khaymah, Falaj al Mualla in Umm al Qaywayn, Wadi adh 
Dhayd in Sharjah, Al Awir in Dubayy, and the coastal area of Al 
Fujayrah. Total cultivable land is around 70,000 hectares. 

Most of the UAE's cultivated land is taken up by date palms, 
which in the early 1990s numbered about 4 million. They are 



232 



United Arab Emirates 



cultivated in the arc of small oases that constitute the Al Liwa 
Oasis. Both federal and amirate governments provide incen- 
tives to farmers. For example, the government offers a 50 per- 
cent subsidy on fertilizers, seeds, and pesticides. It also provides 
loans for machinery and technical assistance. The amirates 
have forty-one agricultural extension units as well as several 
experimental farms and agricultural research stations. The 
number of farmers rose from about 4,000 in the early 1970s to 
18,265 in 1988. 

Lack of arable land, intense heat, periodic locust swarms, 
and limited water supplies are the main obstacles to agricul- 
ture. The drive to increase the area under cultivation has 
resulted in the rapid depletion of underground aquifers, 
resulting in precipitous drops in water tables and serious 
increases in soil and water salinity in some areas. As a result, 
several farms have been forced to cease production. Despite 
the creation in 1983 of a federal authority to control drilling 
for water, development pressures in the 1980s and 1990s 
increased the exploitation of underground water supplies. 

Between 1979 and 1985, agricultural production increased 
sixfold. Nevertheless, the UAE imported about 70 percent of its 
food requirements in the early 1990s. The major vegetable 
crops, supplying nearly all the country's needs during the sea- 
son, are tomatoes, cabbage, eggplant, squash, and cauliflower. 
Ras al Khaymah produces most of the country's vegetables. In 
addition to dates, the major fruit crops are citrus and mangoes. 
A vegetable canning facility in Al Ayn has a processing capacity 
of 120 tons per day. 

Poultry farms provided 70 percent of local requirements for 
eggs and 45 percent of poultry meat needed in 1989. Local 
dairies produced more than 73,000 tons of milk in 1991, meet- 
ing 92 percent of domestic demand. 

Considerable revenues have been devoted to forestation, 
public landscaping, and parks. Trees and shrubs are distrib- 
uted free to schools, government offices, and residents. Affor- 
estation companies receive contracts to plant plots in the range 
of 200 to 300 hectares. The goals are to improve the appear- 
ance of public places as well as to prevent the desertification 
process in vulnerable agricultural areas. 

Fishing 

The government has supported traditional fishing in the 
rich waters off the UAE, an activity that has provided livelihood 



233 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

for centuries along the coast. The government offers a 50 per- 
cent subsidy on fishing boats and equipment and has opened 
marine workshops that offer free repair and maintenance. 
Cooperatives assist fishermen in marketing their catch. The 
number of fishermen rose from 4,000 in 1980 to 10,611 in 
1990. The total catch in 1989 of 91,160 tons (up from 70,075 
tons in 1982) supplied most local demand. Moreover, prawns 
and fish are raised in fish farms at the National Mariculture 
Center — operated with Japanese assistance — in Umm al Qay- 
wayn. 

Banking and Finance 

The Indian rupee was the principal medium of exchange in 
the amirates until 1966, when Abu Dhabi began using the Bah- 
raini dinar and Dubayy and the northern amirates switched to 
the Qatar-Dubayy riyal. The federal Currency Board was estab- 
lished in 1973 to manage the new national currency (the UAE 
dirham, divided into 100 fils). The UAE dirham was officially 
linked in 1978 to the special drawing rights (SDR — see Glos- 
sary) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glos- 
sary) ; in practice, however, the UAE dirham was pegged to the 
United States dollar. The rate of Dh3.67 to US$1 has held con- 
stant since the end of 1980. 

Reluctant to transfer financial accountability over local 
banks (including ones in which they had major interests) to 
outsiders, the ruling amirs refused to give the Currency Board, 
managed mainly by foreigners, any control over banking. In 
the midst of an oil boom, banks proliferated, credit expanded, 
and real estate speculation was rampant, creating a chaotic 
financial environment. In 1975 a moratorium on the opening 
of new banks was imposed, temporarily lifted, then reimposed. 
The board's lack of foreign exchange meant it could not sup- 
port the UAE dirham in 1977 when a massive run on the cur- 
rency led to a financial crisis and the collapse of two banks. In 
late 1980, a law converting the Currency Board into a central 
bank took effect. Although the Central Bank had more author- 
ity than the Currency Board, it encountered opposition from 
various members of amirate ruling families when it attempted 
to put new policies and regulations in place. 

The Central Bank's responsibilities include issuing currency, 
maintaining gold and foreign currency reserves, regulating 
banks, and controlling credit to encourage balanced economic 
growth. It also advises the government on monetary and finan- 



234 



Fisherman and his wares; 
Persian Gulf waters provide 
abundant fish. 
Courtesy Embassy of the United 
Arab Emirates, Washington 




rial policy. In 1981 the moratorium on new banks was lifted 
once again. But in an effort to rein in the proliferation of 
banks, the Central Bank announced the same year that foreign 
banks would receive no new branch licenses and that foreign 
banks already operating in the country would be restricted to 
eight branches each by 1984. 

The Central Bank took several measures in the early 1980s to 
strengthen the banking structure. It expanded audits and 
inspections, increased bank reporting requirements, estab- 
lished a computerized loan risk department, and set minimum 
capital requirements. The Central Bank also created a regula- 
tion that limited the size of a bank's loans to its directors. As a 
result of a violation of this regulation, administrators 
appointed by the Central Bank in 1983 took over the UAE's 
third largest bank, the Union Bank of the Middle East. The 
Central Bank and the Dubayy government bailed out the bank 
in the amount of US$380 million. Another bank, the Emirates 
Industrial Bank, was established in 1983 with capital of Dh500 
million as a source of loans for new industries. 

As a result of uncertainty in the wake of Iraq's August 1990 
invasion of Kuwait, between 15 and 30 percent of customer 
bank deposits were transferred out of the UAE. At least two 
banks required injections of funds from the Central Bank to 



235 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

maintain liquidity, but confidence and deposits gradually 
returned. The Central Bank's governor was replaced in 1991 in 
the wake of the failure of the National Investments and Secu- 
rity Corporation. 

Another crisis rocked the UAE banking sector in 1991 when 
the Luxembourg-registered Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI) was shut down in most of the sixty-nine 
countries in which it operated. BCCI's troubles began in 1988 
when two of its United States subsidiaries were accused of laun- 
dering profits from the illegal drug trade. Abu Dhabi's ruler 
and UAE president, Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan, is a 
founding shareholder in BCCI and in 1990 had purchased, 
along with others in Abu Dhabi, a 77 percent share in the bank. 
Having moved the bank's headquarters from London to Abu 
Dhabi, Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan was in the process of restruc- 
turing the troubled bank when an audit commissioned by the 
Bank of England alleged major and systematic fraud by BCCI. 
That audit triggered the closing of most of BCCI's banks world- 
wide. 

The ripples of the crisis spread throughout the UAE busi- 
ness community. In addition to its massive obligations world- 
wide, BCCI owed agencies in Abu Dhabi US$1.4 billion and 
private investors US$600 million. In October 1992, a Luxem- 
bourg court approved a US$1.7 billion compensation agree- 
ment between the bank's liquidators and the majority 
shareholders. The agreement called for the shareholders to 
pay 30 to 40 cents on the dollar to BCCI depositors. 

Budget 

The provisional constitution stipulates that each amirate 
contribute to the federal budget. In practice, however, Abu 
Dhabi was the only contributor in the 1970s; Dubayy began to 
contribute in the early 1980s. In 1991 Abu Dhabi provided 77.5 
percent of the federal budget and Dubayy, 8.5 percent. The 
government levies taxes on oil companies and banks in Abu 
Dhabi and Dubayy but not on other businesses and individuals. 

The poorer amirates benefit from federal expenditures on 
defense, infrastructure, education, and social services, but they 
draw up their own budgets (which are seldom published) for 
municipal expenditures and industrial projects. Some of these 
projects have been motivated more by prestige than practical- 
ity. For example, Dubayy, Sharjah, and Ras al Khaymah have 
built large international airports, even though they are a one- 



236 



United Arab Emirates 



half-hour drive from each other and less than a two-hour drive 
from Abu Dhabi's large international airport. 

Ras al Khaymah and Sharjah have borrowed heavily to 
finance facilities and industries, resulting occasionally in eco- 
nomic and political problems. Sharjah, for example, suffered a 
coup attempt in 1987 carried out by opponents critical of the 
amir's alleged financial mismanagement. The amirate's debt 
burden at the time was estimated at US$920 million. 

The revenue and spending estimates for the UAE's first and 
only five-year plan (1981-85) were based on strong oil revenues 
in the late 1970s. Petroleum revenues fell in the early 1980s, 
however, rendering many of the plan's goals unattainable. The 
federation's first budget deficit (Dh3.9 billion) occurred in 
1982. Since that time, government planners have opted for a 
more flexible approach, keeping in mind the vagaries of the 
world oil market and tending to be more conservative in reve- 
nue and spending projections. Even so, sudden drops in oil 
revenues have repeatedly forced the government to put new 
projects on hold and to freeze current projects. Deficits gener- 
ally are funded by Abu Dhabi and Dubayy and by borrowing 
from the Central Bank. 

Although there is no attempt at long-term, coordinated 
development planning, three main objectives have guided fed- 
eral government spending. These include strengthening the 
federation's physical infrastructure and social services network, 
diversifying the economy, and expanding entrepot trade. 

Despite slowdowns in world oil markets and amirs jealous of 
their local sovereignty, the UAE has been able to finance mas- 
sive infrastructure projects (roads, utilities, communications, 
ports, and airports); modern education, health, and welfare 
systems; and improvements in agriculture and fishing. The 
lion's share of the federal budget, however, goes to defense 
(see table 29, Appendix). As a result of the continuing poten- 
tial for conflict in the gulf in the 1990s, defense will probably 
continue to absorb between 40 and 50 percent of federal out- 
lays and will not face the same cuts as do other sectors if the 
economy contracts. 

After battling budget deficits during most of the 1980s, the 
UAE saw budget surpluses in 1990 and 1991. Deficits were pro- 
jected to return in 1992 and 1993, with an almost US$710 mil- 
lion shortfall expected in 1993 (the figure includes US$245 
million rolled over from the previous year's deficit). 



237 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Abu Dhabi is one of the world's most generous donors of for- 
eign aid in terms of GDP and population. In 1981 foreign 
grants and loans amounted to US$2.7 billion, or 8 percent of 
GDP. Even in leaner times, aid in 1983 was US$1 billion, or 4 
percent of GDP. The Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic 
Development, with paid-up capital of US$500 million, extends 
loans and grants mainly to Arab and Muslim countries. Recipi- 
ents have included Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Syria, and Yemen. The level of annual outlays 
depends on oil revenues. In 1989 the fund's committed capital 
was US$2.2 billion. Loans in 1988 amounted to US$41.1 mil- 
lion, up from US$4.2 million in 1987. 

Trade 

The UAE, in particular Dubayy, epitomizes trade. The fed- 
eral government promotes open and free trade as an official 
policy, and a thriving source of income and full employment 
has resulted. The oil economy (world prices and demand as 
well as local production) and regional security strongly influ- 
ence trade. Oil and gas exports account for about three-fourths 
of all exports. The UAE's balance of trade surplus grew during 
the boom years of the 1970s but leveled off in the 1980s with 
decreased oil production. Although the Iran-Iraq War buffeted 
the oil economies of the region, Dubayy's fruitful trade links 
with Iran helped it to have exports and reexports of US$354 
million in 1987. 

The end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 led to a 20 percent 
increase in UAE imports, reducing the trade surplus from its 
1987 level of US$5.2 billion (Dhl9 billion) to US$3.7 billion 
(Dhl3.4 billion) (see table 30, Appendix). But oil price 
increases and production increases resulting from Iraq's inva- 
sion of Kuwait in 1990 created a windfall for the UAE and 
drove the federation's trade surplus to US$9.3 billion (Dh34.1 
billion). 

Administering customs and setting rates are functions 
reserved to the individual amirates, and duties and regulations 
therefore vary among them. In 1982 Dubayy and Sharjah 
reduced their customs duties from 3 percent to 1 percent, 
bringing them on a par with Abu Dhabi's tariffs. In 1983 a 4 
percent general import tariff was imposed to conform to agree- 
ments among GCC members on minimum duties. 

Principal imports are manufactured goods, machinery, 
transportation equipment, food, and live animals. Leading sup- 



238 



United Arab Emirates 



pliers in 1988 were Japan, Britain, and the United States. Non- 
petroleum exports include basic manufactures, aluminum, and 
cement. The reexport trade overshadows national exports. 
Federal exports, which consist largely of petroleum, go mainly 
to Japan (see table 31, Appendix). In 1988 national exports 
amounted to US$518 million while reexports stood at more 
than US$2 million. Iran, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are the prin- 
cipal recipients of reexports. The view along bustling Dubayy 
Creek gives ample evidence of the vibrant reexport trade. 
Scores of large, motorized dhows tied up four and five deep 
line the wharf, their decks and holds packed with refrigerators, 
television sets, clothing, toys, and even automobiles. In 1991 
Dubayy's imports (much of which was destined for reexport) 
arrived from Japan, the United States, China, Britain, and the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea). 

Government and Politics 



Executive and Legislative Branches 

On July 18, 1971, rulers of six amirates from those known as 
the Trucial Coast states, ratified the provisional constitution of 
the UAE. A product of more than three years of discussion and 
debate among the rulers, the document was promulgated on 
December 2, 1971, on the UAE's independence. (Ras al Khay- 
mah joined the union in February 1972.) Originally, the provi- 
sional constitution was to be replaced after five years with a 
permanent document, pending the resolution of issues stand- 
ing in the way of full integration among the federation's 
amirates. These issues included individual amirates' contribu- 
tions to the federal budget and defense integration. Reflecting 
a lack of progress in resolving these matters and a grudging 
preference for the status quo, however, the provisional consti- 
tution was extended for five-year periods in 1976, 1981, 1986, 
and 1991. 

The provisional constitution of the UAE provides for the 
separation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches. Additionally, it separates legislative and executive 
powers into federal and amirate jurisdictions. Certain powers 
are expressly reserved for the central government, including 
foreign policy, defense, security, immigration, and communica- 
tions. The individual amirates exercise residual powers. 

The separation of powers remained nominal in 1993. The 
Supreme Council of the Union (SCU), also seen as the Federal 



239 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



ABU DHABI 



AL FUJAYRAH 



RAS AL KHAYMAH 



UMM AL QAYWAYN 



SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE UNION * 
(Amirs of the Seven Amirates) 



VICE PRESIDENT 



SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNION 



PRESIDENT 



UNION COURTS 
OF FIRST INSTANCE 



Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Union 
Head of State 
Commander of the Union Defense Force 



SECRETARIAT 



<--, 



COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 

PRIME MINISTER 
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER 
23 MINISTERS 



A 

I 



FEDERAL NATIONAL COUNCIL 
(40 Members Representing 
Individual Amirates) 



MEMBERS 
(Listed in Order of Accession) 



Ruler of Ras al Khaymah: 
Ruler of Abu Dhabi: 
Ruler of Sharjah: 
Ruler of Al Fujayrah: 
Ruler of Umm al Qaywayn: 
Ruler of Ajman: 
Ruler of Dubayy. 



SHAYKH SAQR IBN MUHAMMAD AL QASIMI (1948) 
SHAYKH ZAYID IBN SULTAN AL NUHAYYAN (1966) 
SHAYKH SULTAN IBN MUHAMMAD AL QASIMI (1972) 
SHAYKH HAMAD IBN MUHAMMAD AL SHARQI (1974) 
SHAYKH RASHID IBN AHMAD AL MUALLA (1981) 
SHAYKH HUMAYD IBN RASHID AL NUAIMI (1981) 
SHAYKH MAKTUM IBN RASHID AL MAKTUM (1990) 



Appointive ------ Elective - — — — Advisory 



Figure 12. United Arab Emirates: Government Structure, 1992 



240 



United Arab Emirates 



Supreme Council, functions as the highest federal authority in 
executive and legislative capacities. Narrowly, the executive 
branch consists of the SCU, the Council of Ministers (the cabi- 
net), and the presidency (see fig. 12). The SCU consists of the 
rulers of the seven amirates; it elects from among its members 
a chairman and a vice chairman, who serve for a term of five 
years. Article 150 of the provisional constitution defines the 
powers of the SCU as formulation of general policy; legislation 
on all matters of state; ratification of federal laws and decrees, 
including those relating to the annual budget and fiscal mat- 
ters; ratification of international treaties and agreements; and 
assent to the appointment of the prime minister and Supreme 
Court of the Union judges. 

The rulers make decisions by a simple majority vote, except 
on substantive issues. Substantive issues require a two-thirds 
majority (five of seven rulers), including the votes of both Abu 
Dhabi and Dubayy. The SCU carries out its work through a sec- 
retariat and whatever ad hoc committees it chooses to appoint. 

The president serves as chairman of the SCU, head of state, 
and commander of the Union Defense Force. The president 
convenes the SCU and appoints the prime minister, deputy 
prime minister, cabinet ministers, and other senior civil and 
military officials. He has the power to proclaim martial law and 
to carry out a variety of functions usually associated with the 
chief executive. 

The Council of Ministers administers federal affairs. In 1992 
there were twenty-five ministers, including the prime minister 
and deputy prime minister. UAE citizenship is a requirement 
for appointment as a minister. All ministers are individually 
and collectively answerable to the president and the SCU. In 
addition to its executive duties, the Council of Ministers is 
responsible for drafting bills for formal enactment. 

Under the provisional constitution, the Federal National 
Council (FNC) is the principal legislative authority, but its 
actual role in the governmental process is limited to consulta- 
tion. Its forty members are appointed for two-year terms by the 
respective amirate rulers, in accordance with a constitutionally 
fixed quota that allots proportionately more members to the 
wealthiest and most populous amirates. Thus, Abu Dhabi and 
Dubayy each appoint eight members to the FNC; Ras al Khay- 
mah and Sharjah each appoint six members; and Ajman, Al 
Fujayrah, and Umm al Qaywayn each appoint four members. 
Members of the FNC must be citizens of the amirates they rep- 



241 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

resent, twenty-one years of age or older, and literate. They may 
not hold any other public office. 

The FNC meets in regular session for a minimum of six 
months, beginning in November. The UAE president may call 
a special session if necessary. The president opens the regular 
session with a speech on the state of the union. The FNC can 
reply to the state of the union address in the form of "observa- 
tions and wishes," but the reply has no legal effect. The FNC 
also makes recommendations on legislative matters to the 
Council of Ministers, the president, and the SCU. The FNC can 
discuss any government bills drafted by the Council of Minis- 
ters; it can agree with, amend, or reject such bills, but it cannot 
veto them. 

The laws of the UAE are divided into two main categories: 
union laws and decrees. A bill drafted by the Council of Minis- 
ters for nonbinding deliberation by the FNC and then submit- 
ted to the president for his assent and the SCU for ratification 
becomes a union law when promulgated by the president. 
Decrees are issued jointly by the president and the Council of 
Ministers between sessions of the SCU; a decree must be con- 
firmed by the SCU to remain valid. 

The Judiciary 

Article 94 of the provisional constitution guarantees the 
independence of the judicial branch under the Supreme Court 
of the Union. This body consists of a president and up to five 
judges appointed by the UAE president, following approval by 
the SCU. The Supreme Court is vested with the power of judi- 
cial review and original jurisdiction over federal-amirate and 
interamirate disputes. It also is empowered to try cases of offi- 
cial misconduct involving cabinet and other senior federal offi- 
cials. 

The provisional constitution also provides for the establish- 
ment of union courts of first instance to adjudicate civil, com- 
mercial, criminal, and administrative cases. Judgments of these 
courts can be appealed to the Supreme Court. Local courts in 
each of the seven amirates have jurisdiction over matters that 
the provisional constitution does not specifically reserve to the 
union courts. 

The provisional constitution designates the sharia (Islamic 
law) as the basis of all legislation. Three of the four legal 
schools of Sunni Islam have adherents in the UAE. Most citi- 
zens follow the Maliki legal school, but a minority follow the 



242 



United Arab Emirates 



Hanbali and Shafii schools. The Twelve Imam Shia (see Glos- 
sary) legal school of Shia Muslims also has adherents in the 
federation (see Sunni Islam; Shia Islam, ch.l). 

Ruling Families 

In 1993 the most important political figures in the UAE were 
the senior members of the ruling families of the individual 
amirates — the Al Nuhayyan family of Abu Dhabi, the Al Nuaimi 
of Ajman, the Al Sharqi of Al Fujayrah, the Al Maktum of 
Dubayy, the Al Qasimi of Ras al Khaymah and Sharjah, and the 
Al Mualla of Umm al Qaywayn. The most powerful amir is 
Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan (b. ca. 1920), the ruler of 
Abu Dhabi and the president of the UAE (reelected to a five- 
year term in 1991). Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan has ruled Abu 
Dhabi since 1966, when his older brother, Shaykh Shakhbut Al 
Nuhayyan (r. 1928-66), was deposed by the British. 

The Al Nuhayyan originally were beduin of the Bani Yas 
tribe and were based in the Al Liwa Oasis. An ancestor of the 
current ruler migrated to the island of Abu Dhabi in the late 
1770s and established a commercial port there. Prior to 1966, 
Abu Dhabi remained a small town and residence site of the 
ruler, but it had not attracted most Al Nuhayyan shaykhs, who 
preferred to live in the interior oases. Even Shaykh Zayid ibn 
Sultan favored the beduin lifestyle as a young man, and for sev- 
eral years under his brother's rule he was governor of Al Ayn in 
the Al Buraymi Oasis. Beginning in the late 1960s, the oil 
boom-induced transformation of Abu Dhabi into a cosmopoli- 
tan city prompted politically ambitious Al Nuhayyan members 
to settle in the capital, where many of them obtained positions 
in the expanding amirate and federal bureaucracies. 

Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan designated his son, Shaykh Khalifa 
ibn Zayid Al Nuhayyan (b. 1949), as crown prince. Khalifa ibn 
Zayid acquired progressively more responsibilities as he 
matured. In 1992 he served as president of Abu Dhabi's Execu- 
tive Council (the amirate equivalent of the Council of Minis- 
ters) and as head of the Department of Social Services. In 
addition, he was deputy commander in chief of the federal 
Union Defense Force. Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan had more than 
forty-five other children, although most of them were not 
involved actively in politics; one son was a colonel in the Union 
Defense Force air force. Several of Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan's 
cousins were prominent in government, especially the sons of 
his cousin Muhammad ibn Khalifa Al Nuhayyan: Tahnun ibn 



243 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Muhammad Al Nuhayyan was head of ADNOG; Hamdan ibn 
Muhammad Al Nuhayyan was deputy prime minister; and 
Sarur ibn Muhammad Al Nuhayyan was chief of the ruler's 
diwan (court). 

Until his death on October 7, 1990, Shaykh Rashid ibn Said 
Al Maktum (b. 1912), as ruler of Dubayy and vice president 
and prime minister of the UAE, was the second most powerful 
amir. His eldest son, Shaykh Maktum ibn Rashid Al Maktum, 
succeeded him in all his offices. The Al Maktum are a branch 
of the same Bani Yas tribe that includes the Al Nuhayyan. The 
Al Maktum emigrated from Abu Dhabi to Dubayy's creek in the 
1830s and established there the port that eventually became 
Dubayy. The late Shaykh Rashid ibn Said succeeded to the rule 
of Dubayy in 1958 following the death of his father, Shaykh 
Said ibn Maktum Al Maktum (r. 1912-58). During the 1960s 
and 1970s, Shaykh Rashid ibn Said presided over the transfor- 
mation of Dubayy into a wealthy oil amirate. Since the mid- 
1980s, however, his sons effectively have ruled the amirate 
because of Rashid ibn Said's serious and chronic illnesses. 

Before taking over his father's offices, Shaykh Maktum ibn 
Rashid (b. 1941) was crown prince and had several other gov- 
ernmental responsibilities. Shaykh Maktum ibn Rashid's 
brother, Muhammad ibn Rashid Al Maktum, is UAE minister of 
defense and head of Dubayy's armed forces. Two other broth- 
ers also hold important positions in the Dubayy or federal 
administrations. In addition, several of Shaykh Rashid ibn 
Said's nephews and cousins are politically prominent. 

Two branches of the Al Qasimi tribe rule Sharjah and Ras al 
Khaymah. The Al Qasimi, based at Ras al Khaymah, emerged as 
a major maritime power during the eighteenth century; the Al 
Qasimi control of trade in the Persian Gulf area led to conflict 
with Oman and eventually with Britain, which was consolidat- 
ing its colonial empire in India (see Treaties with the British, 
ch. 1). Following several naval battles, the British finally 
defeated the Al Qasimi in 1819, burning their ships and the 
town of Ras al Khaymah. Because of this history, the Al Qasimi 
inherited a historical hostility toward the British. 

The Al Qasimi family of Sharjah is the larger of the two ruling 
houses. Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammad Al Qasimi (b. 1942) of 
Sharjah became ruler in 1972, following the assassination of his 
brother, Shaykh Khalid ibn Muhammad Al Qasimi (r. 1965-72), 
killed in an unsuccessful coup to restore his cousin, Shaykh Saqr 
ibn Sultan Al Qasimi (r. 1951-65), whom the British had 



244 



Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan, 
president of the 
United Arab Emirates and ruler 
of Abu Dhabi 
Courtesy Embassy of the 
United Arab Emirates, 
Washington 



{ I 

' 4 



deposed. Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammad has a reputation for 
being relatively progressive and for being an enthusiastic sup- 
porter of strengthening the powers of the federal government. 

The ruler also has a reputation for initiating extravagant 
construction projects for the amirate. Since assuming power, 
Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammad had amassed a debt estimated 
in 1987 at US$920 million, creating discontent among some 
members of the royal family and precipitating a coup attempt 
in June 1987. While Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammad was out of 
the amirate, his elder brother, Shaykh Abd al Aziz Al Qasimi, 
issued a statement through Sharjah's news agency that Shaykh 
Sultan ibn Muhammad had abdicated because he had misman- 
aged the amirate's economy. Despite initial Abu Dhabi support 
for the pretender, the coup failed when Dubayy called a meet- 
ing of the SCU. Through mediation it was decided to return 
Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammad to power, but to give Shaykh 
Abd al Aziz a seat on the SCU and the title of crown prince. 
Somewhat chastened, Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammad initiated 
administrative and financial reforms, but he had the last word 
when, in February 1990, he removed his brother from the post 
of crown prince, revoked his brother's right to succeed him, 
and exiled him. 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

The Al Qasimi family of Ras al Khaymah is smaller than the 
branch in Sharjah. Shaykh Saqr ibn Muhammad Al Qasimi (b. 
1920) has ruled the amirate since 1948. As do his cousins in 
Sharjah, he has acquired a reputation for being sympathetic to 
Arab nationalist issues. He is a contemporary of the former 
ruler of Sharjah, Shaykh Saqr ibn Sultan, and, like him, tends 
to be suspicious of the British. In 1971 he refused to accept 
Britain's compromise for resolving Iran's claims to Tunb al 
Kubra (Greater Tumb) and Tunb as Sughra (Lesser Tumb), 
two tiny islands in the Persian Gulf (see Foreign Relations, this 
ch.). Shaykh Saqr ibn Sultan has designated his son, Khalid ibn 
Saqr Al Qasimi, as crown prince; Khalid ibn Saqr was educated 
in the United States. 

The rulers of the other three amirates have limited influ- 
ence within the UAE. Ajman, Al Fujayrah, and Umm al Qay- 
wayn are relatively small, poor, and dependent on their 
wealthier neighbors for development grants. Shaykh Humayd 
ibn Rashid Al Nuaimi has ruled Ajman since 1981. Shaykh 
Rashid ibn Ahmad Al Mualla has ruled Umm al Qaywayn since 
1981 as well. In Al Fujayrah, where a majority of the population 
claims membership in the dominant Al Sharqi tribe, Shaykh 
Hamad ibn Muhammad Al Sharqi has ruled since 1974. 

The Media 

Provided the media do not criticize the ruling families and 
the government, they are relatively free. Abu Dhabi publishes 
two dailies, one in Arabic, Al Ittihad (Unity), and one in 
English, Emirates News, at a government-owned press. The 
Dubayy government publishes one Arabic daily, Al Bayan (The 
Official Report) . In addition, the UAE has three other Arabic 
dailies and two English dailies. 

The government-owned UAE Broadcasting Service airs 
radio programs mainly from Abu Dhabi, which also has a televi- 
sion station, and from Dubayy. Other amirates also have radio 
stations, and Sharjah airs a small amount of television time. 

Foreign Relations 

Since obtaining full independence at the end of 1971, the 
UAE has focused on security concerns in its foreign relations. 
Indeed, it was uncertain in the early 1970s whether the UAE 
would endure as a viable state. Saudi Arabia, for example, 
refused to recognize the new federation because of a border 



246 



United Arab Emirates 



dispute with Abu Dhabi over the Al Buraymi Oasis, subse- 
quently resolved in 1974. Iran and Oman also contested UAE 
claims to certain territories. In addition, the discovery of exten- 
sive petroleum deposits in the 1960s prompted Iraq and other 
states to challenge the legitimacy of the UAE's ruling families. 
Because the UAE was a relatively small state, its leaders recog- 
nized that defending the country's security from both internal 
and external threats depended on skillful management of dip- 
lomatic relations with other countries, particularly larger and 
more powerful neighbors such as Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. 

A principal goal of the UAE's foreign policy has been to con- 
tain the spillover effects of various regional crises. For example, 
during the initial years of UAE independence, a major insur- 
rectionary movement threatened to overthrow the government 
in neighboring Oman. This movement also supported a group 
known as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and 
the Arab Gulf, which aimed at establishing a republican regime 
in the UAE. During the mid-1970s, repercussions of the escalat- 
ing civil war in Lebanon reverberated throughout the Persian 
Gulf. Subsequently, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the civil 
war and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq 
War all affected the UAE in various ways. 

Despite its criticisms of United States policies toward the Pal- 
estinians, the UAE perceives its evolving relationship with the 
United States as providing a measure of protection from these 
crises. Thus, by 1990-91, when it joined with the United States 
in the military effort to force Iraq out of Kuwait, the UAE 
already had become a de facto member of the United States 
strategic umbrella over the region. 

The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait were a shock to 
the UAE. Prior to that crisis, the UAE had tried to demonstrate 
solidarity on inter-Arab issues. In particular, it had supported 
the cause of Palestinian Arabs, both within the League of Arab 
States (Arab League), of which it was a member, and within 
international forums. In practical terms, this meant that the 
UAE did not recognize Israel. When Egypt signed a separate 
peace agreement with Israel in 1979, the UAE joined other 
Arab states in breaking diplomatic relations with Egypt. The 
UAE did not, however, expel the thousands of Egyptian work- 
ers in the UAE or interfere with their transfer of remittances 
home. For the UAE, the crisis over Kuwait demonstrated a lack 
of Arab unity on a critical Arab issue. The UAE joined the Arab 



247 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

states that opposed the Iraqi invasion and supported the use of 
force to compel Iraq's withdrawal of troops. 

More fundamental for the UAE, this crisis exposed the fail- 
ure of the GCC, of which the UAE had been a founding mem- 
ber in 1981, as a deterrent collective security organization. 
Although it was not prepared to abandon the GCC — it derived 
other benefits from this alliance with Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, and Saudi Arabia — the UAE believed that new security 
arrangements were necessary. The UAE initially supported 
expanding the GCC framework to include formal military ties 
with Egypt and Syria. When this option seemed unrealistic, the 
UAE concluded that a security relationship with the United 
States should be continued. Consequently, negotiations began 
during the summer of 1991 and continued for more than a 
year. In late 1992, officials of both countries signed an agree- 
ment that permitted the United States to use some UAE bases 
temporarily and to pre-position supplies on UAE territory. 

The negotiations with the United States may have been a fac- 
tor in the UAE's 1992 problems with Iran, a country that 
opposed a continuing United States military presence in the 
region. Like Iraq, Iran is a large neighbor — and a much closer 
one — with a recent history of policies that discomfited the 
UAE. Throughout the 1980s, the UAE had striven with diffi- 
culty to maintain neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War. That conflict 
was also a source of internal UAE tension because Abu Dhabi 
tended to support Iraq while Dubayy was more sympathetic to 
Iran. After the war ended in 1988, Iran appeared to single out 
the UAE for special and friendly attention. By 1992 the UAE 
was the Arab country with which Iran had the closest commer- 
cial relations. Thus, the crisis that erupted in April 1992 over 
disputed islands in the Persian Gulf seemed unexpected. 

The dispute with Iran over the sovereignty of three small 
islands — Abu Musa, Greater Tumb, and Lesser Tumb — had 
been dormant for twenty years. It was rekindled in 1992 when 
Iranian officials on Abu Musa refused to permit UAE contract 
workers to disembark, in apparent contravention of a shared 
sovereignty agreement. Iran had claimed all three islands in 
1970, before the UAE was formed. On the eve of indepen- 
dence in 1971, the amirate of Sharjah, which had jurisdiction 
over Abu Musa, accepted an agreement negotiated between 
London and Tehran that permitted Iran to establish a military 
garrison in the northern part of the island and allowed Sharjah 
to administer the civilian population living in the southern 



248 



United Arab Emirates 



part. The agreement provided for Iran and Sharjah to share 
the proceeds from an offshore oil field but otherwise left the 
question of ultimate sovereignty to be resolved at some unspec- 
ified future time. 

Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb are two uninhabited islands 
claimed by Ras al Khaymah but occupied by Iran since 1971. 
Unlike Sharjah, Ras al Khaymah never accepted an Iranian 
claim to the islands and protested Britain's failure to interfere 
with Iran's occupation. Indeed, it was the amirate's anger over 
the 1971 occupation that caused it to refrain from joining the 
UAE for several months. In the midst of the 1992 crisis over 
Abu Musa, Ras al Khaymah resurrected its grievance over 
Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb, thus enflaming an already 
delicate situation. At the end of the year, Iran and Sharjah qui- 
etly agreed to a restoration of the status quo ante the crisis, but 
the incidents left the UAE feeling wary of Iranian intentions. 

In 1993 the UAE maintained relatively cordial relations with 
countries outside the Middle East. It was a member of the 
United Nations and its specialized agencies. It also was a mem- 
ber of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 

* * * 

The body of scholarly literature on the UAE gradually 
increased in the 1980s. A recent book, Malcolm C. Peck's The 
United Arab Emirates, provides a good account of UAE society, 
politics, and economy. Hassan Hamdan al-Alkim's The Foreign 
Policy of the United Arab Emirates gives a solid introduction to the 
subject. The history of the region from World War I until inde- 
pendence is presented with insight by Rosemarie Said Zahlan 
in her book, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates. A.O. 
Taryam's The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950-85 
gives a detailed discussion of the years immediately before and 
after the UAE's creation. 

There are also informative chapters about the UAE in sev- 
eral earlier books, including Ali Mohammad Khalifa's The 
United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation and Enver Khoury's 
The United Arab Emirates: Its Political System and Politics. (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



249 



Chapter 6. Oman 




Crest of the Sultanate of Oman 



Country Profile 



Country 

Formal Name: Sultanate of Oman. 
Short Form: Oman. 

Term for Citizens: Omani(s); adjectival form, Omani. 
Capital: Muscat. 

Geography 

Size: About 212,000 square kilometers, although estimates vary. 

Topography: Mostly desert; 15 percent of land mountainous. 
Four major regions: Musandam Peninsula, Al Batinah coastal 
plain, Oman interior, and Dhofar region. 

Climate: Hot and dry, except for Dhofar, which has light 
monsoons. 

Boundaries: Oman and Saudi Arabia signed agreement in 1990 
to demarcate borders; Oman and Yemen signed agreement in 
1992 to demarcate borders. 

Society 

Population: In 1992, for planning purposes, government 
estimated 2 million; actual figure may be closer to 1.5 million. 
Growth rate 3.5 percent in 1994. Foreigners estimated at 23.3 
percent of population in 1992. 

Education: Free public schools consist of primary level of six 
years, lower secondary level of three years, and upper secondary 
level of three years. Most teachers (60 percent) foreign. 



NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



253 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Health: Improvement and expansion of health care facilities 
major ongoing government priority. In 1994 infant mortality 
estimated at thirty-seven per 1,000 population. In 1994 life 
expectancy at birth sixty-eight years on average, with sixty-six 
years for males and seventy years for females. 

Ethnic Groups: Most Omanis are Arabs, although numerous 
citizens of non-Arab African origin. Foreign community includes 
Egyptians, Pakistanis, Indians, and others. 

Religion: Most Omanis are Muslims; Ibadis constitute largest 
group. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1991 GDP about RO4.0 
billion, or US$10.5 billion; per capita income R02,696, or 
US$7,000. 

Oil Industry: In 1991 accounted for about 43 percent of GDP, 95 
percent of export earnings, and 82 percent of government 
revenues. 

Agriculture and Fishing: Contributed about 3.8 percent of GDP 
in 1991. 

Currency and Exchange Rate: Omani riyal. In 1994 exchange 
rate US$1 = RO0.3845 (fixed rate) . 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Transportation: In 1992 about 6,000 kilometers paved roads and 
20,000 kilometers gravel or earthen roads. Four-lane highway 
from Muscat along Gulf of Oman runs to Dubayy in United Arab 
Emirates. Major airport As Sib International Airport near 
Muscat. Major port Mina Qabus, near Muscat, being expanded 
in 1994; other major port at Raysut. 

Telecommunications: Telecommunications internationally via 
satellites; domestic telephone service very limited but being 



254 



Oman 



expanded. Television available throughout Oman, but radio 
broadcast facilities limited. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Sultan Qabus ibn Said Al Said as head of state and 
prime minister presides over Council of Ministers. Consultative 
Council has advisory role but no legislative powers. No 
constitution. 

Politics: No political parties. Important political actors are persons 
close to sultan, including Western-educated administrators and 
special advisers. 

Foreign Relations: Member of United Nations and its specialized 
agencies, League of Arab States, Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, and Gulf Cooperation Council. June 1980 
agreement allows United States use of military facilities in 
Oman. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In mid-1993 Royal Armed Forces personnel 
strength 36,700, including 3,700 foreign personnel, as follows: 
Royal Oman Land Forces, 20,000; Royal Oman Navy, 3,500; 
Royal Oman Air Force, 3,500; and Royal Household, 6,000 
(including Royal Guard of Oman, 4,500; Special Forces, 700; 
Royal Yacht Squadron, 150; and other, 650). Army primarily 
infantry force but has some tanks and armored cars. Navy a 
coastal patrol force, expanding and modernizing by acquiring 
guided missile (Exocet) craft and new gunboats. Air force has 
more than fifty combat aircraft, all of British manufacture. 



255 



SINCE 1970, WHEN OMAN'S RULER, Sultan Qabus ibn Said 
Al Said, assumed power, the sultanate has moved from a poor 
underdeveloped country toward a modern nation state. 
Indexes of development measuring per capita gross national 
product, infant mortality, literacy rates, and availability of social 
services validate the government's claim that its policies have 
effected positive change. Although the government's adminis- 
trative structure expanded to accommodate public services, 
change in the political system has been slow. Oman remains a 
conservative monarchy, with the sultan relying on the support 
of a traditional political elite comprising the Al Said ruling 
family, established merchant families, and, to a lesser extent, 
tribal shaykhs. 

Until the commercial production and export of oil in 1967, 
Oman's budget was exclusively dependent on religious taxes 
(zakat), customs duties, and British loans and subsidies. The 
bulk of this revenue served as a mechanism through which the 
sultan could co-opt his traditional allies among the merchant 
families and tribal shaykhs. By transferring income from the 
state treasury, the sultan was able to draw in influential seg- 
ments of Omani society and ensure continuance of Al Said 
rule. Post-1970 economic developments were in part con- 
structed on these antecedents. Income distribution remained a 
principal mechanism for ensuring political stability, but the 
network involved a state administrative structure rather than 
the more direct and personal individual-ruler relationship. 
Also, the system expanded to incorporate the average Omani 
through the creation of a public sector. The net effect has been 
the establishment of a salaried middle class whose economic 
interests are closely tied with the government. 

Since the development of the country's infrastructure in the 
1970s, national development plans have given priority to reduc- 
ing dependency on oil exports and encouraging income-gener- 
ating projects in non-oil sectors (diversification), promoting 
private-sector investment, and effecting a wider geographical 
distribution of investments to correct regional imbalances. 
Such a wider distribution is intended to narrow the gap in the 
standard of living in different regions, develop existing areas of 
population, and discourage migration to densely populated 
urban centers, such as Muscat (also seen as Masqat), the capi- 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

tal. Equally important are the national goals to develop local 
human resources, to increase indigenous participation in the 
private sector, and to improve government management and 
organization. 

Constraints on the government in implementing its eco- 
nomic diversification program include the limited growth 
potential of alternative sectors, such as agriculture, fishing, and 
industry. Constraints also include the limited involvement of 
the private sector in businesses other than trade, the low-skilled 
labor force, the limited water resources, and the inability of 
government ministries to manage and expand services. 

Sultan Qabus ibn Said, therefore, faced different challenges 
in 1993 than those he confronted when he assumed power in 
1970 through a palace coup d'etat. Then, the rebellion of 
tribes in the southern Dhofar (also seen as Zufar) region and 
the exploitation of the country's oil reserves had taken prece- 
dence. 

Opportunities in urban centers stimulated a rural-urban 
shift, reducing the number of individuals engaged in agricul- 
tural labor and contributing to the key role of the oil sector in 
the economy. On the one hand, an increasingly urbanized pop- 
ulation has the potential to be better educated and better enu- 
merated. On the other hand, the small indigenous population 
has necessitated the presence of a large foreign labor force. 
This has contributed to an informal caste system, with Omanis 
clearly ranked highest in the hierarchy, followed by Westerners, 
with non-Western foreigners at the bottom. 

Economic development has resulted in social transforma- 
tion, not only in terms of diminishing the importance of the 
tribal element in Oman and stratifying Omani society but also 
in terms of inadvertently engendering a sense of entitlement 
among the public, common to social welfare states. In doing so, 
the government has been under increasing pressure to provide 
suitable employment for new migrants to the cities from village 
communities and to new graduates from colleges, to expand its 
social services, and to maintain the security of the country. 

To fulfill these expectations, the government must ensure 
sustainable economic growth. Therefore, the policies of diversi- 
fication and indigenization have taken on greater importance. 
Diversification is needed to ensure growth in the post-oil era; 
indigenization potentially eliminates the demand for foreign 
labor and increases opportunities for Omani nationals. The 
problems of the 1990s are resistant to change, however. The 



258 



Oman 



depletion of the country's proven oil reserves (at the produc- 
tion rate of 1992, reserves will be depleted within seventeen 
years) heightens the need for economic diversification, but so 
far, non-oil sectors have shown limited potential. 

The net effect of the government's policies has been to link 
economic conditions with political stability. The suppression of 
the Dhofar rebellion in the first half of the 1970s provided a 
lesson for Sultan Qabus ibn Said. By addressing the gross eco- 
nomic neglect of the south, the government was able to ensure 
some political quiescence. In providing the majority of Omanis 
with adequate income through employment in the public sec- 
tor, health and medical services, education, and other social 
services, the government has similarly ensured a modicum of 
public political support. 

Geography and Population 

Geography 

Oman is located in the southeastern quarter of the Arabian 
Peninsula and, according to official estimates, covers a total 
land area of approximately 300,000 square kilometers; foreign 
observer estimates, however, are about 212,000 square kilome- 
ters, roughly the size of the state of Kansas. The land area is 
composed of varying topographic features: flat or rolling ter- 
rain covered with desert accounts for 82 percent of the land 
mass; mountain ranges, 15 percent; and the coastal plain, 3 
percent. 

The sultanate is flanked by the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian 
Sea, and the Rub al Khali (Empty Quarter) of Saudi Arabia, all 
of which contributed to Oman's isolation. Historically, the 
country's contacts with the rest of the world were by sea, which 
not only provided access to foreign lands but also linked the 
coastal towns of Oman. The Rub al Khali, difficult to cross even 
with modern desert transport, formed a barrier between the 
sultanate and the Arabian interior. The Al Hajar Mountains, 
which form a belt between the coast and the desert from the 
Musandam Peninsula (Ras Musandam) to the city of Sur at 
Oman's easternmost point, formed another barrier. These geo- 
graphic barriers kept the interior of Oman free from foreign 
military encroachments (see fig. 13). 

Natural features divide the country into seven distinct areas: 
Ruus al Jibal, including the northern Musandam Peninsula; 
the Al Batinah coastal plain; the Muscat-Matrah coastal area; 



259 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 




Figure 13. Oman, 1993 



the Oman interior, comprising Aljabal al Akhdar (Green 
Mountain), its foothills, and desert fringes; the barren coast- 
line south to Dhofar; the Dhofar region in the south; and the 
offshore island of Masirah. 

The northernmost area, Ruus al Jibal, extends from the 
Musandam Peninsula to the boundary with the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) at Hisn Diba. It borders the Strait of Hormuz, 



260 



Oman 



which links the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman, and is sep- 
arated from the rest of the sultanate by a strip of territory 
belonging to the UAE. This area consists of low mountains 
forming the northernmost extremity of the Al Hajar al Gharbi 
(Western Al Hajar) Mountains. Two inlets, Elphinstone (Khawr 
ash Shamm) and Malcom (Ghubbat al Ghazirah), cleave the 
coastline about one-third the distance from the Strait of Hor- 
muz and at one point are separated by only a few hundred 
meters of land. The coastline is extremely rugged, and the 
Elphinstone Inlet, sixteen kilometers long and surrounded by 
cliffs 1,000 to 1,250 meters high, has frequently been com- 
pared with fjords in Norway. 

The UAE territory separating Ruus al Jibal from the rest of 
Oman extends almost as far south as the coastal town of Shinas. 
A narrow, well-populated coastal plain known as Al Batinah 
runs from the point at which the sultanate is reentered to the 
town of As Sib, about 140 kilometers to the southeast. Across 
the plains, a number of wadis, heavily populated in their upper 
courses, descend from the Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains to the 
south. A ribbon of oases, watered by wells and an underground 
channel (falaj) system, extends the length of the plain, about 
ten kilometers inland. 

South of As Sib, the coast changes character. For about 175 
kilometers, from As Sib to Ras al Hadd, it is barren and 
bounded by cliffs almost its entire length; there is no cultiva- 
tion and little habitation. Although the deep water off this 
coast renders navigation relatively easy, there are few natural 
harbors or safe anchorages. The two best are at Muscat and 
Matrah, where natural harbors facilitated the growth of cities 
centuries ago. 

West of the coastal areas lies the tableland of central Oman. 
The Al Hajar Mountains form two ranges: the Al Hajar al 
Gharbi Mountains and the Al Hajar ash Sharqi (Eastern Al 
Hajar) Mountains. They are divided by the Wadi Samail (the 
largest wadi in the mountain zone), a valley that forms the tra- 
ditional route between Muscat and the interior. The general 
elevation is about 1,200 meters, but the peaks of the high ridge 
known as Al Jabal al Akhdar — which is considered a separate 
area but is actually part of the Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains — 
rise to more than 3,000 meters in some places. Al Jabal al Akh- 
dar is the only home of the Arabian tahr, a unique species of 
wild goat. In the hope of saving this rare animal, Sultan Qabus 
ibn Said has declared part of Al Jabal al Akhdar a national 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

park. Behind the Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains are two inland 
regions, Az Zahirah and inner Oman, separated by the lateral 
range of the Rub al Khali. Adjoining the Al Hajar ash Sharqi 
Mountains are the sandy regions of Ash Sharqiyah and Jalan, 
which also border the desert. 

The desolate coastal tract from Jalan to Ras Naws has no spe- 
cific name. Low hills and wastelands meet the sea for long dis- 
tances. Midway along this coast and about fifteen kilometers 
offshore is the barren island of Masirah. Stretching about sev- 
enty kilometers, the island occupies a strategic location near 
the entry point to the Gulf of Oman from the Arabian Sea. 
Because of its location, it became the site of military facilities 
used first by the British and then by the United States, follow- 
ing an access agreement signed in 1980 by the United States 
and Oman and most recently renewed in 1990. 

The Dhofar region extends from Ras ash Sharbatat to the 
border with Yemen. Its exact northern limit has never been 
defined, but the territory claimed by the sultan includes the 
Wadi Mughshin, about 240 kilometers inland. The southwest- 
ern portion of the coastal plain of Dhofar is regarded as one of 
the most beautiful in Arabia, and its capital, Salalah, was the 
permanent residence of Sultan Said ibn Taimur Al Said and 
the birthplace of the present sultan, Qabus ibn Said. The high- 
est peaks are about 1,000 meters. At their base lies a narrow, 
pebbly desert adjoining the Rub al Khali to the north. 

Climate 

With the exception of the Dhofar region, which has a light 
monsoon climate and receives cool winds from the Indian 
Ocean, the climate of Oman is extremely hot and dry most of 
the year. Summer begins in mid-April and lasts until October. 
The highest temperatures are registered in the interior, where 
readings of more than 50°C in the shade are common. On the 
Al Batinah plain, summer temperatures seldom exceed 46°C, 
but, because of the low elevation, the humidity may be as high 
as 90 percent. The mean summer temperature in Muscat is 
33°C, but the gharbi (literally, western), a strong wind that blows 
from the Rub al Khali, can raise temperatures from the towns 
on the Gulf of Oman by 6°C to 10°C. Winter temperatures are 
mild and pleasant, ranging between 15°C and 23°C. 

Precipitation on the coasts and on the interior plains ranges 
from twenty to 100 millimeters a year and falls during mid- and 
late winter. Rainfall in the mountains, particularly over Al Jabal 



262 



Oman 



al Akhdar, is much higher and may reach 700 millimeters. 
Because the plateau of Al Jabal al Akhdar is porous limestone, 
rainfall seeps quickly through it, and the vegetation, which 
might be expected to be more lush, is meager. However, a huge 
reservoir under the plateau provides springs for low-lying 
areas. In addition, an enormous wadi channels water to these 
valleys, making the area agriculturally productive in years of 
good rainfall. Dhofar, benefiting from a southwest monsoon 
between June and September, receives heavier rainfall and has 
constantly running streams, which make the region Oman's 
most ferule area. 

Population 

A comprehensive population census has never been con- 
ducted, but in 1992 the sultanate solicited help from the 
United Nations (UN) Fund for Technical and Financial Assis- 
tance in taking a full census. For planning purposes, the gov- 
ernment in 1992 estimated the population at 2 million, but the 
actual figure may be closer to 1.5 million, growing at a rate of 
3.5 percent per annum. The population is unevenly distrib- 
uted; the coastal regions, the Al Batinah plain, and the Muscat 
metropolitan area contain the largest concentration. 

Omanis live mainly in rural areas, but urban locations also 
exist. The major city is Muscat, the capital. In the Al Batinah 
plain in the north, the largest town is Suhar. Farther south, in 
the hilly region of Al Jabal al Akhdar, lies the town of Nazwah. 
Salalah is a major center for the Dhofar region. 

The population is heterogeneous, consisting of an ethnic 
and religious mix derived in large part from a history of mari- 
time trade, tribal migrations, and contacts with the outside 
world. Although Arabs constitute the majority, non-Arab com- 
munities include Baluchis — from the Makran coast of Iran and 
Pakistan — who are concentrated in Muscat and the Al Batinah 
coast and play a significant role in the armed forces; ex-slaves 
(a legacy of Oman's slave trade and East African colonies); and 
Zanzibari Omanis, who are well represented in the police force 
and the professions. The integration of Omanis of African 
descent is often circumscribed by a language barrier (they 
often speak Swahili and English but not always Arabic). The 
presence of Omanis of Indian descent in Muscat reflects the 
historical commercial ties between the sultanate and the 
Indian subcontinent. The Khoja community in Matrah, of 
Indian origin, is perhaps the richest private group in Oman, 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

and its members are among the best educated. The Shihuh of 
the northern Musandam Peninsula numbered about 20,000 in 
the early 1990s. They speak Arabic and a dialect of Farsi and 
engage primarily in fishing and herding. 

Because of the small indigenous population, the government 
has been obliged to use foreign labor. In 1992 about 60 percent 
of the labor force was foreign. Some 350,000 foreign workers 
and their families (primarily Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, 
Filipinos, and Sri Lankans) live in Oman. The high percentage 
of foreigners in the work force, combined with improvements in 
the country's education system, has prompted the government 
to institute a program of indigenization whereby Omani nation- 
als gradually replace foreigners (see Labor, this ch.). 

Society 
Religion 

The majority of Omanis are Ibadi Muslims, followers of Abd 
Allah ibn Ibad (see Shia Islam, ch. 1). Approximately 25 per- 
cent are Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims and live primarily in Sur 
and the surrounding area and in Dhofar. They form the largest 
non-Ibadi minority. The Shia (see Glossary) minority lives 
along the Al Batinah coast in the Muscat-Matrah region. This 
minority includes the Khoja, the Baharina of Iraqi or Iranian 
descent, and the Ajam, of vague origin but generally consid- 
ered to originate in Iran. 

Ibadism is an outgrowth of the Kharijite movement, a variant 
form of Islam practiced by descendants of a sect that seceded 
from the principal Muslim body after the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad in A.D. 632. Kharijites reject primogeniture suc- 
cession of the Quraysh, the tribe of Muhammad, and assert 
that leadership of Islam, the caliphate, should be exercised by 
an imam (see Glossary) elected by the community from candi- 
dates who possess spiritual and personal qualities. Ibadi leader- 
ship is vested in an imam, who is regarded as the sole legitimate 
leader and combines religious and political authority. The 
imam is elected by a council of prominent laymen or shaykhs 
(see Glossary). Adherence to Ibadism accounts in part for 
Oman's historical isolation. Considered a heretical form of 
Islam by the majority Sunni Muslims, Ibadis were not inclined 
to integrate with their neighbors. 



264 



Oman 



Education 

As in other sectors of Omani society, the education system 
was radically altered after the accession of Sultan Qabus ibn 
Said. Prior to 1970, there were only three primary schools in 
the sultanate — in Muscat, Matrah, and Salalah. These were 
reserved for approximately 900 boys personally selected by the 
sultan from among many applicants. Additionally, in Muscat 
there was a religious institute with an enrollment of fifty boys, 
three private schools for Hyderabadis (Indians), and one 
United States missionary school serving fifty foreign girls. Sul- 
tan Qabus ibn Said initiated a shift in the government's policies 
and priorities from neglect to expansion of the school system, 
increasing the public's access to general education. 

The education system is guided by the policy-making body of 
the Council for Education chaired by the sultan and operated 
by the Ministry of Education and Youth. General education is 
divided into three levels: primary (grades 1-6); lower second- 
ary (grades 7-9); and upper secondary (grades 10-12). 
Teacher-training colleges provide training programs for pri- 
mary and lower secondary school teachers. 

Education accounted for a modest 11.2 percent of the gov- 
ernment's current expenditures in 1990, up from only 2.4 per- 
cent in 1975 but still considerably less than the 28 percent 
planned and less than the proportion recorded by other coun- 
tries in the process of expanding their school systems. By the 
1989-90 academic year, the percentage of students enrolled in 
primary schools was almost 100 percent in the respective age- 
group, compared with 53 percent in 1977-78 (see table 32, 
Appendix). The percentage of girls attending primary schools 
also rose rapidly during this period, from 37 percent in 1977- 
78 to 97 percent in 1989-90. The student-teacher ratio at the 
primary level was twenty-seven to one in 1988-89. Secondary 
school enrollment lagged behind primary school attendance 
and rose from 8 percent of secondary-school-age youth in 
1977-78 to 48 percent in 1989-90. In 1986 Sultan Qabus Uni- 
versity opened at Al Khawd, west of Muscat, with faculties of 
agriculture, education, engineering, Islamic studies, medicine, 
and science. Faculties for commerce, economics, and the arts 
are planned. 

Rapid expansion and enrollment have exceeded the capac- 
ity of the ministry to plan and administer the system. This has 
produced problems in planning, budgeting, curriculum devel- 
opment, and teacher training. Often, inappropriate sites for 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

facilities are selected, and programs are of poor quality or 
unavailable. Lower secondary education remains underdevel- 
oped, contributing to the low enrollment rates in upper sec- 
ondary school, particularly for females. 

The government emphasizes teacher training for Omanis, in 
order to create an indigenous teaching force. The dependency 
on foreign staff, and hence the high turnover rate and lack of 
continuity, further compromises the quality of education. In 
the 1980-81 academic year, 618 of a total 5,663, or 11 percent 
of the teaching staff, were Omanis. By the 1985-86 academic 
year, the number had increased to 18 percent. The majority of 
ministry employees (55 percent in 1990) are non-Omanis, of 
whom more than 70 percent are Egyptians; the balance consists 
of Jordanians, Pakistanis, Sudanese, Indians, Filipinos, and oth- 
ers. As of 1990, there were six teacher-training colleges provid- 
ing a two-year program and enrolling a total of about 700 
students. Secondary school teachers receive training at the Fac- 
ulty of Education at Sultan Qabus University. 

The government's medium-term objectives are to ensure 
that all six-year-olds are enrolled in primary school and to 
expand access to primary and secondary education in rural 
areas. The government also seeks to expand teacher-training 
facilities; to increase the number of trained nationals staffing 
schools by increasing the number of teacher-training colleges; 
to improve teacher-class ratios and school-building operations; 
and to introduce student testing and new programs. 

Health 

Developments in the health and medical sector paralleled 
those in education. In 1970 there was one twelve-bed hospital 
operated by United States missionaries and nine government 
health centers. In 1990 there was a total of forty-seven hospi- 
tals, compared with fourteen in 1980. The number of doctors 
increased from 294 to 994 in the same ten-year period, and the 
number of nurses more than quadrupled from 857 to 3,512. 

The government's health policy is directed at achieving a 
level of health care that approaches its goal of Health for All by 
the Year 2000. Included among the health priorities of the Min- 
istry of Health are strengthening curative services, particularly 
in urban areas, and improving preventive services, with the 
emphasis on communicable diseases and immunization. The 
Public Health Department of the Ministry of Health is respon- 
sible for mass immunizations for smallpox and other infectious 



266 





Sultan Qabus University at Al Khawd, west of Muscat 
Sultan Qabus ibn Said Al Said presenting gifts to the first graduates of 

Sultan Qabus University 
Courtesy Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman, Washington 



267 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

diseases. The government stresses delivering maternal and 
child health care at the village level to decrease the infant mor- 
tality rate, estimated in mid-1992 at forty-four per 1,000 popula- 
tion. Life expectancy in mid-1992 was sixty-four years for males 
and sixty-eight years for females. The government is also 
expanding its education program, especially with regard to 
maternal and child health care. In July 1987, the country held 
its first workshop on acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) to increase awareness of the problem in the medical 
community. Contraceptives are available at private hospitals 
and dispensaries and through commercial outlets. Abortion is 
illegal except when the mother's life is endangered. 

Although adequate health facilities exist in urban centers, 
coverage in rural areas remains insufficient. As a result, the 
government is continuing to develop health services as an inte- 
gral part of national development. The Fourth Five-Year Devel- 
opment Plan (1991-95) allocated R048 million (for value of 
the Omani riyal — see Glossary), which is equivalent to 
US$124.7 million, for this purpose. Ministry of Health plans 
include a 100-bed hospital in Al Buraymi and a 200-bed hospi- 
tal at Ar Rustaq, southeast of Qurayyat, to replace the existing 
medical facility in Ar Rustaq and to serve as a central, referral 
hospital for the region. Other projects include replacing all 
outpatient clinics at the Royal Hospital polyclinic in the capital 
and building a new 200-bed hospital at Ibri and a 200-bed hos- 
pital at Tanam, in the interior north of Ibri. 

The Economy 

Omani economic development may be divided into three 
phases: a period of rapid expansion between 1970 and 1986; 
economic retrenchment and rationalization between 1986 and 
1989 as a result of the 1985-86 oil price collapse; and a period 
of stabilized growth since 1990. Economic growth and struc- 
tural change have proceeded rapidly in Oman during the rule 
of Sultan Qabus ibn Said. Oman, however, lagged behind such 
neighboring gulf amirates as Kuwait and the UAE as a result of 
the late discovery of oil, financial constraints, and political 
instability in the first half of the 1970s. Nonetheless, increased 
government expenditure as a result of the commercial produc- 
tion and export of oil transformed the standard of living in 
Oman. By the latter half of the 1980s, Oman emerged as a mid- 
dle-income country after entering the development process as 



268 



Oman 



one of the poorest Arab states. Per capita income rose from 
US$360 in 1970 to US$3,140 in 1980 and to US$7,000 in 1991. 

When Sultan Qabus ibn Said assumed power in 1970, he 
immediately implemented an economic development and 
modernization program. Priority was given to expanding the 
country's almost nonexistent infrastructure. In the early 1970s, 
substantial progress was made in developing physical and social 
infrastructure, mainly in the form of roads, a new deepwater 
port, an international airport, electricity-generating plants, 
desalination plants, and schools, hospitals, and low-cost hous- 
ing. Government revenue derived almost exclusively from oil 
receipts made this possible. 

Economic growth was accompanied by uneven structural 
development, however. In 1960 agriculture accounted for 75 
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary); by 
Oman's fiscal year 1991, its share had fallen to less than 3 per- 
cent. By contrast, industry (including petroleum), which 
accounted for only 8 percent of GDP in 1960, increased to 59 
percent by 1985. Manufacturing increased only from 1 percent 
to 3 percent and services from 18 percent to 38 percent in the 
same period. 

As a result, in 1993 Oman's economy was dominated by the 
petroleum and the services sectors. Aware of the vulnerability 
produced by dependency on a depletable natural resource, the 
government has increased funding for sectors based on renew- 
able natural resources that can provide sustainable economic 
growth. The government is concentrating on the agriculture 
and fishing sectors, encouraging tourism, and constructing 
light industrial parks with the objective of exporting consumer 
goods to its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners. 

Public Finance and the Five-Year Development Plans 

Prior to 1970, the financial position of the sultan was virtu- 
ally synonymous with the public finances of the sultanate. After 
Qabus ibn Said's accession to the throne, a formal separation 
was initiated. The first government budget was announced in 
1971, and the First Five-Year Development Plan was initiated in 
1976. 

After recovering somewhat in 1987 after the collapse of oil 
prices in 1986, government revenue fell again in 1988 to 
R01,198 million (see table 33, Appendix). Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait resulted in a sharp rise in oil prices: average crude oil 
spot prices increased from US$16 per barrel in July 1990 to 



269 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

almost US$40 per barrel in September. Higher oil prices 
resulted in increased 1990 oil revenues, up 38 percent from 
1989. The restoration of the Al Sabah monarchy in Kuwait and 
the defeat of Iraqi forces by an allied coalition stabilized the 
international oil market's uncertainty about supplies, and 
prices collapsed to precrisis levels. Omani government reve- 
nues dropped to ROl,570 million in 1991, from R01,859 mil- 
lion in 1990. The government budget for 1992 was based on an 
estimate that total revenues would increase to R01,628 million 
as a result of slightly higher oil income and as a result of 
increases in gas revenues and other domestic indirect taxes. 

Although the government stresses investment, government 
expenditures are largely current expenditures, suggesting the 
importance the government places on maintaining its security, 
against both internal and external threats, and on its civil 
administration. Public corporations and ministries have pro- 
vided a mechanism for income distribution and the creation of 
a salaried middle class. Reducing expenditures through public- 
sector cuts is regarded as politically sensitive and therefore has 
been avoided, even after the oil price collapse in the mid-1980s 
and the associated loss of income. 

The 4.3 percent per annum increase in total expenditures 
after 1986 largely resulted from these concerns. Between 1987 
and 1991, total government spending rose from R01,576 to 
R01,853 million. During this period, current expenditures 
grew at 5 percent per annum. Although barely keeping pace 
with domestic inflation and increasing at a slower growth rate 
than that of the preceding ten years — when current outlays 
rose at 19.7 percent per annum — maintaining domestic 
income and defense and security expenditures prevented any 
retrenchment, despite wild fluctuations in income. Capital 
expenditures, however, had to be reduced between 1987 and 

1990 and fell by 4 percent per annum. Higher oil prices in 

1991 allowed the government to boost investment spending to 
pre-1986 levels, with a 37 percent increase over 1990. This 
adjustment restored the share of capital outlays in total govern- 
ment spending to 23 percent, after falling to about 12 percent 
in 1990. The 1992 budget called for further increases in spend- 
ing to R01,876 million, of which capital expenditures were 
slated to rise to RO404 million, or 22 percent of the total. 

With the exception of a short period in the early 1980s, the 
government budget has registered sizable deficits. During 1986 
the deficit (RO700 million) peaked at 28 percent of GDP. It 



270 



Oman 



was sharply reduced during the latter half of the 1980s but has 
continued to hover close to 10 percent of GDP. A lag in 
increased spending to match the rise in oil revenues late in 
1990 permitted the government almost to balance the budget. 
But in 1991 spending more than offset oil revenues, and the 
actual budget deficit rose to R0283 million, or 10 percent of 
GDP. The 1992 budget forecast indicated another deficit of this 
magnitude. 

The government has financed these budget deficits by draw- 
ing down on the Contingency Fund and by small amounts of 
commercial borrowing. Economic difficulties have compelled 
the government to raise money on international capital mar- 
kets. In 1986 the government received a US$500 million syndi- 
cated Euroloan, the major sponsors of which were Gulf 
International Bank (in which the government is a shareholder) 
and Chase Investment Bank. In 1988 the government obtained 
ajapanese yen-denominated loan valued at US$130 million 
and a second US$100 million loan. Balanced fiscal conditions 
permitted the authorities to pay some of Oman's debt out- 
standing in 1990. During 1991 and 1992, authorities instituted 
a domestic development bond scheme, which has financed 
roughly one-half the fiscal shortfall. 

The Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1991-95) pro- 
jected government revenue at R08,57l million, up 22.8 per- 
cent from the previous plan. Oil revenue is expected to 
account for more than 76 percent of total revenue and to 
increase by an average of about 5 percent each year, reaching 
R01,785 million in 1995 on a gross basis and R01,429 million 
on a net basis (that is, gross oil revenues less subventions to the 
State General Reserve Fund and the Contingency Fund). The 
plan was based on an assumed average oil price of US$20 per 
barrel in the five years. During the first two years of the plan, 
total revenues roughly kept pace with planned earnings 
because oil prices held at those levels. 

Expenditures during the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan 
were set at RO9,450 million, with current expenditures 
accounting for 76 percent of the total, investment expendi- 
tures set at 22 percent, and additional support to the private 
sector set at 1.4 percent. Defense and national security and civil 
ministries continue to make up the bulk of current expendi- 
tures. With expenditures exceeding revenues, the government 
projects a cumulative deficit of R0879 million. The govern- 
ment plans to finance the deficit by issuing RO430 million in 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

government bonds on the Muscat securities market and by fur- 
ther drawdowns on the Contingency Fund. 

The State General Reserve Fund is to be strengthened by 
allocating 15 percent of oil revenues to the fund, up from the 
previous 5 percent. This policy change was made possible after 
the creation of the Contingency Fund in 1990, which receives 
7.5 percent of net oil revenues if the oil price is US$18 to 
US$20 per barrel and 10 percent if the oil price rises to US$20 
to US$22 per barrel. Both policies are directed toward smooth- 
ing out the effects of oil price fluctuations and reducing the 
economy's vulnerability to unexpected changes in the interna- 
tional oil market. 

Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments 

Oman's exports are dominated by oil earnings. Total exports 
peaked in 1985 at almost US$5.0 billion before the oil price 
collapse in 1986. During the preceding decade, exports rose by 
a factor of 3.5, largely because of the higher volume of crude 
and refined product sales overseas and the sustained rise in 
international oil prices. Petroleum exports constituted 98 per- 
cent of foreign merchandise earnings in 1985. Exports 
declined to US$2.9 billion in 1986 but have steadily risen since 
then as a result of further increases in the volume of oil 
shipped and higher oil prices. In 1990 total exports rose to 
US$5.5 billion, of which oil exports were just under US$5.2 bil- 
lion (see table 34, Appendix). Non-oil exports accounted for 
only 3.4 percent of total exports in 1990, up from 2 percent in 
1986. The bulk of non-oil exports includes livestock and some 
metals. Oman also made considerable strides in increasing tex- 
tile and mineral exports during the early 1990s. Most exports 
go to other Middle Eastern countries, followed by Japan and 
other Asian countries (see table 35, Appendix). 

Domestic government expenditures and rising incomes have 
stimulated a steady increase in merchandise imports. Total 
imports rose from US$907 million in 1975 to a peak of US$3 
billion in 1985 before economic retrenchment and weaker 
domestic economic conditions caused a slight reduction in for- 
eign purchases. After falling to below US$2 billion in 1987, 
imports increased to US$3.3 billion in 1991 because of the 
improved oil revenue situation and the onset of the Fourth 
Five-Year Development Plan. Development goods, notably 
machinery and transportation equipment, and defense items 
dominate the imports profile. In 1991 machinery and transpor- 



272 



Oman 



tation items constituted 42 percent of the total import bill, and 
other manufactured goods made up 18 percent. Oman's total 
food imports fell in 1991 to 18 percent from a mid-1980s aver- 
age of 20 percent. Imports came mostly from other Middle 
Eastern countries and from Japan. 

Despite the vagaries of international oil markets and sharp 
fluctuations in oil prices, Oman has succeeded in maintaining 
a surplus on its merchandise trade account, except in 1986. A 
deficit in the services account, however, continues to constitute 
a leakage in the government's external position. Workers' 
remittances and payments on external debt account for more 
than one-half of the services deficit. Although the net outflow 
from workers' remittances slowed after the mid-1980s because 
of the recessionary climate in the region and the reduction in 
the number of foreign workers, the value of workers' remit- 
tances constituted just under US$1 billion per annum on the 
balance of payments. The program of indigenization was 
intended to reduce this leakage, but limited local manpower 
skills remain a bottleneck for indigenization. Interest on the 
foreign debt is the second largest item of services imports. It 
peaked at US$320 million in 1990 but declined in 1991 as a 
result of lower international interest rates and some repayment 
of the foreign debt. Interest receipts on official and commer- 
cial bank assets abroad (totaling US$350 million in 1991) are 
insufficient to offset services outflows. 

During the 1980s, Oman registered sizable surpluses on its 
current account. In 1981 the surplus reached just over US$1 
billion; it tapered off rapidly thereafter with the decline in oil 
prices. In 1986 Oman registered a deficit just over US$1 billion 
on its current account, recovered to a US$784 million surplus 
in 1987, a smaller deficit in 1988, and a surplus in 1989. Higher 
oil prices in 1990 boosted the balance to a record US$1.2 bil- 
lion surplus, but a rapid rise in imports and some weakening in 
external earnings left the current account in balance in 1991. 

Before 1986 the capital account was dominated by increases 
in external reserves. The cumulative increase in external assets 
of the government was US$2.5 billion between 1978 and 1985. 
Despite a shrinking surplus on the current account, the gov- 
ernment could raise foreign assets because of a sizable pro- 
gram of foreign borrowing and direct foreign investment, 
mainly in the oil sector. In 1986 the government had to reduce 
foreign reserves by US$612 million to fortify the capital 
account. This was necessary despite nearly US$765 million in 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

loans secured on international markets. Since then, continued 
access to international loan markets and a steady rise in foreign 
direct investment, not to mention higher oil prices, have per- 
mitted the government to replenish foreign assets. At the end 
of 1991, the government's published foreign assets totaled 
US$1.6 billion; the World Bank (see Glossary) estimate of 
Oman's foreign debt at the end of 1990 was US$2.5 billion. 

Hydrocarbon Sector 

Since the first commercial field was discovered at Jibal, west 
of Adam, in 1962, the petroleum industry has dominated the 
economy. In 1991 the industry contributed about 43 percent of 
GDP and 82 percent of government revenues. The govern- 
ment's heavy reliance on crude oil export earnings to maintain 
its income distribution system and political stability made con- 
tinued development of this sector a priority. 

By early 1977, the newly organized Ministry of Petroleum, 
Fisheries, and Agriculture prematurely assumed that produc- 
tion had probably peaked at more than 350,000 barrels per day 
(bpd — see Glossary) and would decline. Exploration activity in 
the south was insignificant, deterred by political instability in 
the region, and production at the main fields of Petroleum 
Development Oman (PDO) in the north, includingjibal, was 
in decline (see fig. 14). The suppression of the Dhofar rebel- 
lion in the mid-1970s helped reverse an output decline. For- 
eign exploration companies, satisfied with the restoration of 
political stability, began to sign area exploration and produc- 
tion agreements with the government. Enhanced oil recovery 
(EOR) techniques at existing fields, combined with new fields 
coming onstream, raised average output to 708,000 bpd in 
1991. 

The principal problem the government faced in the early 
1990s was a diminishing reserve base. Proven reserves were esti- 
mated at 4.6 billion barrels in 1992, small in comparison with 
other gulf states. At the mid-1992 rate of production of 725,000 
bpd, Oman's crude reserves are sufficient to permit seventeen 
years of output, compared with nearly 350 years for Saudi Ara- 
bia. 

Oil prospecting began in 1924 when the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company (later renamed British Petroleum) obtained a con- 
cession; however, unsuccessful exploratory drilling discour- 
aged further interest. Discoveries in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia 
during the 1930s stimulated exploration activity. The first con- 



274 



Oman 



cession agreement was signed with Petroleum Concessions, a 
Western consortium formed by the owners of the Iraq Petro- 
leum Company (IPC). In 1951 the concessionaire's name was 
changed to Petroleum Development Oman (PDO). In 1993 
PDO remained the principal operating company and con- 
trolled the bulk of oil reserves and output. 

After several years of costly and unsuccessful exploratory 
drilling, most IPC partners wanted to withdraw from their con- 
cession area. In 1960 Royal Dutch Shell acquired an 85 percent 
interest in PDO; Participations and Explorations (Partex) held 
the remaining 15 percent share. In 1967 the French firm Total- 
Compagnie Francaise des Petroles acquired 10 percent of Par- 
tex's 15 percent interest. In December 1973, the government 
of Oman, following the participation agreements negotiated by 
several gulf countries, acquired a 25 percent share of PDO. In 
July 1974, the government's stake was raised to 60 percent, ret- 
roactive to January 1, 1974. Since 1974 the remaining 40 per- 
cent has been held by Royal Dutch Shell with 34 percent, Total- 
Compagnie Francaise des Petroles with 4 percent, and Partex 
with 2 percent. 

PDO operates two main production areas: a group of north- 
ern oil fields, including Jibal, Fuhud, and Sayh Nuhaydah, that 
produce lighter grades of crude oil; and a group of southern 
fields, including Rima, Mamul, Amal, Nimr, Mukhaizna, and 
Sayyala, that produce heavier crudes. Development of the 
southern fields took place after the suppression of the Dhofar 
rebellion and the reestablishment of political stability in the 
sultanate. 

Reserves 

As of January 1992, official proven crude reserves were esti- 
mated at 4.6 billion barrels, up almost 6 percent from 1991 and 
up 83 percent from the oil reserve estimate in 1980. The rela- 
tively gradual increments to Oman's reserve base since 1980 
were attributable to the discovery of new, smaller oil fields and 
revised estimates for existing fields. 

More than one-half of Oman's total reserves are concen- 
trated in the northern region, where six fields — Jibal, Natih, 
Fuhud, Al Huwaysah, Al Khuwayr, and Shaybikah — are part of a 
single geological structure containing recoverable reserves of 
more than 2 billion barrels. Similarly, in the south, eight princi- 
pal producing fields also come from a single geological struc- 
ture. 



275 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



I 

YEMEN > 



L 




Arabian 
Sea 



KHURiYA MURIYA 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 14. Oman: Oil Fields, Gas Fields, and Refineries, 1993 



Several foreign companies that are engaged in exploration 
and production activities, such as France's Elf Aquitaine Oman, 
the Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Occidental Oman), 
and the American Oil Company (Amoco), signed agreements 
in the 1970s. Others, such as the Japan Exploration Company 
(Japex Oman) and Canada's International Petroleum, followed 
in 1981 and 1984, respectively. 



276 



Oman 



Oil Production and Exports 

During the period from 1967 to 1980, crude oil production 
peaked in 1976 at 365,000 bpd but subsequently declined. Pro- 
ducing fields are concentrated in the northern region around 
Jibal, Fuhud, and Natih, all three of which were discovered in 
the 1960s. The Dhofar rebellion inhibited exploration farther 
south and suspended development activity around Mamul, dis- 
covered in 1957 and holding 600 million barrels of gross 
proven and probable oil reserves. Because of the declining pro- 
duction from northern fields, total output fell. In 1979 average 
output was 285,000 bpd. 

Once hostilities ceased in 1975 and confidence in the 
authority of the central government returned, southern explo- 
ration and production activities resumed, facilitating new dis- 
coveries in the late 1970s and 1980s. The Rima field, with gross 
proven and probable reserves estimated at 270 million barrels, 
was discovered in 1979; Amal, with 145 million barrels of 
reserves, was discovered in 1982; and Mukhaizna, with 130 mil- 
lion barrels, was discovered in 1985. All were brought onstream 
by PDO. As a result, oil output increased throughout the 1980s. 
Crude oil production averaged 708,000 bpd in 1991, compared 
with 685,000 bpd in 1990 (see table 36, Appendix). Output for 
1992 averaged 745,000 bpd. Most of this, about 670,000 to 
680,000 bpd, was lifted by PDO. According to Minister of Petro- 
leum and Minerals Said Ahmad ash Shanfari, there are plans to 
maintain output at that level into the twenty-first century. 

Apart from PDO, which contributes the bulk of the output, 
three other groups have interests in the producing fields. 
These are Occidental Oman (28,000 bpd), Elf Aquitaine Oman 
(15,000 bpd), andjapex Oman (8,000 bpd). 

To maintain output at current levels and avoid future 
declines, the government is pursuing a two-pronged strategy of 
developing smaller fields and applying EOR and secondary 
techniques at existing fields. The strategy appears successful 
because 1992 was the twelfth consecutive year in which produc- 
tion increased. However, a pattern has emerged whereby the 
number of fields discovered holding large (greater than 500 
million barrels of gross proven and probable) reserves has 
been declining. The potential for discovering fields with a 
reserve base and production rates comparable to Jibal appears 
remote, given Oman's mature exploration history. 

EOR techniques are applied to the mature fields. In the 
north, additional wells have been drilled, and water injection 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

facilities have been constructed at the Jibal field. Gas injection 
is used at Fuhud and Natih. At Mamul, in the south, high-pres- 
sure steam injection techniques have been used since 1985. 

Most of the increase in output will come from PDO's Al Khu- 
wayr field in north-central Oman, where a US$500 million 
development project was designed to increase the field's out- 
put from 25,000 bpd to more than 120,000 bpd when com- 
pleted in 1993. The project involves gas lift and water injection 
facilities. Output will compensate for falling output from exist- 
ing producing fields. Apart from the pilot waterflood project at 
Al Khuwayr, near Izki, the Sayh Nuhaydah gas-condensate field 
is a potential candidate for an analogous waterflood develop- 
ment program. 

More than 90 percent of oil production is exported. The 
majority of Oman's exports are destined for the Far East mar- 
ket. Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Singapore, 
China, Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines accounted for 85 
percent of total crude exports in 1990. Japan accounted for 40 
percent of total exports, South Korea for 26 percent, and Sin- 
gapore for 7 percent. Less than 7 percent of crude exports was 
destined for the United States market. 

All crude oil from the northern and southern fields is col- 
lected and blended into Omani export blend. The country's 
only refinery and terminal is at Mina al Fahl, near Muscat. The 
refinery, completed in 1982 with an initial throughput capacity 
of 50,000 bpd and expanded to 80,000 bpd in 1987, was 
designed to meet domestic demand for petroleum products. 
Operated by the Oman Oil Refinery Company, in which the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals holds a 99 percent share 
and the Central Bank of Oman holds 1 percent, the refinery 
produces liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), butane, jet fuel, and 
two grades of gasoline. 

Foreign Downstream Ventures 

The Oman Oil Company (OOC), established in the late 
1980s, is responsible for the government's foreign petroleum 
activities. The board of directors consists of former govern- 
ment officials and private advisers and is responsible to the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals. The OOC engages in 
international oil trading, including the purchase and sale of 
Omani crude oil, and in acquiring foreign downstream (see 
Glossary) holdings. Acquiring foreign downstream holdings is 
the most recent development in the ministry's oil policies, lag- 



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Oman 



ging behind such other Arab oil producers as Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, and Libya, which have actively pursued foreign down- 
stream ventures to ensure a secure market for crude oil sales. 

As of late 1992, the OOC was negotiating equity interest in a 
foreign downstream venture, the acquisition of a 20 percent 
stake in Thailand's fifth refinery, in Rayong Province in the 
south. The refinery is designed to process up to 120,000 bpd of 
crude and will cost US$600 million. Operations are scheduled 
to begin in 1996 and will involve Oman's supplying part of the 
refinery's feedstock. Also, as a member of a consortium includ- 
ing Chevron Corporation of the United States, the OOC has 
committed itself to build an export pipeline to transport oil 
from the Tengiz and Korolyov fields in Kazakhstan to interna- 
tional markets. The pipeline complements an agreement 
signed on June 18, 1992, by the government of Oman with 
Kazakhstan for exploration and production of oil and gas in 
the former Soviet republic. The Tengiz and Korolyov fields are 
said to have a potential output of 700,000 bpd by 2010. 

Gas Development and Production 

The depletion of the sultanate's crude oil reserves acceler- 
ated the government's bid to increase the use of gas in electric 
power generation and industry. In the early 1970s, the sultan- 
ate began to use gas in electric power generation. Gas pipelines 
were laid, and generators were converted from diesel to gas. 
This was done in the Muscat metropolitan area just before the 
second oil price shock despite resistance by importers of diesel. 
Plans were to increase gas use by extending the government 
gas grid linking the south and the east to the north. Power gen- 
eration facilities north of Muscat in 1992 were using gas as a 
feedstock, and plans were to increase gas-fired units elsewhere. 

Although the government has promoted the industrial use 
of gas, oil firms remain the principal consumers, using a total 
of 8.5 million cubic meters per day of associated gas. Gas is 
required for reinjection, compression fuel, and power genera- 
tion to support facilities at producing fields. This is likely to 
continue in the short term, given the slow pace of switching 
industrial use from petroleum. The government's focus in the 
1990s on exploiting natural gas reserves and increasing output 
to meet rising demand complements its priority in maintaining 
current oil output levels. It seeks to do this without depleting 
crude reserves by using gas produced in association with oil 
output for reinjection at mature fields to increase production 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

and, by substituting gas for oil, to release greater volumes of 
crude oil for export. 

On February 8, 1992, the Ministry of Petroleum and Miner- 
als signed a cooperation protocol with Royal Dutch Shell for a 
comprehensive evaluation of Oman's gas reserves, estimated in 
June 1992 at 482 billion cubic meters, the bulk of which is in 
nonassociated form. According to the minister of petroleum 
and minerals, some studies indicate a reserve base as high as 
935 million cubic meters. A preliminary feasibility study con- 
ducted by Royal Dutch Shell indicated the potential for exploit- 
ing gas reserves at a rate of 142,000 cubic meters per year as 
exports over a twenty-year period and for meeting domestic 
demand for the next fifty years. 

Most of the gas produced is in associated form and comes 
from PDO's Jibal field; smaller volumes come from the Natih 
and Sayh Nuhaydah fields in northern Oman and the Birba 
field in the south. Gas plants have been constructed in Jibal, 
Fuhud, Sayh Nuhaydah, Sayyala, and Rima, providing Oman 
with a gas-processing capacity of almost 18 million cubic meters 
per day. Despite increased gas production, gas throughput at 
these plants ran at about one-half of total capacity in 1989. 

Evaluation of the commercial viability of the northern off- 
shore Bukha natural gas and condensate field, discovered in 
1986 by its concession operator, the International Petroleum 
Company of Canada, was completed in June 1992. The com- 
pany estimates the life expectancy of the Bukha field at fifteen 
years, a capacity of 28 million cubic meters per day of gas and 
5,000 to 10,000 bpd of condensate, and a requirement of an 
approximately US$60 million capital investment to bring the 
field onstream. Production was scheduled to begin in 1993. 

The government planned to drill wells in the central fields 
(Sayh Rawl, Sayh Nuhaydah, Barik, and Mabruk) at a cost of 
R047 million (US$18 million) between 1992 and 1995. Output 
from these structures will supply the US$9 billion LNG project, 
which was finalized on May 6, 1992, by a memorandum of 
understanding. In this project, the government will be respon- 
sible for all upstream (see Glossary) activities. A new consor- 
tium was established, comprising the Omani government at 51 
percent, PDO's foreign shareholders (Royal Dutch Shell, Total- 
Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, and Partex) at 42 percent, 
and three Japanese firms (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and C. Itoh) at 
the remaining 7 percent, undertaking downstream operations 
under a service contract. Deliveries of LNG are not expected to 



280 



Oman 



begin before 1999. The Japanese market is expected to be the 
most probable destination for output. 

If increasing volumes of gas are lifted, the government may 
consider new gas-based industries such as methanol, fertilizers, 
and methyl tertiary-butyl ester (MTBE). During 1992 talks were 
conducted with Iran concerning joint development of the 
Bukha and Henjam offshore fields, where limited drilling has 
indicated a gas and gas liquids potential. Omani officials have 
also conducted talks with Qatar regarding the purchase of nat- 
ural gas from Qatar's North Field. The proposal to build a gas 
line from Qatar to Dubayy may be expanded to include a spur 
line to Oman. Minister of Petroleum and Minerals Shanfari 
indicated that Oman is prepared to purchase a volume up to 
113 million cubic meters per day of gas from Qatar if an accept- 
able price can be negotiated. The regional gas line proposal 
was being considered among gulf countries for much of the 
1980s. As of early 1993, a definitive decision on a regional (Ara- 
bian Peninsula) coordinated, long-term gas plan that would 
rationalize supply and demand for decades had not been com- 
pleted. 

Agriculture and Fishing 

The government's economic development policy empha- 
sizes the expansion of such non-oil sectors as agriculture, fish- 
ing, industry, and mining in its bid to diversify the economy 
and diminish its dependence on oil exports. The goal is to 
establish a sustainable economic base in preparation for the 
time when hydrocarbon reserves are depleted. The govern- 
ment launched several economic campaigns, naming 1988 and 
1989 as Years of Agriculture and 1991 and 1992 as Years of 
Industry. Through these campaigns, the government has 
encouraged private-sector investment by allocating generous 
amounts of cash support for private industry to be disbursed 
mainly through official development banks. For example, the 
Oman Bank for Agriculture and Fisheries, created in 1981, 
extends loans at concessionary rates to individuals for whom 
farming or fishing is the principal activity. The bank acts as a 
distributive institution, receiving an interest subsidy from the 
government. In 1990 there were 1,308 loans, totaling R04.7 
million. Development programs also incorporate the govern- 
ment's policy of indigenization, with a large component of 
funds allocated for domestic technical training and academic 
training, often in the United States or in developing countries. 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 
Agriculture 

Oman has five distinct agricultural regions. Going roughly 
from north to south, they include the Musandam Peninsula, 
the Al Batinah coast, the valleys and the high plateau of the 
eastern region, the interior oases, and the Dhofar region, 
along the narrow coastal strip from the border with Yemen to 
Ras Naws and the mountains to the north. 

In the early 1990s, interior farming areas accounted for 
more than one-half of the country's cultivated land. Rainfall, 
although greater in the interior than along the coast, is insuffi- 
cient for growing crops. Most of the water for irrigation is 
obtained through the falaj system, in which a vertical shaft is 
dug from the surface to reach water in porous rock. From the 
bottom of this shaft, a gently sloping tunnel is dug to tap the 
water and allow it to flow to a point on the surface at a lower 
level or into a cistern or underground pool from which it can 
be lifted by bucket or pump. 

A falaj may be many kilometers in length and require 
numerous additional vertical shafts to provide fresh air to the 
workers digging the tunnels and to permit the removal of the 
excavated rock and soil. A falaj requires tremendous expendi- 
ture of labor for maintenance as well as for construction. 
Because private maintenance efforts during the 1970s and 
early 1980s proved inadequate, the government initiated repair 
and maintenance of the falaj system to increase the quantity of 
water available to cultivated areas. 

The cooler climate on the high plateau of the Al Jabal al 
Akhdar enables the growing of apricots, grapes, peaches, and 
walnuts. The Al Batinah coastal plain accounts for about two- 
fifths of the land area under cultivation and is the most concen- 
trated farming area of the country. Annual rainfall along the 
coast is minimal, but moisture falling on the mountains perco- 
lates through permeable strata to the coastal strip, providing a 
source of underground water only about two meters below the 
surface. Diesel motors are used to pump water for irrigation 
from these shallow wells. 

By the mid-1980s, the water table along the Al Batinah coast 
had dropped to a low level, and salinity of the wells had 
increased, significantly reducing the water quality. This was 
caused by the combined effect of cultivating land too close to 
the sea and pumping more well water than was being 
recharged by nature, thereby permitting seawater to encroach. 



282 




Falaj Alin atAl Jabal al Akhdar; the falaj is an ancient underground 

channel used for irrigation in Oman. 
Al Jabal al Akhdar, showing terraced farming in one of Oman's main 

agricultural areas 

Courtesy Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman, Washington 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Overfarming and attendant water problems caused the gov- 
ernment to establish the Ministry of Water Resources in 1990 
with the mandate of limiting water consumption and improv- 
ing irrigation. A freeze on new wells was imposed in addition to 
delimiting several "no drill zones" in areas where groundwater 
supplies are low. The ministry is also considering the installa- 
tion of water meters. Recharge dams are designed to hold rain- 
water in the wadis for a period of time to facilitate the trickling 
of water down into the ground; replenishing aquifers have 
been built mainly in the northeastern Al Batinah region, where 
the groundwater levels are up to five meters below sea level. 

Apart from water problems, the agricultural sector has been 
affected by rural-urban migration, in which the labor force has 
been attracted to the higher wages of industry and the govern- 
ment service sector, and by competition from highly subsidized 
gulf producers. As a result, agriculture and fishing have 
declined in relative sectoral importance. In 1967 the two sec- 
tors together contributed about 34 percent of GDP; by 1991 
they accounted for 3.8 percent of GDP (see table 37, Appen- 
dix). The government encourages farming by distributing 
land, offering subsidized loans to purchase machinery, offering 
free feedstock, and giving advice on modern irrigation meth- 
ods. As a result, the area under cultivation has increased, with 
an accompanying rise in production. But extensive agricultural 
activity has also depleted freshwater reserves and underground 
aquifers and has increased salinity. 

The area under cultivation increased by almost 18 percent to 
57,814 hectares over the period from 1985 to 1990. Fruits were 
grown on 64 percent, or 36,990 hectares, of the area under cul- 
tivation in crop year 1989-90. Dates accounted for 45 percent 
of the total area, or 70 percent of the area under fruit cultiva- 
tion. Grains such as barley, wheat, and corn accounted for 19.2 
percent, or 11,092 hectares, and vegetables accounted for 16.8 
percent, or 9,732 hectares, of the total area under cultivation. 

In the same five-year period, overall agricultural production 
increased by 3 percent to 699,000 tons. Field crops, largely 
alfalfa, accounted for more than one-half of total production, 
or 354,300 tons, a 40 percent increase in the five-year period. 
Fruit production (including dates and limes) was 182,400 tons, 
up from 154,500 tons. Vegetable production totaled 162,300 
tons, an increase of almost 50 percent. 



284 



Oman 



Fishing 

Historically, fishing was second only to farming as an eco- 
nomic activity in pre-oil Oman. Both the Gulf of Oman and the 
Arabian Sea offer a variety of catch, including sardines, blue- 
fish, mackerel, shark, tuna, abalone, lobsters, and oysters. Fish- 
ermen harvest their catch in the waters near the coast, using 
the traditional, small seagoing canoe, to which an outboard 
motor has been added. 

The fishing sector (along with agriculture) is considered one 
of the most promising areas for commercial attention and 
accounts for the highest non-oil export revenue. However, sales 
in 1990 totaled R017.3 million, dwarfed by oil export earnings 
of ROl.9 billion. The GCC provided the largest fish export 
market. The fishing sector also provided employment opportu- 
nities to 19,296 registered fishermen in 1990, of whom 18,546 
were employed in traditional fisheries and 750 in industrial 
fisheries. Like agriculture, fishing has been affected by the 
diminishing number of people employed in the sector. As 
increasing numbers of fishermen turn to more remunerative 
employment, there has been a gradual decrease in the amount 
of fish caught. 

The government has stressed modernizing and expanding 
the fishing industry and developing its export potential. The 
Joint United States-Oman Commission funded the Oman Fish- 
eries Development and Management Project to strengthen the 
technical, administrative, and management skills of the Direc- 
torate General of Fisheries Resources (DGFR). In strengthen- 
ing the DGFR, the government hopes to increase private-sector 
confidence in the fishing industry and, in the long term, to cre- 
ate private-sector-led development of the industry. 

The government is following a dual strategy — internally, to 
improve the capacity of the DGFR to manage Oman's fishing 
resources and, externally, to provide incentives for fishermen 
to remain in their occupations. The government provides sub- 
sidies to purchase fiberglass boats and outboard engines; to 
construct workshops, cold storage facilities, and jetties along 
the coastline; and to establish companies to market fish both 
domestically and internationally. 

Non-oil Minerals 

The sultanate produces copper, chromite, gold, and silver. 
Oman's main copper reserves are in the Suhar area on the Al 
Batinah coast. The processing of ore at the Suhar complex, 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

operated by the government-owned Oman Mining Company, 
began in 1983. The production of chromite by the Oman Min- 
ing Company also began in 1983 in the Suhar area. Exports of 
the Oman Mining Company are primarily destined to the Far 
East market. In 1990 Taiwan accounted for 38.5 percent of 
exports, followed by Japan with 11.1 percent and South Korea 
with 2.9 percent. 

In July 1991, the government established the Oman Chrome 
Company (OCC), in which it holds a 15 percent share. The 
remainder of the shares are held by the private sector. The 
OCC was created to develop the country's chromite reserves — 
estimated by the Robertson Group of Britain and the Bureau 
des Recherches Geologiques et Minieres of France at 2 million 
tons of chromite — at 600 sites throughout the country. The 
public offering of OCC shares reflects the government's official 
policy of encouraging private-sector participation in industry 
and manufacturing. 

Limestone for cement production is mined in both the 
northern and the southern areas to supply the Oman Cement 
Company's plant in the Rusayl Industrial Estate near As Sib and 
the Raysut Cement Corporation's plant near Salalah. Tile and 
marble are also produced for local construction. 

Surveys have indicated deposits of numerous other materi- 
als — asbestos, coal, iron ore, lead, manganese, nickel, silver, 
and zinc. Large deposits of metal ores are located at the Sayh 
Hatat area (northeast of Izki) and the Al Jabal al Akhdar area. 
Substantial deposits of zinc and lead are known to exist in Dho- 
far, Jalan, and Hawshi Huqf (southwest of Al Ghabah). The fea- 
sibility of exploiting coal reserves at Al Kamil, near Sur, to 
replace oil in electric power generation, is being studied. A pre- 
liminary study on coal completed in 1990 by the UN Depart- 
ment of Technical Cooperation for Development estimates 
coal reserves in the sultanate at 22 million tons, a figure consid- 
ered adequate for domestic use but not for export. 

Industry 

The government's program to diversify from the oil industry 
emphasizes the industrial sector, with a steady increase in small 
and medium-sized industries based on heavily subsidized indus- 
trial parks. The first industrial estate, at Ar Rusayl, fifteen kilo- 
meters from As Sib International Airport, was developed in the 
mid-1980s and housed about sixty enterprises, including manu- 
facturers of cement, soap, crackers, and copper cathodes. The 



286 






Copper mine near Suhar; copper has been mined in Oman since 

ancient times. 

View of multiple-highway system near Al Khuwayr, linking the 

sultanate's major cities 
Courtesy Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman, Washington 



287 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

sultanate's second industrial estate, a 100-hectare site at Raysut, 
was developed in the early 1990s by the local firm of Shanfari 
and Partners. The sultanate's third industrial estate is a 
planned fifty-hectare project at Suhar. Other estates are 
planned at Nazwah, Sur, Al Khasab, and the Al Buraymi Oasis. 
The government is also studying the feasibility of establishing 
cottage industries to produce such items as pottery, rose water, 
and frankincense. As a result of these efforts, by 1991 manufac- 
turing contributed 3.5 percent of Oman's GDP. 

A few small-scale traditional industries use primitive meth- 
ods, such as in the production of ghee (clarified butter) and 
the drying of fish, dates, and limes. Some handicraft industries 
remain, but their importance is steadily being eclipsed. Silver- 
smiths practice their trade, and artisans work with clay at Bahla, 
just west of Adam, an important center for the production of 
household pottery. Goldsmiths follow their trade in the Muscat 
metropolitan area and its environs. In several regions, workers 
fashion low-quality, hand-made cloth from locally produced 
wool. The coastal towns remain boat-building centers. 

Whereas the industrial sector during the 1970s and 1980s 
was aimed at import-substitution industrialization (see Glos- 
sary), the objective in the 1990s is to encourage export indus- 
tries for the Persian Gulf market. However, this assumes that 
Oman will be able to operate effectively in an increasingly com- 
petitive market, attract foreign investors, and increase the role 
of private-sector industry. 

To increase its ability to compete with its Persian Gulf neigh- 
bors, particularly Dubayy, where the Mina Jabal Ali Duty-Free 
Zone permits fully owned foreign subsidiaries, Oman needs to 
overhaul its commercial and economic laws. The Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry set up three working teams in early 
1992 to recommend amendments to existing laws for discus- 
sion with the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(OCCI) and the Consultative Council. The government revised 
laws to permit GCC nationals to own up to 49 percent of the 
shares in twenty specified Omani companies, ten of which are 
banks. The OCCI has introduced an industrial consultations 
unit, computer-linked with the Vienna-based United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization, offering investment 
advice on twenty industrial sectors as well as data on equipment 
suppliers and training needs. 



288 



Oman 



Tourism 

The government promotes tourism, consistent with its policy 
of economic diversification, with emphasis on the Muscat met- 
ropolitan area and on coastal towns where principal hotels are 
located. The Ministry of National Heritage and Culture is 
restoring historical sites at Muscat and in the coastal towns. 
The forts at Nazwah, Ar Rustaq, Al Hazm, Bidbid, and Jabrin in 
the interior are accessible by automobile. 

Oman has seven international hotels, the majority located in 
the Muscat metropolitan area. AZD Enterprises, set up by Qais 
ibn Tariq Al Said, Sultan Qabus ibn Said's first cousin, is plan- 
ning a new tourism project at Bandar Jissah, a weekend coastal 
retreat in the north. The site of the planned hotel and sports 
facilities, including a large golf course, will be near the Al 
Bustan Palace Hotel, the most luxurious hotel in Oman. 

Transportation 

The Omani transportation system, as with virtually all the 
sultanate's physical infrastructure, is a post-1970 development. 
It includes an expanding highway network, two modern deep- 
water ports, an oil port at Mina al Fahl, and an international 
airport facilitating international, intraregional, and domestic 
service. By 1992 there were 6,000 kilometers of paved roads 
and 20,000 kilometers of gravel or earthen roads, in a contrast 
to 1970, when there was one ten-kilometer paved highway and 
limited coastal and air traffic. 

The sultanate's modern transportation system links all signif- 
icant populated places within Oman and gives easy access to 
many international destinations. A four-lane highway runs west 
from Muscat along the Gulf of Oman to Dubayy in the UAE. A 
second major paved highway in the interior connects locations 
from just east of Al Ayn in the UAE to Salalah on Oman's south 
coast. Good land connections link Oman only with the UAE, 
however. No roads extend across the Saudi or Yemeni borders. 
The sultanate's principal airport, As Sib International Airport, 
has regularly scheduled flights to numerous cities worldwide 
and also to five domestic destinations. Muscat's natural harbor 
has long been a haven for ships, and its port facilities are 
among the best in the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula. 

Transportation planning and administration, with the 
exception of the Muscat metropolitan area highways, are 
administered by the Ministry of Communications through the 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

northern and southern directorates general of roads. The 
Development Council is responsible for recommending and 
monitoring overall sectoral objectives and priorities and 
reports directly to the Council of Ministers. Laying pipelines 
and certain roads and port facilities related to oil production 
are under the direction of PDO. 

With the major infrastructure in place by the mid-1980s, 
there was a shift from construction to maintenance and 
improvement of the existing network. Until 1984 ministry bud- 
gets reflected a marginal outlay for maintenance as a result of 
the relatively new paved road system. However, starting in 1984, 
main tenance of paved roads became important, and a program 
of bituminous surface treatment and regraveling was begun. 
The emphasis in the early 1990s has been on maintaining and 
upgrading the present highway infrastructure, but the govern- 
ment continues to allocate substantial resources to the develop- 
ment plan for the Muscat metropolitan area, where severe 
urban traffic problems are being addressed by the construction 
of interchanges and expansion of some highways to four-lane 
systems. 

Further expansion of the existing transportation system 
includes enlarging both As Sib International Airport and Mina 
Qabus, the port near Muscat. Mina Qabus is expected to be 
inadequate to accommodate the projected increase in cargo 
traffic by the year 2000. An expansion project is designed to 
increase port capacity from 1.6 million tons to 2.6 million tons. 
The project involves converting two berths to container berths, 
building a new berth for the Royal Yacht Squadron, creating a 
storage area, and building a sea wall. The expansion is partially 
funded by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. 
The possibility of a port at Suhar, to be used as a transshipment 
site for destinations farther up the gulf, is under consideration. 

Telecommunications 

Modern telecommunications facilities were introduced in 
1975, but major investment in such facilities occurred only 
after 1982. In 1989 the sultanate had almost 87,000 telephones, 
or about 6.8 telephones per 100 inhabitants, a figure consider- 
ably lower than for Oman's Persian Gulf neighbors. Service is 
unevenly distributed; more than 50 percent of the telephones 
are in the Muscat area. Service is entirely automatic, with inter- 
national direct dial available to all customers. 



290 



Oman 



International telecommunications to Europe, Asia, and the 
Americas go via a satellite ground station, working with the 
International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation's 
(Intelsat) Indian Ocean satellite. Calls to other countries in the 
region are routed through a ground station linked to the Arab 
Satellite Communication Organization (Arabsat) satellite. A 
third system of eight ground stations is used for domestic calls. 

In 1992 broadcast facilities were limited. Television service 
was more widespread than radio. There are only two AM radio 
stations, one in Muscat and one in Salalah, and three FM radio 
stations, two in Muscat and the other in Al Khasab in northern- 
most Oman. A powerful shortwave station that broadcasts in 
Arabic and English can be received worldwide. Television ser- 
vice is available throughout the country; seven large transmit- 
ters are located in major towns, and twenty-five smaller relay 
stations broadcast in rural areas. 

The government's priorities in the 1990s are to expand the 
local telephone facilities in existing telephone switching cen- 
ters, to provide telephone service to rural communities without 
service, and to expand domestic long-distance and interna- 
tional telephone facilities. The Fourth Five-Year Development 
Plan allocated R093 million (US$242 million) to telecommu- 
nications projects. Plans of the state-owned General Telecom- 
munications Organization include launching public paging, 
data communications, and telephone expansion services. 

Labor 

A foreign work force was the key to the development of 
Oman's physical and administrative infrastructure. In 1992 
about 60 percent of the labor force consisted of foreigners. 
However, indigenization is among the government's principal 
priorities. Only 23 percent of the private-sector work force is 
Omani, whereas the public-sector work force is dominated by 
Omani nationals. In 1990 Omanis made up 80 percent of pub- 
lic corporation employees, 52 percent of diwan, or court, 
employees, and 65 percent of the civil service. In certain orga- 
nizations and ministries — such as the Oman News Agency and 
the ministries of foreign affairs; interior; justice, awqaf [reli- 
gious endowments], and Islamic affairs; national heritage and 
culture; and social affairs and labor — Omanis exceed 90 per- 
cent of the work force. 

In the banking sector, 70.8 percent of the work force was 
Omani in 1990; in the oil sector, it was 61.0 percent, with a 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

large disparity between producing and nonproducing compa- 
nies. Of PDO's work force, 61.0 percent was Omani, compared 
with 53.4 percent of Elf Aquitaine Oman, 20.0 percent of Occi- 
dental Oman, and 21.0 percent of Japex Oman (see Hydrocar- 
bon Sector, this ch.). In non-oil-producing companies, Omanis 
averaged 31.6 percent of the work force. In 1990 only 24.0 per- 
cent of insurance-sector workers and 19.0 percent of hotel-sec- 
tor workers were Omanis. 

The government hopes that an increasing number of Oma- 
nis will enter trade and industry, increasing the number of 
Omanis in the private sector to 45.2 percent by 1995. RO40 
million (US$104 million) was allocated to training in 1990, 
with the intent of training 100,000 individuals and creating 
160,000 job opportunities. In March 1991, the Higher Commit- 
tee for Vocational Training and Labor was established to gener- 
ate employment for Omanis and to establish other policies for 
the indigenous and foreign work force. 

Institution building has been largely a foreign initiative. The 
professional core of the civil administration has consisted 
mainly of British and United States citizens, influencing the 
development of ministries, the judiciary, development plan- 
ning, and resource management. The dependency on foreign 
advisers in the 1990s is likely to grow, given increasing Western, 
notably United States, involvement in the gulf after Operation 
Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, particularly in 
defense and security areas. Also, the emphasis of the Joint 
United States-Oman Commission on institution building and 
privatization has resulted in sustained foreign influence in the 
sultanate (see International Relations, this ch.). 

The government not only faces a skills barrier to its indigeni- 
zation program but also a psychological obstacle. As a result of 
the initiation of a civil administrative structure, a sense of enti- 
tlement has arisen in the public psyche. By ensuring positions 
in the public sector for Omani nationals, the government inad- 
vertently created the notion that it was the universal provider 
for its citizens. This notion may be difficult to reverse and per- 
haps will become a source of political instability if the govern- 
ment proves unable to fulfill its obligations should an 
economic downturn and consequent financial difficulties 
occur. 

Water and Power 

The country's water resources are a key to its economic 



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Oman 



future, and continued development will require much more 
water than has been available. Rainfall is so scant that crop pro- 
duction is impossible without irrigation. Livestock raising is 
restricted to areas having a dependable supply of drinking 
water for animals. Any substantial expansion of agricultural 
production will therefore require developing new water 
sources. Industrial expansion, increased tourism, and an 
improved standard of living combine to increase the require- 
ments for water. 

In the 1990s, water sources include wells for village water 
supplies, the falaj system, and desalination plants. Although the 
Muscat metropolitan area, Salalah, and Raysut are supplied 
with adequate water distribution and sewerage systems, such 
systems remain underdeveloped in many rural areas. 

In 1969 Oman had only one electric power generating sta- 
tion, which produced one megawatt of electricity for the Mus- 
cat metropolitan area. Since then, electricity has been 
introduced in an increasing number of areas: Salahin in 1970; 
the island of Masirah in 1976; and Nazwah, As Sahm, and Ibri 
in 1978. In 1990 in the sultanate, 4,503 million kilowatt-hours 
were produced in comparison with 787 million kilowatt-hours 
in 1980. The Muscat metropolitan area represents 67.4 percent 
of the sultanate's electricity consumption, followed by the Al 
Batinah area at 14.7 percent and Dhofar at 9.4 percent. The 
government's diversification program and its plans to develop 
infrastructure across the country to balance economic develop- 
ment and to correct the regional disparities between the less 
developed south and interior and the more developed north 
require greater attention to water and power. Several large 
infrastructure projects are being considered in the Fourth Five- 
Year Development Plan: a new power station and grid network 
for the interior; improvement in Muscat's sewerage network; 
and construction of another desalination plant, which was 
completed by 1992. However, the water problem requires 
greater attention to the management of existing installations. 

Banking 

The Omani banking sector is largely the product of a 
November 1974 banking law that established the Central Bank 
of Oman (CBO), effective April 1975. The law also facilitated 
the entry of foreign-owned banks and permitted an increase in 
the number of local banks in the sultanate. As of September 
1992, there were twenty-one commercial banks in comparison 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

with three registered in 1972. In addition, there were three spe- 
cialized development banks: the Oman Development Bank 
(1977); the Oman Housing Bank (1977); and the Oman Bank 
for Agriculture and Fisheries (1981). However, the Omani 
banking market is the smallest in the GCC. Of the twenty-one 
commercial banks, eleven are foreign owned and concentrate 
primarily on financing trade. Ten are local banks operating in 
an increasingly competitive market. Because of competition, 
the government seeks to encourage consolidation. The expec- 
tation is that five or six local banks will emerge as the core, with 
those facing financial difficulties ceasing operations or merg- 
ing with more profitable institutions. A similar pattern may 
apply to foreign banks, of which only five or six would continue 
to undertake significant business. 

The CBO effectively replaces the Oman Currency Board, 
which was created in 1972 to issue currency, manage govern- 
ment accounts, and execute banking transactions with com- 
mercial banks and international institutions. A board of 
governors appointed by the sultan manages the CBO. The 
board's responsibilities include management of the govern- 
ment's foreign assets. The CBO is empowered to make 
advances to the government to cover temporary deficiencies in 
current revenues; to purchase government treasury notes and 
securities with a maximum maturity of ten years; to make 
advances to commercial banks; and to buy, sell, discount, and 
rediscount commercial paper. In 1991 the banking law was 
amended to empower the CBO to withdraw the license or sus- 
pend the activities of banks under its jurisdiction, allowing the 
CBO to liquidate, reorganize, or manage a bank directly. 

The CBO exercised these expanded powers with regard to 
the takeover of the Bank of Credit and Commerce Interna- 
tional (BCCI) branches in the sultanate. BCCI was incorpo- 
rated in Luxembourg in 1972 and established a presence in 
Oman in July 1974. After 1974 it expanded its local operations 
to include twelve branches having total assets of R067 million 
(US$174 million) as against total deposit liabilities of R057 
million (US$148 million). Gross mismanagement of assets 
resulted in a decision by central banks of various countries to 
freeze BCCI operations on July 5, 1991. Accordingly, the CBO 
suspended BCCI operations in the sultanate on July 6, 1991, 
and its board of governors offered BCCI branches for sale to 
locally incorporated banks. An agreement was signed with 
Bank Dhofar al Omani al Fransi, effective February 15, 1992, to 



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assume all assets and liabilities of BCCI Oman. Bank Dhofar al 
Omani al Fransi received a grant of R015 million to cover 
BCCI's frozen assets abroad and a guarantee of R04 million 
against future claims. The arrangement made Bank Dhofar al 
Omani al Fransi the second largest capitalized bank in the sul- 
tanate. The sale did not affect the National Bank of Oman, the 
largest bank in the sultanate, in which BCCI was a 40 percent 
shareholder. 

In 1992 this sale was the most recent in a series of restructur- 
ing arrangements of the Omani banking market. The Union 
Bank of Oman was restructured in June 1990 and thereafter 
was called the Omani European Bank. Kuwaiti institutions lost 
their shares in the bank, the shares of France's Banque 
Indosuez increased, and several Omani groups held the 
remaining shares: Zubair Enterprises, Royal Oman Police Pen- 
sion Trust, Oman International Development and Investment 
Company, Oman Aviation Services, and the Port Services Cor- 
poration. In January 1989, the Bank of Muscat purchased the 
assets and liabilities of the Oman Banking Corporation, which 
itself was a product of the restructuring of the Bank of Oman 
and the Gulf. 

Consumer loans rose to 31.3 percent of total loans in 1990 
from 18.8 percent in 1985. There was an accompanying decline 
in the share of construction and trade to 44.8 percent from 
57.3 percent in the same period, reflecting the shift in com- 
mercial bank lending from commerce and real estate to per- 
sonal loans. The decline also indicated the different 
development needs within the sultanate. During the early 
1980s, large-scale infrastructural growth prompted banks to 
extend loan facilities for construction and real estate. The 1986 
oil price collapse and the subsequent economic retrenchment 
contributed to repayment difficulties, and nonperforming 
loans diminished the net profits of banks. 

In its declared interest in promoting mergers in the banking 
industry, in 1991 the government placed a ceiling on the 
amount banks could lend to their directors. Banks could lend 
up to 15 percent of their net capital to related individuals or 
their business interests, in comparison with the previous ceiling 
of 20 percent. An amendment to the 1974 banking law 
announced in May 1992, increasing the minimum required 
capitalization for banks to RO10 million for local banks and 
R03 million for branches of foreign banks, was similarly 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

designed to encourage mergers and rationalization of the 
banking sector. 

The three specialized development banks serve as mecha- 
nisms to promote government policies of economic diversifica- 
tion, private-sector development, and indigenization of the 
work force. The Oman Housing Bank is a joint venture devel- 
oped by the government, Kuwait's Ministry of Finance, and the 
Oman Development Bank. In 1991 the Oman Housing Bank 
recorded a net profit of R04.1 million (US$10.7 million), as 
compared with R03.4 million (US$8.8 million) the previous 
year. 

The Oman Development Bank extends loans to industrial 
development projects. The government holds 40 percent of 
the shares, and regional and foreign institutions hold 40 per- 
cent; the remaining 20 percent is open for private Omani sub- 
scription. In March 1991, the bank offered five- to six-year 
interest-free loans of up to RO50,000 (US$131,600) for estab- 
lishing small businesses if all employees were Omanis. Busi- 
nesses employing foreigners were to be levied 3 percent 
interest. 

The government holds 98 percent of the capital of the 
Oman Bank for Agriculture and Fisheries, which, as its name 
implies, is authorized to extend loans to individuals or enter- 
prises to finance activities in agriculture and fishing. By March 
31, 1992, the bank had thirteen operating branches. 

Government and Politics 

Historical Patterns of Governance 

Until 1970 the political title for the Al Said rulers was sultan 
of Muscat and Oman, implying two historically irreconcilable 
political cultures: the coastal tradition, the more cosmopolitan, 
secular, Muscat tradition of the coast ruled by the sultan; and 
the interior tradition of insularity, tribal in origin and ruled by 
an imam according to the theological tenets of Ibadism (see 
Religion, this ch.). The more cosmopolitan has been the 
ascending political culture since the founding of the Al Said 
dynasty in 1744, although the imamate tradition has found 
intermittent expression. 

Several millennia ago, Arab tribes migrated eastward to 
Oman, coinciding with the increasing presence in the region 
of peoples from present-day Iran. In the sixth century, Arabs 
succeeded in repelling encroachments of these ethnic groups; 



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Oman 



the conversion of Arab tribes to Islam in the seventh century 
resulted in the displacement of the settlers from Iran. The 
introduction of Ibadism vested power in the imam, the leader 
nominated by tribal shaykhs and then elected by public accla- 
mation. 

The Ibadis had five imamates before the founding of the Al 
Said dynasty. The first imamate in the ninth century became 
the example of the ideal Ibadi state. The fifth imamate, the 
Yarubid Imamate, recaptured Muscat from the Portuguese in 
1650 after a colonial presence on the northeastern coast of 
Oman dating to 1508. The Yarubid dynasty expanded, acquir- 
ing former Portuguese colonies in East Africa and engaging in 
the slave trade. 

A civil war broke out in the first half of the eighteenth cen- 
tury between two major tribes: the Hinawi, who claimed 
descent from an eponymous ancestor Qahtan, and the Ghafiri, 
who claimed descent from an eponymous ancestor Nizar. The 
war ended in the 1740s with the election of Ahmad ibn Said Al 
Said as imam. Ahmad ibn Said had previously served as gover- 
nor of Suhar under the Yarubid imam, whom he replaced. By 
1749 Ahmad ibn Said had become imam of Oman, Zanzibar, 
and part of what now constitutes Tanzania. Following Ahmad 
ibn Said's death in 1775, his son, Sultan ibn Ahmad Al Said, 
became ruler. 

The successors of Ahmad ibn Said were known initially as 
sayyids, a title of respect for a Muslim of noble lineage, and 
later as sultans. Like its predecessors, Al Said dynastic rule has 
been characterized by a history of internecine family struggle, 
fratricide, and usurpation. Apart from threats within the ruling 
family, there was the omnipresent challenge from the indepen- 
dent tribes of the interior who rejected the authority of the sul- 
tan, recognizing the imam as the sole legitimate leader and 
pressing, by resort to arms, for the restoration of the imamate. 

Schisms within the ruling family were apparent before 
Ahmad ibn Said's death and were later manifest with the divi- 
sion of the family into two main lines, the Sultan ibn Ahmad Al 
Said (r. 1792-1806) line controlling the maritime state, with 
nominal control over the entire country; and the Qais branch, 
with authority over the Al Batinah and Ar Rustaq areas. During 
the period of Sultan Said ibn Sultan Al Said's rule (1806-56), 
Oman cultivated its East African colonies, profiting from the 
slave trade. As a regional commercial power in the nineteenth 
century, Oman held territories on the island of Zanzibar off 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

the coast of East Africa, in Mombasa along the coast of East 
Africa, and until 1958 in Gwadar (in present-day Pakistan) on 
the coast of the Arabian Sea. But when the British declared sla- 
very illegal in the mid-1 800s, the sultanate's fortunes reversed. 
The economy collapsed, and many Omani families migrated to 
Zanzibar. The population of Muscat fell from 55,000 to 8,000 
between the 1850s and 1870s. 

The death of Sultan Said ibn Sultan in 1856 prompted a fur- 
ther division: the descendants of the late sultan ruled Oman 
(Thuwaini ibn Said Al Said, r. 1856—66) and Zanzibar (Mayid 
ibn Said Al Said, r. 1856-70); the Qais branch intermittently 
allied itself with the ulama to restore imamate legitimacy. In 
1868 Azzam ibn Qais Al Said (r. 1868-71) emerged as self- 
declared imam. Although a significant number of Hinawi 
tribes recognized him as imam, the public neither elected him 
nor acclaimed him as such. 

Imam Azzam understood that to unify the country a strong, 
central authority had to be established with control over the 
interior tribes of Oman. His rule was jeopardized by the Brit- 
ish, who interpreted his policy of bringing the interior tribes 
under the central government as a move against their estab- 
lished order. In resorting to military means to unify Oman, 
Imam Azzam alienated members of the Ghafiri tribes, who 
revolted in the 1870-71 period. The British gave Imam Azzam's 
rival, Turki ibn Said Al Said, financial and political support. 
Turki ibn Said succeeded in defeating the forces of Imam 
Azzam, who was killed in battle outside Matrah in January 
1871. 

The deteriorating economy resulting from the suppression 
of the slave trade rendered Sultan Turki ibn Said's rule suscep- 
tible to opposition from the interior. For a brief period, Turki 
ibn Said appeased his opposition with cash payments and Brit- 
ish backing. His authority extended from the Al Batinah coast 
to Suhar, with the rest of the country operating autonomously. 
Sultan Turki ibn Said suffered a stroke in the early 1870s and 
was incapacitated. He was succeeded in 1888 by his son, Faisal 
ibn Turki Al Said, who was the first ruler of the Al Said family in 
the nineteenth century to assume power peacefully, without 
resort to arms or political subterfuge. 

Four sultans of the Al Said family have ruled Oman in the 
twentieth century: Faisal ibn Turki Al Said (1888-1913), 
Taimur ibn Faisal Al Said (1913-32), Said ibn Taimur Al Said 
(1932-70), and the present sultan, Qabus ibn Said Al Said 



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Oman 



(1970- ). In large part, Omani political developments in the 
twentieth century followed the temperament and priorities of 
successive sultans. Each, to varying degrees, responded to 
threats to his authority from the interior; each had to balance 
independent action with an indirect role by Britain, with which 
Oman had treaties of friendship. The initial British-Omani 
treaty, similar to British treaties with other Persian Gulf states, 
was signed in 1891. 

The process of state formation in Oman and the centraliza- 
tion of political power within the ruling family followed the 
same pattern found in other gulf shaykhdoms, particularly 
Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. Oil revenues and income redistri- 
bution facilitated a pattern of continuity of political power 
within the ruling family and the traditional political elite as 
well as change with the modest creation of new institutions and 
expanded administration engaging an increasingly diverse seg- 
ment of Omani society. 

Faisal ibn Turki, 1888-1913 

On assuming power in 1888, Faisal ibn Turki gradually 
found his authority over the interior weakened as tribal leaders 
increasingly perceived his dependence on British advisers as an 
inherent weakness. In 1895 he was forced to seek refuge at 
Jalali fort after Muscat was captured. British political agents 
frustrated his efforts to recapture Muscat, compelling him to 
court the French. He granted the French coaling facilities for 
their fleet at Bandar Jissah near Muscat. 

Determined to thwart any growth in French presence in 
what Britain considered its sphere of influence, Britain pre- 
sented Faisal ibn Turki with an ultimatum in 1899 ordering the 
sultan to board the British flagship or Muscat would be bom- 
barded. Having little recourse, Faisal ibn Turki capitulated. 
Publicly humiliated, his authority was irreversibly damaged. In 
1903 he asked Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, viceroy of 
India, for permission to abdicate, but his request was denied. 
Responsibility for the capital was delegated to Said ibn Muham- 
mad Al Said, while affairs of the interior fell to an ex-slave, 
Sulayman ibn Suwaylim. By 1913 control over the interior was 
completely lost, and a reconstituted imamate was again a threat 
to Muscat. In May 1913, Salim ibn Rashid al Harthi was elected 
imam at Tanuf and spearheaded a revolt against the sultan that 
combined both Hinawi and Ghafiri tribal groups. 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Taimur ibn Faisal, 1913-32 

Taimur ibn Faisal succeeded his father as sultan in October 
1913. When he assumed suzerainty over the country, he inher- 
ited an external public debt and widespread rebellion among 
the tribes. Between 1915 and 1920, .the sultan's forces were 
aided by British financial and materiel support against the 
rebel tribes, ensuring adequate resistance but not total victory. 
An uneasy situation of no war, no peace existed, with the sultan 
controlling Muscat and the coastal towns and the imam ruling 
the interior. This was tacitly codified in the Treaty of As Sib in 
1920, brokered by the British political agent in Muscat. The 
treaty was between the sultan and the tribes, represented by 
Shaykh Isa ibn Salih al Harthi, leader of the Al Harth tribe. 

In return for full autonomy, the tribes in the interior 
pledged to cease attacking the coast. The Treaty of As Sib was, 
de facto, a partition agreement between Muscat and Oman, 
serving Britain's interest in preserving its power through the 
office of the sultan without dispatching British troops to the 
region. The Treaty of As Sib ensured political quiescence 
between Muscat and Oman that lasted until the 1950s, when oil 
exploration in the interior reintroduced conflict. In return for 
accepting a truncation of his authority, the sultan received a 
loan from the government of British India with an amortiza- 
tion period of ten years, sufficient to repay his debts to mer- 
chants. When Sultan Taimur ibn Faisal abdicated for financial 
reasons in 1932, the twenty-two-year-old Said ibn Taimur inher- 
ited an administration that was in debt. 

A United States Department of State bulletin on the sultan 
of Muscat and Oman in February 1938 describes the situation 
in which Sultan Said ibn Taimur found himself after assuming 
power: "The young Sultan found the country practically bank- 
rupt and his troubles were further complicated by tribal unrest 
and conspiracy by certain of his uncles, one of whom immedi- 
ately profited by the occasion to set up an independent regime. 
The Sultan tackled the situation with resolution and within a 
short time the traitorous uncle had been subdued, unrest 
quelled, and most important of all, state finances put on much 
more solid footing." 

Said ibn Taimur, 1932-70 

Between 1932 and 1970, Said ibn Taimur ruled Oman and 
impressed on it his own myopic vision. Said ibn Taimur was an 



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Oman 



Anglophile who was compelled, in order to alleviate the coun- 
try's debt, to integrate the interior with Oman and create an 
independent state. To create a financially independent state, 
he needed oil export revenues. But the acquiescence of the 
interior tribes was indispensable for exploration activities. 

The dilemma materialized in 1954 when the PDO sent 
exploration teams to the interior. The move was interpreted by 
the tribal shaykhs as a violation of the 1920 Treaty of As Sib. 
This coincided with the death of Imam Muhammad ibn Abd 
Allah al Khalili, who had ruled the interior of the country, and 
the election in 1954 of a new imam, who led a breakaway move- 
ment seeking independence from coastal Oman. The new 
imam's brother solicited political and material support from 
Saudi Arabia and established a secessionist movement called 
the Omani Liberation Movement, with the goals of establishing 
an independent Omani state in the interior and forcing the 
withdrawal of foreign troops. The British intervened on behalf 
of the sultan and by 1959 reestablished the sultan's authority. 
The British abrogated the Treaty of As Sib and ended the office 
of imam. 

After 1958 Said ibn Taimur established his residence at Al 
Hisn near Salalah, in Dhofar, where he remained permanently 
except for periodic visits to London. By retiring to the south 
from Muscat, Said ibn Taimur was not only more secure from 
assassination but was also no longer obligated to meet fre- 
quently with tribal shaykhs and distribute subsidies and thereby 
avoided depleting the treasury He married Dhofari wives, one 
of whom bore him his only son, Qabus ibn Said, and two 
daughters. Above all, Said ibn Taimur created his personal fief- 
dom and sought to arrest modernization by enforcing anti- 
quated laws, public executions, and slavery of people of African 
descent. The isolation and xenophobia that he forced on the 
country in general and on Dhofar in particular left Oman 
grossly underdeveloped, despite increasing oil export revenues 
in the late 1960s. 

Qabus ibn Said spent his early years isolated within the royal 
palace. At the instigation of his father's British advisers, Qabus 
ibn Said was permitted to go to Britain in 1958 for his educa- 
tion. He spent two years at a small private school, where he 
acquired mastery of the English language. In 1960 he was 
enrolled in the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and, after 
graduating from a two-year course of study, served for several 
months with British units stationed in the Federal Republic of 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Germany (West Germany). After a world tour and studies in 
London, he returned to Oman in December 1964. His father, 
however, refused to entrust him with a responsible role in the 
government or military and instead sequestered him in the pal- 
ace in Salalah. Qabus ibn Said's more cosmopolitan and pro- 
gressive views were incompatible with his father's conservatism 
and isolationism, which Qabus ibn Said considered detrimental 
to the country's development. With the tacit endorsement of 
the British, who saw thirty-year-old Qabus ibn Said as an agree- 
able alternative, Qabus ibn Said and a number of alienated 
political elite overthrew Said ibn Taimur in a palace coup d'etat 
on July 23, 1970. Said ibn Taimur withdrew to London, where 
he died in 1972. 

Qabus ibn Said: The Emergence of a Modern State 

After assuming power in 1970, Qabus ibn Said concentrated 
on restoring control over the southern Dhofar region, which 
had been in rebellion against his father's oppressive rule. He 
used economic and military means, believing that poor eco- 
nomic conditions had helped motivate the Dhofar rebellion. 
By 1975 he succeeded in suppressing militarily the Marxist- 
inspired rebellion, and the sultan could turn to development 
issues and the establishment of modern governmental and 
administrative institutions. By the mid-1980s, virtually all 
regions of the country were linked by a transportation system 
and a telecommunications network. Ministerial government 
and the civil service were expanded, and limited participation 
in the political process was created in 1981 with the establish- 
ment of the State Consultative Council and in 1991 with the 
formation of the Consultative Council, an advisory body that 
superseded the State Consultative Council. 

The Dhofar Rebellion 

The Dhofar rebellion combined economic grievances with 
political ideology. Placed in a regional context, Arab national- 
ism, the principal ideology of the 1950s and 1960s, indicted the 
conservative monarchs of the gulf and demanded their over- 
throw. Oman was susceptible to these populist stirrings, and, 
given Dhofar's economic backwardness, Dhofar was a tinder- 
box. Dhofaris resonated with the Marxist ideology of the Peo- 
ple's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, also seen as South 
Yemen) during the late 1960s. The primary objective of the 
Omani liberation movement named the Popular Front for the 



302 



Sultan Qabus ibn Said Al Said, 
ruler of Oman 
Courtesy Embassy of the 
Sultanate of Oman, 
Washington 
(Photo Mohamed Mustafa) 



Muscat, capital of Oman, with 
Jilali and Mirani forts in the 
background 
Courtesy Embassy of the 
Sultanate of Oman, Washington 




it 




Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (in 1972 renamed 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab 
Gulf and in 1974 further renamed the People's Front for the 
Liberation of Oman) was the removal of Sultan Said ibn 
Taimur. The government's policies and strategy after Sultan 
Qabus ibn Said's ascent to power diffused much of this opposi- 
tion. Pacification occurred through the dual strategy of carrot 
and stick — military pressure and economic rewards. 

Qabus ibn Said engaged neighboring states, apprehensive of 
the growth of left-wing movements in the region, in dispatch- 
ing economic and military assistance. In 1973 the shah of Iran, 
fulfilling his self-perceived role as guardian of the Persian Gulf 
following the departure of the British, dispatched ground 
forces (eventually numbering more than 3,000) and air units to 
Dhofar to assist the sultan. Oman received annual financial aid 
of about US$200 million from Abu Dhabi to assist military and 
civil development projects and about US$2.5 billion from 
Saudi Arabia, with which relations had improved. Britain, Jor- 
dan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan provided training in 
military schools for armed forces personnel. The UAE and Jor- 
dan occasionally provided troop units for guard duty in the 
north, thereby releasing Omani units for service in Dhofar. 

To erode the Dhofaris' political will, Qabus ibn Said directed 
a disproportionate percentage of government revenues to the 
Dhofar region. The shift was designed in part to augment mili- 
tary capabilities in the event of a resumption of hostilities and 
in part as economic appeasement. The construction of schools, 
hospitals, roads, and other infrastructure ameliorated the 
underprivileged status of the south. 

Almost 25 percent of the approximately RO600 million 
(US$1.8 billion) allocated for development between 1971 and 
1975 went to Dhofar to improve transportation, education, 
rural health, and religious facilities. This amount was spent on 
projects in Dhofar, although the population only numbered 
about 50,000, in comparison with the population of the rest of 
Oman of 400,000 in the mid-1970s. 

The government also benefited from factionalization within 
the insurrectionary movement. The movement in the region 
had originally been organized in 1963 under the Dhofar Liber- 
ation Front, led largely by Arab nationalists and religious con- 
servatives who could enlist support of tribal shaykhs in a 
common struggle against Sultan Said ibn Taimur. In 1968 the 
Marxists took over leadership, having the support of the PDRY, 



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Oman 



the Soviet Union, and China. Conservative Dhofaris broke with 
the movement, and when Qabus ibn Said seized power in 1970, 
many agreed to support him against the insurgency. By the 
mid-1970s, as many as 2,000 rebels had surrendered and had 
been retrained and incorporated into the Sultan's Armed 
Forces (SAF) as pledged under the terms of the amnesty 
declared shortly after the 1970 coup. 

The government based its new administration and distribu- 
tion networks on preexisting tribal structures. The government 
established centers headed by local representatives, usually 
minor tribal leaders elected by the population of their respec- 
tive districts but who had to be endorsed by the governor of 
Dhofar before assuming office. In the larger coastal settle- 
ments, local deputy governors managed the district administra- 
tion independent of the governor of Dhofar. Most of these 
were major tribal shaykhs, who received a monthly stipend 
from the government and additional allowances, usually on 
state or religious holidays. The government's financial allow- 
ances to the shaykhs, irrespective of whether or not the shaykh 
held an administrative position, served to ensure allegiance to 
authorities in Muscat. Two state institutions distributed these 
allowances: the finance section of the wall (governor) and the 
palace administration, popularly known as Diwan Affairs. 

State Formation and Politically Influential Groups 

The process of state formation facilitated by Oman's com- 
mercial production and export of hydrocarbon resources trans- 
formed the relationship between the ruler and the traditional 
political elite comprising the ruling family, established mer- 
chant families, and tribal shaykhs. While reinforcing some link- 
ages, such as the central role of the Al Said and the political 
influence of the merchant families, other linkages, particularly 
the tribes, have diminished in importance. Society outside the 
capital and urban centers remains tribal, with tribal leaders 
exercising political authority locally. But the power of tribes as 
regional pressure groups declined steadily as a result of the 
incorporation of rural areas into the government-administered 
sector. 

Oil revenues facilitated the transfer of some of the income 
from the state to society, creating a broader base. Pre-oil stratifi- 
cation of Omani society, wherein the ruler depended on the 
tribal shaykhs to ensure popular support, has partially been 
superseded by the establishment of a social welfare state 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

through which the government fosters a direct relationship 
between the state and the individual. Government clinics, agri- 
cultural and industrial projects, schools, and employment in 
the public sector reinforce this new linkage. 

The Al Said Dynasty 

Members of the Al Said family have historically played a cen- 
tral role in the state apparatus, not only because of hereditary 
succession to the sultanate but also because much of the ruler's 
bureaucracy has consisted of his relatives. Before 1932 there 
was an implicit division between Muscat and Oman, with the 
ruler rarely able to extend his authority over the whole geo- 
graphical area of Oman. Not only was the interior outside his 
sphere of influence, but frequently the ruler could not exercise 
authority over the Al Batinah coast. Relatives often controlled 
towns such as Suhar and Ar Rustaq autonomously, creating 
individual fiefdoms. 

By the time Sultan Said ibn Taimur assumed power in 1932, 
these independent power centers had disappeared, coinciding 
with an increasing role of family members in the administra- 
tion of the state. This nepotism has been practiced since the 
nineteenth century when members of the Al Said served in 
such positions as representative (wakil), deputy (wazir), gover- 
nor {wall), field general, and council minister. Yet, the practice 
was not without its risks, and often rulers were sensitive to the 
potential for relatives to become contenders for power. Sultan 
Said ibn Taimur recognized the risk his half-brothers Tariq ibn 
Taimur Al Said and Fahar ibn Taimur Al Said and his son 
Qabus ibn Said presented, and he delegated only minor 
responsibilities, if any, to Qabus ibn Said. 

Sultan Qabus ibn Said has similarly incorporated members 
of the Al Said family into the state apparatus, particularly in 
sensitive ministerial positions. The sultan reserved major minis- 
terial positions for himself. In 1993 he held the posts of prime 
minister, minister of defense, minister of finance, and minister 
of foreign affairs, although the functions of the prime minister 
were often entrusted to the minister of state for foreign affairs. 
In the 1993 cabinet, two members of the Al Said served as dep- 
uty prime ministers: Fahar ibn Taimur Al Said for security and 
defense and Fahd ibn Mahmud Al Said for legal affairs; Faisal 
ibn Ali Al Said served as minister of national heritage and cul- 
ture. The Al Said also controlled the Ministry of Interior, the 
governorship of Muscat, and the governorship of Dhofar. Sul- 



306 



Oman 



tan Qabus ibn Said's cousin, Thuwaini ibn Shihab Al Said, was 
the sultan's special personal representative, and some consid- 
ered him the most likely candidate to succeed Qabus ibn Said. 
Shabib ibn Taimur Al Said, Qabus ibn Said's uncle, assumed 
the role of special adviser to the sultan for environmental 
affairs (see fig. 15). 

Despite his progressive rule on some fronts, Sultan Qabus 
ibn Said has been slow to delegate real political authority. One 
of his first acts as sultan was to return his father's half-brother, 
Tariq ibn Taimur, from exile in West Germany and appoint 
him prime minister. Tariq ibn Taimur was educated in West 
Germany, married a German national, and had extensive expe- 
rience working in the Middle East as the representative of a 
construction firm. He had been an outspoken critic of Sultan 
Said ibn Taimur's rule, when forced into exile in 1958. 

Tariq ibn Taimur formed his first cabinet on August 16, 
1970, and brought the notion of political reform. He sup- 
ported the establishment of a constitutional monarchy and par- 
liamentary system and as a result came into direct conflict with 
Sultan Qabus ibn Said, who preferred the status quo, with real 
power remaining in the office of the sultan. As of 1993, power 
remained centralized with the Al Said, and, although departing 
from his father's conviction that to maintain the ruler's power 
the people must remain uneducated, real decision making 
remained the exclusive privilege of a narrowly based elite that 
the Al Said dominated. 

The centralization of power with the sultan and the absence 
of a mechanism for succession left speculation open concern- 
ing Oman after Qabus ibn Said. Qabus ibn Said has no heir, 
although he was married briefly in 1976 to Tariq ibn Taimur's 
daughter. The Al Said family is small, numbering fewer than 
100 male members. Since the death in 1980 of Tariq ibn 
Taimur, no individual within the ruling family has distin- 
guished himself or demonstrated any exceptional ability to 
rule. Likely candidates to succeed Qabus ibn Said include his 
two uncles, Fahar ibn Taimur and Shabib ibn Taimur; three 
cousins, Thuwaini ibn Shibab, Fahd ibn Mahmud, and Faisal 
ibn Ali; and, among the junior princes, Haitham ibn Tariq Al 
Said, son of Oman's former prime minister. The issue of succes- 
sion is sensitive, and, in the absence of a designated crown 
prince, the door is open for political struggle. 



307 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



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308 



Oman 



Established Merchant Families 

Among the most important groups, in terms of political 
influence, are a number of merchant families whose economic 
wealth is predicated on old, established links with the ruling 
family. The merchant families live primarily in Muscat and the 
coastal region and include both Hindus and Muslims from the 
Indian subcontinent and Shia from Iran. These families consol- 
idated their power during the reign of Sultan Said ibn Taimur 
and continued to amass fortunes after 1970, largely through 
monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic franchises. None is directly 
involved in the oil business, but together they are the principal 
suppliers of goods to the government, local contractors, for- 
eign firms, local consumers, and the oil industry. Valuable dis- 
tributorships for consumer and capital services are under their 
aegis. 

Close cooperation between the merchants and Sultan Said 
ibn Taimur evolved into a mutually protective relationship with 
civil servants in the Qabus ibn Said government. Included in 
this group are the Zawawis, whose roots are in Saudi Arabia. 
Qais ibn Abd al Munim az Zawawi, for example, as of 1991 
served as deputy prime minister for economic and financial 
affairs. Apart from his ministerial position, Qais ibn Abd al 
Munim is a prominent Muscat businessman. He was educated 
in India, has no hereditary relationship with the ruling family, 
and is well connected in the Arab world. His brother, Omar ibn 
Abd al Munim az Zawawi, a Harvard-educated physician, is con- 
sidered the second wealthiest man in Oman next to the sultan. 
In addition to being president of Omar Zawawi Establishment 
(the Omzest Group), which comprises about seventy compa- 
nies and joint ventures, he is special adviser for external liaison 
to the sultan. The Omzest Group represents multinational 
companies, such as Daimler-Benz and Mitsui Engineering and 
Shipping Company, which is contracted to build the oil refin- 
ery near Muscat. 

Another example of a merchant family drawn into the minis- 
terial level is Said Ahmad ash Shanfari, the minister of petro- 
leum and minerals, whose family origins are Dhofari and who 
has held the portfolio since 1974. The Shanfari family is related 
to Qabus ibn Said's mother and controls Shanfari and Partners, 
a contracting company involved in building infrastructure. Its 
bid was selected from among six contractors to build the new 
industrial estate at Raysut. 



309 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Khimji Ramdas, who heads the Khimji Ramdas Group, 
which holds international franchises ranging from consumer 
products and soft drinks to insurance and construction, is also 
in this circle. Yahya Muhammad Nasib, chairman of Yahya 
Enterprises, provides defense and communications equipment 
to the Ministry of Defense and other ministries. Other influen- 
tial families include those of Muhsin Haidar Darwish and 
Suhail Bahwan, chairman of the Bahwan Group, Muscat. 

Government Institutions 

Government institutions on the national level include the 
Council of Ministers and two other bodies: the National 
Defense Council and the National Development Council. In 
1992 the Council of Ministers had twenty-seven members, 
including the prime minister and three deputy prime minis- 
ters — for security and defense, legal affairs, and financial and 
economic affairs. The sultan occupied the sensitive posts of 
prime minister, minister of defense, minister of foreign affairs, 
and minister of finance. Sultan Qabus ibn Said controls all 
ministerial appointments and cabinet reshuffles. Policy formu- 
lation remains largely the product of person-to-person negotia- 
tions between the sultan and individual ministers. 

The National Defense Council, working in conjunction with 
the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, coordi- 
nates the activities of the Royal Armed Forces (formerly called 
the Sultan's Armed Forces) and the Royal Oman Police. The 
National Development Council manages national development 
planning, and all projects involving more than a certain mini- 
mum expenditure require its review. 

Consultative Council 

In 1991 Qabus established the Consultative Council (Majlis 
ash Shura), a sixty-member body. The Consultative Council 
superseded the fifty-five-m ember State Consultative Council 
(SCC; Majlis al Istishari lil Dawlah) created in 1981 with signifi- 
cant regional and popular as well as official representation. 

Whereas the concept of consultation is an integral part of 
Ibadi Islam and the imamate, it was not a tradition incorpo- 
rated into Oman's contemporary sultanate until Qabus ibn 
Said established the SCC by royal decree on October 18, 1981. 
Initially, the SCC consisted of forty-three members but was 
expanded to fifty-five in 1983 with representation of the seven 
geographic regions weighted according to population size and 



310 



Oman 



development needs. Nineteen members were government offi- 
cials, and of the nineteen, eleven — undersecretaries of social 
service ministries — were the only permanent members of the 
SCC. The remaining seven government officials could serve a 
maximum of two terms (four years), as could other SCC mem- 
bers. 

Like the SCC, the Consultative Council lacks legislative pow- 
ers but plays a consultative role. Its representatives come from 
Oman's forty-one wilayat (governorates; sing., wilayah). Candi- 
dates are selected by the wali (Muscat-appointed governor) 
and can be nominated by friends or themselves. After the nom- 
ination process, names of three candidates are submitted to the 
deputy prime minister for legal affairs in Muscat, who selects 
the final candidates, who must then be endorsed by the sultan. 

Unlike the SCC, members of the Consultative Council can- 
not include government officials or civil servants. Although 
this condition automatically excludes a pool of politically expe- 
rienced individuals, it is intended to circumvent potential alle- 
gations of conflict of interest. The inclusion of eleven 
undersecretaries in the SCC tended to strengthen it as a body 
codifying the status quo rather than offering legitimate criti- 
cism and alternative policies. The SCC's recommendations did 
not include defense, foreign affairs, or the petroleum sector. It 
convened three times annually, with each session lasting three 
days to a week. The restricted format, infrequent meetings, and 
lack of veto power or legislative role combined to tie the SCC's 
hands. Despite these shortcomings, the news reports and tele- 
vised broadcasts of the SCC exposed the public to a limited 
part of the government structure. It also modestly introduced 
the concept of accountability, although the ultimate authority 
of the sultan remained unquestioned. 

The role of the new Consultative Council can perhaps best 
be understood in the framework of Oman's graduated develop- 
ment process. In 1970 Qabus ibn Said rejected a constitutional 
monarchy and parliamentary system in favor of preservation of 
the status quo. Subsequently, the SCC evolved from an earlier 
advisory body, the Council on Agriculture, Fisheries, and 
Industries, established in April 1979. The council was largely 
successful in serving as an "outside" body offering policy rec- 
ommendations to the sultan and the ministers, although the 
scope of its consultation was relatively narrow. It was abolished 
in October 1981, and seven of its twelve members were incor- 



311 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

porated into the SCC. The Consultative Council has modestly 
opened the political system. 

Judicial System 

Oman's legal system is based on the Ibadi interpretation of 
the sharia (Islamic law), which is similar to that of the four 
orthodox schools of Sunni Islam (see Sunni Islam, ch. ^.Juris- 
prudence is administered regionally by the wali, in conjunction 
with the qadi, a judge who has attained that position either by 
graduating from an Islamic law college or by taking advanced 
study with local religious experts. Although primarily guided by 
the sharia, the system aims at arriving at a fair decision or com- 
promise acceptable to all parties. Invariably, tribal law has 
become mixed with religious law. Modern commercial law, bor- 
rowed from other parts of the Middle East and Europe, also 
operates in the business sphere. 

The Media 

The media sector remained rudimentary in 1993. There are 
three Arabic-language dailies: Al Watan (The Nation), Khali] 
Times, and Oman Daily Newspaper. The Muscat daily, Times of 
Oman, and the Oman Daily Observer are two English-language 
newspapers. Rather than a forum for open discourse, the 
media serve primarily as benign commentators on local and 
international news. 

Foreign Relations 

Oman's foreign policy since the 1970s has been influenced 
by Qabus ibn Said's determination to reverse the isolationism 
of Sultan Said ibn Taimur's rule and guardedly to integrate 
Oman both regionally and internationally. The geostrategic 
position of the country on the southern shore of the Strait of 
Hormuz, the imperatives of an oil-dependent economy, and 
the threats posed by stronger, neighboring regimes, notably 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, have also shaped the sultan's foreign 
policy. Oman's foreign policy, as a result of the sultan's goals 
and the regime's ties to Britain and the United States, has been 
nonconfrontational and conciliatory to Western interests in 
the region. 

Nonetheless, the regime has displayed an uncommon inde- 
pendence of action in comparison with other Arab gulf states. 
On several occasions, Oman has acted as a broker in regional 



312 



Oman 



disputes. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), the two belliger- 
ents conducted cease-fire talks secretly in Muscat. Although no 
formal agreement resulted, the talks reduced mistrust between 
the parties. Similarly, after 1988 Oman acted as mediator in the 
restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Britain 
and Iran and Saudi Arabia. 

Regional Relations 

Since 1970, when Qabus ibn Said assumed power, Oman's 
role in regional political dynamics has increased. Although 
remaining outside the Organization of the Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries (OPEC), it has been a member of the GCC since 
its formation in May 1981. Relations between Oman and other 
Persian Gulf countries have improved since 1970 as long-stand- 
ing territorial disputes have been resolved. Oman and Saudi 
Arabia signed a treaty in 1974 ending a long-standing territo- 
rial dispute concerning the Al Buraymi Oasis; in March 1990, 
the two countries concluded a border agreement. Oman and 
the UAE resolved a border dispute in 1981. And in 1982, Oman 
and the PDRY normalized relations; in October 1992, Oman 
and reunited Yemen signed a border demarcation agreement, 
ending a twenty-five-year border dispute. 

The resolution of the Al Buraymi Oasis territorial dispute, 
concerning a cluster of nine villages claimed by Saudi Arabia 
and administered by Abu Dhabi and Oman, improved regional 
relations. With the discovery of oil reserves in the Persian Gulf, 
the revenue potential for the Al Buraymi Oasis prompted Saudi 
Arabia to press its claim to the disputed territory. Riyadh dis- 
patched troops, which occupied the area in 1952. After failing 
to win their claim in international arbitration, the British, 
using the sultan's army and the Trucial Oman Scouts, reoccu- 
pied the oasis in 1955. Although the United States protested 
the British action, the United States was not prepared to 
extend military assistance to Saudi Arabia to reverse the situa- 
tion. From the early 1950s onward, Saudi Arabia provided a 
base from which the Ibadi imam of the interior continued to 
challenge the authority of the Al Said dynasty. 

After the 1970 coup d'etat, Qabus ibn Said sought to 
improve and normalize relations with Saudi Arabia. Formal 
relations were established following a state visit by the sultan to 
the kingdom in December 1971. An agreement on July 29, 
1974, among Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE settled the Al 
Buraymi dispute. It stipulated that Oman would receive three 



313 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

villages in the region and Abu Dhabi six and that the two coun- 
tries would share the oil field at Shaybah. The agreement pro- 
vided Saudi Arabia with an outlet to the gulf through UAE 
territory. 

In the course of the Dhofar rebellion, Oman received sub- 
stantial financial support from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and 
Kuwait, countries that feared the growth of left-wing, antimon- 
archist movements in their own territories. In March 1990, 
Saudi Arabia and Oman formalized a border pact legitimating 
the existing declared line separating the two countries. 

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the fear of militant 
Islam among Arab leaders, combined with the Iran-Iraq War 
and the potential interruption of tanker traffic through the 
Strait of Hormuz, catalyzed the formation of the GCC, consist- 
ing of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
UAE (see Collective Security under the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, ch. 7). The GCC is theoretically a means to ensure col- 
lective security of the member states. In practice, as Iraq's 1990 
invasion of Kuwait showed, it proved ineffectual in deterring 
and responding to aggression by neighboring states. 

After the Persian Gulf War, Sultan Qabus ibn Said suggested 
the creation of a multilateral 100,000-strong collective defense 
force. However, Saudi Arabia scuttled the proposal, which was 
unpopular in Oman and in other gulf states. Objections 
ranged from the matter of costs and manpower needs of such a 
force, given the small populations of GCC member states, to 
the question of who would command such a force. The smaller 
gulf states feared a dominant Riyadh dictating terms and for- 
eign policy. 

International Relations 

Reciprocity has characterized Oman's relationship with for- 
eign powers. Historically, Oman has relied on foreign powers 
to ensure political stability, domestically and regionally. In 
turn, Oman's geostrategic location at the entry point of the 
Strait of Hormuz and its long coastline have guided the inter- 
ests of foreign powers. 

Relations with the British date back to 1798 when the first 
treaty of friendship was concluded between the sultan of Mus- 
cat and the British government of India. British interests in 
Oman were predicated on Whitehall's concern with the 
defense of India and the imperative of maintaining secure 
trade routes and containing the expansion of other European 



314 



Oman 



powers in the Indian Ocean. Following the discovery of the 
potential for using oil as fuel, and later the conversion of the 
British naval fleet from coal-fired ships to oil-fired ships in 
1911, the security of tanker traffic through the Strait of Hor- 
muz gained increasing importance. Britain's Royal Air Force 
had staging and diplomatic telecommunications facilities on 
the island of Masirah from 1932 to 1977. 

The British largely facilitated the extensive military buildup 
and modernization of Oman's armed forces during the course 
of the Dhofar rebellion in the 1960s and 1970s. Without British 
military assistance in suppressing the rebellion, the sultanate 
probably could not have contained the threat, even with troops 
from Iran and advisers from Jordan. This close military rela- 
tionship continued after the suppression of the insurrection. 
The chief of the general staff and the commanders of the air 
force and navy were British officers through the mid-1980s. 

United States influence in Oman has been felt more strongly 
since the 1970s. Britain's disengagement east of Suez in 1971 
opened up the region to greater competition for influence, pri- 
marily from the United States. When Sultan Qabus ibn Said 
assumed power, there was no United States diplomatic pres- 
ence in Oman. A United States consular officer made at least 
an annual visit, with contacts managed by the British, who had 
full control of Oman's foreign relations and defense matters. A 
United States missionary medical doctor was prominent in the 
health program. In addition, a United States archaeologist, 
explorer, and oilman briefly extended his exploration from the 
PDRY into Dhofar in the 1970s. 

United States interests in regional security and in maintain- 
ing local allies, particularly after the fall of the shah of Iran in 
1979, called for the reinforcement of close security links to the 
sultanate. Since the 1970s, Sultan Qabus ibn Said has quietly 
asserted his independence and engaged United States petro- 
leum professionals to advise the government. The selection of 
United States citizens to manage the development programs in 
the Musandam Peninsula and the Al Buraymi Oasis and to 
develop water resources in the sultanate was a dramatic depar- 
ture from the sultanate's exclusive reliance on British advisers. 
Relations between Oman and the United States strengthened 
as Qabus ibn Said supported United States peace initiatives in 
the Middle East, manifest in Muscat's support of the Camp 
David Accords signed in 1979 by Egypt and Israel and mediated 
by the United States. 



315 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

United States influence in Oman widened with the signing 
of a facilities access agreement in June 1980 (most recently 
renewed in 1990) providing United States military access to 
Omani bases under specified conditions. This was part of a 
larger regional strategy that also included facilities in Somalia 
and Kenya. The air bases at As Sib and Thamarit and on 
Masirah (the latter abandoned by the British in 1977) were 
upgraded with United States assistance. 

The Joint United States-Oman Commission was established 
in 1980 with the mandate to fund and administer economic 
assistance programs in the country. Activities funded through 
the commission reflect sectoral priorities and include a school 
construction project, a scholarship and training project, a fish- 
eries development project, a management project, and a water 
resources project. 

The activities funded reflect United States Agency for Inter- 
national Development (AID) priorities. In the 1990s, AID 
development assistance focused on the agency's interest in 
privatization and institution building. The annual Omani bud- 
get proposal for fiscal year 1993 allocated US$5 million (or 33 
percent of the total program) to private-sector development, 
US$9.5 million (or 63 percent) to institution building, and 
US$8.8 million (or 58 percent) to develop education facilities. 

Despite these programs promoting economic development 
and education, Oman faced significant problems in the early 
1990s. A wealthier, better-educated population will demand 
greater participation in the political process. As of early 1993, 
the sultan was unwilling to relinquish real power, and he care- 
fully preserved his political autonomy. A new Consultative 
Council was established in late 1990 but was essentially an advi- 
sory body without legislative power. To serve as a mechanism 
for true political reform, the council must be empowered with 
a legislative role; as of early 1993, this had not occurred. 

* * * 

The literature on Oman is scarce and varies in quality. Most 
works were published in the late 1970s or 1980s and concen- 
trate on contrasting the periods before and after Qabus ibn 
Said came to power. Although such comparative analysis is 
valid, it seems dated because more than twenty years have 
elapsed since the accession of the sultan. Government publica- 
tions, such as the annual Statistical Yearbook, provide informa- 



316 



Oman 



tion on every sector of the society and economy and are 
helpful tools in determining economic and social trends. 

Monographs offer a general framework for understanding 
Oman's contemporary scene and also provide a detailed his- 
tory. Among the more useful is John E. Peterson's Oman in the 
Twentieth Century. Also valuable is a work by John Townsend, 
former adviser to sultans Said ibn Taimur and Qabus ibn Said, 
Oman: The Making of a Modern State, which focuses on institu- 
tion building in the post-1970 period. 

Various journal articles provide more up-to-date material. 
General economic information is reported weekly in Middle 
East Economic Survey and Middle East Economic Digest and period- 
ically in London's Financial Times country surveys. Current 
information on the hydrocarbon sector is best found in indus- 
try journals, particularly the Oil and Gas Journal, Petroleum Intel- 
ligence Weekly, and Petroleum Economist. (For further information 
and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



317 



Chapter 7. Regional and National Security 

Considerations 




Crossed scimitars 



ANY THREAT TO THE STABILITY of the Persian Gulf endan- 
gering the region's oil flow greatly concerns the rest of the 
world. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was the opening stage in 
more than a decade of upheaval. The outbreak of war between 
Iran and Iraq in 1980, the expansion of the war to nonbelliger- 
ent shipping, and the presence of foreign naval flotillas in the 
gulf followed. When general hostilities eventually broke out, 
they arose from an unexpected quarter — Iraq's sweep into 
Kuwait in August 1990 and the possibility of Iraqi forces con- 
tinuing down the gulf coast to seize other oil-rich Arab states. 
The smaller Arab regimes volunteered use of their ports and 
airfields as bases for the coalition of forces in Operation Desert 
Storm to defeat Iraq. 

The overwhelming concentration of military power that 
enabled Iraq to invade and occupy Kuwait underscored the vul- 
nerability of the territory and oil facilities of the other gulf 
states. To the extent that their military resources permitted, 
each of the Arab states participated in the coalition that 
defeated Iraq and drove it out of Kuwait. It was clear, nonethe- 
less, that they played a subordinate role in the vast operation in 
which the United States, Britain, and France predominated, 
supported by Egypt and Syria. 

After its sharp setback, Iraq in early 1993 remained a major 
regional power and a littoral state of the Persian Gulf, along 
with Iran and Saudi Arabia. None of the five other Persian Gulf 
littoral states — Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emir- 
ates, or Oman — is in a position to defend its borders or territo- 
rial waters alone. In the face of their fragility, these Persian 
Gulf states continue to take measures to reinforce their individ- 
ual and collective security. Relative to size and population, they 
have been among the world's most lavish spenders on the 
needs of their armed forces. Nevertheless, their military poten- 
tial is limited by small manpower pools, sectarian divisions, lim- 
ited area, and little experience in the effective use of modern 
weaponry. 

A few months after the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, 
the six regional nonbelligerents — the five gulf states and Saudi 
Arabia — in 1981 banded together to form the Gulf Coopera- 
tion Council (GCC). Although the GCC had economic, social, 
and political aims, its main purpose was the creation of a defen- 
sive military alliance. The GCC leaders feared that a decisive 



321 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Iranian military victory would fuel the drive of the revolution- 
ary government of Iran to spread its Islamic revolution. Con- 
currently, the GCC states accelerated their individual military 
efforts by purchasing modern aircraft, armored vehicles, air 
defense systems, and missile-armed naval vessels. 

The GCC members are determined to construct a collective 
self-defense system without the direct involvement of foreign 
powers. For both political and practical reasons, however, the 
military goals of the GCC — standardization of equipment, 
coordination of training, integration of forces, and joint plan- 
ning — have been achieved only to a limited degree. The gulf 
states have also been forced to restrain their military purchases 
as a result of declining oil revenues. 

In the immediate aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, agree- 
ment was reached with the GCC to station Egyptian and Syrian 
troops in Kuwait to ensure the military stability of the northern 
gulf. By 1993, however, this plan seemed to have been aban- 
doned. Instead, Kuwait and most other gulf states turned to 
cooperation with the West to develop a new security frame- 
work. The United States concluded agreements to permit pre- 
positioning of United States equipment for combat units, port 
access, and joint exercises and training. Britain and France also 
negotiated military cooperation arrangements. The effect was 
to spread a Western strategic umbrella over the region without 
the permanent stationing of foreign forces, although a United 
States and British naval presence is expected to continue. 

In early 1993, two years after the gulf war ended, the danger 
of renewed violence in the region had receded, although no 
reconciliation among the antagonists had occurred. Iraq has 
not fully recovered from its humiliating defeat; nevertheless, its 
reduced army and air force still overshadow the combined 
forces of the GCC. Iran's military strength was depleted during 
its eight-year struggle with Iraq, and recovery is proceeding 
slowly. Although it appears to have shifted to more moderate 
policies, Iran's ambition to be a factor in regional gulf security 
has been treated with suspicion. 

Traditional rivalries and territorial disputes among the 
smaller gulf states still linger but have steadily diminished as 
sources of tension. Subversion and terrorist incidents, often 
linked to Iran, have abated, as has the potential for disruption 
by foreign workers manipulated by external forces. The police 
vigilantly control internal dissent that can threaten the stability 
of the existing regimes. Nevertheless, resistance to democratic 
reforms by some members of the conservative ruling families 



322 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

of the gulf increases the likelihood of future destabilization 
and upheaval. 

Historical Overview 

According to archaeologists, warfare was a common activity 
5,000 years ago among the peoples of the area of the Middle 
East that in modern times became known as Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, and the smaller gulf states. Sargon, Hammurabi, Neb- 
uchadnezzar II, and Alexander the Great were among the best 
known kings who led warring armies in the 2,500 years before 
the birth of Christ. During the centuries of Greek and Roman 
domination, the gulf region was of limited interest to the major 
powers, but the area's importance as a strategic and trading 
center rose with the emergence of Islam in the seventh century 
A.D. The caliphate's naval strength was concentrated at Hor- 
muz (present-day Bandar-e Abbas in Iran). Strategically sited at 
the mouth of the Persian Gulf, its authority extended over 
ports and islands of the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf (see 
fig. 16). 

The strategic importance of Hormuz, however, did not sur- 
vive the appearance of Western powers, initially the Portuguese 
who came to the gulf in the late fifteenth century after Vasco 
da Gama's discovery of the route to India via the Cape of Good 
Hope. The Ottomans and the Iranians also tried to dominate 
the gulf but faced opposition from local tribes in Bahrain and 
Muscat, reluctant to cede authority over their territories, which 
by then were the most important areas on the coast. Increasing 
British involvement in India beginning in the late eighteenth 
century quickened British interest in the Persian Gulf region as 
a means of protecting the sea routes to India. The principal 
challenge to Britain arose from the Al Qasimi confederation 
originating in the area of the present-day United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). The Al Qasimi, who amassed a fleet of about 900 ves- 
sels, demanded tribute for the passage of merchant vessels and 
were regarded as pirates by the Europeans. Between 1809 and 
1820, British sea power gradually brought about the destruc- 
tion of the Al Qasimi fleet. This in turn led to the signing of 
agreements with Britain by the Al Qasimi and other shaykhs 
(see Glossary; see Treaties with the British, ch. 1). The amirates 
promised to have no direct dealings with other foreign states 
and to abstain from piracy. Britain in turn assumed responsibil- 
ity for the foreign relations of the amirates and promised to 
protect them from all aggression by sea and to lend its support 
against any land attacks. Before the end of the century, Britain 



323 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 




Figure 16. Strait ofHormuz, 1993 



extended protection to Bahrain and Kuwait. Qatar entered the 
trucial system as well, in 1916, and received Britain's military 
protection from Ottoman encroachment in return for relin- 
quishing its autonomy in foreign affairs and certain other 
areas. 

Although Muscat was traditionally a center of the slave 
trade, its sultan made concessions to the British in this regard 
in return for British help in building a navy. In the early nine- 
teenth century, the sultan's efficient fleet of sloops, corvettes, 
and frigates enabled him to support a maritime empire extend- 



324 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

ing from East Africa to the coast of present-day Pakistan. With 
the eventual decline of this empire, owing in part to its division 
into two states — Zanzibar and Oman — Britain's influence grew, 
and it signed a treaty in 1891 similar to those with the gulf 
amirates. 

The strategic importance of the Persian Gulf became 
increasingly apparent as the oil industry developed in the twen- 
tieth century. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran all claimed some of 
the territory of the gulf states during the years between World 
War I and World War II, but Britain's firm resistance to these 
claims enabled the amirates to maintain their territorial integ- 
rity without resort to arms. Except for a small force of the Brit- 
ish Indian Navy to ensure observance of the treaty conditions 
and maintain maritime peace in the gulf, Britain abstained 
from direct military involvement. As the wealth of the gulfs oil 
resources became clear, the size of the British military estab- 
lishment expanded. By the end of the 1960s, Britain had about 
9,000 men in Oman, Sharjah (an amirate of the Trucial Coast 
states, which became the UAE in 1971), and Bahrain, where 
British military headquarters was located. The Trucial Oman 
Scouts, a mobile force of mixed nationality that Britain sup- 
ported and British officers commanded, became a symbol of 
public order in the Trucial Coast states until Britain's with- 
drawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971. 

Impact of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-88 

The first major threat to the security of the Persian Gulf 
states followed the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq in 
1980. The war began after a period of deteriorating relations 
between these two historic rivals, dating from the fall of 
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1979 and his replacement as 
Iranian leader by Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini. 
Full-scale warfare erupted in September 1980 as Iraqi military 
units swept across the Shatt al Arab waterway — which forms the 
confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers — into the prov- 
ince of Khuzestan, Iran's richest oil-producing area. Iraqi presi- 
dent Saddam Husayn hoped to overthrow Khomeini, who had 
been overtly attempting to spread his Islamist (also seen as fun- 
damentalist) revolution into Iraq, where the secular Baath 
(Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party regime feared Iran's influ- 
ence among Iraq's disaffected Shia (see Glossary) Muslims. 

By November 1980, the Iraqi offensive had lost its momen- 
tum. Rejecting an Iraqi offer to negotiate, Iran launched a 
series of counteroffensives in 1982 that resulted in the recap- 



325 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

ture of the Iranian city of Khorramshahr. The destruction of 
huge oil facilities caused both belligerents sharp declines in oil 
revenues. Iraq was able to obtain substantial financial aid from 
Saudi Arabia and other gulf states. In early 1986, an Iranian 
offensive across the Shatt al Arab resulted in the fall of the 
Iraqi oil-loading port of Faw and the occupation of much of the 
Faw Peninsula almost to the Kuwait border. But the Iranians 
could not break out of the peninsula to threaten Basra, and 
their last great offensive, which began in December 1986, was 
ultimately repelled with heavy losses. In the spring of 1988, the 
freshly equipped Iraqi ground and air forces succeeded in 
retaking the Faw Peninsula. Iranian battlefield losses, com- 
bined with Iraqi air and missile attacks on Iranian cities, forced 
Khomeini to accept a cease-fire, which took effect in August 
1988. 

Initially, the fighting between Iran and Iraq only peripher- 
ally affected the Persian Gulf states. In May 1981, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE banded 
together in the GCC to protect their interests and, if necessary, 
to defend themselves (see Collective Security under the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, this ch.). In 1984 Iran reacted to Iraqi air 
attacks on its main oil terminal on the island of Khark by 
attacking ships destined for ports in gulf countries that assisted 
Iraq's war effort. In addition, the Arab states of the gulf sus- 
pected Iranian involvement in several destabilizing incidents, 
including an abortive coup in Bahrain in 1981, terrorist activity 
in Kuwait in 1983, and the violence in Mecca during the 1987 
pilgrimage resulting in the deaths of more than 400 pilgrims. 

Iran stepped up the tanker warfare in early 198/ by intro- 
ducing high-speed small craft armed with Italian Sea Killer mis- 
siles. Kuwait had already sought the protection of United States 
naval escorts through the gulf for reflagged Kuwaiti vessels. 
Determined to protect the flow of oil, the United States began 
tanker convoys in July 1987. Eleven Kuwaiti ships — one-half of 
the Kuwaiti tanker fleet — were placed under the United States 
flag. Other Kuwaiti tankers sailed under Soviet and British 
flags. Although United States escorts were involved in a num- 
ber of clashes with Iranian forces and one tanker was damaged 
by a mine, Iran generally avoided interfering with Kuwaiti ships 
sailing under United States protection. 

Persian Gulf War, 1991 

Despite its huge losses in the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq was unchal- 
lenged as the most powerful military presence in the gulf area. 



326 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

Reviving Iraq's old territorial claims against Kuwait, Saddam 
Husayn demanded leases for the islands of Bubiyan and War- 
bah at the mouth of the Shatt al Arab to give Iraq a clear pas- 
sage to the gulf. He also accused Kuwait of illegally siphoning 
off oil from Ar Rumaylah field, one of the world's largest oil 
pools, which the two countries shared. Saddam Husayn threat- 
ened to use force against Arab oil producers, including Kuwait 
and the UAE, that exceeded their oil quotas, charging them 
with colluding with the United States to strangle the Iraqi econ- 
omy by flooding the market with low-priced oil. 

Although Iraq had accompanied its threats by moving 
troops to the border area, the world was largely taken by sur- 
prise when, on August 2, 1990, the Iraqi army invaded and 
occupied Kuwait. A force of about 120,000 soldiers and approx- 
imately 2,000 tanks and other armored vehicles met little resis- 
tance. The Kuwaiti army was not on the alert, and those troops 
at their posts could not mount an effective defense. Some air- 
craft operating from southern Kuwait attacked Iraqi armored 
columns before their air base was overrun, and they sought ref- 
uge in Saudi Arabia. Of the 20,000 Kuwaiti troops, many were 
killed or captured, although up to 7,000 escaped into Saudi 
Arabia, along with about forty tanks. 

Having completed the occupation of Kuwait, the Iraqi 
armored and mechanized divisions and the elite Republican 
Guard advanced south toward Kuwait's border with Saudi Ara- 
bia. Intelligence sources believed that the Iraqis were position- 
ing themselves for a subsequent drive toward the Saudi oil 
fields and shipping terminals, possibly continuing toward the 
other gulf states. 

In the first of a series of resolutions condemning Iraq, the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council on August 2 called for 
Iraq's unconditional and immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. 
In the ensuing months, a coalition force of more than 600,000 
ground, sea, and air force personnel was deployed to defend 
Saudi Arabia and to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait. Command 
of the coalition force was divided: the commander in chief of 
the United States Central Command, General H. Norman 
Schwarzkopf, headed United States, British, and French units; 
his Saudi counterpart, Lieutenant General Khalid ibn Sultan 
ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, commanded units from twenty-four 
non-Western countries, including troops from Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, and the other Persian Gulf states. In addi- 
tion to 20,000 Saudi troops and 7,000 Kuwaiti troops, an esti- 
mated 3,000 personnel from the other GCC states took part in 



327 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

the land forces of the coalition offensive, which was known as 
Operation Desert Storm. 

When the massive coalition ground assault of Operation 
Desert Storm got under way on February 24, 1991, troops of 
the Persian Gulf states formed part of two Arab task forces. The 
first, Joint Forces Command North, consisting of Egyptian, 
Saudi, Syrian, and Kuwaiti troops, deployed on Kuwait's west- 
ern border. Joint Forces Command East deployed along the 
gulf immediately south of Kuwait and consisted of about five 
brigades (each well below the strength of a regular Western bri- 
gade) from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. The 
main attack was a sweeping movement by United States, Brit- 
ish, and French forces in the west designed to cut the links 
between the Iraqi forces in Kuwait and their bases in Iraq. The 
Saudis and Kuwaitis on the western border of Kuwait, com- 
posed of about four brigades organized as the Khalid Division, 
together with an Egyptian regiment, breached Iraqi defenses 
after allied bombing and engineer operations blasted passages. 
Iraqi troops, although in strong positions, surrendered or 
streamed to the north. Units of Joint Forces Command East 
advanced up the coastal road, capturing the city of Kuwait on 
the third day of the offensive after light fighting and the sur- 
render of thousands of Iraqi soldiers. 

Territorial Disputes 

Before the oil era, the gulf states made little effort to delin- 
eate their territories. Members of Arab tribes felt loyalty to 
their tribe or shaykh and tended to roam across the peninsula's 
desert areas according to the needs of their flocks. Official 
boundaries meant little, and the concept of allegiance to a dis- 
tinct political unit was absent. Organized authority was con- 
fined to ports and oases. The delineation of borders began 
with the signing of the first oil concessions in the 1930s. The 
national boundaries had been defined by the British, but many 
of these borders were never properly demarcated, leaving 
opportunities for contention, especially in areas of the most 
valuable oil deposits. Until 1971 British-led forces maintained 
peace and order in the gulf, and British officials arbitrated 
local quarrels. After the withdrawal of these forces and officials, 
old territorial claims and suppressed tribal animosities rose to 
the surface. The concept of the modern state — introduced into 
the gulf region by the European powers — and the sudden 
importance of boundaries to define ownership of oil deposits 
kindled acute territorial disputes. 



328 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

Iran has often laid claim to Bahrain, based on its seven- 
teenth-century defeat of the Portuguese and its subsequent 
occupation of the Bahrain archipelago. The Arab clan of the Al 
Khalifa, which has been the ruling family of Bahrain since the 
eighteenth century, in turn expelled the Iranians in 1783. The 
late shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, raised the Bahrain ques- 
tion when the British withdrew from areas east of Suez, but he 
dropped his demand after a 1970 UN-sponsored plebiscite 
showed that Bahrainis overwhelmingly preferred indepen- 
dence to Iranian rule. 

In 1971 Iranian forces occupied the islands of Abu Musa, 
Tunb al Kubra (Greater Tumb), and Tunb as Sughra (Lesser 
Tumb), located at the mouth of the Persian Gulf between Iran 
and the UAE. The Iranians reasserted their historic claims to 
the islands, although the Iranians had been dislodged by the 
British in the late nineteenth century. Iran continued to 
occupy the islands in 1993, and its action remained a source of 
contention with the UAE, which claimed authority by virtue of 
Britain's transfer of the islands to the amirates of Sharjah and 
Ras al Khaymah. By late 1992, Sharjah and Iran had reached 
agreement with regard to Abu Musa, but Ras al Khaymah had 
not reached a settlement with Iran concerning Greater Tumb 
and Lesser Tumb. 

Another point of contention in the gulf is the Bahraini 
claim to Az Zubarah on the northwest coast of Qatar and to 
Hawar and the adjacent islands forty kilometers south of Az 
Zubarah, claims that stem from former tribal areas and dynas- 
tic struggles. The Al Khalifa had settled at Az Zubarah before 
driving the Iranians out of Bahrain in the eighteenth century. 
The Al Thani ruling family of Qatar vigorously dispute the Al 
Khalifa claim to Az Zubarah, as well as lay claim to the Bah- 
raini-occupied Hawar and adjacent islands, a stone's throw 
from the mainland of Qatar but more than twenty kilometers 
from Bahrain. The simmering quarrel reignited in the spring 
of 1986 when Qatari helicopters removed and "kidnapped" 
workmen constructing a Bahraini coast guard station on Fasht 
ad Dibal, a reef off the coast of Qatar. Through Saudi media- 
tion, the parties reached a fragile truce, whereby the Bahrainis 
agreed to remove their installations. However, in 1991 the dis- 
pute flared up again after Qatar instituted proceedings to let 
the International Court of Justice in The Hague decide 
whether it had jurisdiction. (Bahrain refused the jurisdiction of 
the court, and as of early 1993 the dispute was unresolved.) 
The two countries exchanged complaints that their respective 



329 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

naval vessels had harassed the other's shipping in disputed 
waters. 

As one pretext for his invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saddam 
Husayn revived a long-standing Iraqi claim to the whole of 
Kuwait based on Ottoman boundaries. Ottoman Turkey exer- 
cised a tenuous sovereignty over Kuwait in the late nineteenth 
century, but the area passed under British protection in 1899. 
In 1932 Iraq informally confirmed its border with Kuwait, 
which had previously been demarcated by the British. In 1961, 
after Kuwait's independence and the withdrawal of British 
troops, Iraq reasserted its claim to the amirate based on the 
Ottomans' having attached it to Basra Province. British troops 
and aircraft were rushed back to Kuwait. A Saudi-led force of 
3,000 from the League of Arab States (Arab League) that sup- 
ported Kuwait against Iraqi pressure soon replaced them. 

The boundary issue again arose when the Baath Party came 
to power in Iraq after a 1963 revolution. The new government 
officially recognized the independence of Kuwait and the 
boundaries Iraq had accepted in 1932. Iraq nevertheless rein- 
stated its claims to Bubiyan and Warbah in 1973, massing 
troops at the border. During the 1980-88 war with Iran, Iraq 
pressed for a long-term lease to the islands in order to improve 
its access to the gulf and its strategic position. Although Kuwait 
rebuffed Iraq, relations continued to be strained by boundary 
issues and inconclusive negotiations over the status of the two 
islands. 

In August 1991, Kuwait charged that a force of Iraqis, 
backed by gunboats, had attacked Bubiyan but had been 
repulsed and many of the invaders captured. UN investigators 
found that the Iraqis had come from fishing boats and had 
probably been scavenging for military supplies abandoned 
after the Persian Gulf War. Kuwait was suspected of having 
exaggerated the incident to underscore its need for interna- 
tional support against ongoing Iraqi hostility. 

A particularly long and acrimonious disagreement involved 
claims over the Al Buraymi Oasis, disputed since the nine- 
teenth century among tribes from Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, 
and Oman. Although the tribes residing in the several settle- 
ments of the oasis were from Oman and Abu Dhabi, followers 
of the Wahhabi (see Glossary) religious movement that origi- 
nated in Saudi Arabia had periodically occupied and exacted 
tribute from the area. Oil prospecting began on behalf of 
Saudi oil interests, and in 1952 the Saudis sent a small constab- 
ulary force to assert control of the oasis. When arbitration 



330 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

efforts broke down in 1955, the British dispatched the Trucial 
Oman Scouts to expel the Saudi contingent. After new negotia- 
tions, a settlement was reached in 1974 whereby Saudi Arabia 
recognized claims of Abu Dhabi and Oman to the oasis. In 
return, Abu Dhabi agreed to grant Saudi Arabia a land corri- 
dor to the gulf and a share of a disputed oil field. Other dis- 
agreements over boundaries and water rights remained, 
however. 

The border between Oman and Yemen remained only par- 
tially defined, and, as of early 1993, border clashes had not 
occurred since 1988. Improving relations between Oman and 
the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, also seen 
as South Yemen) — which was reunited with the Yemen Arab 
Republic (YAR, also seen as North Yemen) in 1990 — offered 
some hope that the border would be demarcated. Earlier, the 
physical separation of the southern portion of Oman from its 
territory on the Musandam Peninsula (Ras Musandam) was a 
source of friction between Oman and the various neighboring 
amirates that became the UAE in 1971. Differences over the 
disputed territory appeared to have subsided after the onset of 
the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. 

Regional Security Problems 

The Persian Gulf is a relatively constricted geographic area 
of great existing or potential volatility. The smaller states of the 
gulf are particularly vulnerable, having limited indigenous pop- 
ulations and, in most cases, armed forces with little more than 
symbolic value to defend their countries against aggression. All 
of them lack strategic depth, and their economies and oil 
industries depend on access to the sea. Conflicts involving the 
air forces and navies of the larger gulf powers inevitably endan- 
ger their critical transportation links. Closure of the Strait of 
Hormuz, which was threatened but which never actually 
occurred during the Iran-Iraq War, would have a catastrophic 
effect on regular ship movements. 

The oil drilling, processing, and loading facilities of the Per- 
sian Gulf states, some of them on offshore platforms, are vital 
to their economies. In an era of highly accurate missiles and 
high-performance aircraft, the protection of these exposed 
resources against surprise attack presents enormous difficul- 
ties. Even those states that can afford the sophisticated weap- 
onry to defend their installations can ensure their effectiveness 
only through proper training, manning, and maintenance. 



331 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Most of the Arab gulf states, although vulnerable by air and 
by sea, are relatively immune from ground attack. Because of 
their geographic position on the Arabian Peninsula, they are 
exposed on their landward side only to vast desert tracts con- 
trolled by Saudi Arabia, with which they are linked by security 
treaties. Potential aggressors in the region, although heavily 
armed, lack the equipment or experience to project their 
forces over long distances. The only realistic possibility of over- 
land attack seems to be in the north, where Kuwait has no natu- 
ral line of defense and its oil facilities are near both Iran and 
Iraq. In early 1992, Kuwaiti officials disclosed plans to con- 
struct an electronic fence stretching more than 200 kilometers 
along the Kuwait-Iraq border. Although some obstacles might 
be emplaced to obstruct an Iraqi crossing, the main purpose of 
the fence is to prevent infiltration. Border guards of Kuwait's 
Ministry of Interior are to patrol the fence area. 

In the south, reunited Yemen had inherited large stocks of 
military equipment from the Soviet Union's earlier support of 
the PDRY Yemen's political support of Iraq in the Kuwaiti crisis 
caused the GCC states to regard it as a potentially hostile neigh- 
bor. Although offensive operations against Oman or Saudi Ara- 
bia, with which it shared long, undefined borders, seem 
unlikely, the encouragement of border infiltration by all three 
countries cannot be ruled out. 

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 introduced a new threat to 
stability in the gulf. Shia form a majority of the population of 
Bahrain and an important part of the foreign labor force in 
Kuwait and are considered potential dissidents in any future 
hostilities. Numerous terrorist actions in Kuwait during the 
1980s were attributed to domestic Shia instigated by Iran (see 
Kuwait: Internal Security, this ch.). Iran is one of the strongest 
military powers of the region and has historically sought to 
extend its influence to the Arab shore of the gulf. Nevertheless, 
fears of military confrontation subsided after the Iran-Iraq War 
ended. The influence of the more extremist elements within 
the Iranian government appears to have declined; Iran also 
had opposed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. 

In spite of Iraq's defeat in 1991, Kuwait remains the most 
vulnerable of the gulf states. Despite the crippling of Iraq's 
offensive military capabilities, it continues to be a formidable 
military power in the region. Its postwar manpower strength is 
estimated at 380,000, including at least three intact divisions of 
the elite Republican Guard, as well as large stocks of armor, 
artillery, and combat aircraft. Only with the assurance of out- 



332 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

side support can the GCC states be confident that they can suc- 
cessfully resist renewed Iraqi aggression. 

The gulf Arabs believe that a settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict will enhance gulf security. Direct conflict with Israel 
was a remote contingency in early 1993, although Israel's doc- 
trine of preemptive attack and its demonstrated ability to hit 
distant targets must be reckoned with in their strategic plan- 
ning. Because the northwestern areas of Saudi Arabia are well 
within range of Israeli attack, air defense units that would 
otherwise be available to the GCC for gulf defense must be 
positioned there. Efforts of the Arab gulf states to upgrade 
their air defense systems have often been viewed by the United 
States Congress and by the public as hostile to Israeli interests. 

In early 1993, two years after Saddam Husayn's defeat in the 
Persian Gulf War, the region's security appeared more stable 
than in many years. The fear of a communist encroachment or 
of a superpower confrontation has evaporated. Iran seems to 
be seeking greater accommodation with its gulf neighbors, 
although the Tehran government is continuing its military 
buildup and insists that it has a role in regional mutual security. 
Iraq, although still hostile, does not present an immediate mili- 
tary threat. The United States and other Western powers have 
indicated that they will act against any new instability in the 
gulf that endangers their interests. 

Collective Security under the Gulf Cooperation 
Council 

The six Persian Gulf states of the Arabian Peninsula — Bah- 
rain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE — 
formed the GCC in May 1981 with the aim of "co-ordination, 
integration, and co-operation among the member-states in all 
fields." Although none of the committees initially established 
dealt with security, the final communique of the first meeting 
affirmed the will and the intention of the signatories to defend 
their security and independence and to keep the region free of 
international conflicts. Four months later, the chiefs of staff of 
the armed forces of the six member states met to discuss 
regional military cooperation. The immediate objective was to 
protect themselves from the dangers posed by the Iran-Iraq 
War and the political violence associated with revolutionary 
Islam. In a series of meetings over the years, the defense minis- 
ters and chiefs of staff devoted numerous sessions to the 
improvement of military cooperation and the creation of a 



333 




334 



Rulers of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council 

pose for a photograph. 
Courtesy Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman, Washington 



335 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

joint command and joint air defense mechanisms. Managing 
their common security challenges collectively has made 
progress in some areas, but little in others. Creation of a fully 
integrated air defense system was far from a reality as of early 
1993. The GCC states have not realized plans to develop an 
arms production capacity, although they have launched a new 
effort to revive an earlier arrangement with Egypt to create a 
pan-Arab weapons industry. 

Political differences among GCC members have been the 
main obstacles to placing gulf defense on a collective rather 
than on a bilateral basis, even in such matters as achieving 
interoperability of equipment and cooperating in training, 
logistics, and infrastructure. The GCC experienced delays in 
reaching agreement to cooperate in internal security matters 
because Kuwait, the chief target of terrorism, feared that its rel- 
atively liberal domestic security regime might be impaired. 
Until Kuwait accepted a GCC agreement in late 1987, Saudi 
Arabia and several other members of the GCC coordinated 
their efforts bilaterally, including the exchange of equipment, 
expertise, and training; the extradition of criminals; and the 
interception of border infiltrators. GCC members have 
adopted parallel policies on deportation and travel restrictions 
and share information on suspected terrorists and plots. 

Ground and air units of the six member states have carried 
out small-scale combined training exercises. Military assistance, 
provided mainly by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait under GCC aus- 
pices, has enabled Bahrain to modernize its stock of combat 
aircraft and Oman to improve its air and sea defenses around 
the Strait of Hormuz. In 1984 GCC defense ministers agreed to 
create the Peninsula Shield force and base it at Hafar al Batin 
in Saudi Arabia, about sixty kilometers south of the Kuwaiti 
border. Under the command of a Saudi general, the unit con- 
sists of one Saudi brigade and a composite brigade with token 
personnel from the other states. 

The limited reaction of the GCC to the August 2 Iraqi inva- 
sion of Kuwait exposed its weakness when faced with direct 
aggression against a member of the alliance by a much stron- 
ger power. The GCC immediately condemned the Iraqi action, 
but when GCC defense ministers met three weeks later, they 
could only agree on strengthening the Peninsula Shield force. 
During the Persian Gulf War, national contingents deployed 
separately as units of Arab task forces. 

At the conclusion of the war on March 3, 1991, the six mem- 
bers of the GCC, along with Syria and Egypt, met in Damascus 



336 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

to agree on the establishment of a permanent security force to 
protect Kuwait against future aggression. Syria and Egypt were 
to contribute troop contingents on a reimbursable basis. The 
Damascus Declaration soon unraveled when differences 
emerged over the desirability of a long-term Egyptian and Syr- 
ian presence in the gulf. However, Egypt and Syria remain com- 
mitted under the agreement to send military aid to Kuwait and 
the other gulf states if a threat arises. 

Kuwait subsequently negotiated defense cooperation agree- 
ments with the United States, Britain, and France as an addi- 
tional form of security if its borders were again threatened (see 
Kuwait: Background, this ch.). At a GCC meeting in late 1991, 
Oman proposed that the six GCC members develop a 100,000- 
strong joint security force under a unified military command. 
The Omani plan was set aside after other defense ministers 
questioned whether the manpower target was attainable and 
whether administrative and procedural problems could be 
overcome. The consensus of the ministers was that the Penin- 
sula Shield force should be the nucleus of a unified army, the 
realization of which might be many years in the future. 

Military Capabilities of the Persian Gulf States 

During the decade after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, 
all the gulf states set out to strengthen their armed forces by 
converting to the most modern weapons they could obtain and 
assimilate. By 1993 each state had at least a modest inventory of 
tanks and other armored equipment, air defense missiles, com- 
bat aircraft, armed helicopters, and missile-armed naval craft 
with which to deter an intruder. Kuwait is less prepared than 
the others, not having recovered from the losses it suffered in 
personnel and equipment during the Persian Gulf War. A fun- 
damental constraint for all the gulf states has been the limited 
pool of qualified manpower and, in most countries, the prob- 
lem of attracting recruits when better employment opportuni- 
ties exist in the civilian sector. The emphasis on advanced 
weaponry is part of an effort to minimize the need for person- 
nel. As stated by a senior Kuwaiti officer, the object is to obtain 
the best equipment technologically, "easy to maintain, under- 
stand, and operate . . . the greatest firepower for the smallest 
human effort." But integrating modern weapons into the gulf 
armies and ensuring their effective operation create other 
problems. Such problems include the necessity of continued 
reliance on foreign officers and foreign maintenance and 
training of staffs at a time when all gulf states are trying to 



337 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

achieve greater self-sufficiency. Dependence on foreign per- 
sonnel, moreover, implies a degree of loyalty and trustworthi- 
ness that may not be forthcoming in times of crisis. 

Although in every case the gulf armies are much larger than 
the air forces and navies, the ground forces have traditionally 
been oriented toward counterinsurgency actions and the pro- 
tection of the ruling families. Most of the armies are organized 
into one or more combat brigades; actual fighting strengths are 
generally lower than the brigade structure implies. Except for 
the officers and men who were briefly exposed to modern mili- 
tary operations during the Persian Gulf War — and in the late 
1960s and first half of the 1970s during Oman's war with Dho- 
fari guerrillas and their supporters in the PDRY — most have 
not faced actual combat situations. 

In recognition of the great strategic importance of their air 
and sea defenses, the gulf states have all introduced modern 
combat aircraft and air defense missile systems, such as the 
United States Hawk surface-to-air missile (SAM). Several of the 
states have in their inventories or on order attack helicopters to 
help protect their oil facilities and oil drilling platforms in the 
gulf. All the gulf states have communications, control, and 
warning systems for the effective use of their fighter aircraft 
and antiaircraft missiles. But each air force is small, and, unless 
integrated with others, the overall effectiveness of the GCC in 
air defense is marginal. In spite of the attention the problem 
has received, there is no common network linking all air 
defense squadrons and SAMs to the Saudi Arabian air defense 
system and to the Saudi airborne warning and control system 
(AWACS) aircraft. Technical difficulties, including the incom- 
patibility of national communications systems and the reluc- 
tance to turn control of national air defense over to a unified 
command structure, account for this weakness. 

Fast missile attack craft acquired by all of the gulf navies 
with small but well-trained crews could inflict damaging blows 
to heavier fleets and discourage hostile amphibious operations. 
The sixty-two-meter corvettes belonging to Bahrain and the 
UAE are the largest vessels among the gulf navies. As the Iran- 
Iraq War demonstrated, the navies lack minesweeping capabil- 
ity, and their shipboard defense weapons against air attack are 
also weak. Only Oman has available large amphibious trans- 
ports to convey troops and vehicles for defending islands or 
remote coastal areas. 

Defense expenditures of the gulf states are among the high- 
est in the world relative to population. According to an analysis 



338 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

covering 1989, prepared by the United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, Qatar recorded the highest per cap- 
ita military expenditures of any country in the world, followed 
by Israel and the United States. Oman ranked fourth and 
Kuwait sixth. The UAE was eleventh highest; Bahrain, listed in 
twenty-seventh place worldwide, had the lowest outlays rela- 
tively of the gulf states. Military spending as a percentage of 
central government expenditures also is high, amounting to 
more than 40 percent in Oman and the UAE, for example. In 
contrast, military spending in Bahrain is 13 percent of central 
government expenditure. Military expenditures as a percent- 
age of the gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) are 
more moderate except for Oman, whose military outlays were 
more than 20 percent of GNP in 1989. Force ratios are also 
high in Oman and the UAE; both countries had about twenty 
men in uniform per 1,000 population in 1989. Their respective 
rankings were eleventh and twelfth highest in the world. Bah- 
rain and Kuwait had manpower levels of about ten per 1,000 
population, whereas the level for Qatar was fifteen per 1,000 in 
1989. 

In spite of the small personnel pools and the desire of all 
the gulf governments to train nationals to replace foreigners as 
quickly as possible, constraints found in traditional Islamic soci- 
eties prevent the widespread recruitment of women to serve in 
the armed forces. Oman and Bahrain have allowed a few 
women to enlist. They receive combat-style training and learn 
how to operate small arms. In Bahrain, however, almost all the 
women have been assigned to hospital staffs. In 1990 the UAE 
introduced a five-month training course for female recruits 
with the assistance of a team of female soldiers from the United 
States. About 1,200 women applied; only seventy-four were 
accepted. Two top members of the first class were selected to 
continue with officer training at the Royal Military Academy at 
Sandhurst in Britain. The other graduates of the first class were 
assigned as bodyguards of female members of the ruling fami- 
lies and as specialists in such fields as military intelligence. 

Before the Persian Gulf War, some women served in support 
departments of the Kuwaiti armed forces, including engineer- 
ing, military establishments, moral guidance, and public rela- 
tions. In July 1991, noting that a large number of women had 
volunteered for service in the postwar military, the minister of 
defense said that some would be accepted for a training period 
of three to six months but would initially be unsalaried. A role 
would then be found for them. The minister cautioned that 



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Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

acceptance by Kuwaiti society was essential for the government 
to move ahead with this plan. 

Kuwait 
Background 

From 1899 until 1961, Kuwait remained, in effect, a British 
protectorate. A succession of amirs of the Al Sabah ruled the 
country, but the handling of its foreign affairs was a British pre- 
rogative, and Britain guaranteed the security of the amirate. 
Kuwaiti forces consisted of the amir's royal guard plus a small 
domestic police force or constabulary under the British admin- 
istration. During the 1920s and 1930s, British protection 
became particularly important in deterring Saudi encroach- 
ment and later in blocking Iraqi territorial claims. By indepen- 
dence on June 19, 1961, the British had converted the 600-man 
constabulary into a combined arms brigade of 2,500 men 
trained by a British military mission. Small air and naval forces 
were also established in 1961 under British tutelage. 

With its small size and enormous oil wealth, Kuwait occupies 
an uneasy position at the head of the gulf. One of its powerful 
neighbors, Iran, only forty kilometers away, had proclaimed its 
aim of exporting its Islamic revolution; another powerful 
neighbor, Iraq, had repeatedly challenged Kuwait's legitimacy 
(see Territorial Disputes, this ch.). Fearful of the radical leader- 
ship in Iran, Kuwait aided Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War by per- 
mitting the transshipment of goods across its territory and by 
loans of about US$6 billion. Kuwait responded to terrorist 
bombings and other violence inspired by Iran by intensifying 
its military cooperation with the GCC and by building up its 
own forces. Although formally neutral and reluctant to become 
involved with the great powers except as a last resort, Kuwait 
turned to the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain for 
naval protection of its tanker fleet after twenty-one ships were 
attacked in the gulf in the six months preceding April 1987. 

Iraq's surprise attack and occupation of Kuwait caused the 
virtual disintegration of the Kuwaiti armed forces. Large num- 
bers of personnel were killed, captured, or dispersed, and most 
Kuwaiti equipment was destroyed or taken over by the Iraqi 
armed forces. The minister of defense said that 90 percent of 
military installations had suffered major damage. By early 
1992, most army barracks were again usable, and the naval base 
was in operation but needed rebuilding. The air force flew tem- 
porarily from the civilian airport near the city of Kuwait while 



340 




Kuwaiti soldiers in formation during a dignitary's visit to their 

outpost in Operation Desert Shield 
Kuwaiti M-84 main battle tank lays a smoke screen in an exercise 

during Operation Desert Shield. 
Courtesy United States Air Force 



341 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

the air bases were being reconstructed in 1992. Kuwait 
expected to spend about US$9 billion — six times the prewar 
defense budget — in 1992 to replace destroyed equipment and 
installations. 

In a sharp departure from previous policy, Kuwait entered 
into a ten-year defense cooperation agreement with the United 
States in September 1991. The agreement included provisions 
for United States port access, military equipment storage, and 
joint training and exercises. The agreement did not provide for 
the stationing of United States military personnel in Kuwait; 
1,500 personnel remaining after the gulf war were scheduled to 
leave within a few months. Similar but less extensive ten-year 
cooperation agreements were subsequently concluded with 
Britain and France. 

Organization and Mission of the Forces 

Under the constitution, the amir is the supreme com- 
mander of the armed forces. The minister of defense directs 
the armed forces through the chief of general staff. The 
National Guard has its own commander, who reports directly to 
the minister of defense. The public security forces are all under 
the minister of interior. The minister of defense in early 1993, 
Ali as Sabah as Salim Al Sabah, had been shifted from the Min- 
istry of Interior as part of the military shakeup after the gulf 
war. The ruling family maintained a tight grip on the centers of 
power, including many senior posts in the security services. 

Before the Iraqi invasion, the army's manpower strength was 
16,000 officers and enlisted men. The principal combat forma- 
tions were three armored brigades, one mechanized infantry 
brigade, and one artillery brigade with a regiment of self-pro- 
pelled howitzers and a surface-to-surface missile (SSM) battal- 
ion. All the combat units were under strength; by one estimate, 
as of 1988 the army's entire fighting strength was the equiva- 
lent of only one Western brigade. 

Kuwait's first-line main battle tanks are M-84s, Yugoslav ver- 
sions of the Soviet T-72 tank. The army has various models of 
British armored cars and armored personnel carriers (APCs). 
Its artillery consists of 155mm self-propelled howitzers, mainly 
of French manufacture. Kuwait has a large inventory of anti- 
tank missile systems of British, French, and United States ori- 
gin, including the improved TOW (tube-launched, optically 
sighted, wire-guided) missile from the United States. It has pur- 
chased the Soviet FROG-7, a mobile battlefield missile with a 
range of sixty kilometers. In 1984, after the United States 



342 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

rejected a Kuwaiti order for Stinger shoulder-fired SAMs, 
Kuwait turned to Moscow for air defense weapons, purchasing 
SA-7 and SA-8 SAMs and ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft guns. 

An estimate of the postwar strength of the Kuwaiti army, 
published in The Military Balance, 1992-1993, revealed the dev- 
astating effect of the Persian Gulf War. The disparate ground 
forces, estimated to number about 8,000, were to be reconsti- 
tuted into four understrength mechanized and armored bri- 
gades, a reserve brigade, and an artillery brigade. Little 
materiel survived the war: some tanks, APCs, and 155mm guns 
(see table 38, Appendix). Kuwait's postwar equipment orders 
include 200 M-84 tanks (from Serbia to offset previous Serb oil 
purchases) and eighteen self-propelled 155mm guns from 
France. Kuwait also has received United States, Russian, and 
Egyptian armored vehicles. 

The air force complement in 1990 before the gulf war was 
estimated at 2,200, excluding foreign personnel. Its inventory 
included about eighty combat aircraft, mainly Mirage Fls from 
France and A-4 Skyhawks from the United States, and more 
than forty helicopters of French manufacture, some fitted for 
assault missions with antitank missiles. Ground-based air 
defense was structured around the United States improved 
Hawk (I-Hawk) missile system, tied into Saudi air defense to 
receive data transmitted by United States and Saudi AWACS air- 
craft that had been operating in the area since the start of the 
Iran-Iraq War. 

The Military Balance estimated that the immediate postwar 
complement of the air force was 1,000, with thirty-four combat 
aircraft and twelve armed helicopters remaining. By early 1993, 
however, air force personnel numbered about 2,500, with sev- 
enty-four combat aircraft, including McDonnell Douglas A-4s 
and F-18s, and twenty armed helicopters. Its two air bases, at 
Ahmad al Jabir and Ali as Salim, badly damaged in the war, are 
being repaired. In addition to Iraq's capture of the four batter- 
ies of I-Hawk medium-range SAMs, most of the fleet of trans- 
port aircraft was lost to Iraq. Before the occupation of the 
amirate, the Kuwaiti air force had ordered forty United States 
F-18 fighter aircraft plus air-to-air missiles and cluster bombs. 
Deliveries under this order began in the first half of 1992. 
Kuwait will acquire the strongest air defense network in the 
Persian Gulf region under a proposal announced by the 
United States in March 1992 to transfer six Patriot antiballistic 
missile SAM firing units (each consisting of up to four quadru- 
ple launchers, radar, and a control station) and six batteries of 



343 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Hawk SAMs. The sale will include 450 Patriot missiles and 342 
Hawk missiles. 

The navy's strength had been estimated at 1,800 in 1990 
before the Iraqi occupation. Previously a coastal defense force 
with police responsibilities, the navy's combat capabilities were 
significantly enhanced during 1984 with the delivery of eight 
fast-attack craft armed with Exocet antiship missiles from the 
West German Lurssen shipyard. The navy also operated a wide 
variety of smaller patrol craft. According to The Military Balance, 
the navy was reduced to about 500 personnel in 1992 as a result 
of the Persian Gulf War and the Kuwaiti policy of removing 
bidun ("without" — stateless persons without citizenship, many 
of whom had long-standing stays in Kuwait while others came 
in the 1960s and 1970s as oil field workers and construction 
workers) from the armed forces. By early 1993, however, naval 
personnel numbered about 1,200, including the coast guard. 
With the exception of two missile boats, the entire fleet was 
captured and sunk or badly damaged by coalition forces while 
being operated by the Iraqis. Some ships are believed to be sal- 
vageable. Five Republic of Korea (South Korea) twenty-four- 
meter patrol craft were among the vessels lost. However, deliv- 
ery is expected on an additional four craft under an order 
pending when the war broke out. 

Role of Kuwaiti Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf War 

The Iraqi invasion in the early hours of August 2 was 
detected by a balloon-borne early warning radar, but the army 
had insufficient time to mount any organized resistance. Some 
contingents continued a small-unit defense, including those 
equipped with Chieftain tanks. About 7,000 soldiers escaped to 
Saudi Arabia; the remainder were killed or captured or partici- 
pated in the internal resistance movement. Some Mirage and 
Skyhawk aircraft carried out attacks on the advancing Iraqi col- 
umns: when their air base in southern Kuwait was overrun, 
they flew to Saudi Arabian bases, as did some of the armed heli- 
copters. 

According to Norman Friedman, author of a study on the 
strategy and tactics of the Persian Gulf War, the Kuwaiti forces 
participating in Operation Desert Storm in February 1991 
included the 35th Armored Brigade (renamed Martyr Bri- 
gade), the 15th Infantry Brigade, and the lightly equipped Lib- 
eration Brigade, which was armed with .50-caliber machine 
guns mounted on trucks. One source estimated that 7,000 
Kuwaiti troops were involved. The Martyr Brigade was the first 



344 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

of the units of Joint Forces Command East in the drive parallel- 
ing the coast northward when the allied operation began on 
February 24, 1991. Along with Saudi, Qatari, and Bahraini 
forces, supported by United States marines on their left flank, 
their assignment of liberating the city of Kuwait incurred little 
Iraqi resistance. 

Of twenty-four Kuwaiti aircraft participating in strikes 
against the Iraqi forces, one A-4 Skyhawk was lost to enemy 
fire. The two surviving Kuwaiti missile craft, carrying small 
marine contingents, were able to retake oil platforms and some 
of the gulf islands. Kuwait suffered only one combat death, 
according to an official British source. 

Kuwait pledged contributions totaling more than US$16 bil- 
lion to support the United States role in the Persian Gulf War. 
An additional US$6 billion was promised to Egypt and other 
member countries of the coalition to help offset the economic 
effects of the war. 

Personnel, Training, and Recruitment 

Unlike other Persian Gulf states, Kuwait has a conscription 
system that obligates young men to serve for two years begin- 
ning at the age of eighteen. Educational deferments are 
granted, and university graduates serve for only one year. In 
practice, exemptions are liberally granted, and most young 
Kuwaitis are able to avoid military duty. Estimates are that only 
20 to 30 percent of the prewar military ranks were filled by 
Kuwaiti nationals. Military and security forces had been purged 
of Shia personnel during the 1980s. At the outbreak of the gulf 
war, Palestinians filled many technical positions, supported by 
thousands of Pakistanis, Indians, and Filipinos in maintenance 
and logistic functions. Officers on detail from Britain, Pakistan, 
Egypt, and Jordan provided military expertise. Lower ranks in 
the army and security forces were occupied predominantly by 
bidun, who had taken reasonably well to military life but were 
poorly prepared to absorb training in operating and servicing 
modern equipment. In spite of reports that many bidun fought 
well against the Iraqis, many were expelled from the army in 
1991 for alleged collaboration. Because of their removal and 
the removal of Palestinians and other non-Kuwaitis, the ranks 
of the services became seriously depleted. Few Kuwaitis volun- 
teer for military service, and conscription is not regarded as an 
acceptable option. Under the circumstances, Kuwait will be 
hard pressed to meet its goal of a postwar armed strength of 
30,000. A relaxation of the policy toward bidun was hinted at by 



345 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

the statement of the minister of defense that people of 
"unspecified nationality" may be retained after screening for 
loyalty and may even be given Kuwaiti citizenship. With respect 
to conscription, the minister of defense in July 1991 said that 
the system was being reviewed to make it more effective. 

Most Kuwaiti officers are members of the ruling family or 
related tribal groups. Education standards are high — many are 
graduates of Sandhurst — and living conditions, pay, and bene- 
fits are excellent. The Kuwaiti Military College accepts second- 
ary school graduates for eighteen months of cadet training in 
army, air force, and navy programs. The United States provides 
pilot training and assistance in developing a flight training 
facility within Kuwait. United States, British, and French mili- 
tary missions and civilian contractors provide training for more 
technologically advanced systems. A small Soviet advisory 
group provided training in the use of Soviet missile systems 
before the Persian Gulf War. 

Traditionally, the officer corps — with its close links to the 
ruling family — was considered to be a loyal and trustworthy 
defender of the regime. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf 
War, however, there were displays of discontent among officers 
arising from the inadequate response of the armed forces to 
the Iraqi invasion and the failure to launch postwar reforms. 
Many of the 6,000 officers and men taken prisoner by the Iraqis 
were prevented from rejoining the armed forces and were 
angered at their treatment by senior officers who fled to Saudi 
Arabia. In June 1991, some officers of the resistance group 
known as the Second of August Movement petitioned the amir 
to dismiss the former ministers of defense and interior from 
their cabinet posts and to investigate the reason the Kuwaiti 
army was not mobilized or on the alert when the Iraqis 
attacked. The petition also called for removal of the army chief 
of staff and his immediate staff and as many as twenty generals 
and seventy-five colonels. 

In July fourteen senior officers were forced into retirement. 
The amir reportedly met with disaffected officers to tell them 
that their calls for reform would be considered. Officers threat- 
ened with dismissal for signing the petition were reinstated, 
and other reform-minded officers were reportedly promoted. 

Internal Security 

Many of the domestic strains in Kuwait arise from the dis- 
parities between the living standards of Kuwaiti nationals and 
the majority of Kuwait's foreign population. Palestinian work- 



346 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

ers presented problems for the Al Sabah rulers for several 
decades, but, during the 1980s, militants and terrorists advanc- 
ing revolutionary Islam overshadowed the Palestinians as trou- 
blemakers. Kuwait's support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War 
accounted for much of the violence that disturbed internal sta- 
bility during the 1980s. A series of terrorist bombings in 1983 
aimed at Kuwaiti installations and the United States and 
French embassies were ascribed to events in Lebanon. A net- 
work of Hizballah terrorists was uncovered, and, in the spring 
of 1984, seventeen Shia were sentenced to long prison terms, 
and three were condemned to death. Airplane hijackings, 
explosions, car bombings, and an assassination attempt against 
the amir ensued. Kuwait steadfastly rejected demands for 
release of terrorists in its custody, most of whom were still in jail 
at the time of the Iraqi invasion and subsequently disappeared. 
A number of Kuwaiti Shia were sentenced for setting fires at oil 
installations in 1986 and 1987. The incidents declined after 
1988. 

Police and the Criminal Justice System 

The Ministry of Interior has overall responsibility for public 
security and law and order. Under the ministry, the national 
police has primary responsibility for maintaining public order 
and preventing and investigating crimes. The National Guard, 
a semiautonomous body, has guard duties on the border and at 
oil fields, utilities, and other strategic locations. The guard acts 
as a reserve for the regular forces and reinforces the metropol- 
itan police as needed. 

Police selected for officer rank attend a three-year program 
at the Police Academy. National Guard officer candidates 
attend the Kuwaiti Military College, after which they receive 
specialized guard training. Women work in certain police 
departments, such as criminal investigation, inquiries, and air- 
port security. 

The principal police divisions are criminal investigation, 
traffic, emergency police, nationality and passports, immigra- 
tion, prisons, civil defense, and trials and courts-martial. The 
criminal investigation division is responsible for ordinary crim- 
inal cases; Kuwait State Security investigates security-related 
offenses. Both are involved in investigations of terrorism and 
those suspected of collaboration with Iraq. 

The Kuwaiti judicial system generally provides fair public tri- 
als and an adequate appeals mechanism, according to the 
United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human 



347 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Rights Practices for 1991. Under Kuwaiti law, no detainee can be 
held for more than four days without charge; after being 
charged by a prosecutor, detention for up to an additional 
twenty-one days is possible. Persons held under the State Secu- 
rity Law can be detained. Bail is commonly set in all cases. The 
lowest level courts, aside from traffic courts, are the mis- 
demeanor courts that judge offenses subject to imprisonment 
not exceeding three years. Courts of first instance hear felony 
cases in which the punishment can exceed three years. All 
defendants in felony cases are required to be represented by 
attorneys, appointed by the court if necessary. Legal counsel is 
optional in misdemeanor cases, and the court is not obliged to 
provide an attorney. 

Kuwaiti authorities contend that the rate of ordinary crime 
is low, and data available through 1986 tended to bear this out. 
Of more than 5,000 felonies committed in that year, only 5 per- 
cent were in the category of theft. The number of misdemean- 
ors was roughly equal to the number of felonies, but only 10 
percent were thefts. Offenses involving forgery, fraud, bribery, 
assaults and threats, and narcotics and alcohol violations were 
all more common than thefts. 

Two separate State Security Court panels, each composed of 
three justices, hear crimes against state security or other cases 
referred to it by the Council of Ministers. Trials in the State 
Security Court, with few exceptions, are held in closed session. 
They do not, in the judgment of the Department of State, meet 
international standards for fair trials. Military courts, which 
ordinarily have jurisdiction only over members of the armed 
services or security forces, can try offenses charged against 
civilians under conditions of martial law. Martial law was 
imposed for the first time after the liberation of the country 
from Iraqi occupation. About 300 persons suspected of collabo- 
ration with Iraq were tried by military courts in May and June 
1991, and 115 were convicted. Twenty-nine received sentences 
of death, later commuted to life imprisonment after interna- 
tional criticism of the trials. Human rights groups drew atten- 
tion to the failure to provide adequate legal safeguards to 
defendants and an unwillingness to accept the defense that col- 
laboration with Iraqi forces had been coerced. Many of the 
accused alleged that their confessions had been extracted 
under torture. 

Human Rights Practices 

Prior to the occupation of Kuwait in 1990, the principal 



348 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

human rights concerns, aside from widespread restriction on 
the exercise of political expression, were instances of arbitrary 
arrest and mistreatment of prisoners and lack of due process in 
security trials. A number of Kuwaitis were arrested between late 
1989 and mid-1990 for political reasons and for participating in 
unlicensed gatherings. Noncitizens could be arbitrarily 
expelled if deemed security risks and were also subject to 
deportation if they were unable to find work after being 
released from their initial employment. Some foreigners 
reportedly were held in deportation centers for up to five years 
because they were unable to provide for their own travel out of 
the country. According to the Department of State, there were 
plausible reports of occasional torture and violence in appre- 
hending and interrogating criminal suspects. 

The seven-month Iraqi occupation subjected Kuwaitis to a 
systematic terror campaign that included extrajudicial killings, 
torture and other inhuman treatment, kidnappings, and arbi- 
trary arrest and detention. There were many credible accounts 
of killings, not only of members of the Kuwaiti resistance but 
also of their families, other civilians, and young children. 
Attacks on Iraqi soldiers resulted in reprisal actions in neigh- 
borhoods where attacks had taken place and included sum- 
mary and random execution of innocent civilians. Many 
Kuwaiti citizens also disappeared at the hands of the Iraqi occu- 
pation authorities. Large-scale executions of young men by 
gunfire or by hanging were reported. About 850 Kuwaitis 
remained unaccounted for in early 1993, many of them pre- 
sumably killed while in Iraqi detention. Iraq insisted that it had 
no Kuwaiti prisoners. 

After the restoration of the amirate government in 1991, 
there were many reports of beatings and torture to extract con- 
fessions from suspected collaborators. The Department of 
State estimated that forty-five to fifty Palestinian and other for- 
eigners were tortured to death by police or military personnel. 
As many as 5,800 persons, mostly non-Kuwaitis, were detained 
on suspicion of collaboration during the four months of mar- 
tial law that followed the country's liberation. Many arrests 
were arbitrary, and some detainees were held for months with- 
out being charged. As of early 1993, about 900 persons were 
still in detention; these included persons convicted in the State 
Security Court or martial law courts and those under deporta- 
tion order but with no place to go. Of the prewar population of 
about 400,000 Palestinians resident in Kuwait, only about 
30,000 remained. Most of the departures occurred during the 



349 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Iraqi occupation; the remainder left because of less favorable 
living circumstances or because of Kuwaiti pressure. 

Bahrain 

After more than 100 years of British presence and protec- 
tion, Bahrain gained full independence on August 15, 1971. 
The agreement granting independence contained no provi- 
sion for British defense in an emergency, but it did provide for 
consultation. British authorities hoped that Bahrain, the most 
economically and socially advanced of the small gulf states, 
might take the lead in a federation similar to that of the UAE, 
but Bahrain opted instead for complete independence. Shaykh 
Isa ibn Salman Al Khalifa, leader of the Al Khalifa since the 
death of his father in 1961, became the newly independent 
country's first amir and continued as the hereditary ruler in 
1993. 

The constitution designates the amir supreme commander 
of the armed forces. In 1977 Isa ibn Salman chose his eldest 
son and heir apparent, Hamad ibn Isa Al Khalifa, to be minis- 
ter of defense and commander in chief of the Bahrain Defense 
Force (BDF). In 1988 the former chief of staff, Major General 
Khalifa ibn Ahmad Al Khalifa, was named minister of defense, 
but Hamad ibn Isa retained the position of commander in 
chief in 1993. Other members of the Al Khalifa in prominent 
military positions include the new chief of staff, Brigadier Gen- 
eral Abd Allah ibn Salman Al Khalifa, as well as the assistant 
chief of staff for operations, the chief of naval staff, and the 
commander of the air force. As in other Persian Gulf states, the 
ruling family keeps a tight hold on important positions in the 
national security structure. 

The BDF is principally dedicated to the maintenance of 
internal security and the protection of the shores of the Bah- 
rain archipelago. Nevertheless, with the rise of tensions in the 
Persian Gulf, the force has nearly tripled in size since 1984 and 
has added significantly to its inventory of modern armaments. 
Its total personnel strength in 1992 was about 6,150: army, 
5,000; navy, 500; and air force, 650. The Bahraini army is orga- 
nized into one brigade, consisting of two mechanized infantry 
battalions, one tank battalion, one special forces battalion, an 
armored car squadron, and two artillery and two mortar batter- 
ies. Its principal armored weapons are M-60A3 main battle 
tanks purchased from the United States in the late 1980s. Deliv- 
eries are awaited on an order for eighty United States M-113 
APCs, supplementing a mixed accumulation of older armored 



350 





A-4KU Skyhawk aircraft of the Kuwaiti air force being serviced in 
Saudi Arabia in preparation for an Operation Desert Storm mission 
UH-1W Iroquois helicopter of the Bahrain Defense Force takes part in 
a training mission following Operation Desert Storm. 

Courtesy United States Air Force 



351 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

vehicles. The army's artillery pieces consist of a few towed 
105mm and 155mm howitzers. Its principal antitank weapon is 
the BGM-71A-TOW wire-guided missile (see table 39, Appen- 
dix). 

Until 1979, when its first fast-attack craft were ordered from 
the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Bahrain's 
maritime force was a coast guard under the supervision of the 
minister of interior. As of 1992, the navy was equipped with two 
Lurssen sixty-two-meter corvettes. One Dauphin helicopter 
armed with an antiship missile has been delivered for use with 
the corvettes. The navy also has in its inventory four forty-five- 
meter Lurssen fast-attack craft and two thirty-eight-meter craft. 
The coast guard operates a variety of patrol craft, as well as 
three landing craft and a Hovercraft. 

The Bahraini air force began operations in 1977 with a 
gradually expanding fleet of helicopters. Its first combat air- 
craft — United States F-5s — were acquired in 1986, followed in 
1990 by more advanced F-16s. As of 1992, it had twelve F-5s 
and twelve F-16s. Eight Apache attack helicopters were 
ordered from the United States in 1991 to defend the archipel- 
ago and offshore oil platforms against incursions or terrorist 
action. I-Hawk SAMs are on order as the principal air defense 
weapon. After initially being denied shoulder-fired Stinger 
SAMs by congressional objections, Bahrain was allowed to pur- 
chase the weapons on a provisional basis and later to retain 
them permanently. The main air force base is adjacent to Bah- 
rain International Airport on Al Muharraq. Another base 
developed for use in the Persian Gulf War is available near the 
southern tip of Bahrain; as of 1992, it was being used for servic- 
ing carrier-based United States aircraft. 

Defense expenditures, which reached a peak of US$281 mil- 
lion in 1982, fell off sharply before gradually rising again to 
US$237 million in 1992. Because of its declining revenue from 
oil, the amirate has fewer resources available for defense than 
the more prosperous gulf states. The GCC had allotted Bahrain 
and Oman a special subsidy of US$1.8 billion between 1984 
and 1994. Bahrain's share enabled it to purchase new fighter 
aircraft and to construct its new air base. 

At the time of the British withdrawal in 1971, the United 
States leased port and docking facilities from the government 
of Bahrain for the United States Middle East Force. This was, in 
fact, an extension of a United States-British agreement, in 
effect since the late 1940s, enabling United States naval vessels 
to use facilities at Al Jufayr, a port section of the capital, Man- 



352 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

ama. The agreement was a sensitive one because none of the 
Arab states of the gulf wanted to appear to be submitting to any 
new form of colonialism or to be too closely associated with the 
United States, the main supporter of Israel. In 1977 the amir's 
government terminated the lease. The headquarters of the 
United States Middle East Force was compelled to move aboard 
one of the three ships that constituted the force. Otherwise, lit- 
tle changed as a result of the termination of the lease. United 
States ships — with the aid of a support unit staffed by about 
sixty-five United States naval personnel — were still permitted to 
use Bahraini port facilities for naval operations in the gulf to 
ensure the availability of fuel, communications, and supplies. 
During the Iran-Iraq War, when attacks on gulf shipping threat- 
ened Bahrain's oil refining and tanker servicing operations, 
United States personnel and military cargoes were permitted 
to transit the region via Bahrain International Airport. Large 
barges in Bahraini waters were used as bases for United States 
attack helicopters, radar, and air defense weapons. In October 
1991, Bahrain signed a defense cooperation agreement with 
the United States similar to that previously concluded between 
the United States and Kuwait. The agreement provided for 
port access, equipment storage, and joint exercises. 

Role in the Persian Gulf War 

Bahrain played a limited but active role in the Persian Gulf 
War. Bahraini ground forces were among the 3,000 Peninsula 
Shield force of the GCC (exclusive of Saudi Arabian and 
Kuwaiti troops) that were assigned to a support role during 
Operation Desert Storm as part of Joint Forces Command East. 
Bahrain was the primary coalition naval base and was the point 
of origin for coalition air operations against Iraqi targets. Bah- 
raini pilots joined other members of the coalition in flying 
strikes into Iraq. Three Scud missiles were aimed at Bahrain 
during the war. Only one landed in the country, and it did not 
hit a target area. There were no Bahraini combat deaths in the 
war. 

Internal Security 

The Bahraini national police force was believed by most 
sources to number about 2,000 in 1992. In addition to the 
usual police functions, the mission of the force is to prevent 
sectarian violence and terrorist actions. Bahrain has a high pro- 
portion of native Shia, possibly 65 to 70 percent of the popula- 



353 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

tion, who tend to resent their inferior status in the social and 
economic structure. The government sought to moderate the 
socioreligious cleavage by appointing Shia to a number of cabi- 
net posts and senior civil service posts, although generally not 
in security-related positions. A failed coup d'etat against the Al 
Khalifa in 1981 resulted in the expulsion or trial of many Shia 
dissidents. A number of persons were arrested in 1987. In 1989 
twenty-two persons were sentenced to prison by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, sitting as the Security Court, for plotting to 
overthrow the government. 

Two clandestine political groups are active in Bahrain. The 
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which was respon- 
sible for the 1981 coup attempt, consists of militant Shia calling 
for violent revolution. The Islamic Call Party is more moderate, 
calling for social and economic reforms. Two secular leftist 
groups that espouse Arab nationalist ideologies are the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and the National Front for 
the Liberation of Bahrain. Their influence appeared to be on 
the decline as of early 1993. The agencies of the Ministry of 
Interior, the police force, and the Security and Intelligence Ser- 
vice (SIS) maintain strict control over political activity. It is 
thought that their operations are extensive and highly effec- 
tive. Detention and arrest can result from actions construed as 
antiregime activity, such as membership in illegal organiza- 
tions, antigovernment demonstrations, possession or circula- 
tion of antiregime writings, or preaching of sermons of a 
radical or extreme Islamist tone. The Department of State 
reported some loosening of controls in 1991 over actions previ- 
ously regarded as subversive, reflecting the government's 
assessment that domestic and foreign threats to its security had 
receded. 

Under the State Security Act of 1974, persons can be 
detained for up to three years, with a right of appeal after a 
period of three months and thereafter every six months. 
Arrested persons tried in ordinary criminal courts are provided 
the usual guarantees, such as public trials, the right to counsel 
(including legal aid if needed), and the right of appeal. Prison- 
ers charged with security offenses are tried directly by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, sitting as the Security Court. The 
procedural guarantees of the penal code do not apply: pro- 
ceedings are in secret, and there is no right of judicial appeal, 
although cases can be referred to the amir for clemency. 

According to Department of State human rights studies, 
there have been credible reports that the SIS engages in tor- 



354 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

ture and mistreatment of detainees. Convictions in some cases 
have been based only on confessions that allegedly have been 
extracted by torture. There were, however, no confirmed cases 
of torture in 1991. The independent human rights group 
Amnesty International claimed that as of 1992, about seventy 
political prisoners, many with ties to banned Islamic groups, 
were serving sentences after unfair trials. Between 220 and 270 
people were held in Bahraini jails in 1992. Of these, fewer than 
100 were thought to be serving sentences for security offenses. 

Qatar 

In company with other gulf amirates, Qatar had long-stand- 
ing ties with Britain but had remained under nominal Otto- 
man hegemony until 1916, when Qatar formally became a 
British protected state. During the next five decades, Britain 
also exercised considerable influence in the internal affairs of 
the amirate. When the announcement came that Britain would 
withdraw its military forces from the gulf by 1971, Qatari lead- 
ers were forced to consider how to survive without British pro- 
tection. Unable to support a large military establishment, 
Qatar has placed its reliance on small but mobile forces that 
can deter border incursions. Nevertheless, the Iran-Iraq War 
brought attacks on shipping just beyond its territorial waters, 
underscoring Qatar's vulnerability to interference with oil ship- 
ments and vital imports. In addition to seeking collective secu- 
rity through the GCC, Qatar has turned to close ties with Saudi 
Arabia, entering into a bilateral defense agreement in 1982. 

The ruler in 1992, Shaykh Khalifa ibn Hamad Al Thani, had 
taken control of the country twenty years earlier, when the 
leading members of the ruling family decided that Khalifa's 
cousin, Ahmad ibn Ali Al Thani, should be replaced because of 
his many shortcomings as amir. As supreme commander of the 
armed forces, Khalifa ibn Hamad issued a decree in 1977 
appointing his son and heir apparent, Hamad ibn Khalifa Al 
Thani, to the post of commander in chief. The same decree 
created the Ministry of Defense and named Hamad ibn Khalifa 
as minister. Hamad ibn Khalifa was a graduate of Sandhurst 
and had attained the rank of major general. 

At the time of independence on September 3, 1971, the 
armed forces consisted of little more than the Royal Guard 
Regiment and some scattered units equipped with a few 
armored cars and four aircraft. By 1992 it had grown to a force 
of 7,500, including an army of 6,000, a navy of 700, and an air 
force of 800. In addition to the Royal Guard Regiment, the 



355 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

army had expanded to include a tank battalion, three mecha- 
nized infantry battalions, a special forces company, a field artil- 
lery regiment, and a SAM battery. The combined combat 
strength of these units, however, is estimated to be no more 
than that of a reinforced regiment in a Western army. 

Initially outfitted with British weaponry, Qatar shifted much 
of its procurement to France during the 1980s in response to 
French efforts to develop closer relations. The tank battalion is 
equipped with French-built AMX-30 main battle tanks. Other 
armored vehicles include French AMX-10P APGs and the 
French VAB, which has been adopted as the standard wheeled 
combat vehicle. The artillery unit has a few French 155mm self- 
propelled howitzers (see table 40, Appendix). The principal 
antitank weapons are French Milan and HOT wire-guided mis- 
siles. Qatar had also illicitly acquired a few Stinger shoulder- 
fired SAMs, possibly from Afghan rebel groups, at a time when 
the United States was trying to maintain tight controls on 
Stingers in the Middle East. When Qatar refused to turn over 
the missiles, the United States Senate in 1988 imposed a ban 
on the sale of all weapons to Qatar. The ban was repealed in 
late 1990 when Qatar satisfactorily accounted for its disposition 
of the Stingers. 

Three French-built La Combattante III missile craft, which 
entered service in 1983, form the core of the navy. The missile 
craft supplement six older Vosper Thornycroft large patrol 
craft. A variety of smaller craft are operated by the marine 
police. 

The air force is equipped with combat aircraft and armed 
helicopters. Its fighter aircraft include Alpha Jets with a fighter- 
ground attack capability and one air defense squadron of 
Mirage Fls, all purchased from France. All of the aircraft are 
based at Doha International Airport. The planned purchase of 
Hawk and Patriot missile systems from the United States will 
give Qatar a modern ground-based air defense. British pilots 
on detail remain on duty with the air force, and French special- 
ists are employed in a maintenance capacity. Nevertheless, an 
increasing number of young Qataris have been trained as pilots 
and technicians. 

The lack of sufficient indigenous personnel to staff the 
armed forces is a continuing problem. By one estimate, Qatari 
citizens constitute only 30 percent of the army, in which more 
than twenty nationalities are represented. Many of the officers 
are of the royal family or members of leading tribes. Enlisted 
personnel are recruited from beduin tribes that move between 



356 



" • . wi -fro-" 
% 



Lieutenant General Charles Horner, commanding general, United States 
Central Air Force, congratulates Major Hamad ibn Abd Allah Al Khalifa, 
commander of Bahrain's Shaykh Is a Squadron, after awarding him the 
Legion of Merit for his support during Operation Desert Storm. 
A Qatari air force pilot performs a preflight check on his Mirage Fl 
aircraft before a mission during Operation Desert Storm. 

Courtesy United States Air Force 



357 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Qatar and Saudi Arabia and from other Arab groups. Many 
Pakistanis serve in combat units. In 1992 there were still a num- 
ber of British officers, as well as British, French, Jordanian, and 
Pakistani advisers and technicians. More young Qataris are 
being recruited, and the number of trained and competent 
Qatari officers is steadily increasing. 

Although official data on military expenditures are not pub- 
lished, the defense budget estimate of US$500 million for 1989 
was 8 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary). The estimate of US$934 million for 1991, an increase of 
80 percent over 1989, was presumably attributable to the costs 
of the Persian Gulf War. 

During the hostilities, the Qatari tank battalion was deployed 
to the Saudi-Iraqi border as part of Joint Forces Command 
East. Beginning on January 22, 1991, Qatari aircraft joined 
other countries in carrying out strikes against Iraqi forces. 
United States, Canadian, and French fighter squadrons flew 
daily missions from Doha during the gulf war. Saudi and Qatari 
forces that had dug in to defend the road leading south from 
the border town of Ras al Khafji were forced to withdraw when 
the Iraqis made their only incursion into Saudi territory on 
January 29, 1991. The three Saudi battalions and the one tank 
battalion from Qatar maintained contact with the Iraqi forces 
and participated in the coalition counterattack two days later 
that drove the Iraqis out of the town with considerable losses. 
The Qatari contingent, composed mostly of Pakistani recruits, 
acquitted itself well. The Qatari battalion also formed part of 
the Arab forces that advanced across Iraqi positions toward the 
city of Kuwait during the general coalition offensive on Febru- 
ary 24, 1991. One Qatari tank was lost in the engagement, and 
a number of Arab soldiers were killed or wounded. No Qatari 
combat deaths were reported during the war. 

Although the amirate has experienced little internal unrest, 
the large number of foreigners — forming 80 percent of the 
work force — is regarded as a possible source of instability. 
Qatar is determined to maintain control over their activities 
and limit their influence. A significant number of resident Pal- 
estinians, some of whom included prominent businessmen and 
civil servants, were expelled after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
Iranian Shia have not been the source of problems but are nev- 
ertheless looked on as potential subversives. Foreigners are lia- 
ble to face arbitrary police action and harassment and often 
complain of mistreatment after their arrest. 



358 




7 



i 



.A, 



ML 





General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief, United States 
Central Command, with Brigadier General Muhammad ibn Abd Allah al 
Attiyah of Qatar, whom he presented with the Legion of Merit for his role in 

Operation Desert Storm 

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf speaks with Lieutenant General Khamis 
ihn Humaid ibn Salim al Kilbani, chief of staff , Royal Oman Land Forces, 
while touring As Sib Air Base during Operation Desert Storm. 

Courtesy United States Air Force 



359 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

The Ministry of Interior has controlled the police force of 
about 2,500 members since 1990. The local police enforces 
laws and arrests violators. The General Administration of Pub- 
lic Security, which in 1991 replaced the Criminal Investigation 
Department, is a separate unit of the ministry charged with 
investigation of crimes. The Mubahathat (secret police office), 
a nearly independent branch of the Ministry of Interior, deals 
with sedition and espionage. The army's mission does not 
include internal security, although the army can be called on in 
the event of serious civil disturbances. Nevertheless, a separate 
agency, the Mukhabarat (intelligence service), is under armed 
forces jurisdiction. Its function is to intercept and arrest terror- 
ists and to keep surveillance over political dissidents. 

Qatar has both civil and sharia courts, but only sharia courts 
have jurisdiction in criminal matters. Lacking permanent secu- 
rity courts, security cases are tried by specially established mili- 
tary courts, but such cases have been rare. In sharia criminal 
cases, the proceedings are closed, and lawyers play no formal 
role except to prepare the accused for trial. After the parties 
state their cases and after witnesses are examined by the judge, 
the verdict is usually delivered with little delay. No bail is set, 
but in minor cases, charged persons may be released to a 
Qatari sponsor. Most of the floggings prescribed by sharia law 
are administered, but physical mutilation is not allowed, and 
no executions have occurred since the 1980s. 

The police routinely monitor the communications of sus- 
pects and security risks. Although warrants are usually required 
for searches, this does not apply in cases involving national 
security. The security forces reportedly have applied severe 
force and torture in investigating political and security-related 
cases. Suspects can be incarcerated without charge, although 
this is infrequent. The United States Department of State 
noted that standards of police conduct have improved in spite 
of a 1991 incident in which a group of Qataris were detained 
without charge for two months in connection with the unau- 
thorized publication of tracts and letters critical of the govern- 
ment; at least one member of the group, which included 
several members of the ruling family, is said to have been 
beaten. 

United Arab Emirates 
Background 

The numerous treaties that Britain concluded with the sev- 



360 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

eral gulf amirates in the nineteenth century provided, inter 
alia, that the British were responsible for foreign relations and 
protection from attack by sea. Until the early 1950s, the princi- 
pal military presence in the Trucial Coast states (sometimes 
referred to as Trucial Oman) consisted of British-led Arab 
security forces and the personal bodyguard units of the ruling 
shaykhs. In 1951 the British formed the Trucial Oman Levies 
(later called the Trucial Oman Scouts) under a British com- 
mander who reported to the British political agent of the gulf. 
Arabs from the Trucial Coast made up only about 40 percent of 
the strength; Omanis, Iranians, Pakistanis, and Indians made 
up the remainder. Organized as light armored cavalry, the 
scouts used British weapons, trucks, and armored cars in carry- 
ing out police functions and in keeping peace among the tribes 
of the various amirates. During its approximately two decades 
of existence, the unit was respected for its impartial role in 
maintaining public order on the coast. 

By the time the United Arab Emirates (UAE) became inde- 
pendent on December 2, 1971, the scouts had become a 
mobile force of about 1,600 men, trained and led by about 
thirty British officers assisted by Jordanian noncommissioned 
officers (NCOs). At the time of independence and federation, 
the Trucial Oman Scouts became the nucleus of the Union 
Defense Force (UDF), responsible to the federal minister of 
defense, the Supreme Council of the Union, and — ulti- 
mately — to the president of the federation, Shaykh Zayid ibn 
Sultan Al Nuhayyan, ruler of Abu Dhabi, who continued to fill 
this office in 1993. Separate amirate forces are also authorized 
by the provisional constitution, and the separate entities of the 
union — especially Abu Dhabi — have made clear that they 
intend to maintain their own forces. Drawing on tremendous 
oil wealth accumulated in the early 1960s, the amir of Abu 
Dhabi gave high priority to the development of the Abu Dhabi 
Defense Force (ADDF) when the British withdrawal from the 
gulf was announced. The ADDF — with 15,000 men and prima- 
rily British and Jordanian officers — consisted of three army bat- 
talions, an artillery battery, twelve Hawker Hunter fighter- 
bombers, and a sea defense wing of four fast patrol boats. 
Dubayy had a much smaller force of 2,000, Ras al Khaymah had 
900, and Sharjah had even fewer. 

Personnel for the UDF and separate amirate forces were 
recruited from several countries of the region, but soon after 
independence enlistments from the Dhofar region in Oman 
and from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, 



361 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

also seen as South Yemen) were curtailed out of fear that per- 
sonnel from these areas might spread dangerous revolutionary 
doctrines. As the largest in territory, the most populous, and by 
far the richest of the amirates, Abu Dhabi has borne the brunt 
of funding the federation's military establishment. A major 
step toward unification of forces occurred in 1976 when Abu 
Dhabi, Dubayy, and Ras al Khaymah announced the merger of 
their separate armed forces with the UDF. Sharjah had previ- 
ously merged its police and small military units into the UDF. 

Despite the promises and pledges of 1976, true integration 
and unification of the UAE armed forces has not occurred. 
The UDF is seen by some, particularly the amir of Dubayy, as 
merely an extension of Abu Dhabi power. Individual amirs view 
their forces as symbols of sovereignty no matter the size or com- 
bat readiness of the units. The separate forces therefore con- 
tinue as they had earlier, but they are called regional 
commands, only nominally part of the UDF. Shaykh Zayid ibn 
Sultan's attempt to install his eighteen-year-old son as com- 
mander in chief in 1978 shook the fragile unity of the UDF. 
Although the appointment was rescinded, Dubayy strength- 
ened its resolve to maintain the autonomy of the Central Mili- 
tary Command, its own regional military command. 

As of 1992, the commander in chief of the UDF was Zayid 
ibn Sultan. The crown prince, Lieutenant General Khalifa ibn 
Zayid Al Nuhayyan, held immediate command as deputy com- 
mander in chief. The chief of staff with operational responsibil- 
ities was Major General Muhammad Said al Badi, a UAE 
national who replaced a Jordanian general in the post in the 
early 1980s. His headquarters was in Abu Dhabi. The minister 
of defense was Shaykh Muhammad ibn Rashid Al Maktum, son 
of the ruler of Dubayy. The ministry, located in Dubayy, con- 
cerned itself primarily with administrative, personnel, and 
logistic matters and apparently had little influence on opera- 
tional aspects of the UDF. 

In data published by the Department of State in mid-1991, 
the total strength of the UDF with responsibility for defense of 
six of the seven amirates was estimated at 60,000. Dubayy forces 
of the Central Military Command with responsibility for the 
defense of Dubayy were given as 12,000. The Department of 
State estimated that there were 1,800 in the UDF air force and 
1,000 in the navy. Estimates of ground forces given in The Mili- 
tary Balance, 1992-1993 were significantly lower. 

The Military Balance stated that perhaps 30 percent of the 
armed services consist of foreigners, although other sources 



362 



~ X ■■■■1 

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf presents the Legion of Merit to 
Major General Muhammad Said al Badi, chief of staff United Arab 
Emirates Union Defense Force, for his contribution to the coalition 

during Operation Desert Storm. 
Courtesy United States Air Force 

claim that the forces have a much higher proportion of non- 
UAE nationals. Omanis predominate in the enlisted ranks, but 
there are also many Pakistanis among the more than twenty 
nationalities represented. Well into the 1980s, many mid-level 
officers were Britons under contract, as well as Pakistanis and 
Omanis. By 1991 the officer corps was composed almost exclu- 
sively of amirate nationals, according to the Department of 
State. The UAE lacks a conscription system and is unlikely to 
adopt one. It was announced in 1990 that all university stu- 
dents would undergo military training as a requirement for 
graduation. Although adopted as a reaction to the Iraqi inva- 
sion of Kuwait, the UAE authorities reportedly are considering 
continuation of the requirement as a possible prelude to 
reservist training. 

Organization and Equipment 

The principal units of the UDF in 1993 were one mecha- 
nized infantry brigade, one armored brigade, two infantry bri- 
gades, one artillery brigade, and the Royal Guard, organized 
along brigade lines. The Central Military Command of Dubayy 



363 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

supplies one infantry brigade. Major weapons include French 
AMX-30 main battle tanks, of which an additional twenty-five 
tanks are on order. The Central Military Command separately 
purchased Italian OF-40 Mk 2 Lion tanks. French armor pre- 
dominates throughout the army; it includes reconnaissance 
vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, APCs, and 155mm self-pro- 
pelled howitzers (see table 41, Appendix). Negotiations were 
reportedly under way in 1992 for the purchase of 337 M1A1 
tanks from the United States. The UAE also has a variety of 
older British armored vehicles, many of them in storage, as well 
as Brazilian APCs. The army's antitank guided wire missiles 
include twenty-five TOWs from the United States, some of 
them mounted on Urutu chassis, as well as French Milan and 
HOT and the older British Vigilant systems. Because of difficul- 
ties of coordination between air- and ground-based defenses, 
the operation of air defense missiles was shifted to the air force 
in 1988. The army's tactical air defense is limited to 20mm and 
30mm guns. 

The most powerful units of the UDF navy are two Lurssen 
corvettes delivered by Germany in 1991, similar to those of the 
Bahraini navy. The corvettes are supplemented by fast-attack 
craft and large patrol boats. 

The air force is organized into two fighter-ground attack 
squadrons, one air defense squadron, and one counterinsur- 
gency squadron. The fighter-ground attack squadrons are 
equipped with Mirage Ills and British Hawks, the latter with a 
combined attack and training role. The fighter squadron is 
composed of Mirage 5s and Mirage 2000s. The counterinsur- 
gency squadron is equipped with the Italian Aermacchi. In 
addition, the air force has four early warning aircraft. A num- 
ber of French helicopters are armed with Exocet, HOT, and 
other air-to-ground missiles. In 1991 the United States agreed 
to the sale of twenty Apache attack helicopters after the admin- 
istration overcame objections in Congress by pointing out that 
the helicopters were needed to defend the UAE's oil platforms 
in the gulf and to enable the UAE to contribute more effec- 
tively to the deterrence of aggression by Iraq. 

The existing air defense system is based on one air defense 
brigade organized into thirteen batteries armed with Rapier, 
Crotale, and RBS-70 SAMs. Five batteries of improved Hawk 
missiles were being formed in 1992, with training provided by 
the United States. 



364 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

The Role of the United Arab Emirates in the Iran-Iraq War and 
the Persian Gulf War 

The attitude of the UAE during attacks on international 
shipping in the Iran-Iraq War was ambivalent. The amirates 
were profiting from a brisk reexport trade with Iran; further- 
more, they felt vulnerable because their offshore oil facilities 
were exposed to the danger of Iranian attack. Dubayy and Ras 
al Khaymah in particular, with a substantial number of Iranians 
and native Shia, leaned toward Iran and were reluctant to aban- 
don their neutrality. Abu Dhabi, however, as the richest oil 
state, adopted a pro-Arab stance in the war favoring Iraq. An 
offshore oil platform belonging to Abu Dhabi was hit by Ira- 
nian missiles in 1987; although denying responsibility, Iran 
paid an indemnity. The Department of State credited the UAE 
with supporting the United States Navy during its convoy oper- 
ations despite Iranian threats of retaliation. 

Reversing its earlier policy of avoiding collaboration with 
foreign military powers, the UAE, according to the Depart- 
ment of State, was the first Persian Gulf state to propose com- 
bined military action to deter Iraq when it threatened war 
against Kuwait. An air refueling exercise between United States 
and UAE aircraft one week before the invasion of Kuwait was 
intended as a warning signal to Iraq. During the Persian Gulf 
War, UAE troops, reportedly numbering several hundred, par- 
ticipated in the conflict as part of the GCC Peninsula Shield 
force that advanced into the city of Kuwait. United States air- 
craft bombed Iraqi positions from the UAE, and United States 
ships, including aircraft carriers, operated out of UAE ports. 
The UAE air force also carried out strikes against Iraqi forces. 
A total of six UAE combat deaths were reported as a result of 
the fighting. 

The UAE defense budget remained fairly stable at about 
US$1.6 billion between 1988 and 1991. However, an additional 
US$3.3 billion represented UAE contributions and pledges in 
1991 to other countries in connection with the war. Total UAE 
support to other countries participating in the Persian Gulf 
War was reported to have reached US$6 billion by mid-1991; 
payments of nearly US$3.8 billion had been made to the 
United States, US$500 million to Britain, and US$1.4 billion to 
Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and seven other nations, combined, to 
offset their economic losses from the war. Oil prices and UAE 
oil production rose significantly after the outbreak of the gulf 
crisis; exports rose from US$15.5 billion in 1989 to US$21.0 bil- 
lion in 1990. However, the balance of payments was negative 



365 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

for the first time as a result of UAE contributions to other 
countries affected by the crisis and large capital transfers out of 
the country during the period. 

Internal Security Problems 

In the past, internal dynastic rivalries within individual 
amirates were often sources of tension and even bloodshed. In 
part, this resulted from the absence of clearly established rules 
of succession. More recently, however, heirs apparent have usu- 
ally been designated, most often the eldest son of the amir. 
Intra-UAE rivalries no longer take a violent form, but the con- 
tinued existence of independent military forces and competi- 
tion in acquiring arms bring with them a costly proliferation of 
weapons that complicates training and logistics. 

The threat of subversion from resident Iranians and native 
Shia seems to be less acute in the UAE than in other gulf states 
in spite of the large Shia population in Dubayy. Dubayy and 
Sharjah have traditionally maintained good relations with Iran 
and enjoyed profits from maritime trade, particularly the trans- 
shipment of items officially banned in Iran to conserve foreign 
exchange. 

The provisional constitution authorizes federal police and 
security guard forces, which are subordinate to the Ministry of 
Interior. The strength of the police force has not been 
reported but is estimated as relatively large and vigilant in exer- 
cising control over political activities. Individual shaykhs had 
their own police forces before independence and maintained 
those forces after unification. Both the federal government 
and the amirate of Dubayy retain independent internal security 
organizations. The police forces of the other amirates are also 
involved in antinarcotic and antiterrorist activities. 

Criminal cases are tried either by sharia courts administered 
by each amirate or by civil courts of the federal system that exist 
in several amirates. Rights of due process are accorded under 
both systems. Defendants are entitled to legal counsel. No for- 
mal public defender system exists, but the judge has responsi- 
bility for looking after the interests of persons not represented 
by counsel. Under the Criminal Procedures Code adopted in 
1992, the accused has the right to defense counsel, provided by 
the government, if necessary, in cases involving possible sen- 
tence of death or life imprisonment. There are no jury trials, 
but trials are open except in cases involving national security or 
morals offenses. No separate security courts exist, and military 
courts try only military personnel in a system based on Western 



366 




Lieutenant General Charles Homer presents Muhammad an Nahyan, a 
United Arab Emirates Union Defense Force air force officer, with a pistol 
in recognition of his performance during Operation Desert Storm. 

Courtesy United States Air Force 

military judicial principles. According to Department of State 
human rights reports, the criminal court system is generally 
regarded as fair. Despite the lack of a formal bail system, there 
are instances of release on deposit of money or passport. 

Detentions must be reported to the attorney general within 
forty-eight hours; the attorney general must decide within 
twenty-four hours whether to charge, release, or allow further 
limited detention. Most persons receive expeditious trials, 
although Iraqis and Palestinians had been held incommuni- 
cado in detention for one or two months in 1991. Others were 
being held in jail because they were unwilling or unable to 
return to their countries of origin. 

Oman 
Background 

As a regional commercial power in the nineteenth century, 
Oman held territories on the island of Zanzibar off the coast of 
East Africa, in Mombasa along the coast of East Africa, and 
until 1958 in Gwadar (in present-day Pakistan) on the coast of 
the Arabian Sea. When its East African possessions were lost, 



367 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Oman withdrew into isolationism in the southeast corner of 
the Arabian Peninsula. Another of the Persian Gulf states with 
long-standing ties to the British, Oman became important in 
the British-French rivalry in the nineteenth century when 
France challenged the British Empire for control of the trade 
routes to the East. Although nominally an independent sultan- 
ate, Oman enjoyed the protection of the empire without being, 
de jure, in the category of a colony. With its external defenses 
guaranteed and its overseas territories lost, the sultanate had 
no need for armed forces other than mercenaries to safeguard 
the personal position of the sultan. 

In 1952 a small Saudi constabulary force occupied the Al 
Buraymi Oasis, where tribes from Oman and Abu Dhabi had 
traditionally resided. When arbitration failed, the British sent a 
force of Trucial Oman Scouts to expel the Saudis in 1955. 
Later in the same decade, the sultan called on British troops to 
aid in putting down a rebellion led by the former imam (see 
Glossary) of Oman, who attempted to establish a separate state 
free of rule from Muscat. British ground and air forces dis- 
patched to aid the Muscat and Oman Field Force succeeded in 
overcoming the rebels in early 1959. Nevertheless, instead of a 
minor intertribal affair in Oman's hinterland, the rebellion 
became an international incident, attracting wide sympathy 
and support among members of the League of Arab States 
(Arab League) and the UN. 

An agreement between Sultan Said ibn Taimur Al Said and 
the British government in 1958 led to the creation of the Sul- 
tan's Armed Forces (SAF) and the promise of British assistance 
in military development. The agreement included the detail- 
ing of British officers and confirmed the existing rights of Brit- 
ain's Royal Air Force to use facilities at Salalah in the Dhofar 
region and on Masirah, an island off the Omani coast in the 
Arabian Sea. 

Sultan Said ibn Taimur was ultraconservative and opposed 
to change of any kind. Kindled by Arab nationalism, a rebellion 
broke out in 1964 in Dhofar, the least developed area of Oman. 
Although begun as a tribal separatist movement against a reac- 
tionary ruler, the rebellion was backed by leftist elements in the 
PDRY Its original aim was the overthrow of Said ibn Taimur, 
but, by 1967, under the name of the Popular Front for the Lib- 
eration of the Occupied Arabian Gulf, which in 1974 was 
changed to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman 
(PFLO), it adopted much wider goals. Supported by the Soviet 
Union through the PDRY, the rebellion hoped to spread revo- 



368 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

lution throughout the conservative regimes of the Arabian 
Peninsula. 

Said ibn Taimur's reprisals against the Dhofari people 
tended to drive them into the rebel camp. In 1970, as the Dho- 
fari guerrilla attacks expanded, Said ibn Taimur's son, Qabus 
ibn Said Al Said, replaced his father in a coup carried out with 
the assistance of British officers. Qabus ibn Said, a Sandhurst 
graduate and veteran of British army service, began a program 
to modernize the country and to develop the armed forces. In 
addition to British troops and advisers, the new sultan was 
assisted by troops sent by the shah of Iran. Aid also came from 
India, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, all inter- 
ested in ensuring that Oman did not become a "people's 
republic." An Iranian brigade, along with artillery and helicop- 
ters, arrived in Dhofar in 1973. After the arrival of the Iranians, 
the combined forces consolidated their positions on the coastal 
plain and moved against the guerrillas' mountain stronghold. 
By stages, the Omanis and Iranians gradually subdued the 
guerrilla forces, pressing their remnants closer and closer to 
the PDRY border. In December 1975, having driven the PFLO 
from Omani territory, the sultan declared that the war had 
been won. Total Omani, British, and Iranian casualties during 
the final two and one-half years of the conflict were about 500. 

Mission of the Armed Forces 

After 1970 the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF; later renamed 
the Royal Armed Forces) became one of the more modern and 
better trained fighting forces among the Arab gulf states. Rec- 
ognizing its strategic importance guarding the Strait of Hor- 
muz (through which nearly one-fifth of the world's oil 
transited) and the Gulf of Oman, the sultanate has struggled to 
maintain a high degree of military preparedness in spite of its 
limited financial means. Its defense budget in 1992 was esti- 
mated at US$1.7 billion, exclusive of the GCC subsidy shared 
with Bahrain. It has periodically tested the capabilities of its 
armed forces by engaging in joint exercises with Western pow- 
ers, particularly in regular exercises with British forces. Oman 
has taken the initiative in efforts to strengthen regional collec- 
tive security through the GCC. At the conclusion of the Persian 
Gulf War, it proposed the development of a GCC regional secu- 
rity force of 100,000 personnel. 

For many years after the defeat of the Dhofari insurgents, 
Oman regarded its southern border with the PDRY as the most 
likely source of future conflict. The PDRY provided the Dhofari 



369 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

rebels with supplies, training camps, and refuge from attacks. 
Omani ground and air strength was concentrated at Salalah, 
Thamarit, and other towns near the PDRY border. The threat 
of PFLO dissident activity supported by the PDRY or border 
operations against Oman declined after reconciliation with the 
PDRY, marked by the exchange of ambassadors in 1987. 

Apart from its military role, the SAF carried out a variety of 
civic-action projects that, particularly in Dhofar, were an impor- 
tant means of gaining the allegiance of the people. Military 
engineers assisted road construction in mountain areas. The 
air force carried out supply operations and provided medical 
service to remote areas. The navy performed similar duties 
along Oman's long coastline. The navy also patrolled the sul- 
tanate's territorial waters and the 370-kilometer Exclusive Eco- 
nomic Zone to deter smuggling and illegal fishing. 

Organization and Equipment of the Armed Forces 

Sultan Qabus ibn Said retained for himself the positions of 
prime minister and minister of defense. The sultan's uncle, 
Fahar ibn Taimur Al Said, served as deputy prime minister for 
security and defense. Between 1970 and 1987, the armed forces 
commander, as well as the heads of the air force and navy, were 
British generals and admirals on loan. As of early 1993, the 
chief of staff and the three service commanders were Omanis. 
As of 1992, personnel strength of the Royal Armed Forces (as 
they were renamed — RAF) had reached about 35,700, includ- 
ing 6,000 Royal Household troops (a 4,500 Royal Guard of 
Oman (RGO) brigade, two Special Forces regiments totaling 
700, the Royal Yacht Squadron of 150, and 650 other person- 
nel) and foreign personnel, believed to number about 3,700. 
The army, known as the Royal Oman Land Forces (ROLF), is 
the largest of the service branches with a strength of 20,000. 
The ROLF is organized into regiments, although each regi- 
ment is of no more than battalion size. It includes two armored 
regiments composed of three tank squadrons; one armored 
reconnaissance regiment composed of three armored car 
squadrons; eight infantry regiments, three of which are staffed 
by Baluchis; four artillery regiments; one air defense regiment 
of two batteries; one infantry reconnaissance regiment com- 
posed of three reconnaissance companies; two independent 
reconnaissance companies; one airborne regiment; and one 
field engineering regiment of three squadrons. A small tribal 
militia of rifle company strength on the Musandam Peninsula 
is known as the Musandam Security Force. 



370 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

One divisional headquarters and two brigade headquarters 
are maintained, within which the independent regiments can 
be combined into larger fighting units. The separate Royal 
Household troops consist of the RGO, the Special Forces ele- 
ments (trained by British commandos), and personnel to staff 
the royal yacht and a number of transport aircraft and helicop- 
ters. The RGO, an elite corps with the primary function of pro- 
tecting the sultan and performing ceremonial duties, has a 
separate identity within the ROLF but is trained to operate in 
the field alongside other army formations. 

The two tank squadrons are equipped with United States 
M-60A1 and M-60A3 tanks and with British Chieftains. The 
armored car squadrons are outfitted with British Scorpion light 
tanks and French VBC-90s. The ROLF lacks armored equip- 
ment for troop movement, depending on Austrian Steyr cross- 
country vehicles. In July 1991, Oman ordered US$150 million 
worth of armored vehicles from the United States. The ROLF 
has a variety of towed artillery pieces; its principal antitank 
weapons are TOW and Milan guided missiles. Air defense is 
provided by a variety of guns and shoulder-fired SAMs (see 
table 42, Appendix) . 

Initially, nearly all the army officers and men were Baluchis 
from Pakistan, except for senior commanders, who were Brit- 
ish. As of early 1993, most of the officers were Omanis, 
although British involvement continued, especially in the 
armored regiment. The training battalion of the RAF conducts 
recruit training for all services at the RAF training center near 
Muscat. Officer candidates — who must serve at least one year 
in the enlisted ranks — attend the Sultan Qabus Military Col- 
lege and the Officers' Training School. In 1988 the first class of 
twenty officers graduated from the Sultan's Armed Forces 
Command and Staff College near Muscat. This is a tri-service 
school to prepare mid-ranking officers for senior command 
and staff appointments. Officers of other government security 
services and some civilian officials also attend. 

The Royal Oman Navy (RON), with a strength of 3,000 in 
1992, has its headquarters at As Sib, thirty-six kilometers west of 
Muscat. The principal naval establishment is the Said ibn Sul- 
tan Naval Base, completed in 1987, at Wudham Aiwa near As 
Sib. One of the largest engineering projects ever undertaken in 
Oman, it provides a home port for the RON fleet, training 
facilities, and workshops for carrying out all maintenance and 
repair activities. The Naval Training Center, located at the 
base, offers entry-level courses for officers and enlisted person- 



371 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

nel, as well as specialized branch training. Initially, the navy was 
staffed almost entirely by British officers and Pakistani NCOs. 
By the late 1980s, most ship commanders were Omanis, 
although many Pakistani and British technical personnel 
remained. 

The navy's main combat vessels are four Province-class mis- 
sile craft built by Vosper Thornycroft. Armed with Exocet anti- 
ship missiles and 76mm guns, the last ship was delivered in 
1989. The navy also operates four Brook Marine fast-attack 
craft with 76mm guns and four inshore patrol craft. The navy is 
well equipped for amphibious operations and has one 2,500- 
ton landing ship capable of transporting sixty-ton tanks and 
three landing craft, mechanized. Oman has ordered two cor- 
vettes with eight Exocet missiles, scheduled for delivery from 
Britain in 1995-96, and hopes to remedy its lack of minesweep- 
ers. 

The Royal Oman Air Force (ROAF) had a strength of about 
3,500 in 1992. Its forty-four combat aircraft of British manufac- 
ture consist of two fighter-ground attack squadrons of modern 
Jaguars, a ground attack and reconnaissance squadron of older 
Hunters, and a squadron of Strikemasters and Defenders for 
counterinsurgency, maritime reconnaissance, and training pur- 
poses. The air force is fairly well equipped with three transport 
squadrons and two squadrons of helicopters for troop trans- 
port and medical transport. Rapier SAMs are linked to an inte- 
grated air control and early warning network based on a 
Martello radar system. Skyvan aircraft fitted with radar and spe- 
cial navigational gear conduct maritime reconnaissance and 
antipollution patrols. The principal air bases are at Thamarit in 
the south and on Masirah. Others are co-located with the inter- 
national airport at As Sib, at Al Khasab on the Musandam Pen- 
insula, at Nazwah, and at Salalah. Officer and pilot training 
takes place at the Sultan Qabus Air Academy on Masirah. Pilots 
of fighter aircraft receive advanced training in Britain. 

Omani Role in the Persian Gulf War, 1991 

Oman's perceptions of the strategic problems in the gulf 
diverge somewhat from those of the other Arab gulf states. 
Geographically, it faces outward to the Gulf of Oman and the 
Arabian Sea, and only a few kilometers of its territory — the 
western coast of the Musandam Peninsula — border the Persian 
Gulf. Nevertheless, sharing the guardianship of the Strait of 
Hormuz with Iran, Oman's position makes it of key importance 
to the security of the entire Persian Gulf. In its willingness to 



372 



Gunboat of the Royal 
Oman Navy prepares to 
transfer a crew member 




373 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

enter into strategic cooperation with the United States and 
Britain, Oman has always stood somewhat apart from the other 
gulf states. In 1980 Muscat and Washington concluded a ten- 
year "facilities access" agreement granting the United States 
limited access to the air bases on Masirah and at Thamarit and 
As Sib and to the naval bases at Muscat, Salalah, and Al Khasab. 
The agreement was renewed for a further ten-year period in 
December 1990. Although some Arab governments initially 
expressed their disapproval for granting the United States bas- 
ing privileges, the agreement permitted use of these bases only 
on advance notice and for specified purposes. During the Iran- 
Iraq War, the United States flew maritime patrols from Omani 
airfields and based tanker aircraft to refuel United States car- 
rier aircraft. The United States Army Corps of Engineers car- 
ried out considerable construction at the Masirah and As Sib 
air bases, making it possible to pre-position supplies, vehicles, 
and ammunition. Hardened aircraft shelters were built at As 
Sib and Thamarit for use by the ROAF. 

Oman's traditionally good relations with Iran were strained 
by Iran's attacks on tanker movements in the Persian Gulf and 
Iran's emplacement of Chinese Silkworm antiship missile 
launchers near the Strait of Hormuz. The sultanate reinforced 
its military position on the Musandam Peninsula, which is only 
about sixty kilometers from Iranian territory. 

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Oman declared its sup- 
port for the multinational coalition ranged against Iraq. The 
facilities on Masirah became an important staging area for the 
movement of coalition forces to the area of conflict. Oman also 
contributed troops to Operation Desert Storm as part of the 
Arab contingent of Joint Forces Command East. A reinforced 
Omani brigade, along with Saudi, UAE, Kuwaiti, and other 
forces, participated in the ground assault paralleling the gulf 
coast that converged on the city of Kuwait. No Omani combat 
deaths were reported. 

Internal Security 

Oman has not been exposed to a significant internal threat 
since the defeat of the Dhofari insurgents in 1975. Tribal dis- 
sension, a factor in the past, is considered unlikely to recur 
because most tribal chiefs and leading families share the advan- 
tages of rising oil income. The foreign labor force is large — 
estimated at 60 percent of the working population — and most 
foreign workers are Indians and Pakistanis who are not politi- 
cally active. A few observers foresee an internal power struggle 



374 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

over the succession because Sultan Qabus ibn Said has no des- 
ignated successor, but others believe that the country is stable 
enough to avoid strife over the selection of a new ruler. 

The sultanate has not been the target of terrorist acts; it 
faces few problems from the narcotics trade and considers the 
level of general crime to be remarkably low. The security ser- 
vices are described as large and efficient but not overly intru- 
sive. 

The Royal Oman Police (ROP), commanded by the inspec- 
tor general of police and customs, is under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Interior. The size of the force was estimated in 
1992 at 7,000, but this number is believed to include customs, 
immigration, civil defense, firefighters, coast guard, and prison 
service. The principal crime fighting unit is the Directorate 
General of Criminal Investigation. An oil installation division 
has responsibility for security of the oil industry and patrols 
pipelines, oil rigs, and oil terminals. The mounted division 
patrols border areas on horseback and camel and also provides 
security control at airports and border points. The coast guard 
contingent numbers 400; it is equipped with fifteen AT-105 
APCs and eighteen inshore patrol craft. 

The home guard (flrqat) units had been raised and trained 
for irregular counterinsurgency operations by troops of the 
British army's Special Air Services. Armed with small arms, 
firqat units serve as tribal police and defense forces for the 
mountain people engaged in herding cattle in areas infiltrated 
by the Dhofari insurgents during the rebellion. After the insur- 
gency, they remained as paramilitary tribal police, numbering 
about 3,500 in 1992. 

Oman's criminal court system provides for fair trials within 
the framework of Islamic judicial practice. The defendant in 
criminal trials is presumed innocent and cannot be detained 
for longer than twenty-four hours without review of the case by 
a magistrate, who may then allow the police to hold a suspect 
up to fourteen days — extended if necessary up to seventy 
days — to carry out further investigation. Some suits have been 
filed against police officers for illegal arrest. 

The accused can be represented by an attorney, but the gov- 
ernment does not pay for a public defender. There are no jury 
trials and no right to a public trial. The judge can release the 
accused on payment of bail. Only the judge questions witnesses 
at the trial. The verdict and sentencing are frequently pro- 
nounced within a day. Sentences of more than two months and 
more than US$1,300 in fines are subject to appeal. No execu- 



375 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

tions have been carried out since 1975 and are, in any event, 
subject to the sultan's ratification. A rarely used security court 
system handles internal security cases. The government can 
search private residences and monitor telephones and private 
correspondence without a warrant but generally confines such 
actions to investigations of potential security threats and indi- 
viduals suspected of criminal activity. 

According to the Department of State's Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 1991, torture, mistreatment, and 
cruel punishment are not systematically practiced, nor are they 
countenanced by Omani authorities. The traditional punish- 
ments authorized by Islamic law, such as amputation and ston- 
ing, are not imposed. The Department of State reported that 
some prisoners had complained of beatings by police in 1991, 
and other physical abuse had been reported in earlier years. 
Prison conditions are described as harsh, with extreme temper- 
atures in cells without proper ventilation. However, a practice 
of punitive hard labor under grueling desert conditions was 
discontinued in 1991. 

* * * 

Much of the foregoing data concerning the size and equip- 
ment of the armed forces of the Persian Gulf states is based on 
The Military Balance and on Jane's Fighting Ships. Some of the 
discussion of internal security practices and judicial systems is 
drawn from Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991, 
prepared by the United States Department of State. 

Two general works, The Making of the Modern Gulf States by 
Rosemarie Said Zahlan and The Turbulent Gulf by Liesl Graz, 
provide background on security perceptions and problems fac- 
ing the smaller states of the gulf. Anthony H. Cordesman's The 
Gulf and the West contributes details on the individual armed 
forces, the military strengths and shortcomings of each state, 
and each state's involvement in the naval confrontation in the 
gulf in the 1980s. The Middle East, published by the Congres- 
sional Quarterly, treats numerous topics dealing with Persian 
Gulf security, including local disputes, United States military 
sales, and the events leading up to the 1990-91 gulf crisis. 

Studies of the military strategy employed in Operation 
Desert Storm in Desert Victory by Norman Friedman and Thun- 
der in the Desert by James Blackwell give limited mention to the 
role played by the Persian Gulf states. Several analyses of the 
geostrategic environment in the region, although dating from 



376 



Regional and National Security Considerations 

the mid-1980s, still have relevance. They include Arms and Oil 
by Thomas L. McNaugher and Saudi Arabia: The West and the 
Security of the Gulf hy Mazher A. Hameed. (For further informa- 
tion and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



377 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Kuwait: Population by Nationality, Selected Years, 1957-89 

3 Kuwait: Enrollment in Government Schools by Education 

Level, Nationality, and Gender, Academic Year 1989-90 

4 Kuwait: Number of Teachers, Students, and Schools, Se- 

lected Academic Years, 1962-63 to 1988-89 

5 Kuwait: Government Medical Facilities and Personnel, Se- 

lected Years, 1979-88 

6 Kuwait: Production of Crude Oil, Selected Years, 1946-92 

7 Kuwait: Government Revenues, Fiscal Years 1985 and 1989 

8 Kuwait: Principal Exports, 1983, 1984, and 1985 

9 Kuwait: Principal Imports, 1986, 1987, and 1988 

10 Kuwait: Major Trading Partners, 1990 and 1991 

11 Kuwait: Balance of Payments, 1987, 1988, and 1989 

12 Kuwait: Government Budget, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 

13 Bahrain: Enrollment by Education Level and Gender, Se- 

lected Academic Years, 1977-78 to 1991-92 

14 Bahrain: Government Budget, 1987-92 

15 Bahrain: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, Selected Years, 

1984- 89 

16 Bahrain: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Select- 

ed Years, 1982-90 

17 Bahrain: Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1984 -89 

18 Bahrain: Major Trading Partners, 1987, 1988, and 1989 

19 Qatar: Enrollment in Government Schools by Education 

Level and Gender, Selected Academic Years, 1975-76 to 
1988-89 

20 Qatar: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, Selected Years, 

1985- 89 

21 Qatar: Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1984 and 1989 

22 Qatar: Government Budget, Selected Fiscal Years, 1986-91 

23 Qatar: Balance of Payments, 1984-89 

24 Qatar: Major Trading Partners, 1987, 1988, and 1989 

25 United Arab Emirates: Official Estimated Population and 

Population Distribution by Amirate, 1991 

26 United Arab Emirates: Enrollment by Education Level and 

Gender, Selected Academic Years, 1980-81 to 1986-87 



379 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



27 United Arab Emirates: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, 

Selected Years, 1985-91 

28 United Arab Emirates: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 

Sector, Selected Years, 1982-87 

29 United Arab Emirates: Federal Government Budget, 1987, 

1988, and 1989 

30 United Arab Emirates: Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 

1985-90 

31 United Arab Emirates: Major Trading Partners, 1986, 1988, 

and 1990 

32 Oman: Enrollment in Government Schools by Education 

Level and Gender, Selected Academic Years, 1975-76 to 
1989-90 

33 Oman: Government Budget, 1987-92 

34 Oman: Balance of Payments, 1987, 1988, and 1990 

35 Oman: Major Trading Partners, 1987, 1989, and 1990 

36 Oman: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, 1988-91 

37 Oman: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Selected 

Years, 1987-91 

38 Kuwait: Major Military Equipment, 1992 

39 Bahrain: Major Military Equipment, 1992 

40 Qatar: Major Military Equipment, 1992 

41 United Arab Emirates: Major Military Equipment, 1992 

42 Oman: Major Military Equipment, 1992 



380 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

When you know Multiply by To find 

Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204.0 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 1.8 degrees 

(Centigrade) and add 32 Fahrenheit 



381 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 2. Kuwait: Population by Nationality, Selected Years, 1957-89 



Census Year and Nationality 


Population 


Percentage 


1957 






Kuwaiti 


113,622 


55.0 


Non-Kuwaiti 


92.851 


45.0 


Total 


206,473 


100.0 


1961 






Kuwaiti 


161,909 


50.3 


Non-Kuwaiti 


159.712 


49.7 


Total 


321,621 


100.0 


1965 






Kuwaiti 


220,059 


47.1 


Non-Kuwaiti 


247.280 


52.9 


Total 


467,339 


100.0 


1970 






Kuwaiti 


347,396 


47.0 


Non-Kuwaiti 


391,266 


53.0 


Total 


738,662 


100.0 


1975 






Kuwaiti 


472,088 


47.5 




522.749 


52.5 


Total 


994,837 


100.0 


1980 






Kuwaiti 


565,613 


41.7 


Non-Kuwaiti 


792.339 


58.3 


Total 


1,357,952 


100.0 


1985 






Kuwaiti 


681,288 


40.1 


Non-Kuwaiti 


1.016.013 


59.9 


Total 


1,697,301 


100.0 


1989 1 








826,586 


38.6 


Non-Kuwaiti 


1.316.014 


61.4 


Total 


2,142,600 


100.0 



Estimated. 



Source: Based on information from Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical 
Office, Annual Statistical Abstact, 1989, Kuwait, 1990, Tables 11 and 12, 27. 



382 



Appendix 



Table 3. Kuwait: Enrollment in Government Schools by Education 
Level, Nationality, and Gender, Academic Year 1989-90 
(ten years of age and older ) 



Education Level 


Kuwaiti 


Non-Kuwaiti 


Primary 






Males 


35,042 


24,592 


Females 


34,619 


24.525 




69 661 


49 117 


Intermediate 








31,601 


30,325 


Females 


30.575 


27,799 


Total intermediate 


62,176 


58,124 


Secondary 






Males 


21,072 


28,498 


Females 


23.033 


25,314 


Total secondary 


44,105 


53,812 



Source: Based on information from Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical 
Office, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1990-91, Kuwait, 1992, Table 269, 324. 



Table 4. Kuwait: Number of Teachers, Students, and Schools, Selected 
Academic Years, 1962-63 to 1988-89 





1962-63 


1967-68 


1972-73 


1977-78 


1982-83 


1988-89 


Teachers 














Males 


1,551 


3,342 


5,734 


9,673 


12,052 


12,286 


Females 


1.390 


3.053 


5.771 


10,101 


13,085 


16,145 


Total teachers 


2,941 


6,395 


11,505 


19,774 


25,137 


28,431 


Students 














Males 


35,674 


64,366 


88,897 


136,714 


176,368 


190,624 


Females 


23.877 


47.655 


71,334 


116.498 


158,574 


182.063 


Total students 


59,551 


112,021 


160,231 


253,212 


334,942 


372,687 


Schools 


140 


195 


273 


394 


519 


642 



Source: Based on information from Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical 
Office, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1989, Kuwait, 1990, Table 305, 355. 



383 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 5. Kuwait: Government Medical Facilities and Personnel, 
Selected Years, 1979-88 



1979 1982 1984 1986 1988 



Hospitals and sanitoriums 


9 


15 


17 


16 


16 


Clinics 


49 


54 


62 


62 


65 


Dental clinics 


78 


114 


140 


169 


193 


Maternal care centers 


15 


18 


21 


22 


23 


Child care centers 


24 


28 


32 


38 


42 


Preventive health centers 


16 


23 


25 


28 


29 


School clinics 


420 


494 


540 


626 


688 


Physicians 


1,555 


2,254 


2,442 


2,548 


2,641 


Dentists 


167 


223 


259 


294 


320 


Nurses and assistant nurses 


5,322 


7,866 


9.000 1 


8,069 


8.500 1 


Pharmacists and assistant 












pharmacists 


578 


687 


719 


769 


805 



Estimated. 



Source: Based on information from Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical 
Office, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1989, Kuwait, 1990, Table 339, 397. 



Table 6. Kuwait: Production of Crude Oil, Selected Years, 1946-92 
(in thousands of barrels) 

Year Production Year Production 

1946 5,900 1970 1,090,600 

1950 125,700 1975 760,700 

1955 402,700 1980 607,268 

1960 619,100 1985 387,363 

1965 861,500 1992 41,061 

Source: Based on information from M.W. Khouja and P.G. Sadler, The Economy of 
Kuwait, London, 1979, 26; Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical 
Office, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1989, Kuwait, 1990, Table 200, 210; and 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 
1993, Vienna, 1993, 23. 



384 



Appendix 



Table 7. Kuwait: Government Revenues, Fiscal Years 1985 and 1989 
(in thousands of Kuwaiti dinars)^ 

1985 1989 

Oil revenues 2,094,675 1,941,969 

Taxes 

Customs duties and fees 59,481 65,877 

Taxes on net income and profits of nonoil 

companies 11,634 13,000 

Taxes on real estate property transfers 1,348 2,250 

Taxes and fees on goods and services and 

entry and registration fees 477 538 

Total taxes 72,940 81,665 

Service charges 

Transportation and communications 67,014 89,425 

Electricity and water 50,311 60,078 

Housing and public utilities 10,645 10,038 

Security and justice 9,091 7,733 

Financial stamps revenue 6,410 14,800 

Education 4,538 5,606 

Health 581 720 

Other 974 670 

Total service charges 149,564 189,070 

Miscellaneous revenues and fees 20,718 17,546 

Sales of land and real estate 7,196 250 

TOTAL 2,345,093 2,230,500 

1 For value of the Kuwaiti dinar — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical 
Office, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1989, Kuwait, 1990, Table 257, 286. 



385 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 8. Kuwait: Principal Exports, 1983, 1984, and 1 985 1 
(in Kuwaiti dinars) 2 

Commodity 1983 1984 1985 

Food and live animals 30,905 36,152 28,290 

Mineral fuels and lubricants 

Crude petroleum 1,578,171 1,920,958 n.a. 3 

Refined petroleum products 1,259,269 1,258,690 n.a. 

Gas (natural and manufactured) 100,752 77,287 77,486 

Other 15 

Total mineral fuels and lubricants 2,938,207 3,256,935 2,845,178 

Chemicals 

Manufactured fertilizers 18,352 33,237 22,258 

Other 32,033 35,172 30,961 

Total chemicals 50,385 68,409 53,219 

Basic manufactures 

Nonmetallic mineral manufactures 36,255 18,848 10,094 

Other 85.881 67,909 65.942 

Total basic manufactures 122,136 86,757 76,036 

Machinery and transportation equipment 

Transportation equipment 95,580 80,108 78,024 

Other 48.967 45.379 52.871 

Total machinery and transportadon 
equipment 144,547 125,487 130,895 

Miscellaneous manufactured ardcles 50,157 44,301 40,234 

Other 27,420 13,429 11,216 

TOTAL 3,363,757 3,631,470 3,185,068 

1 Free on board. Total exports were KD2.105 million in 1986; KD2.304.4 million in 1987, of which KD666.8 million 
consisted of crude petroleum out of a total of KD1.925.4 million for petroleum and petroleum products; 
KD2.166.2 million in 1988, of which KD524.6 million consisted of crude petroleum out of a total of KD1,783.2 
million for petroleum and petroleum products; and KD3,378.0 million in 1989. Further breakdown not available. 

2 For value of the Kuwaiti dinar — see Glossary. 

3 n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Middle East and North Africa, 1993, London, 
1992, 606. 



386 



Appendix 



Table 9. Kuwait: Principal Imports, 1986, 1987, and 1988 
(in thousands of Kuwaiti dinars) 2 



Commodity 


1986 


1987 


1988 


Food and live animals 










46,350 


37,684 


42,713 


Grains and grain products 


34,459 


33,731 


32,537 


Fruits and vegetables 


79,139 


81,659 


82,181 


Other 


106.498 


115.440 


121.899 




266,446 


268,514 


279,330 


Chemicals 


98.872 


110,489 


132,027 


Basic manufactures 








Paper, cardboard, and manufactures 


24,382 


29,904 


37,051 


Textile yarn and fabrics 


75,150 


80,642 


92,126 


Nonmetallic mineral manufactures 


47,822 


48,588 


58,751 




87,807 


52,321 


81,086 


Other 


85.229 


81.034 


103.625 






qnn AQ(\ 

4y4,4oy 


9*70 can 


Machinery and transportation equipment 








Nonelectric machinery 


147,844 


131,750 


107,714 




285,230 


213,108 


152,873 


Transportation equipment 


213.408 


171.036 


234.140 


Total machinery and transportation 










0*10,104 




4Q4 797 


Miscellaneous manufactured articles 








Clothing (excluding footwear) 


81,257 


85,308 


107,289 


Scientific instruments and watches 


43,307 


40,573 


43,023 


Other 


141.736 


125.502 


148.093 


Total miscellaneous manufactured 

Other 


266,300 
62,741 


251,383 
91,942 


298,405 
137,028 


TOTAL 


1,661,231 


1,530,711 


1,714,156 


1 Cost, insurance, and freight. Total imports in 1989 were KD1 ,849.4 million; breakdown not available. 

2 For value of the Kuwaiti dinar — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from The Middle East and North Africa, 1993, London, 



1992, 605. 



387 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 10. Kuwait: Major Trading Partners, 1990 and 1991 
(in percentages) 

Country 1990 1 1991 2 
Exports 

Japan 20.6 12.3 

Netherlands 13.0 n.a. 3 

United States 7.5 7.9 

Singapore 5.5 n.a. 

Pakistan 5.3 7.6 

India 3.4 n.a. 

France n.a. 16.1 

Italy n.a. 14.9 

Britain n.a. 11.1 

Egypt n.a. 10.0 

Spain n.a. 5.0 

Imports 

Japan 11.6 12.4 

United States 11.1 34.8 

Germany 9.1 4 7.8 

Britain 8.5 8.8 

Italy 6.2 n.a. 

Saudi Arabia 4.1 n.a. 

Canada n.a. 8.7 

South Korea n.a 3.5 

France n.a. 3.1 

1 Figures based on partners' trade data to August 2, 1990, invasion. 

2 Figures based on partners' trade data after February 1991 liberation. 

3 n.a. — not available. 

4 West Germany. 

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: 

Kuwait [London], No. 1, 1992, 3; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country 
Report: Kuwait [London] , No. 1, 1993, 3. 



388 



Appendix 



Table 11. Kuwait: Balance of Payments, 1987, 1988, and 1989 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1987 


1988 


1989 


Merchandise exports, f.o.b. 2 


8,221 


7,709 


11,383 




- 4.945 


- 6.064 


- 5.746 




3,276 


1,645 


5,637 


Exports of services 


1,030 


1,158 


1,328 




- 4,073 


- 4,204 


- 4,228 


Other income received 


5,867 


7,626 


8,840 


Other income paid 


-470 


-487 


-756 




-1,102 


- 1,179 


-1,287 




— 158 


— 140 


-211 


Current account balance 


4,371 


4,419 


9,323 


Direct investment, net 


-115 


-254 


-507 


Portfolio investment, net 


219 


-487 


-330 


Other capital, net 


-4.913 


- 6.028 


- 6.859 


Capital account balance 


- 4,809 


- 6,769 


-7,696 


Errors and omissions, net 


-1,409 


355 


-372 


Overall balance 


-1,847 


-1,996 


1,255 



Figures may not compute to balances because of rounding, 
f.o.b. — free on board. 



Source: Based on information from The Middle East and North Africa, 1993, London, 
1992, 605. 



389 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 12. Kuwait: Government Budget, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 
(in millions of Kuwaiti dinars)^ 





1990 


1991 


Revenues 








2,109 


700 




296 


170 




O AC\ti 

Z,4Ur> 




Expenditures 








AQ1 

. . 4»1 


4Hfi 

4DO 




4ftfi 

. . 'too 


94K 




450 


2,641 




41 n 

. . 41U 


010 




44t> 


1 Q7 

lo/ 




937 


1 OA 

iyo 




. . 233 


91 7 
21 1 




9fl9 

. . 2U2 


937 
23 / 






i nn 

1UU 






Aft 

Do 




on 
yu 


04 




83 


ins 


Information 


69 


57 


Financial services 


68 


71 




64 


45 


Transportation 


24 


17 




21 


15 


Mining and exploration 


16 


24 


Trade and industry 


9 


8 


Unspecified 


182 


525 


Total expenditures 


3,634 


6,087 


Reserve Fund for Future Generations 


240 


87 



TOTAL -1,469 -5,304 



For value of the Kuwaiti dinar — see Glossary. 
Source: Based on information from Middle East Economic Digest [London] , 36, No. 3, 
January 17, 1992, 15. 



390 



Appendix 



Table 13. Bahrain: Enrollment by Education Level and Gender, 
Selected Academic Years, 1977-78 to 1991-92 1 



Education Level 


1977-78 


1980-81 


1984-85 


1986-87 


1991-92 2 


Primary^ 












Males 


24,185 


23,849 


25,000 


26,268 


29,009 


Females 


19,042 


20.305 


25,180 


25.953 


28,165 


Total primary 


43,227 


44,154 


50,180 


52,221 


57,174 


Intermediate 












Males 


5,260 


9,068 


10,099 


10,816 


12,283 


Females 


4,513 


7,394 


8,777 


9,740 


11,804 


Total 


9,773 


16,462 


18,876 


20,556 


24,087 


Secondary, secular and 

\jr\r 3 Mrinsa 1 
VULtii-luiitii 












Males 


4,885 


4,561 


7,614 


7,824 


8,518 


Females 


4,767 


3,926 


6,815 


7,551 


9,528 


Total secondary, 
secular and 


9,652 


8,487 


14,429 


15,375 


18,046 


Secondary, 
religious 4 


31 


20 


126 


20 


41 


Higher education 












Males 


485 


1,255 


1,381 


1,898 


1,837 


Females 


206 


1.093 


1,347 


2,248 


2.543 


Total higher 
education 


691 


2,348 5 


2,728 


4,146 


4.380 6 



1 Until 1986-87 included only students in government schools; thereafter, included students in both government 
and religious schools. 

2 1991-92 figures for government schools only. 

3 Until 1986-87 included students in both government and religious schools. 

4 Males only. 

5 Figures for 1981-62 

6 1988-89 figures for University of Bahrain only. 

Source: Based on information from Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, Landerbericht 
Bahrain, 1991, Wiesbaden, 1992, 38; and America-Mideast Educational and 
Training Services, Education in the Arab World, 1, Washingtron, n.d. 



391 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 14. Bahrain: Government Budget, 1987-92 
(in millions of Bahraini dinars)^ 





1987 


1988 


1989 


1990 2 


1991 2 


1992 2 


Revenues 














Oil sector 


247 


210 


n.a. 3 


250 


292 


314 


Other 


180 


191 


n.a. 


190 


180 


184 


Total revenues 


427 


401 


438 


440 


472 


498 


Expenditures 














Current 


356 


377 


392 


415 


445 


478 


Development 


111 


105 


104 


125 


145 


145 


Total expenditures 4 


466 


482 


496 


540 


590 


623 


TOTAL 


- 39 


-81 


-58 


-100 


-118 


-125 



For value of the Bahraini dinar — see Glossary. 

2 Projected. 

3 n.a. — not available. 

4 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- 
rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 16. 



Table 15. Bahrain: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, Selected Years, 

1984-89 





1984 


1986 


1988 


1989 


Crude oil production 
(in barrels per day) 


39,835.0 


39,578.0 


39,595.0 


39,033.0 


Natural gas production (in millions 
of cubic meters per day) 


15.2 


19.9 


19.9 


20.5 


Petroleum products exports (in millions 
of United States dollars) 


2,712.0 


1,970.0 


1,774.0 


2,129.0 


Refinery capacities (in thousands of 
barrels per day) 


250.0 


250.0 


250.0 


250.0 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- 
rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 11. 



392 



Appendix 



Table 16. Bahrain: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 
Sector, Selected Years, 1982-90 



(in millions of Bahraini dinars at constant 1985 






prices) 


1 








Sector 


1982 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1990 


Agriculture and fishing 


22.2 


20.3 


19.9 


20.0 


14.3 


Mining and quarrying 


309.2 


364.1 


390.5 


355.7 


323.9 




154.6 


153.1 


140.7 


205.9 


252.7 


Electricity, gas, and water 


17.9 


24.4 


25.8 


23.3 


28.7 




123.0 


166.5 


133.7 


115.3 


94.1 


Wholeasale and retail trade, 
restaurants, and hotels 


202.5 


136.2 


119.2 


111.6 


147.9 


Transportation and 

communications 


142.0 


174.3 


167.1 


143.0 


140.2 


Financial institutions and 
insurance 


283.0 


240.4 


227.8 


289.6 


} 192.5 


Real estate and business 

services 


83.3 


91.2 


81.5 


80.7 




Other services 


41.6 


48.9 


53.4 


51.3 


78.9 


Government services 


203.0 


228.2 


243.3 


243.8 


314.3 


GDP at factor cost 


1,582.3 


1,647.6 


1,602.9 


1,640.2 


1.587.5 2 



1 For value of the Bahraini dinar — see Glossary. 

2 GOP at current prices, 1990. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- 
rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 8; and "Bahrain: Statistical Survey," in The 
Middle East and North Africa, 1994, London, 1993, 294. 



393 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 17. Bahrain: Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1984-89 1 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1984 


1986 


1988 


1989 


Merchandise exports, f.o.b 


3,204.0 


2,199,5 


2,411.4 


2,831.1 




-3,131.6 


- 2,164.6 


- 2,334.0 


- 2,820.2 


Trade balance 


72.3 


34.8 


77.4 


10.9 




812 o 

olo.o 


HCA A 

/04.4 


oyy.o 


872.9 


Imports of services 


-555.1 


-327.1 


- 529.3 


- 559.8 


Inflows of IPD 4 


335.6 


277.9 


263.0 


494.1 


Outflows of IPD 


-447.3 


- 675.0 


-694.1 


-743.6 




— 125.5 


— Z04.0 


— 193.1 


- 195.7 


Official transfers, net 


124.5 


120.7 


366.5 


102.1 


Current account balance 


218.4 


-68.9 


189.9 


-19.1 


Direct investment 


140.7 


-31.9 


222.1 


180.9 


Other capital 


- 176.3 


-41.8 


-448.9 


- 362.5 


Capital account balance 


-35.6 


-73.7 


- 226.8 


-181.6 


Errors and omissions 


- 192.8 


-36.9 


136.7 


12.3 


Overall balance 
(- indicates inflow) 


10.1 


179.4 


-99.7 


188.5 


Change in reserves 

(- indicates increase) 


123.9 


170.3 


- 103.2 


201.7 



Figures may not compute to balances because of rounding. 

2 f.o.b. — free on board. 

3 c.i.f. — cost, insurance, and freight. 

4 IPD — interest, profits, and dividends. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- 
rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 20. 



394 



Appendix 



Table 18. Bahrain: Major Trading Partners, 1987, 1988, and 1989 

(in percentages) 



Country 


1987 


1988 


1989 


Exports 








Saudi Arabia 


16.4 


19.7 


18.2 




15.3 


11.4 


7.3 


Japan 


13.4 


12.7 


5.9 


Kuwait 


7.6 


5.2 


4.3 


India 


6.4 


4.0 


4.5 


South Korea 


3.2 


4.7 


4.0 




9 A 

. . . Z.O 






Imports 










19.2 


11.6 


12.4 


Britain , 


18.3 


19.6 


16.3 


Japan 


10.5 


10.2 


10.5 


Australia 


5.6 


6.0 


6.9 


West Germany 


5.3 


6.2 


6.9 


Italy 


3.9 


4.0 


4.7 


Saudi Arabia 


2.6 


4.4 


4.7 



Excludes oil sector. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- 
rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 19. 



395 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 19. Qatar: Enrollment in Government Schools by Education 
Level and Gender, Selected Academic Years, 1975-76 to 1988-89 

Education Level 1975-76 1979-80 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1988-89 



Primary 

Males 

Females . . 

Total 
primary 



11,150 12,452 
10,252 11,796 

21,402 24,248 



15,285 16,014 
13,941 14.501 

29,226 30,515 



16,573 
15,271 



31,844 48,097 



Intermediate 

Males 2,737 4,328 5,331 5,659 6,028 n.a. 

Females 2,480 4,032 5,369 5,687 6,003 



n.a. 



Total 

intermediate... 5,217 8,360 10,700 11,346 12,031 13,875 



Secondary 

Males 

Females 

Total 

secondary 

Vocational, 
secular 3 

Males 

Females 

Total vocational, 
secular 



1,544 2,195 

1,086 2,401 

2,630 4,596 

224 105 

269 55 

493 160 



3,201 3,139 

3,588 3,776 

6,789 6,915 

n.a. n.a. 

n.a. n.a. 

220 204 



3,224 n.a. 

4,251 n.a. 

7,475 8,303 s 

n.a. n.a. 

n.a. n.a. 

294 924 4 



Vocational, 
religious 

Males 200 287 350 377 406 n.a. 

Females _0 _0 _0 n.a. 

Total vocational, 

religious 200 287 350 377 406 n.a. 



University of Qatar 



Males 


355 


722 


1,582 


1,799 


1,875 


n.a. 


Females 


428 


1,303 


2,483 


2,822 


3,182 


n.a. 


Total University 












5,692 s 


of Qatar 


783 


2,025 


4,065 


4,621 


5,057 



n.a. — not available. 

2 Includes intermediate and secondary schools. 

3 Females are only admitted to the teacher training schools. 

4 Includes secular and religious vocational schools. 

5 1987-88. 



Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundes- 
amt, Landerbericht Katar, 1988, Wiesbaden, 1988, 29; and "Qatar," in The Middle 
East and North Africa, 1993, London, 1992, 762. 



396 



Appendix 



Table 20. Qatar: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, Selected Years, 

1985-89 





1985 


1987 


1988 


1989 


Crude oil production 
(in thousands of barrels per day) 


290.0 


291.0 


319.0 


395.0 


Natural gas production, marketed 
(in billions of cubic meters per day) 


5.5 


5.6 


5.7 


6.1 


Crude oil exports 


280.0 


254.0 


305.0 


320.0 


Oil export revenues 
(in billions of United States dollars) 


3.1 


1.8 1 


1.7 1 


2.0 1 



Estimated. 

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- 
rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 28. 



Table 21. Qatar: Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1984 and 1989 
(in millions of Qatari riyals at current prices) 1 



Sector 1984 1989 

Agriculture and fishing 206 238 

Oil and natural gas 11,330 7,117 

Manufacturing industries 1,829 3,144 

Electricity and water 165 368 

Building and construction 1,411 1,152 

Trade, restaurants, and hotels 1,506 1,457 

Transportation and communications 480 667 

Finance, insurance, and real estate services 1,919 2,350 

Other services 6,162 7,715 

TOTAL 257)08 24,208 

For value of the Qatari rival — see Glossary. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- 
rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 26. 



397 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 22. Qatar: Government Budget, Selected Fiscal Years, 1986-91 
(in millions of Qatari riyalsj 2 





1986 


1988 


1989 


1990 2 


1991 3 


Revenues 


5,884 


7,688 


9,057 


7,786 


8,438 


Expenditures 














8,949 


12,694 


9,358 


9,920 


9,911 


Capital 


1.484 


1.689 


1,013 


1,789 


1,795 


Total expenditures 


10,433 


14,383 


10,371 


11,709 


11,706 


TOTAL 


-4,549 


-6,695 


-1,314 


- 3,923 


-3,268 



1 Fiscal year followed Islamic calendar until 1989, when fiscal year changed to April 1-March 31 in Gregorian calen- 
dar. 

2 For value of the Qatari riyal — see Glossary. 

3 Projected. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- 
rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 33. 

Table 23. Qatar: Balance of Payments, 1984-89 
(in millions of Qatari riyalsj^ 



1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 2 



Exports, f.o.b. 3 


12,245 


11,277 


6,730 


7,435 


8,045 


9,658 


Imports, c.i.f. 4 


- 4.230 


-4.147 


- 4.000 


-4.128 


-4.613 


- 4.827 


Trade balance 


8,015 


7,130 


2,730 


3,307 


3,432 


4,831 


Services and private 
transfers, net 


- 4.995 


-5,132 


-3.417 


- 3.923 


-4.382 


-4.977 


Current account 
balance 


3,020 


1,998 


-687 


-616 


-950 


-146 


Capital account 
balance 


- 2,005 


- 2,360 


-1,085 


-1,031 


- 1,286 


-92 


Change in reserves 
(- indicates 
increase) 


-1,015 


362 


1,772 


1,647 


2,236 


238 



For value of the Qatari riyal — see Glossary. 

Provisional. 

f.o.b. — free on board. 

c.i.f.— cost, insurance, and freight. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- 
rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 36. 



398 



Appendix 



Table 24. Qatar: Major Trading Partners, 1987, 1988, and 1989 
(in percentages,) 





1987 


1988 


1989 


Exports 










39.6 


50.0 


54.4 


Singapore 


13.5 


10.0 


4.0 


South Korea 


3.1 


2.1 


3.6 




2.9 


3.3 


2.8 


Saudi Arabia 


2.6 


2.8 


2.5 


United Arab Emirates 


2.2 


2.1 


3.4 




9 9 




o.u 


Imports 








Japan 


16.3 


17.6 


18.8 


Britain 


16.0 


13.8 


11.6 


United States 


11.9 


9.3 


8.8 


West Germany 


7.1 


7.9 


7.3 


Italy 


4.9 


4.3 


7.8 


France 


4.3 


4.0 


4.7 


United Arab Emirates 


3.0 


3.1 


4.4 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- 
rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 35. 



Table 25. United Arab Emirates: Official Estimated Population and 
Population Distribution by Amirate, 1991 



Amirate 


Population 


Percentage 

of Total 
Population 


Area 1 


Density 2 


Abu Dhabi 


798,000 


41.8 


67,340 


11.9 


Ajman 


76,000 


4.0 


259 


293.4 


Al Fujayrah 


63,000 


3.3 


1,166 


54.0 


Dubayy 


501,000 


26.2 


3,885 


129.0 


Ras al Khaymah 


130,000 


6.8 


1,683 


77.2 


Sharjah 


314,000 


16.4 


2,590 


121.2 


Umm al Qaywayn 


27,000 


1.4 


777 


34.7 


UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 3 


1,909,000 


100.0 


77,700 


24.6 



In square kilometers. Excludes islands; approximate only because boundary with Saudi Arabia is undemarcated. 

2 Inhabitants per square kilometer. Excludes islands. 

3 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from 'The United Arab Emirates," in The Middle East and 
North Africa, 1993, London, 1992, 933. 



399 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 26. United Arab Emirates: Enrollment by Education Level and 
Gender, Selected Academic Years, 1980-81 to 1986-87 



Education Level 


1980-81 


1983-84 


1984-85 


1985-86 


1986-87 


Primary 












Males 


46,300 


65,900 


71,600 


78,800 


85,300 




42,300 


60.800 


66.100 


73.300 


80.200 


Total primary 


88,600 


126,700 


137,700 


152,100 


165,500 


Secondary 












Males 


17,400 


27,200 


29,100 


31,600 


34,300 


Females 


14,500 


24.100 


27,000 


29.900 


33.300 




31,900 


51,300 


56,100 


61,500 


67,600 


Teacher training 


422 


615 


607 


604 


638 


Quran schools 


1,770 


1.930 1 


n.a. 2 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Higher education, 
university 














1,393 


2,854 


2,851 


3,152 


3,295 


Females 


1.126 


2.761 


3.475 


3.988 


4.559 


Total higher education, 
university 


2,519 


5,615 


6,326 


7,140 


7,854 


Higher education, 
other 














35 


14 


30 


50 


n.a. 




180 


238 


500 


450 


n.a. 


Total higher 


215 


252 


530 


500 


n.a. 



Figures for 1982-83. 
n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from Germany, Statist! sches Bundesamt, Landerbericht 
Vereinigte Arabische Emiraten, 1990, Wiesbaden, 1990, 31. 



400 



Appendix 



Table 27. United Arab Emirates: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, 
Selected Years, 1985-91 

1985 1987 1989 1990 1991 



Crude oil 
Production 





788.0 


1,058.0 


1,470.0 


1,650.0 


1,946.0 


Dubayy 


351.0 


365.0 


431.0 


435.0 


434.0 


Ras al Khaymah 


9.0 


10.0 


10.0 


10.0 


0.8 




64.0 


45.0 


35.0 


37.0 


25.0 


Total production 


1,212.0 


1,495.0 


1,946.0 


2,132.0 


2,405.0 


Exports 1 


978.0 


1,250.0 


1,650.0 


1,865.0 


2,195.0 


Export revenues 2 


11.8 


8.7 


11.5 


15.0 


n.a. 3 


Natural gas 












Production 4 












Marketed 


13.2 


18.9 


22.4 


22.1 


25.9 


Nonmarketed 


9.2 


8.2 


7.4 


7.7 


n.a. 


Total production 


22.4 


27.1 


29.8 


29.8 


n.a. 


Exports 4 


3.0 


2.9 


3.1 


3.2 


3.5 



In thousands of barrels per day. 

2 In billions of United States dollars. 

3 n.a. — not available. 

4 In billions of cubic meters. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: United 
Arab Emirates, 1991-92, London, 1991, 16; and Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1991, Vienna, 1991, 6, 14, 16. 



401 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 28. United Arab Emirates: Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) by Sector, Selected Years, 1982-87 
(in billions of UAE dirhams at current prices) ^ 





1982 


1983 


1985 


1986 


1987 


Agriculture and fishing 


1,144 


1,198 


1,440 


1,540 


1,596 




55,982 


46,145 


44,707 


26,171 


32,423 


Mining 


298 


309 


309 


282 


48 




9,436 


9,584 


9,255 


7,172 


8,151 


Electricity and water 


1,851 


1,746 


2,143 


2,132 


2,063 


Construction 


10,168 


10,520 


8,882 


8,945 


8,400 


Transportation, storage, and 


5,465 


4,780 


4,224 


4,582 


4,746 


Commerce and hotels 


10,913 


9,701 


8,715 


9,385 


9,625 


Finance and insurance 


4,741 


5,520 


5,154 


5,447 


5,404 


Real estate 


6,634 


6,587 


5,176 


4,525 


4,672 


Government services 


9,632 


9,847 


11,001 


10,542 


10,972 


Other 


1,633 


1,854 


2,009 


2,138 


4,038 


Less imputed bank service 
charges 


-2,243 


-2,287 


- 1,025 


- 1,029 


- 1,324 


GDP at factor cost 


115,654 


105,504 


101,990 


81,832 


89,218 



For value of the UAE dirham — see Glossary. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: United 
Arab Emirates, 1991-92, London, 1991, 12. 



402 



Appendix 



Table 29. United Arab Emirates: Federal Government Budget, 
1987, 1988, and 1989 1 
(in millions of UAE dirhamsj 





1987 


1988 


1989 3 


Revenues 








Taxes 


473 


479 


573 




9,865 


10,950 


11,298 


Other 


2.296 


1,442 


775 


Total revenues 


12.634 


12.871 


12,646 


Expenditures 








Defense 


5,827 


5,827 


5,827 




1,773 


1,882 


1,985 


Internal security 


1,713 


1,697 


1,789 


Health 


912 


919 


916 




670 


582 


572 


Social security 


423 


420 


420 


Energy 


401 


324 


329 


Agriculture 


106 


105 


96 


Other 


1.433 


1,429 


1,330 


Total expenditures . 


13,258 


13,185 


13,264 


TOTAL* 


-624 


-314 


-618 



1 As of December 31. 

2 For value of the UAE dirham — see Glossary. 

3 Provisional. 

4 Belived to be exclusively from Abu Dhabi and Dubayy. 

5 Financed exclusively from domestic sources. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: United 
Arab Emirates, 1991-92, London, 1991, 26. 



403 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 30. United Arab Emirates: Balance of Payments, Selected 
Years, 1985-90 1 
(in billions of UAE dirhams) 



1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 

Exports, f.o.b. 3 543. 45X) 44/7 571 75.2 

Imports, c.i.f. 4 -23.5 -26.0 -31.3 -36.7 -41.1 

Trade balance 30.7 19.0 13.4 20.4 34.1 

Services, private transfers, 

and official grants -4.7 -4.8 -4.8 -5.0 5 n.a. 6 

Current account balance 26.0 14.2 8.7 14.8 5 n.a. 

Capital account balance -23.4 -8.0 -6.4 -9.3 n.a. 

Overall balance 2.6 6.2 2.3 5.5 n.a. 



1 Figures may not compute to balances because of rounding. 

2 For value of the UAE dirham — see Glossary. 
3 f.o.b. — free on board. 

4 c.i.f. — cost, insurance, and freight. 

5 Unrevised Central Bank figures, which do not agree with revised trade figures. 

6 n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: United 
Arab Emirates, 1991-92, London, 1991, 31-32. 



404 



Appendix 



Table 31. United Arab Emirates: Major Trading Partners, 1986, 
1988, and 1990 
(in percentages) 

Country 1986 1988 1990 
Exports 

Japan 34.8 30.7 35.1 

United States 4.0 3.5 3.7 

India 2.3 3.4 2.6 

Singapore 0.6 3.6 5.8 

South Korea 0.1 3.7 3.5 

Oman 0.1 2.7 2.0 

Imports 

Japan 18.3 16.4 14.2 

Britain 11.2 9.7 9.6 

United States 9.7 9.5 9.5 

West Germany 8.6 7.1 9.2 1 

France 5.3 3.4 5.2 

Italy 4.6 4.5 5.0 

1 Includes East Germany, beginning in July. 

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: United 
Arab Emirates, 1991-92, London, 1991, 30. 



405 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 32. Oman: Enrollment in Government Schools by Education 
Level and Gender, Selected Academic Years, 1975-76 to 1989-90 



Education Level 


1975-76 


1981-82 


1985-86 


1988-89 


1989-90 


Primary 
Males 


39,700 


65,400 


98,000 


122,400 


129,300 




14,800 


36,200 


77,500 


1 f\G. QAA 

106,300 


113,700 


Total primary 


54,500 


101,600 


175,500 


228,700 


243,000 


Secondary, 
lower and upper 

Males 


900 


12,200 


21,600 


31,000 


35,900 


Females 


200 


4,400 


11,100 


20,300 


25,300 


Total secondary, 
lower and upper 


1,100 


16,600 


32,700 


51,300 


61,200 


Higher education 
Males 


143 


1,788 


6,971 


7,490 


9,572 


Females 


57 


696 


3,763 


7,700 


9,689 


Total higher education . . . 


200 


2,484 


10,734 


15,190 


19,261 



Source: Based on information from Germany, Statistiches Bundesamt, Landerbericht 
Oman, 1991, Wiesbaden, 1991, 34. 



406 



Appendix 



Table 33. Oman: Government Budget, 1987-92 
(in millions of Omani riyalsj 2 





1987 


1988 


1989 


1990 


1991 


1992 3 


Revenues 














Oil and gas 


1,182 


995 


1,130 


1,588 


1,290 


1,344 


Other 


245 


203 


220 


270 


281 


283 


Total revenues . . . 


1,428 


1,198 


1,349 


1,859 


1,570 


1,628 


Expenditures 














Current 














Defense and national 














security 


584 


589 


601 


742 


643 


665 


Civilian 


500 


535 


600 


660 


674 


625 


Interest 


73 


84 


95 


92 


69 


100 


Other 


67 


63 


66 


75 


76 


83 


Total current 


1,223 


1,271 


1,361 


1,570 


1,463 


1,472 


Capital 














Non-oil 


240 


204 


177 


163 


241 


252 


Oil 


99 


76 


94 


123 


151 


157 


Lending and 














equities, net 


16 


_9 


13 


14 


-1 


-6 


Total capital 


354 


289 


284 


300 


390 


404 


Total 














expenditures . . . 


1,576 


1,560 


1,645 


1,870 


1,853 


1,876 


TOTAL 


-149 


-362 


-296 


-11 


-283 


-248 



Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 
For value of the Omani rival — see Glossary. 
Provisional. 



Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Oman, Annual Report, 1991, Mus- 
cat, 1992,41. 



407 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 34. Oman: Balance of Payments, 1987, 1988, and 1990 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1987 


1988 


1990 


Merchandise exports, f.o.b 1 


3,805 


3,342 


5,508 


Merchandise imports, f.o.b 


- 1,769 


-2,107 


-2,519 


Trade balance 


2,036 


1,235 


2,989 




-558 


-824 


-949 




-694 


-720 


-874 


Current account balance 


784 


-309 


1,166 




35 


92 


141 


Other long-term capital of resident 
official sector 


-135 


181 


-403 


Other short-term capital of deposit 
money banks 


-72 


-86 


-96 


Other short-term capital of other sectors 


-18 


34 


-211 


Reserves 


-108 


467 


-109 


Capital account balance 


-298 


688 


-678 


Errors and omissions, net 


-486 


-379 


-488 



f.o.b— free on board. 



Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments 
Statistics Yearbook, 1992, Washington, 1993, 520-21. 



408 



Appendix 



Table 35. Oman: Major Trading Partners, 1987, 1989, and 1990 
(in millions of United States dollars ) 



Country or Region 1987 1989 1990 
Exports 

Middle East 1,862 3,049 2,984 

Asia 454 571 542 

Britain 204 158 275 

Japan 122 46 96 

United States 99 150 168 

Africa 61 45 193 

West Germany 61 25 31 

France 22 26 62 

Imports 

Middle East 433 632 729 

Japan 277 354 455 

Britain 268 263 308 

Asia 186 219 268 

West Germany 146 124 130 

United States 122 191 251 

France , 66 76 115 

Africa 2 3 10 



Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Sta- 
tistics, 1992 Annual, Washington, 1992, 309-10. 



Table 36. Oman: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, 1988-91 





1988 


1989 


1990 


1991 


Crude oil production 
(in thousands of barrels per day) 


621.0 


641.0 


685.0 


708.0 


Crude oil exports 
(in thousands of barrels per day) 


580.0 


592 .0 


628.0 


644.0 


Natural gas production, gross 
(in billions of cubic meters) 


4.9 


5.2 


5.2 


5.3 


Natural gas production, marketed 
(in billions of cubic meters) 


2.1 


2.3 


2.8 


3.1 



Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Oman, Annual Report, 1991, Mus- 
cat, 1992, 31-32; and Legaz naturel dans le monde, Paris, 1988-91. 



409 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 37. Oman: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 

Selected Years, 1987-91 
(in millions of Omani riyals at constant 1978 prices ) } 



Sector 


1987 


1989 


1990 


1991 


Agriculture 


63 


75 


78 


83 


Fishing 


21 


19 


19 


18 




906 


1,001 


1,071 


1,101 




5 


7 


7 


8 


Natural gas 


20 


21 


22 


23 


Mining and quarrying 


10 


10 


8 


9 


Manufacturing 


79 


81 


93 


93 


Construction 


145 


111 


115 


144 


Utilities 


95 


131 


157 


160 




80 


90 


103 


113 


Trade, restaurants, and hotels 


192 


228 


257 


304 


Financial and business services 










and real estate 


226 


243 


281 


271 


Government and other services 


296 


321 


332 


372 


Import duties 


16 


17 


18 


22 


Less imputed bank service charges 


-58 


-67 


-100 


-75 


GDP at factor cost 2 


2,096 


2,289 


2,461 


2,646 



For value of the Omani rival — see Glossary. 
2 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Oman, Annual Report, 1991, Mus- 
cat, 1992, 146. 



410 



Appendix 



Table 38. Kuwait: Major Military Equipment, 1992 



Type and Description 

Army 

Main battle tanks 

M-84 

Other armored vehicles 

Ferret reconnaissance 

BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle 

M-113 personnel carrier 

Fahd personnel carrier 

Artillery 

M-101 105mm howitzer 

M-109A2 155mm self-propelled howitzer 

GCT 155mm self-propelled howitzer. . . . 

Antitank, guided missiles 

TOW/improved TOW, 

some self-propelled 



Country of 
Origin 



In Inventory 



Yugoslavia 

Britain 
Yugoslavia 
United States 
Egypt 

United States 
-do- 
France 



United States 



200 

n.a. 
39 
37 
44 



Navy 

Missile craft 

Lurssen 57-meter, each with 

4 Exocet missiles Germany 1 

Lurssen 45-meter, each 

with 4 Exocet missiles -do- 1 

Air force 

Fighter-ground attack 

A-4TASkyhawk United States 22 

F/A18 -do- 8 

Fighters 

Mirage Fl France 15 

Counterinsurgency and training 

Hawk 64 Britain 12 

Shorts -do- 16 

Helicopters 

AS-332 Super Puma and SA-330 Puma France 13 

SA-342 Gazelle with HOT -do- 16 

1 n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 
113-14; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, Alexandria, Virginia, 1992, 391. 



411 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Table 39. Bahrain: Major Military Equipment, 1992 

Type and Description Country of In 

Origin Inventory 

Army 

Main battle tanks 

M-60A3 United States 81 

Other armored vehicles 

AML-90 reconnaissance France 22 

AT-105 Saxon Britain 10 

PanhardM-3 France 110 

Artillery 

105mm light Britain 8 

155mm M-198 United States 14 

Antitank guided missiles 
BGM-7 1 A-TO W -do- 15 

Navy 

Corvettes 

Lurssen 62-meter, each with 4 Exocet missiles Germany 2 

Missile craft 

Lurssen 45-meter, each with 4 Exocet missiles -do- 4 

Patrol craft 

Lurssen 38-meter -do- 2 

Air force 

Fighter-ground attack 

F-5E/F United States 12 

Fighters 

F-16C/D -do- 12 

Helicopters 

AB-212 Agusta-Bell (8 armed) Italy and 12 

United States 

Bo-105 (armed) Germany 4 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 
105-6; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, Alexandria, Virginia, 1992, 37. 



412 



Appendix 



Table 40. Qatar: Major Military Equipment, 1992 

Type and Description Co " ntr > ' of , * 

3V r Origin Inventory 

Army 

Main battle tanks 

AMX-30 France 24 

Other armored vehicles 

AMX-lOP infantry fighting vehicle -do- 30 

VAB, wheeled armored personnel carrier -do- 160 

Artillery 

G5 155mm howitzer South Africa 12 

AMX Mk F-3 155mm, self-propelled France 6 

Antitank guided missiles 

Milan -do- 100 

HOT (mounted on VAB) -do- 24 

Navy 

Missile craft 

La Combattante III, 56-meter, each with 

8 Exocet missiles France 3 

Patrol craft 

Inshore, Vosper Thornycroft 33-meter Britain 6 

Air force 

Fighter-ground attack and training 

Alpha Jet France and 6 

Germany 

Fighters 

Mirage Fl France 12 

Attack helicopters 

SA-342L Gazelle with HOT -do- 12 

Commando MK3 with Exocet missile Britain 8 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 
119-20; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, Alexandria, Virginia, 1992, 508. 



413 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 41. United Arab Emirates: Major Military Equipment, 1992 



Type and Description 

Army 

Tanks 

AMX-30 

OF-40 Mk 2 Lion 

Scorpion, light 

Reconnaissance vehicles 

AML-90 

Armored personnel carriers and fighting vehicles 

AMX-10P 

VCR 

PanhardM-3 

EE-llUrutu 

Artillery and rocket launchers 

105mm 

130mm 

155mm Mk F-3 self-propelled howitzers 

G-6 155mm howitzers 

FIROS 25 122mm multiple rocket launchers 

Antitank guided missiles 

Milan 

HOT, self-propelled 

Vigilant 

TOW 



Country of 
Origin 



In 

Inventory 



France 

Italy 
Britain 

France 

-do- 
-do- 
-do- 
Brazil 

Various 

-do- 
France 
South Africa 
Italy 

France 

-do- 
Britain 
United States 



95 
36 
76 

90 

15 
50 
240 
100 

77 
20 
20 
40 
40 

230 
20 

n.a. 1 
25 



Navy 

Corvettes 

Lurssen 62-meter, each with 4 Exocet missiles, 
Crotale SAM, 76mm gun, and SA-316 Alouette 

helicopter 

Missile craft 

Lurssen 50-meter, each with 4 Exocet missiles . . . 
Lurssen 45-meter, each with 4 Exocet missiles . . . 
Inshore patrol 

Vosper Thornycroft 33-meter 

Air force 

Fighter-ground attack 

Mirage III 

Hawk Mk 63 

Fighters 

Mirage 5 AD 

Mirage 2000 EA 



Germany 

-do- 
-do- 

Britain 



France 
Britain 



France 
-do- 



414 



Appendix 



Table 41. United Arab Emirates: Major Military Equipment, 1992 



Type and Description 


Country of 
Origin 


In 

Inventory 


Counterinsurgency 






Aermacchi MB-326, MB-339A 


. . . . Italy 


11 


Reconnaissance 






Mirage 2000 


. . . . France 


8 


Mirage 5-R 


-do- 


3 


Early warning 






CasaC212 Aviocar 


. . . . Spain 


4 


Helicopters 






AS-332F Super Puma with Exocet missile 


. . . . France 


2 


SA-342K Gazelle with HOT 


-do- 


10 


SA-316/319Alouettem 


-do- 


7 


Air defense missiles 










5 batteries 2 


Rapier 


. . . . Britain 


12 


Crotale 


. . . . France 


8 


RBS-70 




13 



n.a. — not available. 
2 Being formed. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 
125; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, Alexandria, Virginia, 1992, 714. 



415 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Table 42. Oman: Major Military Equipment, 1992 



Type and Description 

Army 

Tanks 

M-60A1/A3 

Chieftain 

Scorpion (light) 

VBC-90 (light) 

Armored personnel carriers 

VAB PC and VAB VCI 

Artillery 

105mm and 130mm guns, towed 

Antitank guided missiles 

TOW 

Milan 

Navy 

Fast attack craft 

Province-class 56-meter, one with 6 and three with 8 
Exocet missiles 

Brook Marine 37-meter, each with 76mm gun 

Inshore patrol craft 

Vosper Thornycroft 25-meter 



Country of 
Origin 



In 

Inventory 



United States 
Britain 

-do- 
France 

-do- 
Various 

United States 
France 



Britain 
-do- 



-do- 



Air force 
Fighter-ground attack 

Jaguar Mk 1 -do- 15 

Hunter FGA-73 -do- 10 

Counterinsurgency and training 

BAC-167Strikemaster -do- 12 

BN-2 Defender -do- 7 

Helicopters 

Agusta-Bell 205, 206,212, and 214 (transport) Italy and 36 

United States 

Air defense missiles 

Rapier Britain 28 



Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 
118-19; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, Alexandria, Virginia, 1992, 456. 



416 



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Friedman, Norman. Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait. Annapo- 
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Fulghum, David A. "Allied Air Power, Forward Controllers Back 
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Technology, 134, No. 16, April 22, 1991, 71-73. 

Gazir, Schlomo, and Zeev Eytan. The Middle East Military Bal- 
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Graz, Liesl. The Turbulent Gulf. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1990. 

Hameed, Mazher A. Saudi Arabia: The West and the Security of the 
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Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93. (Ed., Richard Sharpe.) Alexan- 
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Kechichian, Joseph A. "Oman and the World," American-Arab 
Affairs, No. 35, Winter 1990-91, 135-50. 

Keegan,John (ed.). World Armies. Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. 



431 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

Kuwait. Ministry of Information. Kuwait: Facts and Figures, 1992. 
Kuwait: 1992. 

McNaugher, Thomas L. Arms and Oil: Military Strategy and the 
Persian Gulf. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985. 

Meacham, Jim. "A New Middle East Security Equation," Defense 
andDiplomacy, 9, Nos. 11-12, November 1991, 43-46. 

The Middle East. (7th ed.) Washington: Congressional Quar- 
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The Military Balance, 1992-1993. London: International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies, 1992. 

Oman. Ministry of Information. Oman, 1989. Muscat: 1989. 

Peterson, Erik R. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in 
a Dynamic Region. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988. 

Peterson, John E. Defending Arabia. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1986. 

Peterson, John E. (ed.). Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Work- 
shop Papers. Washington: Defense Academic Research Sup- 
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Ramazani, R.K. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis. 
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1988. 

Sciolino, Elaine. The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for 
Power and the Gulf Crisis. New York: Wiley, 1991. 

Tetreault, Mary Ann. "Kuwait: The Morning After," Current His- 
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Tusa, Francis. "Defense No Longer 'Business as Usual' in UAE," 
Armed Forces fournal International, 128, No. 6, January 1991, 
18-19. 

United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World 
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Bibliography 



Zahlan, Rosemarie Said. The Making of the Modern Gulf States. 
London: Unwin Hyman, 1989. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used 
in the preparation of this chapter: Congressional Quarterly, Econo- 
mist [London]; Facts on File, Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, Daily Report: Near East, South Asia; Joint Publications 
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World Events [London]; Middle East International [London]; 
Middle East Journal; New York Times; United States Department 
of State, Dispatch; and Washington Post.) 



433 



Glossary 



Al — Uppercased, it connotes family of, or belonging to, as in Al 
Sabah, Al Khalifa, Al Thani, Al Nuhayyan, Al Maktum, Al 
Qasimi, and Al Said. Lowercased, it represents the definite 
article the, as in Ras al Khaymah. 

amir — Literally, commander. In many of the Arab states of the 
Persian Gulf, amir often means ruler or prince. 

amirate — Political entity under the rule of an amir. Analogous 
to a shaykhdom and, if an independent state, to a king- 
dom. 

Bahraini dinar (BD) — Consists of 1,000 fils. Bahrain has main- 
tained a fixed exchange rate according to which in 1993 
US$1 equaled BD0.376. 

barrels per day (bpd) — Production of crude oil and petroleum 
products is frequently measured in barrels per day. A bar- 
rel is a volume measure of forty-two United States gallons. 
Conversion of barrels to tons depends on the density of 
the specific product. About 7.3 barrels of average crude oil 
weigh one ton. Heavy crude is about seven barrels per ton. 
Light products, such as gasoline and kerosene, average 
close to eight barrels per ton. 

downstream — The oil industry views the production, process- 
ing, transportation, and sale of petroleum products as a 
flow process starting at the wellhead. Downstream includes 
any stage between the point of reference and the sale of 
products to the consumer. Upstream (q.v.) is the converse. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy 
over a period of time, such as one year. Only output values 
of goods for final consumption and investment are 
included because the values of primary and intermediate 
production are assumed to be included in final prices. 
GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, 
meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; 
when these have been eliminated, the result is GDP at fac- 
tor cost. The word gross indicates that deductions for 
depreciation of physical assets have not been made. See also 



435 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

gross national product (GNP). 

gross national product (GNP) — The gross domestic product 
(q.v.) plus the net income or loss stemming from transac- 
tions with foreign countries. GNP is the broadest measure- 
ment of the output of goods and services by an economy. 
It can be calculated at market prices, which include indi- 
rect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsi- 
dies are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at 
factor cost by removing indirect taxes and subsidies. 

hadith — Tradition based on the precedent of Muhammad's 
words and deeds that serves as one of the sources of 
Islamic law (sharia). 

hijra — Literally, to migrate, to sever relations, to leave one's 
tribe. Throughout the Muslim world, hijra refers to the 
migration of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers to 
Medina. In this sense, the word has come into European 
languages as hegira. The year of Muhammad's hijra consti- 
tutes the beginning of the Islamic calendar. 

ibn — Literally, son of; bint means daughter of; and bani is liter- 
ally sons of, hence clan or tribe. 

imam — Word used in several senses. In general use, it means 
the leader of congregational prayers; as such it implies no 
ordination or special spiritual powers beyond sufficient 
education to carry out this function. It is also used figura- 
tively by many Sunni (q.v.) Muslims to mean the leader of 
the Islamic community. Among Shia (q.v.) the word takes 
on many complex meanings; in general, however, and par- 
ticularly when uppercased, it indicates that particular 
descendant of the Party of Ali who is believed to be God's 
designated repository of the spiritual authority inherent in 
that line. The identity of this individual and the means of 
ascertaining his identity have been major issues causing 
divisions among Shia. Among the Ibadis of Oman, the 
imam was elected to office and was regarded by all as the 
spiritual leader of the community and by some as the tem- 
poral ruler as well. Claims of various Omani imams to sec- 
ular power led to open rebellions as late as the 1950s. 

import-substitution industrialization — An economic develop- 
ment strategy that emphasizes the growth of domestic 
industries, often by import protection using tariff and non- 



436 



Glossary 



tariff measures. Proponents favor the export of industrial 
goods over primary products. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with 
the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized 
agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsi- 
ble for stabilizing international exchange rates and pay- 
ments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of 
loans to its members (including industrialized and devel- 
oping countries) when they experience balance of pay- 
ments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions 
that require substantial internal economic adjustments by 
the recipients, most of which are developing countries. 

jihad — The struggle to establish the law of God on earth, often 
interpreted to mean holy war. 

Kuwaiti dinar (KD) — The national currency, consisting of 
1,000 fils. The exchange rate of the Kuwaiti dinar to the 
United States dollar has fluctuated somewhat; in May 1993 
the exchange rate was US$1 = KD0.30. 

majlis — Tribal council; in some countries the legislative assem- 
bly. Also refers to an audience with an amir (q.v.) or 
shaykh (q.v.) open to all citizens. 

Omani rial (RO) — Monetary unit of Oman, divided into 1,000 
baizas. Oman has maintained a fixed exchange rate 
according to which in 1993 US$1 equaled RO0.3845. 

Qatari riyal (QR) — The national currency consisting of 100 
dirhams. Qatar has maintained a fixed exchanged rate 
according to which in 1993 US$1 equaled QR3.64. 

shaykh — Leader or chief. Applied either to a political leader of 
a tribe or town or to a learned religious leader. Also used 
as an honorific. 

Shia (from Shiat Ali, or Party of Ali) — A member of the smaller 
of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shia supported the 
claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right to the 
caliphate and leadership of the world Muslim community, 
and on this issue they divided from the Sunnis (q.v.) in the 
major schism within Islam. Later schisms have produced 
further divisions among the Shia over the identity and 
number of imams (q.v.). Most Shia revere twelve Imams, 
the last of whom is believed to be in hiding. See also Twelve 
Imam Shia. 



437 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 

special drawing rights (SDR) — An International Monetary 
Fund (IMF — q.v.) unit of account made up of a basket of 
major international currencies consisting of the United 
States dollar, the German deutsche mark, the Japanese 
yen, the British pound sterling, and the French franc. 

Sunni — The larger of the two great divisions of Islam. The Sun- 
nis, who rejected the claims of Ali's line, believe that they 
are the true followers of the sunna, the guide to proper 
behavior composed of the Quran and the hadith (q.v.). 

Twelve Imam Shia — The majority group among Shia (q.v.), 
who believe that the Imamate began with Ali, the fourth 
caliph, or successor ruler, in Islam. The line continued 
through his sons until the Twelfth Imam, who is believed 
to have ascended to a supernatural state to return to earth 
on Judgment Day. 

UAE dirham (Dh) — National currency of the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), consisting of 100 fils. The UAE has main- 
tained a fixed exchange rate according to which in 1993 
US$1 equaled Dh3.67l. 

ulama — Collective term for Muslim religious scholars. 

upstream — The converse of downstream (q.v.), it includes the 
exploration and drilling of wells in the petroleum produc- 
tion process. 

Wahhabi — Name used outside Saudi Arabia to designate 
adherents to Wahhabism (q.v.). 

Wahhabism — Name used outside Saudi Arabia to designate 
official interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia. The faith is 
a puritanical concept of unitarianism (the oneness of 
God) that was preached by Muhammad ibn Abd al Wah- 
hab, whence his Muslim opponents derived the name. The 
royal family of Qatar and most indigenous Qataris are 
Wahhabis (q.v.). 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of four 
affiliated international institutions that provide advice and 
assistance on long-term finance and policy issues to develop- 
ing countries: the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), the International Development 
Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA). The IBRD, established in 1945, has as its primary 



438 



Glossary 



purpose the provision of loans at market-related rates of 
interest to developing countries at more advanced stages of 
development. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but 
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on 
much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. 
The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the 
IBRD through loans and assistance specifically designed to 
encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in 
the less developed countries. The president and certain 
officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The 
MIGA, which began operating in 1988, insures private for- 
eign investment in developing countries against various 
noncommercial risks. The four institutions are owned by 
the governments of the countries that subscribe their capi- 
tal. To participate in the World Bank group, member states 
must first belong to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF — q.u). 



439 



Index 



Abbas I, 20 

Abbasid Dynasty, 154; persecution of 

imams under, 14 
Abd al Wahhab, Muhammad ibn, 24 
Abduh, Muhammad, 1 65 
abortion, 268 
Abu Bakr, 1 1 

Abu Dhabi (see also United Arab Emir- 
ates), 22; aid from, 238, 304; armed 
forces of, 361 , 362; border disputes of, 
207, 246-47, 330; budget contributions 
by, 203, 236, 237; customs duties of, 
238; education in, 210; electricity in, 
228; exports by, 227; foreign aid from, 
238; gas reserves in, 219; industry in, 
226, 227; land area of, 204; oil in, 30, 
168, 203, 216, 219-21, 226; as member 
of OPEC, 218; political options for, 33; 
population of, 209; representatives 
from, to Federal National Council, 
241-42; ruling family in, 30, 243; sup- 
port of, for Iraq, 248, 365; in United 
Arab Emirates, xxv, 203 

Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil 
Operations (Adco) (see also Abu Dhabi 
Petroleum Company; Trucial Coast 
Development Oil Company) , 220 

Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic 
Development, 238 

Abu Dhabi Gas Industries, 221 

Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Company, 
221 

Abu Dhabi International Airport, 230 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, 221 
Abu Dhabi Marine Areas (ADMA), 220 
Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Operating 

Company (ADMA-Opco) , 220 
Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (AD- 

NOC), 219, 227, 244; established, 221; 

production, 221 
Abu Dhabi National Oil Company for 

Distribution, 221 
Abu Dhabi National Tankers Company, 

230 

Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC) 
(see also Abu Dhabi Company for 
Onshore Oil Operations; Trucial 



Coast Development Oil Company), 
220 

Abu Hanifa, An Numan ibn Thabit, 1 3 
Abu Musa (island): dispute over, xxvi, 

248-49, 329 
Abu Safah oil field, 127 
Abu Zaby. See Abu Dhabi 
Adco. See Abu Dhabi Company for 

Onshore Oil Operations 
Ad Diriyah, 24 

ADMA. See Abu Dhabi Marine Areas 
ADMA-Opco. See Abu Dhabi Marine 

Areas Operating Company 
Administrative Council (Bahrain), 137 
Administrative Development Institute, 

212 

Adnan tribe, 37-38 

ADNOC. See Abu Dhabi National Oil 
Company 

ADPC. See Abu Dhabi Petroleum Com- 
pany 

Advisory Council (Qatar): created, xxiv; 

members of, 183, 185-86; role of, 185 
Afghanistan: materiel from, 356; Soviet 

invasion of, 247; workers from, 203 
Africa: imams in, 19; Omani rule in, 22- 

23, 297-98; spread of Islam into, 17; 

workers from, 52, 208-9, 263 
Agha Khan, Karim al Husayni, 16 
agriculture: in Bahrain, 122-23, 135; in 

Kuwait, 67-68; in Oman, xxvii, 258, 

269, 281-84; in Qatar, 161, 177-78; in 

United Arab Emirates, 215, 232-33, 

237 

AGU. See Arabian Gulf University 

Ahmad al Jabir Air Base, 343 

Ahmadiyyah School (Kuwait) , 55 

AID. See United States Agency for Inter- 
national Development 

air bases: of Bahrain, 352; of Kuwait, 342, 
343; of Oman, 374 

air force of Bahrain: materiel of, 352; 
personnel strength of, 350 

air force of Kuwait, 340, 342-44; in Per- 
sian Gulf War, 345 

air force of Oman, 370, 372 

air force of Qatar, 355-56 



441 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



air force of United Arab Emirates, 362, 
364 

airports: in Oman, 269, 289, 375 

Ajman (see also United Arab Emirates), 
22, 246; industry in, 227; oil in, 222, 
223; political options for, 33; popula- 
tion of, 209; representatives from, to 
Federal National Council, 241-42; rul- 
ing family in, 30-31, 243; schools in, 
210; as trading center, 26; in United 
Arab Emirates, xxv, 203 

Akhbar al KhaUj (Gulf News), 143 

AlAhsa, 18 

AlAlusi, 165 

AlAnba (News), 87 

AlArab (The Arab), 191 

Al Awir, 232 

AlAyam (The Days) , 143 
Al Ayn: hospitals in, 212; population of, 
209 

Al Ayn International Airport, 230 

Alba. Se^ Aluminum Bahrain 

Al Batinah coast, 207, 259, 261; agricul- 
ture in, 282; climate in, 262; electricity 
in, 293; religion in, 209, 264 

AlBayan (The Official Report), 246 

Al Bida, 154 

Al Bunduq oil field (Qatar), 168 

Al Buraymi Oasis, 207; agriculture in, 
215; British occupation of, 313, 368; 
development in, 315; dispute over, 
247, 313, 330-31, 368; industrial estate 
planned for, 288; population of, 209; 
religion in, 209 

Al Burqan oil field (Kuwait) , 59; natural 
gas refinery in, 61 

Alexander the Great, 48; conquests by, 8 

Al Fujayrah (see also United Arab Emir- 
ates), 22, 207, 246; agriculture in, 232; 
industry in, 227; oil exploration in, 
223; political options for, 33; popula- 
tion of, 209; representatives from, to 
Federal National Council, 241-42; rul- 
ing family in, 31 , 243; in United Arab 
Emirates, xxv, 203 

Al Fujayrah International Airport, 230 

Al Fuwayrit, 154 

Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains, 207, 227, 
261 

Al Hajar ash Sharqi Mountains, 207, 261 
Al Hajar Mountains, 259 
AlHisn, 301 



Al Huwayla, 154 

Al Huwaysah oil field (Oman), 275 

Ali as Salim Air Base, 343 

Ali ibn Abu Talib, 11, 12, 14, 16; Imam 
Ali, 15 

Allttihad (Unity), 246 

Al Jabal al Akhdar, 260, 261-62; agricul- 
ture in, 282; climate in, 262-63; miner- 
als in, 286 

Aljahrah,51 

Aljalahima, 154-57 

Aljalahima, Rahman ibnjabir, 157 

Al Jufayr: port of, 352-53 

Aljulandaibn Masud, 19 

Al Kamil: minerals in, 286 

Al Khalifa, xxiii, 154-57, 329; conflicts of, 
with Al Thani, xxiv; dynastic feuding 
among, 111; expansion of, 25; in gov- 
ernment positions, 136, 137; landown- 
ership by, 123; migration of, to 
Bahrain, 74, 157; religious affiliation 
of, 1 13; as ruling family, 23, 30, 36, 39, 
111, 137, 329; succession in, 111, 136- 
37; threats to, 26; in trucial system, 26; 
wars of, 157 

Al Khalifa, Abd Allah ibn Khalid, 137 

Al Khalifa, Abd Allah ibn Salman, 350 

Al Khalifa, Ahmad ibn Muhammad, 111 

Al Khalifa, Ali ibn Khalifa, 1 1 1 

Al Khalifa, Hamad ibn Isa, 112, 136, 159, 
350 

Al Khalifa, Isa ibn Ali, 111 

Al Khalifa, Isa ibn Salman, 111, 120, 134, 

136, 137, 350 
Al Khalifa, Khalifa ibn Ahmad, 112, 137, 

350 

Al Khalifa, Khalifa ibn Salman, 112, 137 
Al Khalifa, Muhammad ibn Khalifa, 137 
Al Khalifa, Muhammad ibn Mubarak, 
137 

Al Khalifa, Salman ibn Hamad, 111, 112, 
119-20 

Al Khasab: industrial estate planned for, 

288; radio in, 291 
Al Khasab Air Base, 372 
Al Khuwayr, 154 

Al Khuwayr oil field (Oman), 275, 278 
Al Liwa Oasis, 207, 243; agriculture in, 
215, 233 

Al Maktum: as ruling family, 31, 243 

Al Maktum, Muhammad ibn Rashid, 

244, 362 



442 



Index 



Al Maktum, Rashid ibn Said, 244 
Al Maktum, Said ibn Maktum, 244 
Al Maktum Hospital, 212 
Al Mamun, 14 
Al Mana family, 189 
Al Man amah. See Manama 
Al Mualla: as ruling family, 31, 243 
Al Mualla, Rashid ibn Ahmad, 246 
Al Mubarraz, port of, 221 
Al Muharraq (city), 117; population of, 
119 

Al Muharraq (island): air force base on, 
352 

Al Musallah, 227 

Al Nuaimi: as ruling family, 30, 243 
Al Nuaimi, Humayd ibn Rashid, 246 
Al Nuhayyan, 243-44; as ruling family, 30, 
243 

Al Nuhayyan, Hamdan ibn Muhammad, 
244 

Al Nuhayyan, Khalifa ibn Zayid, 219, 
243, 362 

Al Nuhayyan, Muhammad ibn Khalifa, 
243 

Al Nuhayyan, Sarur ibn Zayid, 244 
Al Nuhayyan, Shakhbut, 243 
Al Nuhayyan, Tahnun ibn Muhammad, 
243 

Al Nuhayyan, Zayid ibn Sultan, 211, 236, 

243, 361,362 

Al Qabas (Firebrand), 87 

Al Qasimi: attacks by British on, 25-26, 

244, 323; attacks on British shipping 
by, xx, 323; religion of, 25; as ruling 
family, 24, 31, 33, 243, 244-46; threats 
to, 26 

Al Qasimi, Abd al Aziz, 245 
Al Qasimi, Khalid ibn Saqr, 244, 246 
Al Qasimi, Saqr ibn Muhammad, 244-45, 
246 

Al Qasimi, Saqr ibn Sultan, 246 
Al Qasimi, Sultan ibn Muhammad, 244, 
245 

Al Sabah, 111; criticism of, 78; diplomacy 
of, 74; exile of, during Persian Gulf 
War, 78, 94; in government positions, 
79, 101, 342, 346; influence of, xxi; 
pearling by, 74; relationship of, with 
Britain, 74; relationship of, with 
Kuwaiti society, 79; as ruling family, 
23, 30, 36, 47, 54, 73-79, 81, 101, 340; 



trade by, 74 
Al Sabah, Abd Allah 11,74 
Al Sabah, Abd Allah as Salim, 75, 84, 89 
Al Sabah, Ahmad al Jabir, 59, 75 
Al Sabah, Ali al Khalifa, 101 
Al Sabah, Ali as Sabah as Salim, 342 
Al Sabah, Jabir, 74 

Al Sabah, Jabir al Ahmad al Jabir, 47, 75; 
accession of, 78, 79; assassination 
attempt on, 78; legislature under, 82 
Al Sabah, Jabir branch of, xxi, 101 
Al Sabah, Mubarak (the Great), xxi, 56, 
74; concessions granted by, to Britain, 
58; relations of, with Britain, 87, 89; 
succession to, 74-75 
Al Sabah, Nawwaf al Ahmad, 101 
Al Sabah, Saad al Abd Allah, xxiii, 84 
Al Sabah, Saad al Abd Allah as Salim: as 
crown prince, 47, 78, 79; as prime 
minister, 47 
Al Sabah, Sabah al Ahmad, xxiii, 84, 101 
Al Sabah, Sabah as Salim, 75; legislature 

under, 82; succession to, 78 
Al Sabah, Salim, 74 
Al Sabah, Salim al Abd al Aziz, 98 
Al Sabah, Salim as Salim, 101 
Al Sabah, Salim branch of, xxi, 101 
Al Said, 22; division of, 28-29, 297; 
founding of, 296; influence of, 24; 
role of, in government, 306; as ruling 
family, 31, 306; succession in, 307, 375 
Al Said, Ahmad ibn Said, 22, 297 
Al Said, Fahar ibn Taimur, 306, 307, 370 
Al Said, Fahd ibn Mahmud, 306, 307 
Al Said, Faisal ibn Ali, 306, 307 
Al Said, Faisal ibn Turki, 298, 299 
Al Said, Haitham ibn Tariq, 307 
Al Said, Qabus ibn Said (sultan), 257, 
262, 298, 301, 302-10; accession of, 
xxvi, 35, 258, 302, 369; background of, 
301-2, 369; economic development 
under, xxvi, 258, 269; government 
posts of, 310, 370; modernization 
under, xxvi, 269; succession to, 375 
Al Said, Qais ibn Tariq, 289 
Al Said, Said ibn Ahmad, 23 
Al Said, Said ibn Muhammad, 299 
Al Said, Said ibn Sultan, 297-98 
Al Said, Said ibn Taimur, 262, 298, 300- 
302, 368; forced to abdicate, 35, 302, 
369; isolationism under, 34 
Al Said, Sayyid Said ibn Sultan, 23, 28, 



443 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



157 

Al Said, Shabib ibn Taimur, 307 

AI Said, Sultan ibn Ahmad, 297 

Al Said, Taimur ibn Faisal, 298, 300 

Al Said, Tariq ibn Taimur, 306, 307 

Al Said, Thuwaini ibn Said, 307 

Al Said, Turki ibn Said, 298 

Al Saud: threats from, 26 

Al Saud, Khalid ibn Sultan ibn Abd al 

Aziz (general), 327 
Al Sharqi, 246; as ruling family, 31 , 243 
Al Sharqi, Hamad ibn Muhammad, 246 
Al Thani, 188-89, 329; British assistance 
to, 28; business interests of, 190; con- 
flicts in, 190; conflicts of, with Al Khal- 
ifa, xxiv; control of government by, 
xxiv-xxv, 161, 183-85; control of mili- 
tary by, 356; expansion of, 25; as rul- 
ing family, 24, 30, 153, 170; succession 
in, 159 

Al Thani, Abd al Aziz ibn Ahmad, 166-67 

Al Thani, Abd Allah ibn Qasim, 159, 168; 
abdication of, 160; treaty of, with Brit- 
ain, xxiv, 158 

Al Thani, Ahmad ibn Ali, 166, 355; acces- 
sion of, 161; deposed, 162, 188-89 

Al Thani, Ali ibn Abd Allah, 159, 166, 
170, 176, 188; abdication of, 160 

Al Thani, Hamad ibn Abd Allah, 159, 
165 

Al Thani, Hamad ibn Khalifa, 355 
Al Thani, Khalifa ibn Hamad, 153, 159, 
355; accession of, 162, 188-89; as heir 
apparent, 160; political power of, 161; 
as prime minister, 161; social reforms 
under, 167 
Al Thani, Muhammad ibn Thani, 158 
Al Thani, Qasim ibn Muhammad, 158 
Al Thani, Suhaym ibn Hamad, 190 
Al Ubaid culture, 154 
Aluminium Bahrain (Alba), 129 
aluminum processing: in Bahrain, xxiii, 

112; in Dubayy, 226; in Qatar, 175 
Al Wafrah oil field (Kuwait) , 62 
Al Wakrah: attack by, on Doha, 157; pop- 
ulation of, 164; port of, 162 
Al Wasl Hospital (Dubayy), 213 
Al Watan (The Nation), 312 
Amal oil field (Oman), 275, 277 
American Independent Oil Company 

(Aminoil), 59; nationalized, 62 
American Mission Hospital, 122, 212 



American Oil Company (Amoco), 222, 
276 

American Petroleum Institute (API) rat- 
ings, 168 

American University of Beirut, 121 

Aminoil. See American Independent Oil 
Company 

amir, 39 

Amiri Hospital, 56 
Amnesty International, 355 
Amoco. See American Oil Company 
Amoco Sharjah, 222 

Anglo-Ottoman Convention (1913), 89- 
90 

Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) (see 
also British Petroleum; Kuwait Oil 
Company): concession in Kuwait, 58; 
concession in Oman, 274; concession 
in Qatar, 159, 167, 168; oil exploration 
by, 58; oil production by, 29 

An Najaf, 15 

AOC. See Arabian Oil Company 

API. See American Petroleum Institute 

APOC. See Anglo-Persian Oil Company 

Arabia: control of, 1 7 

Arabian American Oil Company 

( Aram co ) , 59 
Arabian Gulf University (AGU), 121 
Arabian Mission of the Dutch Reformed 

Church, 122 
Arabian Oil Company (AOC), 60 
Arabian Sea, 3, 259 

Arabic: broadcasts in, 87, 132, 134, 179, 
230; education in, 165; publications 
in, 143, 191,246, 312 

Arab-Israeli dispute, 333 

Arab League. See League of Arab States 

Arabsat. See Arab Satellite Communica- 
tion Organization 

Arab Satellite Communication Organiza- 
tion (Arabsat): in Bahrain, 132; in 
Kuwait, 69; in Oman, 291; in Qatar, 
179; in United Arab Emirates, 232 

Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard 
(ASRY), 119, 129 

Arab Times, 87 

Aram co. See Arabian American Oil Com- 
pany 

archaeological research, 4-7, 8, 154, 323 
armed forces: attempts to improve, 
xxviii; joint military exercises of, 
xxviii; limits on, 331; military capabili- 



444 



Index 



ties of, 337-40; in Persian Gulf War, 
xxviii 

armed forces of Bahrain (Bahrain 

Defense Force): commander of, 136, 

350; mission of, 350; subsidy for, 369; 

women in, 339-40 
armed forces of Kuwait, 337-46; indigeni- 

zation of, xxii; joint training exercises 

of, xxii, 92 
armed forces of Oman, 310, 368-71; 

buildup of, xxviii, 315; modernization 

of, 315; women in, 339-40 
armed forces of Qatar, 355-60 
armed forces of United Arab Emirates, 

361-64; commander of, 241, 243; 

materiel of, xxvi, 215 
army of Bahrain, 350-52, 353 
army of Kuwait, 340, 343 
army of Oman, 370-71 
army of Qatar, 355 
army of United Arab Emirates, 362 
At Rawdatayn aquifer, 51 
At Rawdatayn geological formation, 51 
Ar Rayah (The Banner) , 191 
ArRay alAmm (Public Opinion), 87 
At Rayyan: population of, 164 
At Rifaa, 119-20 

Ar Rumaylah oil field (Kuwait and Iraq), 
89 

Ar Rusayl industrial estate, 286 
Ar Ruways: industries at, 227; oil refin- 
ery, 221 

Asab oil field (Abu Dhabi), 220, 221 
Ash Shariqah. See Sharjah 
Ash Sharq (The East) ,191 
Ash Sharqiyah, 262 
Ash Shuaybah aquifer, 51 
Ash Shuaybah Industrial Zone, 66; estab- 
lished, 66 
Ash Shuaybah oil refinery, 61 
Ash Shuwaykh: port of, 68 
Ash Shuwaykh Industrial Zone, 68 
Ashurbanipal, 8 

Asia: exports to, 272, 286; workers from, 

52, 130, 164 
ASRY. See Arab Shipbuilding and Repair 

Yard 

As Saffaniyah oil field (Saudi Arabia) , 60 

As Salwa Industrial Area, 173 

As Sib Air Base, 316, 372 

As Sib International Airport, 289, 290 

As Sib Naval Base, 371 



As Sila oil field, 223 
Assyrian Empire: conquests by, 8 
Attiyah, Abd Allah Khalid al, 180 
Attiyah family, 190 
Australia: trade with, 136 
Austria: materiel from, 371 
awqaf: administration of, 1 2 
AZD Enterprises, 289 
Az Zahirah, 262 

Az Zubarah, 111, 145; Bahrain's claims 
to, 158, 159, 193, 329; destroyed, 158; 
founded, 154 

Az Zuqum oil field (Abu Dhabi) , 220 

Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) 

Party, 143, 325,330 
Bab oil field (Abu Dhabi), 220, 221 
Badi, Muhammad Said al, 362 
Bahrain: agriculture in, 117, 122-23, 135; 

aid from, 210; air bases of, 352; armed 

forces of, 136, 339-40, 350, 353, 369; 

attack by, on Doha, 157; banking in, 

xxiii, 112, 134-35; British troops in, 
325; bureaucracy of, 137; censorship 
in, 143; civil rights in, 139; claim of, to 
Az Zubarah, 158, 159, 193, 329; claim 
of, to Hawar and the adjacent islands, 

xxiv, 117, 159, 162, 329; climate of, 
117-18; coup attempt in, 326, 354; 
courts in, 142, 354; currency of, 134; 
defense cooperation of, with United 
States, xxiv; defense spending in, 339, 
352; democracy in, xxiii, 36; early con- 
trol of, 17; economy of, 111, 112, 129, 
135, 136; education in, 112, 120-21; 
elections in, xxiii, 139; embargo by, 
against Qatar, 159; as entrepot, 26, 
135; environmental damage in, 124; 
external claims to, 28; fishing in, 123- 
24; foreign relations of, xxiv, 143-45; 
foreign residents in, xxiii, 113, 118, 
129-30, 144, 215; geography of, 114- 
17; in Gulf Cooperation Council, xxiv, 
36, 113, 144, 248, 314, 321, 326, 333; 
Gulf Cooperation Council subsidy for, 
369; health care in, 112, 121-22, 123; 
housing in, 119; human rights in, 354- 
55; independence of, xx, 33, 112, 137, 
350; industry in, xxiii, 112, 129; inter- 
nal security in, 353-55; in Iranian 
Empire, 111; Iranians in, 35, 329; and 
Iran-Iraq War, 113, 144, 353; Iran's 



445 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



claim to, xxiii, xxiv, 28, 32, 329; 
Islamic sects in, xxiii, 18, 35; labor in, 
113; land in, 119, 123; law in, 142-43; 
life expectancy in, 118-19, 121; literacy 
rate in, 120; materiel of, 350-52; media 
in, 132, 134, 143; migration to, 74, 
157; military assistance to, 336, 352; 
national security of, 140, 144; natural 
gas in, xxiii, 128; Omani rule of, 22; 
oil in, xx, xxiii, 29, 30, 112, 114, 117, 
124-28, 135-36; pearling in, 111, 112, 
124; in Persian Gulf War, xxiv, 328, 
353; police force of, 353, 354; political 
opposition in, 139, 143; population of, 
118-20; ports in, 114, 132; relations of, 
with Britain, xxiv, 26; relations of, with 
Qatar, xxiv, 28, 144-45, 162, 192-93; 
relations of, with Saudi Arabia, 142; 
relations of, with United States, xxiv, 
144, 145, 352-53; reads in, 117, 132; 
ruling family of, xxiii, xxiv, 23, 26, 30, 
39, 74, 111, 136-37; security coopera- 
tion of, 321; social services of, 112, 
121, 122; succession in, 111; suffrage 
in, 139; terrorism in, 353; territorial 
disputes of, 28; trade by, 1 11, 112, 135- 
36; transportation in, 132-34, 179; 
treaties of, 111; in trucial system, 324; 
wars of, 111, 323; water in, 117, 118; 
women in, 339; workforce in, 114, 129- 
32 

Bahrain Aluminium Extrusion Company 

(Balexco), 129 
Bahrain Defense Force (BDF). farmed 

forces of Bahrain 
Bahrain International Airport, 132, 352 
Bahrain International School, 120-21 
Bahrain Military Hospital, 122 
Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA), 134 
Bahrain National Gas Company (Bana- 

gas), 128 

Bahrain Petroleum Company (Bapco), 
127 

Bahrain-Saudi Aluminium Marketing 

Company (Balco), 129 
Bahwan, Suhail, 310 

balance of payments: in Bahrain, 136; in 
Kuwait, 72; in Oman, 272-74; in 
United Arab Emirates, 365-66 

balance of trade: of Bahrain, 136; of 
United Arab Emirates, 238 

Balco. See Bahrain-Saudi Aluminium 



Marketing Company 

Balexco. See Bahrain Aluminium Extru- 
sion Company 

Baluchis, 263, 371 

Banagas. See Bahrain National Gas Com- 
pany 
Bandar Jissah, 289 

Bangladesh: aid to, 238; workers from, 
130, 164, 203, 208 

Bani Abd al Qais tribe, 17 

Bani Ali tribe, 188 

Bani al Murrah tribe, 37 

Bani Hamad tribe, 188 

Bani Khalid tribe, 47, 89, 188 

Bani Utub tribe, xxiii, 23, 111; branches 
of, 154-57; in Kuwait, 54, 57, 73; migra- 
tion of, 73, 296; in Qatar, 154 

Bani Yas tribe, 243, 244; origins of, 24; in 
trucial system, 26 

Bank Dhofar al Omani al Fransi, 294-95 

Bank for Agriculture and Fisheries 
(Oman), 296 

banking: in Bahrain, 112, 134-35; in 
Kuwait, 69-70, 97-98, 99; in Oman, 
291, 293-96; in Qatar, 180; in United 
Arab Emirates, 218, 234-36 

banking, offshore: in Bahrain, xxiii, 134- 
35 

Bank of Credit and Commerce Interna- 
tional (BCCI), 218, 236, 294-95 

Bank of Muscat, 295 

Bank of Oman and the Gulf, 295 

Banque Indosuez, 295 

Bapco. See Bahrain Petroleum Company 

Barik gas field (Oman), 280 

BCCI. SeeBznk of Credit and Commerce 
International 

BDF. See Bahrain Defense Force 

Bechtel Corporation, 128, 171 

beduins: legacy of, xix 

Birba field (Oman), 280 

BMA. See Bahrain Monetary Agency 

border problems: between Abu Dhabi 
and Dubayy, 207; between Dubayy and 
Sharjah, 207, 222; between Iraq and 
Kuwait, xxii, 89, 90-91; between Oman 
and Yemen, xxviii, 331, 332, 369; 
between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, xxv; 
between Qatar and United Arab Emir- 
ates, 204 

borders {see also boundaries, tribal): 
demarcation of, 48, 91, 159, 207, 328; 



446 



Index 



of Iraq, 48, 89, 91; of Kuwait, 47, 48, 
89, 91, 330, 332; of Oman, 3, 204, 369, 
375; of Qatar, 163, 204; of Saudi Ara- 
bia, 48, 163, 204; of United Arab Emir- 
ates, 163, 204 

boundaries, tribal (see also borders), xx, 
31,38,328 

Britain, 157; advisers from, 160; aid 
from, 215-16, 257, 300; attacks by, on 
Al Qasimi, 244, 323; attacks on ships 
of, xx, 323; competition for trade, 25; 
control of Trucial Coast foreign affairs 
by, 74, 203, 323, 340; defense agree- 
ments of, with Kuwait, xxii, 92, 322, 
337; defense agreements of, with 
Oman, 374; departure of, from Per- 
sian Gulf, 32; Kuwaiti investment in, 
71; in Iran-Iraq War, 340; materiel 
from, xix, xxii, 300, 342, 356, 364, 371; 
medical support from, 212; military 
assistance from, 32, 34, 74, 88, 89, 90, 
262, 298, 315, 324, 325, 326, 368; mili- 
tary officers from, 345, 355, 361, 363; 
military training by, xix, 304, 339, 340, 
346, 372, 375; occupation of Al 
Buraymi Oasis, 313, 368; oil conces- 
sions of, 58; oil exploration by, 158-59, 
167, 323; payments to, for Persian 
Gulf War, 218, 365; in Persian Gulf 
War, 321, 327, 328; Portuguese driven 
from Persian Gulf by, 20-22; relations 
of, with Bahrain, xxiv, 145; relations 
of, with Iran, 313; relations of, with 
Kuwait, 87-88, 92; relations of, with 
Oman, xxviii, 28, 34, 299, 313, 314-15; 
relations of, with Qatar, 160, 193, 355; 
relations of, with ruling families, xxiv, 
28, 31, 39, 74, 87, 89, 158, 328; rule, 
xix, xx, xxiv; schools built by, 210; sla- 
very opposed by, 228, 298; study in, 
166, 193; trade by, 25-26, 136, 182; 
treaties of, with Kuwait, 74, 89; treaties 
of, with ruling families, xx, xxiv, 25-29, 
30-31, 58, 111, 157-58, 159, 299, 323, 
360-61; workers from, 203 

British Airways, 132 

British Bank of the Middle East, 134 

British East India Company: destruction 
of Doha by, 157; treaties of, with rul- 
ing families, xxiv, 74, 157 

British Indian Navy, 325 

British Petroleum (see also Anglo-Persian 



Oil Company), 59, 60-61, 62, 220 
Bubiyan (island), 47, 91; claims to, 48, 

90, 91, 327, 330 
budget: of Bahrain, 135; of Oman, 316; 
of Qatar, 180-82; of United Arab Emir- 
ates, xxv, 203, 236-38, 239 
Bu Hasa oil field (Abu Dhabi), 220, 221 
Bukha gas field (Oman) , 280, 281 
bureaucracy: in Bahrain, 137; in Kuwait, 
79-80; overstaffing of, 80; in Qatar, 
160, 161 

Bureau des Recherches Geologiques 

Minieres (France), 286 
Bush, George H.W.: assassination 

attempt on, xxii 
Buyid Dynasty, 18, 19-20 

cabinet: in Bahrain, 137-39; in Kuwait, 
79-80, 84, 348; in Oman, 290, 310; in 
Qatar, xxv, 161, 175, 183, 185; in 
United Arab Emirates, xxvi, 241 

Cable News Network (CNN), 232 

camels, 8, 375 

Camp David Accords (1979), 315 
Canada: in Persian Gulf War, 191, 358; 

workers from, 209 
censorship, in Bahrain, 143; in Kuwait, 

87, 101; in Qatar, 183, 187, 191 
Central Bank (United Arab Emirates) , 

234-35, 237 
Central Bank of Kuwait, 69, 98 
Central Bank of Oman, 278, 293 
CFP. See Compagnie Francaise des 

Petroles 
Chase Investment Bank, 271 
Chevron Corporation (see also Standard 

Oil Company of California) , 1 24, 279 
China: defense agreements of, with 

Kuwait, 92; relations of, with Qatar, 

194; support of, for Dhofar rebellion, 

305; trade with Abu Dhabi, 227; trade 

with Qatar, 174 
Christianity, 9, 17, 164, 209 
chromite, 285, 286 

Chubu Electrical Power Company, 172- 
73 

citizenship: in Kuwait, 52, 86, 94; in 
Qatar, 189-90; qualifications for, 37, 
39-40; in United Arab Emirates, 203, 
229, 241 

civil rights: in Bahrain, 139; in Kuwait, 
78, 82, 86; in Qatar, 186, 187 



447 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



civil service: in Kuwait, xxi, 80, 100; in 
Oman, 257, 302 

climate: of Bahrain, 117-18; of Kuwait, 
48-51, 67; of Oman, 262-63, 282, 293; 
of Qatar, 163; of United Arab Emir- 
ates, 207-8 

CNN. See Cable News Network 

College of Health Sciences (Bahrain), 
121 

colonial rule, 20-24 

Compagnie Francaise des Petroles 
(CFP), 220 

Compania Espanola de Petroleos (Span- 
ish Petroleum Company-Hispanoil) , 
221 

Constituent Assembly (Bahrain), 137- 
39; elections for, xxiii, 137 

Constituent Assembly (Kuwait): elec- 
tions for, 82, 84 

Constitutional Movement (Kuwait), 82- 
83, 86, 100; formed, 78 

constitution, provisional, of Qatar 
(1970), xxiv, 161, 182-83; rights under, 
186, 187, 188 

constitution, provisional, of United Arab 
Emirates (1971), xxv-xxvi, 239-42 

constitution of Bahrain (1973), xxiii, 
139; armed forces under, 350; judi- 
ciary under, 142; succession in, 111 

constitution of Kuwait (1962), 81-82, 84- 
86 

Consultative Council (Bahrain), xxiii- 
xxiv, 140 

Consultative Council (Oman) (see also 
State Consultative Council), 288, 310- 
12; created, xxviii, 302, 310 

Continental Oil Company, 221 

Contingency Fund (Oman), 271, 272 

copper, 4, 285-86 

Council for Education (Oman) , 265 
Council of Ministers (Bahrain), 137-39 
Council of Ministers (Kuwait), 348 
Council of Ministers (Oman), 290, 310 
Council of Ministers (Qatar), xxv, 161, 
183,185 

Council of Ministers (United Arab Emir- 
ates) , xxvi, 241 

Council on Agriculture, Fisheries, and 
Industries (Oman), 311-12 

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
for 1991, 348, 376 

coup d'etat, attempted: in Bahrain, 326, 



354; in Sharjah, 237, 245 
Court of Appeal (Bahrain), 142 
court system: in Bahrain, 142, 354; in 
Kuwait, 348; in Oman, 375, 376; in 
Qatar, 177, 186, 360; in United Arab 
Emirates, 242, 366-67 
Credit and Savings Bank (Kuwait), 69-70 
Crescent Oil Company, 222 
crime: in Kuwait, 348; in Oman, 375 
Criminal Investigation Department 

(Qatar), 360 
criminal justice system {see also court sys- 
tem; judiciary): of Kuwait, 347-48; of 
Oman, 375 
Criminal Procedures Code (United Arab 

Emirates), 366 
currency: of Bahrain, 134; of Kuwait, 69; 
of Qatar, 180; of United Arab Emir- 
ates, 234 
Currency Board (Kuwait) , 69 
Currency Board (United Arab Emir- 
ates), 234 
Curzon, George Nathaniel, 299 
customs duties: of Abu Dhabi, 238; of 
Dubayy, 238; imposed by GCC, 182; of 
Oman, 257; of Sharjah, 238 

Daimler-Benz, 309; Kuwaiti investment 
in, 71 

Dalma oil field (Abu Dhabi), 220 
Damascus Declaration (1991), 92, 336-37 
D'Arcy Exploration Company of Britain, 
220 

Darwish, Abd Allah, 1 89 
Darwish, Muhsin Haidar, 310 
Darwish family, 189 

date palms, 114, 117; cultivation of, 122- 

23, 158, 232-33; export of, 122 
defense spending, 338-39; in Bahrain, 

339, 352; in Oman, 369; in Qatar, 358; 

in United Arab Emirates, 236, 237, 

365 

democracy: in Bahrain, xxiii, 36; in 

Qatar, xxiv 
democracy movement in Kuwait, 75, 78, 

84, 86, 100-101 
Democratic Forum, 84, 100 
Department of Education (Qatar), 165 
Department of Labor (Qatar), 177 
Department of Social Services (Abu 

Dhabi), 243 
Department of State (Kuwait), 348 



448 



Index 



dhimmis (tolerated subject people), 17 

Dhofar Liberation Front, 304 

Dhofar rebellion, xxvii, 34, 35, 258, 274, 
277, 302-5, 368-69; foreign military 
assistance against, 34, 35, 314, 315 

Dhofar region, 22, 260, 262, 301, 361; 
agriculture in, 282; climate in, 263; 
development in, 304; electricity in, 
293; factionalization in, 304-5; govern- 
ment in, 305; governor of, 306; miner- 
als in, 286; religion in, 264 

Dibaal Hisn, 207 

Difficult Credit Facilities Resettlement 

Program, 70 
Dilmun, 4, 8, 47, 154 
Diqdaqah, 232 

Directorate General of Criminal Investi- 
gation (Oman), 375 

Directorate General of Fisheries 
Resources (Oman), 285 

Divided Zone (see also Kuwait-Saudi Ara- 
bia Neutral Zone) , 48 

divorce, 16 

Diwan Affairs (Oman), 305 
Doha, 153, 157, 162, 163, 164, 178 
Doha International Airport, 163, 178 
DPC. See Dubai Petroleum Company 
Dubai. See Dubayy 

Dubai Aluminum Company (Dubai), 

222, 226 
Dubai Dry Docks, 226 
Dubai Marine Areas (Duma), 221 
Dubai Natural Gas Company (Dugas), 

222, 226 

Dubai Petroleum Company (DPC), 221 
Dubai. See Dubai Aluminum Company 
Dubayy (see also United Arab Emirates), 
22; agriculture in, 232; aid to, 215; alu- 
minum production in, 226; armed 
forces of, 361, 362; border disputes of, 
207, 222, 223; Britain's treaties with, 
26; budget contributions by, 237; con- 
cessions in, 221; currency in, 180; cus- 
toms duties of, 238; desalination in, 
226; electricity in, 228; as entrepot, 26, 
226; exports from, 222; foreign resi- 
dents in, 208; gas in, 222, 226; hospi- 
tals in, 212; industry in, 226-27; oil in, 
30, 219, 221-22; oil revenues in, 203, 
216; political options for, 33; popula- 
tion of, 208; port of, 214; relations of, 
with Iran, 366; representatives from, 



to Federal National Council, 241-42; 
ruling family in, 31, 243; schools in, 
210; support of, for Iran, 248, 365; 
taxes in, 236; trade of, 238; treaties of, 
26; in United Arab Emirates, xxv, 203; 
water in, 215, 226 
Dubayy Creek, 239 

Dubayy International Airport, 230, 236- 
37 

Dubayy Ports Authority, 230 
Dugas. See Dubai Natural Gas Company 
Dukhan oil field (Qatar), 168 
Duma. See Dubai Marine Areas 

Eastern Bank (Bahrain), 134 

economic development: in Oman, xxvi, 
xxvii, 34, 35, 268, 269; promotion of, 
xxix; in United Arab Emirates, 218 

economic diversification: in Bahrain, 
112, 129, 135; in Kuwait, xxii, 64-67; in 
Oman, 257, 258, 281, 286, 289; in 
Qatar, xxv, 153, 161; in United Arab 
Emirates, 237 

economy: in Bahrain, 111; in Kuwait, 
xxi, 85-86; in Oman, 268-96, 298; in 
United Arab Emirates, 216-18 

education (see also schools): in Bahrain, 
112, 120-21; in Kuwait, 54-56, 75, 80, 
85, 96; in Oman, 265-66; in Qatar, 164- 
66, 183, 187-88; in United Arab Emir- 
ates, 210-11, 212, 236, 237; of women, 
165,210,211, 212 

Education Council (Kuwait), 55 

Egypt, 190; aid from, 210; aid to, 238; 
conquests by, 8; in Damascus meeting, 
336-37; military training provided by, 
304; payments to, for Persian Gulf 
War, 345, 365; peace of, with Israel, 
247; in Persian Gulf War, 321, 328; 
physicians from, 56; relations of, with 
Kuwait, 92; relations of, with Qatar, 
192; weapons industry, 336; workers 
from, 52, 130, 166, 208, 210, 247, 266 

electric power: in Kuwait, 66; in Oman, 
269, 293; in Qatar, 160; in United Arab 
Emirates, 228 

elections: in Bahrain, xxiii, 139; in 
Kuwait, 75, 81,82, 83, 84, 101 

Elf Aquitaine Qatar, 168, 276, 277, 292 
Elphinstone Inlet (Khawr ash Shamm), 
261 



449 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Emirates Airlines, 230 
Emirates General Petroleum Corpora- 
tion, 222 
Emirates Industrial Bank, 226, 235 
Emirates News, 246 

employment: in Kuwait, 57, 80; in 

Oman, 258, 285 
English: broadcasts in, 87, 132, 179, 232; 

education in, 165; publications in, 

143,191,246,312 
entrepot trade: of Bahrain, 26, 135; of 

Dubayy, 26, 226; of Kuwait, 57, 72; of 

Qatar, 182; of United Arab Emirates, 

237 

environmental pollution, 124; from Per- 
sian Gulf War, 96 
Europe: investment in, 221; oil exported 
to, 63; protection by, in Iran-Iraq War, 
36; workers from, 52, 203, 209 
Exclusive Agreement (1882), 26 
Exclusive Economic Zone (Oman), 370 
executive branch (see also presidency): of 

United Arab Emirates, 239-41 
Executive Council (Abu Dhabi), 243 
exports (see also under individual prod- 
ucts): to Asia, 272, 286; from Bahrain, 
135, 136; to China, 227, 278; from 
Dubayy, 222; to India, 23, 136, 174, 
227; to Japan, 63, 72, 172-73, 221, 222, 
239, 272, 278, 281, 286; of oil and gas, 
72, 222, 238, 272, 278, 280-81; by 
Oman, 272; of pearls, 23; to Philip- 
pines, 278; by Qatar, 182; to Singa- 
pore, 278; to South Korea, 278; to 
Taiwan, 278; to Thailand, 278; by 
United Arab Emirates, 218; to United 
States, 278 
Exxon, 220 

Falah oil field (Dubayy) , 222 

Falaj al Mualla, 232 

falaj irrigation system (Oman), 282 

FAO. See United Nations Food and Agri- 
culture Organization 

farming: in Kuwait, 67; in Qatar, 177; in 
United Arab Emirates, 233 

Fasht ad Dibal (island): Qatari raid on, 
144, 329 

Fath oil field (Dubayy), 222 

Fatima (Muhammad's daughter), 11, 14 

Fatima (shaykha), 211 

Faylakah (island), 47-48, 51 



Federal National Council (FNC) 
(United Arab Emirates), xxvi, 239-42 

fertilizer industry: in Abu Dhabi, 227; 
Qatar's investment in, xxv, 174 

fishing: in Bahrain, 123-24; in Kuwait, 
58, 67, 68; in Oman, xxvii, 258, 269, 
281, 285; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, xix, 178, 284; in 
Qatar, 154, 158, 161, 175, 177, 178; in 
United Arab Emirates, 214, 232, 233- 
34, 237 

five-year development plans (Oman), 

269-72,291,293 
FNC. See Federal National Council 
food: in Bahrain, 135; in Kuwait, 57; in 

Oman, xxvii; in United Arab Emirates, 

238 

foreign aid: from Abu Dhabi, 238; from 
Britain, 215-16, 257, 300; from Egypt, 
210; to Egypt, 238; for Iraq, 64, 73; 
from Kuwait, 64, 72-73, 89, 93 

foreign investment: incentives for, xxix; 
by Kuwait, 71-72, 97; by Qatar, 182; 
reserves from, xxi 

foreign relations: of Bahrain, xxiv, 143- 
45; British control of, 74, 203, 323, 
340; of Kuwait, 92-93; of Oman, 312- 
16; of Qatar, 153; of United Arab 
Emirates, 203, 246-49 

foreign residents: in Bahrain, xxiii, 113, 
118, 129-30, 144, 215; in Kuwait, xxi, 
51-53, 56, 62, 80, 94-96, 113, 215; in 
Oman, 258, 264, 291, 374; as percent- 
age of population, xxi, xxiii, xxv, xxvii; 
in Qatar, xxv, 113, 161, 164, 177, 215, 
358; in United Arab Emirates, xxv, 
113, 203,208-9, 213,228-229 

forestry: in United Arab Emirates, 233 

France: defense agreements with Kuwait, 
xxii, 92, 322, 337; gas exploration by, 
171; investment by, 175; materiel 
from, xxii, xxvi, 342, 343, 364, 371; 
military personnel from, 358; military 
ties with, xxviii; military training by, 
346; oil exploration by, 167; in Persian 
Gulf War, 191, 321, 327, 328, 358 

Fuhud oil field (Oman), 275, 277, 278 

Garmco. See Gulf Aluminium Rolling 

Mill Company 
gas, natural: in Bahrain, xxiii, 128; in 

Dubayy, 222, 226; in Kuwait, 61 , 62; in 



450 



Index 



Oman, 279-81; in Qatar, xxv, 153, 171- 
74, 180, 182, 280-81; in Ras al Khay- 
mah, 223; in United Arab Emirates, 
219, 221, 222,223, 238 
GCC. See Gulf Cooperation Council 
GDP. See gross domestic product 
General Administration of Public Secu- 
rity (Qatar), 360 
General Organization of Social Insur- 
ance (GOSI) (Bahrain), 122 
General Telecommunications Organiza- 
tion (Oman), 291 
General Treaty of Peace (1820), 157 
geography: of Bahrain, 114-117; of 
Kuwait, 47-51; of Oman, 259-62; of 
Qatar, 162-63; of United Arab Emir- 
ates, 204-8 
Germany, Federal Republic of (West 
Germany), 302; Kuwaiti investment in, 
71; materiel from, 344, 352, 364; trade 
with, 136, 182 
Getty Oil Company: Kuwaiti concession 
of, 59 

Ghanim al Kuwari, 190 

GNP See gross national product 

GOSI. See General Organization of 
Social Insurance 

government of Bahrain, 137-42 

government of Kuwait, 66 

government of Oman, 310-12; budget of, 
269-72; in Dhofar, 305; historical pat- 
terns of, 296-99; improvements in, 
258; investment by, 275; relations of, 
with Omani people, 306 

government of Qatar: control of, xxiv- 
xxv; transitional, 186-87 

government of United Arab Emirates: 
budget of, 236-38 

Great Depression: in Kuwait, 75; in 
Qatar, 159 

Greater Tumb. SeeTunb al Kubra 

Greece: conquests by, 8 

gross domestic product (GDP): in Bah- 
rain, 135; in Kuwait, xxi, 57; in United 
Arab Emirates, 216, 218 

gross national product (GNP): defense 
spending as percentage of, 339; in 
Qatar, 165 

Gulf Air, 132, 178-79 

Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Company 
(Garmco), 129 

Gulf Company for Agricultural Develop- 



ment, 227 

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 321- 
22; Bahrain in, xxiv, 36, 113, 144, 248, 
314, 321, 326, 333; collective security 
in, 333-37, 340; formed, xx, xxviii, 36, 
113, 144, 314, 321, 326; headquarters 
of, xxix; intelligence assistance by, 
114; joint military exercises of, 144, 
336; materiel of, 114, 322; members 
of, xx, 36, 113, 144, 248, 314, 321-22, 
326; missions of, xxviii, 36, 191; Oman 
in, 36, 133, 144, 248, 269, 313, 314, 
321, 326, 333; in Persian Gulf War, 
xxviii, 114, 327; Qatar in, xxv, 36, 113, 
144, 248, 314, 321, 326, 333; security 
aims of, xxviii-xxix, 92, 248, 314, 322, 
333-36; subsidies by, 352, 369; tariffs 
imposed by, 182; trade within, 285; 
United Arab Emirates in, 36, 104, 113, 
144, 248,314, 321,326, 333 

Gulf Daily News, 1 43 

Gulf International Bank, 271 

Gulf of Bahrain, 114 

Gulf of Oman, 3,259, 369 

Gulf Oil {see also Kuwait Oil Company), 
58-61, 62 

Gulf Polytechnic, 121 

Gulf Technical College, 121 

Gulf Times, 191 

Gwadar, 298, 367 

hadith, 10 
hajj, 11 

Halul (island), 162 

Hamad General Hospital (Qatar), 167 
Hammurabi, 323 
Hanafi school of Islamic law, 13 
Hanbal, Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn, 13 
Hanbali school of Islamic law, 13, 186, 
242-43 

Harthi, Isa ibn Salih al, 300 
Harthi, Salim ibn Rashid al, 299 
Harun ar Rashid, 14 
Hasan, 13 

Hawar and the adjacent islands, 117; 

competing claims to, xxiv, 117, 144, 

159, 162, 192-93, 329 
Hawshi Huqf, 286 

health care: in Bahrain, 112, 121-22, 123; 
in Kuwait, 56-57, 75, 85; in Oman, 266- 
68, 269, 304; in Qatar, 166-67, 170, 
187-88; in United Arab Emirates, 212- 



451 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



14, 237 

Henjam gas field (Oman), 281 

herding: in Qatar, 175, 177; in United 
Arab Emirates, 215 

Higher Committee for Vocational Train- 
ing and Labor (Oman), 292 

hijra, 1 

Hispanoil. See Compama Espanola de 

Petroleos 
Hizballah, 347 

Hoechst: Kuwaiti investment in, 71 

Hotel and Catering Training Center 
(Bahrain), 121 

housing: in Bahrain, 119; in Kuwait, 57; 
in Oman, xxvii, 269; in United Arab 
Emirates, xxvi, 214 

Hughes Aircraft Company, xxii 

human resources, investment in: in 
Kuwait, 54; in Oman, 258 

human rights: in Bahrain, 354-55; during 
Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, 93, 349; in 
Kuwait, 348-50; in Oman, 376; in 
United Arab Emirates, 367 

Husayn, 14, 15; commemoration of mar- 
tyrdom of, 15-16 

Husayn, Saddam, 91, 325, 327 

Ibad, Abd Allah ibn, 1 6, 264 

Ibadis. See Islam, Ibadi Shia 

Id al Adha festival, 12 

Id al Fitr festival, 12 

Idd ash Sharqi oil field (Qatar), 168 

IDTC. See Industrial Development Tech- 
nical Centre 

imams {see also Islam; Muslims): Ibadi, 
19; Ninth Imam, 15; persecution of, 
14; role of, xxvi; Seventh Imam, 15; in 
Sunni Islam, 12; Twelfth Imam, 15 

IMF. See International Monetary Fund 

imports: to Bahrain, 135-36; to Oman, 
272, 281; to Qatar, 182; to United Arab 
Emirates, 215, 216, 238-39 

independence, 30-35; of Bahrain, xx, 33, 
112, 137, 350; of Kuwait, xx, 32, 75, 88; 
of Oman, xx; of Qatar, xx, xxiv, 33, 
161-62, 171; of United Arab Emirates, 
xx 

India: exports to, 23, 136, 174, 227; 
imports from, 215; military assistance 
from, 369; spread of Islam to, 18; 
trade of, 4, 174, 227; workers from, 
203, 208, 212, 228, 229, 266, 374 



Indian Medical Service, 212 

Indians: in armed forces, 345, 361; in 

Oman, 263; in Qatar, 164, 189; in 

United Arab Emirates, 228 
indigenization: of Kuwait's armed forces, 

xxii; of Kuwait's work force, 95; of 

Oman's work force, xxvii, 177, 258, 

264, 273, 281,291, 292; of Qatar's work 

force, 177 
Indonesia: spread of Islam to, 18 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait, 67, 70 
industrial development: in Bahrain, 

112; in Kuwait, xxii, 64, 66; in Oman, 

xxvii, 293 

Industrial Development Committee 
(Kuwait), 67 

Industrial Development Technical Cen- 
tre (IDTC) (Qatar), 173 

industrial estates: in Abu Dhabi, 227; in 
Oman, xxvii, 269, 286, 288; in Qatar, 
173 

industry: in Kuwait, 66, 67; Kuwaiti 
investment in, 98; in Oman, 258, 269, 
286-88; in Qatar, 173-75; in United 
Arab Emirates, 223-27, 229 

inflation: in Qatar, 170; in United Arab 
Emirates, 216 

infrastructure: damage, in Persian Gulf 
War, 96; in Kuwait, xx, 66, 96; in 
Oman, 257, 269, 272-73, 281, 293, 304, 
315; in Qatar, 161, 170, 181; in United 
Arab Emirates, 203, 216, 236, 237 

Inland Sea. See Khawr al Udayd 
Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Corporation 
International Court of Justice: territorial 
disputes in, xxiv, xxvi, 144-45, 193, 329 
International Hospital (Bahrain), 122 
International Labour Organisation, 194 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
145 

International Petroleum (Canada), 276, 
280 

International Petroleum Investment 
Corporation (IPIC), 221 

International Telecommunications Sat- 
ellite Corporation (Intelsat): in Bah- 
rain, 132; in Kuwait, 69; in Oman, 291; 
in Qatar, 179; in United Arab Emir- 
ates, 232 

Investment Bank of Kuwait, 67 



452 



Index 



IPC. See Iraq Petroleum Company 
IPIC. See International Petroleum Invest- 
ment Corporation 
Iran: claim of, to Bahrain, xxiii, xxiv, 28, 
32, 329; claim of, to Persian Gulf 
islands, 33, 204, 246, 248-49, 329, 330; 
claim of, to Qatar, xxiv; demonstra- 
tions in support of, 36; expansion of, 
24; exports to, 239; medical support 
from, 212; military assistance from, 
xxvii, 369; military buildup of, 333; 
military strength of, 322; oil produc- 
tion of, 222; relations of, with Kuwait, 
93; relations of, with Oman, 374; rela- 
tions of, with Qatar, xxv, 192; relations 
of, with United Arab Emirates, 247, 
248; as security threat, xxviii, 36, 143, 
321, 340; territorial disputes of, xxvi, 
247, 325; tribal wars of, 157; water 
exported by, 192; workers from, 130, 

203, 208, 229 
Iranian Empire, 111 

Iranian Revolution (1979): as challenge 
to regional stability, 35, 247, 314, 332; 
as security threat, xx, 82, 143; support 
for, from gulf Shia, 53-54, 113, 143, 
332 

Iranian rule: in the gulf, xx, 323; of 
Oman, 17, 22 

Iranians: in armed forces, 361; in Bah- 
rain, 35, 329; in Qatar, 163, 164, 192, 
358; in United Arab Emirates, 228, 
366 

Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), 325-26; and 
Bahrain, 113, 144, 353; impact of, 78, 
82, 88, 89, 113, 144, 347; and Kuwait, 
53-54; Oman in, 313, 374; protection 
for shipping during, 36, 230, 365; 
andQatar, 355; support for Iraq in, 
xxv, 36, 72, 89, 340; trade during, 72, 
238; United Arab Emirates during, 

204, 238, 247, 248, 365 

Iraq: aid for, 64, 73, 89, 326; attacks on, 
18; borders of, 48, 89, 90, 330; claims 
of, to Kuwait, 48, 81, 88, 89, 90, 91, 
327, 330; Islam in, 18, 19; Kuwaiti pris- 
oners of war in, xxii, 94; military 
strength of, 322; oil discovered in, 29; 
Omani rule of, 22; pressure on, to 
comply with United Nations resolu- 
tions, xxiii; relations of, with Kuwait, 
88-92, 219-20; relations of, with United 



Arab Emirates, 219-20, 247; as security 
threat, xxviii, 32, 143, 191, 247, 321, 
333, 340; support for, in Iran-Iraq War, 
xxv, 191; territorial disputes of, 325; as 
threat to Kuwait, xxii, 84, 88, 90; water 
from, 64; workers from, 52, 191 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 78, 84, 144, 204, 
247, 327, 336; damage to Kuwaiti 
armed forces by, 340; effects of, 93, 
100-102, 153, 180, 191, 218, 220, 235- 
36, 269-70, 363; impetus for, 88, 91, 
330; Kuwaiti resistance to, 344; Oman 
in, 374 

Iraqi occupation of Kuwait (see also Per- 
sian Gulf War), xxi, 47, 48, 91, 247, 
327; atrocities in, 93; collaboration in, 
347, 349, 367; damage to infrastruc- 
ture in, 69; effect of, 93; Kuwaiti econ- 
omy under, 71-72; media under, 87; 
and oil prices, 128; plunder during, 
93; psychological impact of, 94; 
United Nations condemnation of, 
xxiii; Yemen's support for, 332 

Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), 167, 
221,275 

irrigation: in Bahrain, 117; in Oman, 9, 
282-84, 293 

Islah al Muhammadiyyah (Qatar), 165 

Islam (see also Muslims): conversion to, 
17, 297, 323; early development of, 9- 
18; great schism of, 12; in Kuwaiti con- 
stitution, 85; legal schools of, 13, 142, 
186, 209, 242-43; in Oman, 264 

Islam, Ibadi Shia, xix, xxvi, 17; imams 
under, 19, 22, 264, 297; in Oman, 18- 
19, 22, 35, 264, 297 

Islam, Ismaili Shia, 16, 18 

Islam, Kharijite, 3, 16, 18, 25, 264 

Islam, Qarmatian, 18 

Islam, Seven Imam, 16 

Islam, Shia (see also Islam; Muslims, 
Shia), xix, 3, 12-17, 18; in Bahrain, 
xxiii, 35; in United Arab Emirates, 25, 
209 

Islam, Sunni (see also Islam; Muslims, 
Sunni), 3, 12-13; in Bahrain, xxiii; in 
Oman, 264; in United Arab Emirates, 
209 

Islam, Twelve Imam Shia, 13-14, 15, 16, 

19, 142, 243 
Islam, Wahhabi Sunni, xix, 24-25; in 

Qatar, xxv, 25, 153; in United Arab 



453 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Emirates, 209 

Islamic Alliance, 100 

Islamic Call Party, 354 

Islamic Constitutional Movement 
(Kuwait), 84, 100 

Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bah- 
rain, 354 

Islamic National Alliance (Kuwait), 84 

Islamic Parliamentarian Alliance 
(Kuwait), 84 

Islamism: in Iran, 325; in Kuwait, 78 

Ismail al Kazim, 16 

Ismailis. See Islam, Ismaili Shia 

Israel: military doctrine of, 333; recogni- 
tion of, 247 

Italy: trade with, 136, 182 

Itoh, C, 280 

Jaafar as Sadiq, 16, 142 

Jaafari school of Islamic law, 142 

Jaafar ibn Muhammad, 16, 142 

Jabal ad Dukhan, 114 

Jabal az Zannah, 221 

Jaidah family, 1 90 

Jalan, 262; minerals in, 286 

Japan: exports to, 63, 72, 172-73, 221, 
222, 239, 272, 278, 281, 286; imports 
from, 239, 273; investment in, 221; 
Kuwaiti investment in, 71; oil compa- 
nies from, 60; trade with, 136, 182 

Japan Exploration Company (Japex 
Oman), 276; work force in, 292 

Japan Oil Development Company, 220, 
277 

Japex Oman. Seejapan Exploration 

Company 
JaziratalAzl (island), 117 
Jews, 17 

Jibal oil field (Oman), 274, 275, 277, 

278; gas from, 280 
Jidd Hafs, 119 
jihad, 1 1 

Joint United States-Oman Commission, 
285, 292, 316 

Jordan: aid to, 93, 238; military assis- 
tance from, xxvii, 369; military person- 
nel from, 345, 358, 361; military 
training provided by, 304; payments 
to, for Persian Gulf War, 365; relations 
of, with Kuwait, xxiii; workers from, 
266 

Judaism, 9 



judiciary: in Bahrain, 142; in Kuwait, 85, 
347-48; in Oman, 312; in Qatar, 186; 
in United Arab Emirates, 239, 242-43 

Kalba, 207 
Karbala, 15 

KFAED. See Kuwait Fund for Arab Eco- 
nomic Development 

Khalij Times, 312 

Khalili, Muhammad ibn Abd Allah al, 
301 

Kharijites. See Islam, Kharijite 
Khawr al Udayd (Qatar), 162 
Khawr Fakkan, 207; schools in, 210 
Khimji Ramdas Group, 310 
Khoja, 263-64 

Khomeini, Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi (aya- 
tollah), 325 

KNPC. See Kuwait National Petroleum 
Company 

Kobe Steel Company, 1 74 

KOC. See Kuwait Oil Company 

Korea, Republic of (South Korea): mate- 
riel from, 344; trade with, 136, 286 

KPC. See Kuwait Petroleum Corporation 

KUNA. See Kuwait News Agency 

Kuwait {see also Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; 
Iraqi occupation of Kuwait): agricul- 
ture in, 67-68; aid from, 314; air bases 
of, 342, 343; armed forces of, xxii, 92, 
337, 339-40, 342-46; banking in, 69-70, 
235-36; borders of, xii, 47, 48, 89, 90- 
91, 330, 332; bureaucracy in, 79-80; 
cabinet in, 79-80, 84; citizens of, 86, 
94; civil rights in, , 78, 82, 86; civil ser- 
vice in, xxi, 80, 100; climate of, 48-51, 
67; constitution of, 81; court system in, 
348; criminal justice system in, 347-48; 
currency of, 69; debt of, 99; defense 
of, xxii, 92, 322, 332, 337, 342; democ- 
racy in, 36; democracy movement in, 
75, 78, 84, 86, 100-101; economic 
diversification in, xxii, 64-67; economy 
in, xxi, 85-86; education in, 54-56, 75, 
80, 85, 96, 210; elections in, 75, 81, 82, 
83, 84, 101; electricity in, 66; employ- 
ment in, 57, 80; as entrepot, 72; fish- 
ing in, 58, 67, 68; foreign aid from, 64, 
72-73, 89, 93; foreign policy of, 74, 92- 
93, 340; foreign residents in, xxi, 51- 
53, 56, 62, 80, 94-96, 113, 215; gas in, 
61, 62; geography of, 47-51; Great 



454 



Index 



Depression in, 75; gross domestic 
product in, xxi, 57; in Gulf Coopera- 
tion Council, 36, 92, 113, 144, 248, 
314, 321, 326, 333; health care in, 56- 

57, 75, 85, 96; housing in, 57; human 
rights in, 93, 348-50; independence 
for, xx, 32, 75, 88; indigenization in, 
xxii, 95; industrial development in, 
xxii, 64, 66; industry in, 66, 68; infra- 
structure in, xx, 66, 96; internal secu- 
rity in, 94, 102, 336, 342, 346-47; 
investment by, 71-72; Iran-Iraq War 
and, 78, 82, 88, 89, 347; Iraq as threat 
to, xxii, 32, 84, 88, 90; Iraq's claim to, 
48, 81, 88, 89, 90, 91, 327, 330; Islam- 
ism in, 78; judiciary in, 85, 347-48; 
labor in, 85; legislature in, xxi, 36, 75, 
78, 80-84, 86; life expectancy in, 56-57; 
literacy in, 55, 57; living standards in, 

58, 99-100; martial law in, 348, 349; 
materiel of, xxii, 342-43; media in, xxi, 
69, 81, 85, 86-87, 101; medical support 
from, 212; merchant class in, 54, 55, 
58, 75, 78, 79; military assistance from, 
336; military assistance to, 32, 88; mili- 
tary background of, 340-42; military 
relations of, xxii, 92, 322, 337; nation- 
alization in, 59, 62; oil in, xx, xxii, 30, 
32, 35, 47, 58-64, 66, 71, 72, 75, 79, 88, 
90, 96-97; oil shared with Saudi Ara- 
bia, 48; Palestinians in, xxi, 94-95, 102, 
346-47, 349; pearling in, 57, 58, 67, 75; 
in Persian Gulf War, xxi, 68, 327, 328, 
344-45, 374; police in, 347-48; political 
opposition in, 78, 81, 82-83, 84, 86, 
100, 102; political reform in, 75; popu- 
lation of, 51, 56, 94; ports in, 68; post- 
war reconstruction in, 96-100; 
prisoners of war from, in Iraq, xxii, 94; 
privatization in, xxi, 99; relations of, 
with Britain, 87-88, 92; relations of, 
with Egypt, 92; relations of, with Iran, 
93; relations of, with Iraq, 88-92, 219- 
20; relations of, with Jordan, xxiii; 
relations of, with Qatar, xxiii; relations 
of, with Russia, xxii, 92; relations of, 
with Saudi Arabia, 93; relations of, 
with Soviet Union, 88; relations of, 
with Syria, 92; relations of, with 
United States, 88, 92; roads in, 68; rul- 
ing family of, xxi, 23, 30, 47, 54, 73-79, 
81, 94, 100; sectarian division in, 53; 



security concerns of, xx, 143, 332; 
shipbuilding in, 57, 58; ships of, 
reflagged, 326; social services in, 57, 
75, 80; subsidies in, xxi, 55, 57, 66, 95, 
98; succession in, 74-75, 78-79; suf- 
frage in, xxi, 84; taxes in, 86; telecom- 
munications in, 68, 99; tensions in, 
between foreigners and Kuwaitis, 346- 
47; terrorism in, 332, 347; trade by, 57- 
58, 66, 72-73, 98-99, 136; trade dispute 
of, with Saudi Arabia, 75; transporta- 
tion in, 68-69; treaties of, 74, 87, 89; 
troops stationed in, 322; in trucial sys- 
tem, 324; United Nations resolutions 
condemning Iraqi invasion of, xxiii; 
vulnerability of, 87, 91-92, 340; wages 
in, 66; water in, 51, 64, 66; welfare in, 
57; work force in, 51-52, 66 

Kuwait, city of: as entrepot, 57; popula- 
tion in, 51; settled, 47 

Kuwait Airways, 69, 93 

Kuwait Bay, 48 

Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration 

Company, 62 
Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting, 

and Investment Company, 98 
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Devel- 
opment (KFAED), 72-73, 290 
Kuwaiti Military College, 346, 347 
Kuwait International Airport, 69 
Kuwait International Investment Com- 
pany, 98 
Kuwait Investment Company, 98 
Kuwait National Petroleum Company 

(KNPC), 61 
Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) , 87 
Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), 59, 62, 75, 
97 

Kuwait Oil Tanker Company, 62 
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC), 
62-63 

Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone {see 

also Divided Zone), 48, 59, 60 
Kuwait State Security, 347 
Kuwait Television, 87 
Kuwait Times, 87 
Kuwait University, 55 
Kuwait Wafrah Oil Company, 62 
Kuwari, Ghanim al, 190 

Labor Law (Bahrain) (1993), xxiv 
Labor Law (Qatar) (1962), 177 



455 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



labor relations: in Qatar, 170, 176-77 
labor unions: in Bahrain, 113; in Kuwait, 

85; in Qatar, 177 
land: in Bahrain, 119, 123; in Qatar, 177- 

78; in United Arab Emirates, 232 
land area: of Abu Dhabi, 204; of Ajman, 

204; of Kuwait, 47; of Oman, 259; of 

Qatar, 162; of United Arab Emirates, 

104 

law: civil, 142; customary, 142; in United 

Arab Emirates, 242 
law, sharia, 11; in Bahrain, 142; in 

Kuwait, 85; in Oman, 312; in Qatar, 

161, 186; in United Arab Emirates, 

242-43 

Law of Public Security (1965) (Bahrain) , 
139 

League of Arab States (Arab League), 
32, 145, 192, 247; military assistance 
from, 32, 36, 88, 90, 330, 368 

League of Nations, 90 

Lebanon: civil war in, 247, 347; study in, 
166; workers from, 52, 130 

legislature: in Bahrain, 36; in Kuwait, 
xxi, 36, 75, 78, 80-84, 86; in Qatar, 
xxiv; in United Arab Emirates, 239-41 

Lesser Tumb. SeeTunb as Sughra 

Libya, 190 

life expectancy: in Bahrain, 118-19, 121; 

in Kuwait, 56-57; in Oman, 268; in 

Qatar, 167 
limestone, 51, 162, 286 
literacy rate: in Bahrain, 120; in Kuwait, 

55, 57; in Qatar, 165; in United Arab 

Emirates, 211 
livestock: exported, 272; imported, 136, 

182, 238; in Kuwait, 67; in Oman, 261, 

272, 293; in Qatar, 178, 182; in United 

Arab Emirates, 233, 238 
living standards: attempts to improve, 

xxix, 268-69, 293; in Kuwait, 58, 99- 

100; in Oman, 268-69, 293 

Mabruk gas field (Oman) , 280 
Madinatlsa, 119, 120 
Mahmud, Amina, 165 
majlis, 140-42 

Majlis Movement, 75, 79, 90 
Malaya, 18 

Malcom Inlet (Ghubbat al Ghazirah), 
261 

Malik ibn Anas, Abu Abd Allah, 13, 142 



Maliki school of Islamic law, 13, 142, 209, 
242 

Mamul oil field (Oman), 275, 278 
Mana, Muhammad Abd al Aziz al, 165 
Manama (Al Manamah), 114; popula- 
tion of, 119 
M an nai family, 190 
Margham oil field (Dubayy), 222 
marriage: government subsidies for 
(Kuwait), 95; and tribal organization, 
38 

martial law: in Kuwait, 348, 349 
Mashhad, 14, 15 

Masirah Air Base, 315, 316, 368, 372 
Masirah (island), 260, 262 
Masqat. See Muscat 

materiel, xix, 337-38; from Afghanistan, 
356; air force, 343, 352, 356, 364, 372; 
army, 343, 350-52; from Austria, 371; 
of Bahrain, 350-52; from Brazil, 364; 
from Britain, xix, xxii, 300, 342, 356, 
364, 371; from France, xxii, xxvi, 342, 
343, 364, 371; from Germany, 344, 
352, 364; of Gulf Cooperation Coun- 
cil, 114, 322; from Italy, 364; of Kuwait, 
xxii, 342-43; navy, 352, 364, 372; of 
Oman, xxviii, 370, 371, 372; of Qatar, 
356; from South Korea, 344; from the 
Soviet Union, 332; trade in, 215; of 
United Arab Emirates, xxvi, 215, 364; 
from United States, xxii, 342, 343, 
350, 356, 364, 371; of Yemen, 332 

Matrah, 259; port of, 261; religion in, 
264; schools in, 265 

Mauritania: aid to, 238 

Maydan Mahzam oil field (Qatar), 168 

Mecca, 11, 18 

media: in Bahrain, 143; in Kuwait, 86-87; 

in Oman, 312; in Qatar, 183, 191; in 

United Arab Emirates, 246 
Medina, 10, 18 

Mediterranean Sea: access to, 7 
merchant families: in Bahrain, 39; in 

Kuwait, 54, 55, 58, 73, 75, 78, 79, 82- 

83; in Oman, xxvii-xxviii, 309-10; in 

Qatar, 189-90 
Mesopotamia, 4, 7, 154 
middle ages, 17-20 
military capabilities, 337-40 
military conscription: in Kuwait, xxii 
military training, xix; by Britain, xix, 

304, 339, 340, 346, 372, 375; by Egypt, 



456 



Index 



304; by France, 346; by United States, 
339 

Mina Abd Allah shipping terminal, 62 
Mina al Ahmadi, 68-69 
Mina al Fahl: oil port at, 289; refinery at, 
278 

Mina al Fujayrah, 230 
Minajabal Ali, 222, 226, 230 
Minajabal Ali Free Zone, 226, 288 
Mina Khalid, 227, 230 
Mina Qabus, 290 
Mina Rashid, 230 
Mina Salman, 114, 132 
Mina Saqr, 230 
Mina Zayid, 230 

minerals: development of, xxvii; in 

Oman, 285-86 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry 

(Oman), 288 
Ministry of Communications (Oman), 

289 

Ministry of Defense (Oman), 310 
Ministry of Defense (Qatar), 355 
Ministry of Economy and Industry 

(United Arab Emirates) , 223 
Ministry of Education (United Arab 

Emirates), 212 
Ministry of Education and Youth 

(Oman), 265 
Ministry of Electricity and Water (United 

Arab Emirates), 228 
Ministry of Finance (Kuwait), 296 
Ministry of Finance and Petroleum 

(Qatar), 180 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Oman), 291 
Ministry of Health (Oman), 266, 268 
Ministry of Health (United Arab Emir- 
ates), 212 

Ministry of Information (Bahrain), 143 
Ministry of Information (Kuwait) , 87 
Ministry of Information and Culture 

(Qatar), 191 
Ministry of Interior (Bahrain), 354 
Ministry of Interior (Kuwait), 332, 347 
Ministry of Interior (Oman), 291, 306, 

310 

Ministry of Interior (Qatar) , 360 
Ministry of Interior (United Arab Emir- 
ates) , 366 

Ministry of Islamic Affairs (Oman) , 291 
Ministry of Justice (Oman) , 291 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 



(Bahrain), 130 

Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
(United Arab Emirates) , 229 

Ministry of National Heritage and Cul- 
ture (Oman), 289, 291 

Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral 
Resources (United Arab Emirates), 
218-19 

Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals 

(Oman), 278, 280 
Ministry of Petroleum, Fisheries, and 

Agriculture (Oman), 274 
Ministry of Public Works and Housing 

(United Arab Emirates), 214 
Ministry of Religious Endowments 

(Oman), 291 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor 

(Oman), 291 
Ministry of Water Resources (Oman), 

284 

Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, 

226 

missionaries, 18 
Mitsubishi, 226, 280 

Mitsui Engineering and Shipping Com- 
pany, 280, 309 
Mobil Oil, 220 
Mombasa, 298, 367 
Morocco: aid to, 238 
Muawiyah, 12, 16 

Mubahathat (secret police) (Qatar), 360 
Mubarakiyyah School (Kuwait) , 55 
Mubarak oil field (Sharjah), 222 
Mubarak the Great. See Al Sabah, 

Mubarak 
muezzin, 10 

Muhammad, 9-10, 14; succession to, 11- 
12 

Mukhabarat (intelligence service) 

(Qatar), 360 
Mukhaizna oil field (Oman), 275, 277 
Musa al Kazim, 1 6 

Musandam Peninsula (Ras Musandam), 
207, 259; agriculture in, 282; develop- 
ment in, 315; dispute over, 331 
Musandam Security Force, 370 
Muscat, 22, 23, 259, 263; climate in, 262; 
development plan for, 290; electricity 
in, 293; gas use in, 279; governor of, 
306; migration to, 257; navy of, 324-25; 
port of, 20, 261, 289; radio in, 291; 
religion in, 264; schools in, 265; tour- 



457 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



ism in, 289; wars of, 323 
Muscat and Oman, 29 
Muscat and Oman Field Force, 368 
Muslims, Ibadi. See Islam, Ibadi Shia 
Muslims, Shia (see also Islam): in Bah- 
rain, 113, 143, 353-54; in Kuwait, 53- 
54, 78; support for, by Iran, xxiii; in 
United Arab Emirates, 366 
Muslims, Sunni (see also Islam): in Bah- 
rain, 113; in Kuwait, 53, 54, 78; in 
Qatar, 164 
Muslims, Wahhabi (see also Islam): claim 
of, to Qatar, xxiv; in Qatar, 192; rela- 
tions of, with ruling families, 74; terri- 
torial disputes of, 330; tribal wars of, 
157 

Nabi Salah (island), 117 

Nairn tribe, 158, 159 

Nasib, Yahya Muhammad, 310 

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 160 

Natih oil field (Oman), 275, 277, 278; 

gas from, 280 
National Assembly (Bahrain), xxiii, 113, 

139, 140 

National Assembly (Kuwait), xxi, xxii, 

75, 78, 80-82, 84, 85, 86, 100 
National Assistance Law, 214 
National Bank of Bahrain, 134 
National Bank of Kuwait, 69, 70, 97, 98 
National Bank of Oman, 295 
National Bloc (Kuwait), 82 
National Cement Company (Dubayy), 

226 

National Council (Kuwait), 101; estab- 
lished, 83-84 
National Defense Council (Oman), 310 
National Development Council (Oman), 
310 

National Flour Mills (Dubayy) , 226 
National Front for the Liberation of Bah- 
rain, 140, 354 
National Guard (Kuwait), 342, 347 
National Investments and Security Cor- 
poration (United Arab Emirates), 236 
National Islamic Coalition (Kuwait), 100 
nationalization: of American Indepen- 
dent Oil Company, 62; of Kuwait Oil 
Company, 59; of Qatar Petroleum 
Company, 171; of Shell Company of 
Qatar, 171 

National Mariculture Center (Umm al 



Qaywayn), 234 
National Oil Distribution Company, 171 
National Unity Front (Qatar), 161 
Naval Training Center (Oman), 371-72 
navy of Bahrain: materiel of, 352; per- 
sonnel strength of, 350 
navy of Kuwait, 340; fleet of, 344; person- 
nel strength of, 344 
navy of Oman: bases of, 371; deployment 
of, 370; materiel of, 372; personnel 
strength of, 371 
navy of Qatar, 355 

navy of United Arab Emirates: materiel 

of, 364; personnel strength of, 362 
Nazwah, 263; industrial estate planned 

for, 288 
Nazwah Air Base, 372 
Nebuchadnezzar II, 323 
Netherlands: Portuguese driven from 

Persian Gulf by, 20-22 
New Medical Centre (Abu Dhabi), 213 
Nimr oil field (Oman), 275 
nomads, 7, 328; in Qatar, 154; in United 

Arab Emirates, 215 
Norsk Hydro of Norway, 174 
North Field natural gas project (Qatar), 

xxv, 153,171,172, 175,192, 281 



OAPEC. See Organization of Arab Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries 
oases, 261 

OCC. See Oman Chrome Company 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation, 

276, 277; work force in, 292 
Officers' Training School (Oman), 371 
oil, in Abu Dhabi, xxv, 30, 219, 220, 221- 
26; in Ajman, 223; in Al Fujayrah, 223; 
in Bahrain, xx, xxiii, 29, 30, 117, 124- 
28, 135-36; in Divided Zone, 48; in 
Dubayy, xxv, 30, 219, 221, 222; in Iran, 
29; in Iraq, 29, 59; in Kuwait, xx, xxii, 
32, 58-64, 66, 88, 90, 97; in Oman, 
xxvi.xxvii, 30, 258-59, 274-81, 291-92, 
301; in Qatar, xxv, 30, 153, 159, 167-75; 
in Ras al Khaymah, xxv, 223; and rul- 
ing families, 39; in Saudi Arabia, 128; 
in Sharjah, xxv, 222; in Umm al Qay- 
wayn, 223; in United Arab Emirates, 
xxv, 203, 216, 219, 220 
oil concessions, 328; to Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company, 58, 159; in Bahrain, 



458 



Index 



124; in Kuwait, 58, 59, 60, 75; in 
Oman, 274; in Qatar, 158, 159, 167, 
168; and ruling families, 31; in Shar- 
jah, 222; of Standard Oil Company of 
California, 29, 124 
oil exports: from Bahrain, 127, 128, 135, 
136; from Kuwait, 58, 59, 64, 72; from 
Oman, 257, 272, 277-78; from Qatar, 
159, 170, 182; from Saudi Arabia, 135- 
36; from United Arab Emirates, 218, 
238 

oil fields: in Kuwait, 30, 51, 59, 62; in 
Oman, 274, 275; in Qatar, 168; in 
United Arab Emirates, 220-21 

oil industry facilities: damage to, in Per- 
sian Gulf War, 96-97; destruction of, 
326; protection of, xxviii; rebuilding 
of, in Kuwait, xx, 96-97; vulnerability 
of, 321 

oil prices: collapse in 1980s, 268, 269; 
increases in 1973, 35, 127; increases 
during Persian Gulf War, 128, 238, 
269-70 

oil production quotas, xx-xxi, 63-64, 88, 
170, 220; in Bahrain, 127; in Dubayy, 
222; in Kuwait, 64, 88; of United Arab 
Emirates, 219, 220 

oil revenues, 30, 31, 35; in Abu Dhabi, 
203, 216; in Bahrain, 35, 112, 127-28; 
in Dubayy, 203, 216; in Kuwait, 35, 47, 
71, 72, 75, 79, 90; in Oman, 257, 259, 
268-69, 270, 271, 727, 301, 305; in 
Qatar, 159, 160, 161, 162, 167, 180, 
182, 187-88; in United Arab Emirates, 
203, 216, 220, 229 

Olcott Memorial Hospital (Kuwait), 56 

Oman: agriculture in, xxvii, 9, 258, 269, 
281-84, 293; aid to, 314; air bases of, 
374; airports in, 269, 289, 375; armed 
forces of, xxviii, 310, 315, 339-40, 367- 
72; Bahrain claimed by, 22, 28; border 
agreement with Saudi Arabia, xxviii; 
border dispute with Yemen, xxviii, 
331, 332, 369; borders of, 3, 204, 369, 
375; British troops in, 325; budget of, 
316; civil service in, 257, 302; claim of, 
to Qatar, xxiv; climate of, 262-63, 282, 
293; coastline of, xix-xx, 261, 262; 
court system of, 375; crime in, 375; 
customs duties of, 257; defense spend- 
ing by, 369; Dhofar rebellion in, xxvii, 
34, 35, 304; economy in, xxvi, xxvii, 



34, 35, 257, 258, 268-69, 298; educa- 
tion in, 265-66, 269, 304; electricity in, 
269, 293; employment in, 258, 285; 
entitlement in, 258, 292; expansion of, 
22-23; fishing in, xxvii, 258, 269, 281, 
285; food production in, xxvii; foreign 
advisers in, 292; foreign relations of, 
312-16; foreign residents in, 258, 264, 
291, 374; gas, 279-81; geography of, 
259-62; in Gulf Cooperation Council, 
36, 133, 144, 248, 269, 313, 314, 321, 
326, 333; Gulf Cooperation Council 
subsidy for, 369; health care in, 266-68, 
269, 304; housing in, xxvii, 269; 
human resources in, 258; human 
rights in, 376; Ibadi population of, 35; 
independence, xx; indigenization in, 

xxvii, 258, 264, 273, 281, 291, 292; 
influence of, 28; infrastructure in, 
269, 281, 289, 290, 293, 304, 315; 
internal security of, 374-76; as interna- 
tional mediator, xxviii; Iranian rule of, 
22; Iranians expelled from, 17; in Iran- 
Iraq War, 313, 374; Islam in, 18-19, 22, 

35, 264, 297; isolation of, 34, 259, 368; 
judiciary in, 312; legal system in, 312; 
life expectancy in, 268; livestock in, 
261, 272, 293; living standards in, 268- 
69, 293; materiel for, xxviii, 370, 371, 
372; media in, 291, 312; merchant 
families in, xxvii-xxviii, 309-10; middle 
class in, 257, 270; military accord of, 
with United States, xxviii; military 
agreement of, with Britain, 374; mili- 
tary assistance by, xx; military assis- 
tance to, 304, 352; military facilities of, 
262; military training in, 375; minerals 
in, 285-86; modernization in, xxvi, 34, 
269, 301, 302; oil in, 30, 34, 257-58, 
272, 274-81, 291-92, 301, 305; Persian 
Gulf War, 372-74; police in, 375; politi- 
cal reform in, 34; political stability in, 
258; population of, xxvii, 263-64, 268; 
ports in, 289, 290; privatization in, 
xxvii; regions of, 259-62; relations of, 
with Britain, xxviii, 28, 34, 299, 313, 
314-15; relations of, with France, 299; 
relations of, with Iran, 22, 374; rela- 
tions of, with Saudi Arabia, xxviii, 313, 
330; relations of, with United States, 

xxviii, 374; rule by, in Africa, 22-23, 
297-98; ruling family of, xxvii, 26, 31; 



459 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



security concerns of, 143; security 
cooperation of, 321; slavery in, 263, 
301; strategic location of, 262, 312, 
314; telecommunications in, 290-91, 
302; territorial disputes of, 247, 313, 
330; tourism in, xxvii, 269, 289, 293; 
transportation in, 179, 289-90, 302; 
tribal wars of, 157; in trucial system, 
26; unification of, 23, 298; urban 
migration in, xxvii, 257, 258, 284; utili- 
ties in, xxvii; wadis in, 261, 263; wars 
of, with Bahrain, 111; water in, 258, 
269, 282, 292-93; welfare system in, 
258, 259, 292; women in, 339-40; work 
force in, 258, 291 

Oman Aviation Services, 295 

Oman Bank for Agriculture and Fisher- 
ies, 281, 294 

Oman Banking Corporation, 295 

Oman Cement Company, 286 

Oman Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, 288 

Oman Chrome Company (OCC), 286 

Oman Currency Board, 294 

Oman Daily Newspaper, 312 

Oman Daily Observer, 312 

Oman Development Bank, 294, 296 

Oman Development Council, 290 

Oman Fisheries Development and Man- 
agement Project, 285 

Oman Housing Bank, 294, 296 

Omani European Bank, 295 

Omani Liberation Movement, 301 

Oman International Development and 
Investment Company, 295 

Oman Mining Company, 286 

Oman News Agency, 291 

Oman Oil Company (OOC), 278 

Oman Oil Refinery Company, 278 

Omar Zawawi Establishment (Omzest 
Group) , 309 

Omzest Group. See Omar Zawawi Estab- 
lishment 

OOC. See Oman Oil Company 

OPEC. See Organization of the Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries 

Operation Desert Shield (1990), xix, 
193, 327-28 

Operation Desert Storm, 193, 247-48, 
328; Bahraini forces in, 345, 353; bases 
for, 321; costs of, 99; Kuwaiti forces in, 
344-45, 374; Omani forces in, 374; 



Qatari forces in, 345; Saudi forces in, 
345, 374; United Arab Emirates forces 
in, 374 

Organization of Arab Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries (OAPEC), 129 

Organization of the Islamic Conference: 
Bahrain as member of, 145; United 
Arab Emirates as member of, 249 

Organization of the Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries (OPEC): Abu Dhabi as 
member of, 218; Bahrain as member 
of, 145; compliance with quotas of, 63- 
64, 170; price increases by, 35, 127; 
production quotas of, xx-xxi, 63-64, 
170, 222; Qatar as member of, 170; 
United Arab Emirates as member of, 
218, 249 

ORKEM of France, 175 

Ottoman Empire: claim of, to Bahrain, 
28; claim of, to Kuwait, 28, 87, 330; 
claim of, to Qatar, xxiv, 28, 154; end 
of, 158; expansion of, 24, 158, 323, 
324; Kuwait's independence from, 74, 
87; relations of, with ruling families, 
74, 89; tribal wars of, 157 

Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah, 304, 
325, 329 

Pahlavi, Reza Shah, 29 

Pakistan: military assistance form, 369; 
military personnel from, 345, 361, 
363, 371; military training provided 
by, 304; oil exported to, 63; workers 
from, 164, 203, 208, 229, 266, 374 

Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO), xxiii; aid to, 93; decline in sup- 
port for, 153, 191 

Palestinians, 247; in armed forces, 345; 
in Bahrain, 130; diaspora of, 39; in 
Kuwait, xxi, 52, 94-95, 102, 346-47, 
349-50; in Qatar, 358; in United Arab 
Emirates, 367 

Partex. See Participations and Explora- 
tions 

Parthian rule, xx, 8 

Participations and Explorations (Par- 
tex), 220, 275, 280 

PDO. See Petroleum Development Oman 

PDRY. See Yemen, People's Democratic 
Republic of 

pearling, xix, 23, 24, 28, 39, 47; in Bah- 
rain, 111, 112, 124; in Kuwait, 57, 58, 



460 



Index 



67, 75; in Qatar, 153, 154, 158-59, 175, 
176, 177; in United Arab Emirates, 
214 

Pelly, Lewis, 157-58 

Peninsula Shield forces, 336; Bahrain in, 
353; plans to expand, xxix; United 
Arab Emirates in, 365 

People's Front for the Liberation of 
Oman, 304 

Persian Empire, 8 

Persian Gulf: Britain's withdrawal from, 
xxiv; proposed federation in, 161; role 
of, in culture, xx; role of, in trade, xx, 
28; strategic importance of, 325 

Persian Gulf War (1991), xix, 88-92, 326- 
28; Bahrain in, xxiv, 328, 353; Canada 
in, 191, 358; costs of, xxi, 97, 358; 
damage to environment by, 96, 124; 
damage to infrastructure in, 68, 69, 
96; and defense infrastructure, xxviii; 
effects of, on financial reserves, xxi; 
effects of, on Kuwait, xxi, 68; Egypt in, 
321, 328; France in, 191, 321, 327, 328, 
358; Gulf Cooperation Council in, 
114; materiel losses in, 345; oil prices 
in, 128; Oman in, 372-74; psychologi- 
cal impact of, 96; Qatar in, xxv; ship- 
ping during, 230; United Arab 
Emirates in, xxvi, 365 

Petrochemicals Industries Company 
(PIC), 62 

Petroleum Concessions, 275 

Petroleum Development Oman (PDO), 
274, 275, 290; work force in, 292 

Petroleum Development (Qatar) {see also 
Qatar Petroleum Company) , 1 67, 1 89; 
working conditions in, 176 

Philippines: nationals of, in armed 
forces, 345; workers from, 130, 164, 
203, 266 

physicians: in Bahrain, 122; in Kuwait, 
56; in Trucial Coast, 212; in United 
Arab Emirates, 213 

PIC. See Petrochemicals Industries Com- 
pany 

piracy, 157, 158, 323; attempts to end, 
xxiv, 157, 158; participation in, 7, 24, 
25 

PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion 

police academy (Kuwait), 347 



police force: of Bahrain, 353, 354; of 
Kuwait, 347-48; of Oman, 375; of 
Qatar, 160; of United Arab Emirates, 
366 

political demonstrations: in Kuwait, 83, 
84; pro-Iranian, 36; in Qatar, 160 

political opposition: in Bahrain, 113, 
139, 143; in Kuwait, 78, 81, 82-83, 84, 
86, 100, 102; in Qatar, 190-91 

political reform: in Kuwait, 75; in Oman, 
34 

Popular Front for the Liberation of Bah- 
rain, 354 

Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Oman, 368-69 

Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Oman and the Arab Gulf, 247, 304 

Popular Front for the Liberation of the 
Occupied Arab Gulf, 304, 368-69 

population: of Abu Dhabi, 209; of Bah- 
rain, xxiii, 118-20, 353-54; of Dubayy, 
208, 229, 263; of Kuwait, xxi, 51, 53-54, 
56, 93-94; of Oman, xxvii, 263-64, 268; 
of Qatar, 163-64; of Sharjah, 208; of 
United Arab Emirates, xxv, 203, 208-9, 
229 

ports: in Bahrain, 114, 132; in Kuwait, 
68; in Oman, 289, 290; in United Arab 
Emirates, 230, 237 
Port Services Corporation, 295 
Portugal: exploration by, 20, 323; trade 
by, 20 

Portuguese rule, xx; end of, xx, 22; of 
Iran, 20; of Oman, 20; of Qatar, 154 

presidency: of United Arab Emirates, 
xxvi, 241 

press (see also media): in Bahrain, 143; in 

Kuwait, xxi, 81, 85, 86, 87, 101; in 

Qatar, 187 
Press and Publishing Law (1961) 

(Kuwait) , 86 
prime minister: in Kuwait, 79; in Qatar, 

183 

privatization: in Kuwait, xxi, 99; in 
Oman, xxvii 



Q8.63 

qadis (judges): appointment of, 12 
Qafco. See Qatar Fertilizer Company 
Qahtan tribe, 37-38 
Qalhat, port of, 20 



461 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Qapco. See Qatar Petrochemical Com- 
pany 

Qarmat, Hamdan, 18 
Qarmatians. See Islam, Qarmatian 
Qasco. See Qatar Steel Company 
Qatar: agriculture in, 158, 161, 177-78; 
aid from, 210, 215; armed forces, 339, 
355-60; Bahrain's embargo against, 
159; banking in, 180; birth rate in, 
164; border disputes of, xxv, 204, 329; 
borders of, 163, 204; British advisers 
in, 160; budget of, 180-82; bureau- 
cracy of, 160, 161; business in, 173, 
189-90; censorship in, 183, 187, 191; 
citizenship in, 189-90; civil rights in, 
186, 187; claim of, to Hawar and the 
adjacent islands, xxiv, 117, 162, 204; 
climate of, 163; constitution of, xxiv, 
161, 182-83; court system in, 186, 360; 
currency of, 180; defense cooperation 
agreement of, with United States, xxv; 
defense spending, 358; democracy in, 
xxiv; economic diversification in, xxv, 
153, 161; education in, 164-66, 183, 
187-88; electoral districts of, 185; elec- 
tricity in, 160; entrepot trade in, 182; 
fiscal year, 181; fishing in, 154, 158, 
161, 175, 177, 178; foreign relations 
of, 153; foreign residents in, xxv, 113, 
161, 164, 177, 215, 358; gas from, 73, 
175, 192, 281; geography of, 162-63; 
Great Depression in, 159; gross 
national product in, 165; in Gulf 
Cooperation Council, xxv, 36, 113, 
144, 248, 314, 321, 326, 333; health 
care in, 166-67, 170, 187-88; herding 
in, 175, 177; independence for, xx, 
xxiv, 33, 161-62, 171; indigenization 
in, 177; industry in, 173-75; inflation 
in, 170; infrastructure in, 161, 170; 
investment by, xxv, 1 82; and Iran-Iraq 
War, 355; Islam in, xxv, 25, 153, 164, 
192; labor relations in, 170, 176-77; 
legal system in, 161, 186; legislature 
of, xxiv; life expectancy in, 167; liter- 
acy rate, 165; livestock in, 178, 182; 
media, 179, 183, 187, 191; merchant 
families in, 189-90; nationalization in, 
171; nomads in, 154; oil in, xxv, 30, 
153,158, 159, 167-72, 174-75, 180, 182, 
187-88; Ottoman rule of, ended, 158; 
Palestinians in, 358; pearling in, 153, 



154, 158, 175, 176, 177; in Persian 
Gulf War, xxv, 328, 345, 358; police 
force of, 160; political activity in, 160, 
177; political opposition in, 190-91; 
population in, 163-64; relations of, 
with Bahrain, xxiv, 28, 144-45, 162, 
192-93; relations of, with Britain, 160, 
193; relations of, with China, 194; rela- 
tions of, with Egypt, 192; relations of, 
with Iran, xxv, 192; relations of, with 
Kuwait, xxiii; relations of, with Russia, 
194; relations of, with Saudi Arabia, 
xxv, 192, 355; relations of, with Soviet 
Union, 194; relations of, with Syria, 
192; relations of, with United States, 
xxv, 193-94; ruling family of, 23, 24, 
30; slaves in, 154, 163, 176; social ser- 
vices in, 167; subsidies, 173; suffrage 
in, 183; support of Iraq by, in Iran-Iraq 
War, xxv, 191; telecommunications in, 
160, 179; threats to, 26; trade, 158, 
182; transportation in, 178-79; in tru- 
cial system, xxiv, 324; wages in, 176; 
water in, 160, 163, 192; welfare system 
in, 187-88; women in, 183; workforce, 
164, 175-77 
Qatar Broadcasting Service, 191 
Qatar Fertilizer Company (Qafco), 173- 
74 

Qatar Hour Mills Company, 175 
Qatargas. See Qatar Liquefied Gas Com- 
pany 

Qatar General Petroleum Corporation 
(QGPC),171, 174,175 

Qatar Industrial Manufacturing Com- 
pany, 173 

Qatar Islamic Bank, 180 

Qatar Liquefied Gas Company (Qatar- 
gas), 172 

Qatar Monetary Agency (QMA), 180 
Qatar National Bank (QNB), 180 
Qatar National Cement Company 

(QNCC),175 
Qatar National Fishing Company, 178 
Qatar National Islamic Bank, 180 
Qatar National Petroleum Company, 171 
Qatar News Agency, 191 
Qatar Peninsula, 154 
Qatar Petrochemical Company (Qapco), 

173, 174-75 
Qatar Petroleum Company (QPC), 168; 

labor relations of, 170 



462 



Index 



Qatar Steel Company (Qasco), 173, 174 

Qatar Television Service, 191 

QGPC. See Qatar General Petroleum 
Corporation 

QMA. See Qatar Monetary Agency 

QNB. See Qatar National Bank 

QNCC. See Qatar National Cement Com- 
pany 

Qom, 14, 15 

QPC. See Qatar Petroleum Company 
Quran, 10 

Quran schools: in Kuwait, 54-55 
Quraysh tribe, 9 

radio: in Bahrain, 132, 134; in Kuwait, 
69, 87; in Oman, 291; in Qatar, 179 

Radio Kuwait, 87 

Ramadan, 10-11 

Ramdas, Khimji, 310 

Ras al Khaymah (see also United Arab 
Emirates), 22; agriculture in, 215, 232; 
armed forces of, 361, 362; borrowing 
by, 237; electricity in, 228; hospitals in, 
212; industry in, 227; oil revenues in, 
203, 216; political options for, 33; pop- 
ulation of, 209; representatives from, 
to Federal National Council, 241-42; 
ruling family in, 31, 243, 244, 246; 
schools in, 210; support for Iran by, 
365; territorial disputes of, 249, 329; as 
trading center, 26; in United Arab 
Emirates, xxv, 203, 239 

Ras Al Khaymah International Airport, 
230, 236-37 

Ras Al Khaymah Rock Company, 227 

Rashid oil field (Dubayy), 222 

Ras Laffan: gas production at, 172; port 
of, 162 

Ras Musandam. See Musandam Penin- 
sula 

Raysut Cement Corporation, 286 
Raysut Industrial Estate, 288, 309 
Real Estate Bank of Kuwait, 70 
recession: in Kuwait, 70, 75; in United 

Arab Emirates, 218 
Red Sea, 8 

regional instability, 35, 321, 323; Iran as 
threat to, 35, 36, 321; Iraq as threat to, 
87, 321; and Kuwait, 87 

regional security, 331-33; limits on, 331, 
336 

Republican Guard (Iraq), 327, 332 



Reserve Fund for Future Generations 
(Kuwait) , 4; depletion of, xxi; estab- 
lished, 71 

Reza (imam), 14; suspected treachery 
against, 15 

Rima oil field (Oman), 275, 277 

roads: in Bahrain, 117, 132; in Kuwait, 
68; in Oman, 269, 289, 290, 304; in 
United Arab Emirates, 215, 230, 237 

Robertson Group of Britain, 286 

Roman Empire, 8 

Royal Armed Forces. See armed forces of 
Oman 

Royal Dutch Shell Oil, 168, 220, 275, 280 
Royal Guard of Oman, 370 
Royal Hospital, 268 

Royal Household Troops (Oman), 370, 
371 

Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, 

301,339, 346, 355,369 
Royal Oman Air Force. SeezXr force of 

Oman 

Royal Oman Land Forces. See army of 
Oman 

Royal Oman Navy. See navy of Oman 
Royal Oman Police, 310, 375 
Royal Oman Police Pension Trust, 295 
Royal Yacht Squadron (Oman), 290, 370 
Rub al Khali, 207, 259, 262 
ruling families, 30-31, 36, 38-39; in Abu 
Dhabi, 30, 243; in Dubayy, 31, 243; in 
Kuwait, xxi, 23, 30, 47, 54, 73-79, 81, 
94, 100; in Oman, xxvii, 26, 31; rela- 
tions of, with British, xx, xxiv, 26, 28, 
30-31, 39, 74, 87, 89, 158, 299, 323, 
328; relations of, with Ottomans, 74; 
relations of, with Wahhabis, 74; in 
United Arab Emirates, 23, 30, 243-46, 
366 

Rumailah Hospital (Qatar), 166, 167 
Rusayl Industrial Estate (Oman), 286 
Russia (see also Soviet Union): defense 
agreements with Kuwait, xxii, 92; mili- 
tary ties with, xxviii; relations of, with 
Qatar, 194 
Ruus al Jibal, 259, 260-61 
Ruways Fertilizer Industries, 227 

Saad, Majid Muhammad al Majid as, 180 
Safavid Dynasty, 19-20 
Saghyah oil field (Sharjah) , 222 
Said ibn Sultan Naval Base, 371 



463 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Salalah, 262, 263; industry in, 286; radio 

in, 291; schools in, 265 
Salalah Air Base, 368, 372 
Salmaniya Medical Center (Bahrain), 

122 

Santa Fe International Corporation, 62 
Sargon, 323 
Sassanian rule, xx, 8-9 
Sath ar Ras Boot oil field (Abu Dhabi), 
220 

Saud, Abd al Aziz ibn, 158 
Saud, Muhammad ibn, 24 
Saudi Arabia, 190; aid from, 215, 314, 
326; border agreement of, with Oman, 

xxviii, 313, 330-31; border agreement 
of, with Yemen, xxviii, 332; border dis- 
pute of, with Abu Dhabi, 247, 330; 
border dispute of, with Qatar, xxv; 
borders of, 48, 90; claim of, on United 
Arab Emirates, 32, 313; established, 
25; exports to, 174, 239; foreign resi- 
dents in, 113; foreign workers in, 215; 
influence of, 82; Kuwaitis in exile in, 
100; in Gulf Cooperation Council, xx, 

xxix, 36, 113, 144, 248, 314, 321, 326, 
333; military assistance provided by, 
304, 336, 369; oil in, 29, 60, 128, 135- 
36; oil shared with Kuwait, 48; in Per- 
sian Gulf War, 327, 328, 358; relations 
of, with Bahrain, 136, 143; relations 
of, with Iran, 313; relations of, with 
Kuwait, 93; relations of, with Oman, 
313; relations of, with Qatar, xxv, 192, 
355; relations of, with United Arab 
Emirates, 247; security concerns of, 
143; trade dispute of, with Kuwait, 75 

Sayh Halat: minerals in, 286 

Sayh Nuhaydah oil field (Oman), 275, 
278; gas from, 280 

Sayh Rawl gas field (Oman), 280 

schools: in Abu Dhabi, 210; in Bahrain, 
120-21; British, 210; in Dubayy, 210; in 
Kuwait, 55; in Oman, 265, 269, 304; in 
Qatar, 164-66; in Sharjah, 210; in 
United Arab Emirates, 210-1 1 

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman (general), 327 

Scimitar Oils (Dubai), 222 

SCR See Supreme Council for Planning 
(Qatar) 

SCQ See Shell Company of Qatar 

SCU. See Supreme Council of the Union 



(United Arab Emirates) 
Second of August Movement, 346 
security, internal: in Bahrain, 353-55; in 
Kuwait, 94, 102, 336, 342, 346-47; in 
Oman, 374-76; in United Arab Emir- 
ates, 366-67 
Security and Intelligence Service (Bah- 
rain) , 354 

security concerns: of Bahrain, 140; of 
Kuwait, xx, 143, 332; of United Arab 
Emirates, xxvi, 144, 204 
Security Court (Bahrain) , 354 
Seven Imam Shia. See Islam, Seven Imam 
Shafii, Muhammad ibn Idris ash, 13, 142 
Shafii school of Islamic law, 13, 142, 209, 
242-43 

Shamlan, Abd al Aziz, 1 39 
Shanfari, Said Ahmd ash, 277, 309 
Shanfari and Partners, 288, 309 
sharia. See law, sharia 
Sharjah {see also United Arab Emirates), 
22; agriculture in, 232; aid to, 215; 
armed forces of, 361, 362; British 
troops in, 325; border disputes of, 223; 
borrowing by, 237, 245; concessions 
in, 222; coup attempt in, 237, 245; 
electricity in, 228; hospitals in, 212; 
industry in, 226, 227; oil in, 203, 216, 
222; political options for, 33; popula- 
tion of, 209; port of, 214; relations of, 
with Iran, 366; representatives from, 
to Federal National Council, 241-42; 
ruling family in, 31, 243, 244-45; 
schools in, 210; territorial disputes of, 
248, 329; as trading center, 26; in 
United Arab Emirates, xxv, 203 
Sharjah International Airport, 230, 236- 
37 

Shaybikah oil field (Oman), 275 
Shell Company of Qatar (SCQ): conces- 
sion, 168 
Shia. See Islam; Muslims 
ShiatAli, 11 
Shihuh people, 264 

shipbuilding, 47; in Kuwait, 57-58; as 
source of income, xix; in United Arab 
Emirates, 215 

ships: drydock and repair facilities for, 
xxiii, 117, 132,226, 227 

shrimp, 124, 234 

Singapore: trade with, 182 

Sitrah, 117, 119, 120; oil export termi- 



464 



Index 



nal, 117; oil refinery, 128, 135-36; port 
of, 132 

slaves: in Oman, 263, 298, 301; in Qatar, 
154, 158, 163, 176; in United Arab 
Emirates, 214, 215, 228 

slave trade, 28, 157, 215, 297 

Socal. See Standard Oil Company of Cali- 
fornia 

social services: in Bahrain, 112, 122; in 
Kuwait, 57, 75, 80; in Qatar, 167; in 
United Arab Emirates, 236 

Somalia: United Nations peacekeeping 
forces in, xxvi 

South Korea. See Korea, Republic of 

South Yemen. See Yemen, People's Dem- 
ocratic Republic of 

Soviet Union (see also Russia): Afghani- 
stan invaded by, 247; in Iran-Iraq War, 
340; materiel from, 332; military advis- 
ers from, 346; military assistance from, 
326; relations of, with Kuwait, 88; rela- 
tions of, with Qatar, 194; support of, 
for Dhofar rebellion, 305, 368-69 

Spanish Petroleum Company. See Com- 
pania Espanola de Petroleos 

Sri Lanka: workers from, 130, 203, 208 

Standard Oil Company of California 
(Socal) (see also Chevron Corpora- 
tion): concessions of, 29, 124-27 

State Consultative Council (Oman) (see 
also Consultative Council), xxviii, 302, 
310; origins of, 311-12 

State General Reserve Fund (Oman), 
272 

State Security Act (1974) (Bahrain), 354 
State Security Court (Kuwait), 348 
State Security Law (Kuwait), 348 
steel industry: Qatar's investment in, xxv 
stock market crash of 1977 (Kuwait), 70 
stock market crash of 1982 (Kuwait). See 

Suq al Manakh stockmarket crash 
Strait of Hormuz, 336, 369, 372 
strikes: in Bahrain, 113; in Qatar, 176-77; 

in United Arab Emirates, 229 
subsidies: from Britain, 257; in Kuwait, 

xxi, 55, 57, 66, 95, 98; in Oman, 257, 

281, 285; in Qatar, 173; in United Arab 

Emirates, 214, 233, 234 
succession: to amirs, 39; in Bahrain, 111, 

136-37; in Kuwait, 74-75, 78-79; to 

Muhammad, 11-12 
Sudan: aid to, 93; workers from, 266 



Suez Canal: trade through, 28 

suffrage: in Bahrain, 139; in Kuwait, xxi, 

84; in Qatar, 183 
Suhar, 263; industrial estate planned for, 

288; ore processing at, 285-86 
Sulayman ibn Suwaylim, 299 
sultan of Oman, 23; role of, xxvi 
Sultan Qabus Air Academy, 372 
Sultan Qabus Military College, 371 
Sultan Qabus University, 265, 266 
Sultan's Armed Forces. See armed forces 

of Oman 

Sultan's Armed Forces Command and 

Staff College, 371 
sunna, 10 

Sunningdale Oils, 222 

Sunnis. See Islam; Muslims 

Supreme Council for Planning (SCP) 

(Qatar), 175 
Supreme Council of the Judiciary 

(Kuwait), 85 
Supreme Council of the Union (SCU) 

(United Arab Emirates) , xxvi, 239-41 , 

361 

Supreme Court of Appeal (Bahrain), 

142-43, 354 
Supreme Court of the Union (United 

Arab Emirates), 242 
Supreme Petroleum Council (United 

Arab Emirates), 219 
Suq al Manakh stock market crash 

(1982) (Kuwait), 70, 82,97 
Sur, 264; industrial estate planned for, 

288 

Syria: aid to, 238; in Damascus meeting, 
336-37; in Persian Gulf War, 321, 328; 
relations of, with Kuwait, 92; relations 
of, with Qatar, 192; troops of, sta- 
tioned in Kuwait, 322; workers from, 
52 

taaziya passion plays, 16 

Taiwan: exports to, 286 

Tanam hospital (Oman), 268 

taxes: in Abu Dhabi, 236; in Dubayy, 236; 

in Kuwait, 86; in Oman, 257, 270 
teachers: in Kuwait, 55, 96; in Oman, 

265; in Qatar, 165, 166; in United Arab 

Emirates, 210 
Technip Geoproduction, 171 
telecommunications: in Bahrain, 112; in 

Kuwait, 68, 99; in Oman, 290-91, 302; 



465 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



in Qatar, 179; in United Arab Emir- 
ates, 230-32, 237 
telephones: in Kuwait, 69; in Oman, 290- 

91; in Qatar, 160, 179; in United Arab 

Emirates, 230-32 
television: in Bahrain, 132; in Kuwait, 69, 

87; in Oman, 291; in Qatar, 179; in 

United Arab Emirates, 232 
terrorism: in Bahrain, 353; in Kuwait, 

332, 347 
Texaco. See Texas Oil Company 
Texas Oil Company (Texaco), 127 
Thailand: oil refining in, 279; trade with, 

182; workers from, 203 
Thamarit Air Base, 316, 372 
Times of Oman, 312 
Tokyo Boeki, 1 74 

Total-Compagnie Francaise des 
Petroles, 275, 280 

trade (see also exports; imports), 4-8, 24; 
by Bahrain, 111, 112, 135-36; with 
China, 18; competition, 25, 368; dis- 
putes, 75; by India, 4, 174, 227; with 
Japan, 136, 182; of Kuwait, 57, 66, 72- 
73, 98-99, 136; land routes for, 7-8; of 
Oman, 34, 272-74; of Qatar, 158, 182; 
role of gulf in, xx; of United Arab 
Emirates, 136, 214, 218, 238-39; water 
routes for, 4-7, 28 

transportation: in Bahrain, 132-34, 179; 
in Kuwait, 68-69; in Oman, 179, 289- 
90, 302; in Qatar, 178-79; in United 
Arab Emirates, 179, 229-30 

Treaty of Al Uqayr (1922) , 48 

Treaty of As Sib (1920) , 300, 301 

Treaty of Lausanne (1923), 90 

Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity 
(1853), 203 

Treaty of Al Uqayr (1899), 87, 89 

tribes, 7, 31, 37-39 

Trucial Coast, xx, 26, 157, 158, 203, 212, 

239; slavery in, 228 
Trucial Coast Development Oil Com- 
pany (see also Abu Dhabi Company for 
Onshore Oil Operations; Abu Dhabi 
Petroleum Company) , 220 
Trucial Oman. See Oman 
Trucial Oman Levies, 361 
Trucial Oman Scouts, 313, 325, 331, 361 
Trucial States Development Fund, 212 
trucial system: xxiv, 26, 361 324 
Tunb al Kubra (Greater Tumb) (island): 



dispute over, xxvi, 246, 248-49, 329 
Tunb as Sughra (Lesser Tumb) (island): 

dispute over, xxvi, 246, 248-49, 329 
Tunisia, xxiii 

Turkey: payments to, for Persian Gulf 

War, 365; workers from, 203 
Twelve Imam Shia. See Islam, Twelve 

Imam Shia 

Umar, 11 

Umayyad Dynasty, 14 
Umm ad Dalkh oil field (Abu Dhabi), 
221 

Umm al Qaywayn (see also United Arab 
Emirates), 22, 246; agriculture in, 232; 
aquaculture in, 234; industry in, 227; 
oil in, 222, 223; political options for, 
33; population of, 209; representatives 
from, to Federal National Council, 
241-42; ruling family in, 31, 243; 
schools in, 210; in United Arab Emir- 
ates, xxv, 203 

Umm an Nar, 221 

Umm an Nasan (island), 117 

Umm ash Shayf oil field (Abu Dhabi), 
220 

Umm Said: industry in, 172-75; popula- 
tion of, 164; port of, 162, 178 
Union Bank of the Middle East, 235 
Union Bank of Oman, 295 
Union Carbide, 226 

Union Defense Force (United Arab 
Emirates) . See armed forces of United 
Arab Emirates 

United Arab Emirates (UAE) (see also 
under individual amirates) , 22; agricul- 
ture in, 215, 232-33, 237-38; aid from, 
314; airports in, 230, 236, 237; armed 
forces of, 215, 241, 243, 339, 361-64; 
banking, 234-36; borders of, 163, 204; 
budget of, xxv, 203, 236-38, 239; citi- 
zenship in, 203, 229, 241; climate of, 
207-8; constitution of, xxv-xxvi, 239; 
court system of, 242, 366-67; creation 
of, xxv; currency of, 234; defense of, 
xxv, 239; defense spending of, 236, 
237, 365; disputes of, over Persian 
Gulf islands, 204; economy in, 216-18, 
237-39, 365-66; education in, 210-11, 
212, 236, 237; electricity, 228; entrepot 
trade in, 237; fishing in, 214, 232, 233- 
34, 237; foreign relations of, 203, 361; 



466 



Index 



foreign residents in, xxv, 113, 203, 
208-9, 213, 228-229; forestry, 233; gas 
in, 219, 221, 238; geography of, 204-8; 
in Gulf Cooperation Council, 36, 104, 
113, 144, 248, 314, 321, 326, 333; 
health care in, 212-14, 237; herding 
in, 215; housing in, xxvi, 214; human 
rights in, 367; independence, xx; indi- 
genization, 223-27; industry in, 223- 
26; infrastructure in, 203, 216, 236, 
237; internal security in, 366-67; dur- 
ing Iran-Iraq War, 204, 238, 247, 248, 
365; Islam in, 25, 209, 366; judiciary 
in, 239, 242-43; literacy in, 211; live- 
stock in, 233, 238; materiel for, xxvi, 
215, 364; media in, 232, 246; members 
of, xxv, 203; military assistance from, 
304, 369; negotiations to form, 33; 
nomads in, 215; oil, xxi, 203, 216, 218- 

22, 238; payments by, for Persian Gulf 
War, 218, 365; pearling in, 214; in Per- 
sian Gulf War, xxvi, 365, 374; police in, 
366; population of, xxv, 203, 208-9; 
ports of, 230, 237; relations of, with 
Iran, 247, 248; relations of, with Iraq, 
219-20, 247; relations of, with Saudi 
Arabia, 247; relations of, with United 
States, 247, 248; revenues, 237; roads 
in, 215, 230, 237; ruling families of, 

23, 30, 243-46, 366; Saudi claims to, 
32; security concerns of, xxvi, 144, 
204; shipbuilding in, 215; slaves in, 
214, 215, 228; in Somalia, xxvi; strikes 
in, 229; subsidies in, 218, 233, 234; 
telecommunications in, 230-32, 237; 
territorial dispute with Iran, xxvi; 
trade of, 136, 214, 218, 238-39; trans- 
portation in, 179, 229-30; utilities in, 
237; wages in, 226; water in, 207, 228, 
233; welfare system in, 214, 236, 237, 
237; women in, 211-12, 214; work 
force in, 212, 229 

United Arab Emirates Broadcasting Ser- 
vice, 246 

United Arab Emirates University, 211, 
212; military training in, 363 

United Fisheries of Kuwait, 68 

United Nations, 21 1; Bahrain as member 
of, 145; demarcation of Kuwait's bor- 
ders by, 48, 91; and Dhofar rebellion, 
34; peacekeeping forces, xxvi; Qatar as 
member of, 194; resolution condemn- 



ing Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, xxiii, 48; 
territorial disputes arbitrated by, xxvi; 
United Arab Emirates as member of, 
249 

United Nations coalition (Persian Gulf 
War), 327 

United Nations Department of Techni- 
cal Cooperation for Development, 286 

United Nations Development Pro- 
gramme, 57 

United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization, 120 

United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), 124 

United Nations Fund for Technical and 
Financial Assistance, 263 

United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, 288 

United Nations Security Council Resolu- 
tion 687,91, 327 

United States: defense cooperation 
agreement of, with Bahrain, xxiv, 144, 
145, 353; defense cooperation agree- 
ment of, with Kuwait, xxii, 92, 322, 
337, 342; defense cooperation agree- 
ment of, with Oman, 374; defense 
cooperation agreement of, with Qatar, 
xxv; defense cooperation agreement 
of, with United Arab Emirates, 248; 
embassy in Kuwait, bombed, 78; influ- 
ence of, on Oman, 315-16; in Iran-Iraq 
War, 340; joint military exercises of, 
with Kuwait, xxii, 92; materiel from, 
xxii, 342, 343, 350, 356, 364, 371; mili- 
tary agreements with Bahrain, 352-53; 
military agreements with Oman, 
xxviii; military assistance from, 326; 
military ties with, xxviii, 262, 333; mili- 
tary training by, 346, 364; payments to, 
for Persian Gulf War, 218, 345, 365; in 
Persian Gulf War, 191, 321, 327, 328, 
345, 358; protection by, in Iran-Iraq 
War, 36; relations of, with Bahrain, 
xxiv, 145; relations of, with Kuwait, 88, 
92; relations of, with Oman, xxviii; 
relations of, with Qatar, xxv, 193-94; 
relations of, with United Arab Emir- 
ates, 247; security role of, xxviii-xxix; 
study in, 55, 166, 246; trade with, 72, 
136, 182; workers from, 52, 203, 209, 
212 

United States Agency for International 



467 



Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 



Development (AID), 316 

United States Arms Control and Disar- 
mament Agency, 339 

United States Army Corps of Engineers, 
92 

United States Middle East Force, 352-53 
University College of Art, Science, and 

Education (Bahrain), 121 
University of Bahrain, 121 
University of Qatar, 166 
urban migration: in Bahrain, 119; in 

Oman, xxvii, 257, 258, 284 
urf. See law: customary 
Uthman, 11, 12, 16 

utilities: in Kuwait, 57; in Oman, xxvii; in 
United Arab Emirates, 237 

Wadi adh Dhayd, 232 

Wadi al Batin, 51 

Wadi Mughshin, 262 

wadis: in Bahrain, 118; in Kuwait, 67; in 

Oman, 261, 263 
Wadi Samail, 261 

wages: in Kuwait, 66; in Qatar, 176; in 

United Arab Emirates, 226 
wahhabis. See Islam, Wahhabi Sunni 
walayat (spiritual guidance), 13 
Warbah (island), 47, 91; claims to, 48, 

90, 327, 330 
water: in Bahrain, 117, 118; from Iraq, 
64; in Kuwait, 51, 64, 66; in Oman, 
258, 269, 282, 292-93; pollution, in 
Bahrain, 124; in Qatar, 160, 163; in 
United Arab Emirates, 207, 215, 226, 
228, 233 

welfare system: in Bahrain, 121; in 
Kuwait, 57; in Oman, 258, 259, 292; in 
Qatar, 187-88; in United Arab Emir- 
ates, 214, 236, 237 

West Germany. See Germany, Federal 



Republic of 

women: in armed forces, xxviii; in Bah- 
rain, 130-32, 139; under Islam, 10, 16; 
in Kuwait, 54, 55, 84, 347; in Oman, 
339-40; in Qatar, 165, 177, 183; in 
United Arab Emirates, 210-12, 214 

Women's Federation (United Arab Emir- 
ates), 211 

Women's Hospital (Qatar), 167 

work force (see also foreign residents): in 
Bahrain, xxiii, 113, 129-32; in Kuwait, 
51-52, 66; in Oman, xxvii, 258, 291, 
292; in Qatar, xxv, 175-77; in United 
Arab Emirates, 212, 229 

World Bank: Bahrain as member of, 145; 
recommendations by, for Kuwait, xxi 

World War II, 30 

Xerox, 226 

Yahya Enterprises, 310 
Yarubid Dynasty, 297 
Yathrib, 10 

Yemen: aid to, 93, 238; border agree- 
ment with Saudi Arabia, xxviii, 332; 
border dispute with Oman, xxviii, 331, 
332, 369; materiel of, 332 

Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of 
(South Yemen— PDRY), 362-63; sup- 
port by, for Dhofar rebellion, 34, 302, 
304, 368-69 

Zangid Dynasty, 19 

Zanzibar: British takeover of, 34; Omanis 

in, 23, 34, 263, 297, 325, 367 
Zawawi, Omar Abd al Munim az, 309 
Zawawi, Qais Abd al Munim az, 309 
Zaydjabir ibn, 18-19 
Zoroastrianism, 9 
Zubair Enterprises, 295 
Zufar. See Dhofar region 



468 



Contributors 



Jill Crystal, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Uni- 
versity of Michigan, has published several works on Kuwait 
and the Persian Gulf. 

Eric Hooglund currently serves as Editor of the Middle East Jour- 
nal; he has taught courses on the Middle East at several 
universities. 

Helen Chapin Metz is Supervisor, Middle East/ Africa/Latin 
America Unit, Federal Research Division, Library of Con- 
gress. 

Fareed Mohamedi is Senior Economist, Petroleum Finance 
Company, and author of articles on the Middle East and 
international oil affairs. 

William Smyth is an independent author who writes on the 
Middle East; he served as Visiting Assistant Professor at 
Emory University from 1989 through 1991. 

Jean R. Tartter is a retired Foreign Service Officer who has 
written extensively on the Middle East and Africa for the 
Country Studies series. 

Anthony Toth, who has lived in Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates, has written widely on the Middle East for a num- 
ber of publications. 



469 



Published Country Studies 



(Area Handbook Series) 



550-65 


Afghanistan 


550-28 


Ethiopia 


550-98 


Albania 


550-167 


Finland 


550-44 


Algeria 


550-155 


Germany, East 


550-59 


Angola 


550-173 


Germanv Fed Ren of 

\JV1U11U1 X VUi 1VVU. V/X 


550-73 


Argentina 




VJ 11 £4.1 let 


550-169 


Australia 


550-87 


Greece 


550-176 


Austria 


550-78 


Guatemala 


550-175 


Bangladesh 


550-174 


Guinea 


55O-170 


Belgium 




CtWVATM PTlii Rp1i7P 

VJ U V CLL Id CLLlxS X^wllXiVv 


550-66 


Bolivia 


550-151 


Honduras 

X 1V/11UU1 uo 


550-20 


Brazil 


550-165 


Hungary 


550-168 


Bulgaria 


550-21 


India 


550-61 


Burma 


550-154 


Indian Ocean 


550-50 


Cambodia 


CCA 1Q 


Indonesia 


JJu J.UVJ 


V^CUllCl UU11 


CCA f o 

550-68 


T 

Iran 


550-159 


Chad 


CCA 1 

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Iraq 


jj~ / / 


Chile 


C C/~\ o c 

550-25 


Israel 


550-60 


China 


550-182 


Italy 


550-26 


Colombia 


550-30 


Japan 


JJU JJ 


V^UlllillUIl W Cdl 111 v^dl 1U 


550-34 


Jordan 




hpan T<i1anrR nf thp 






550-91 


Congo 


550-56 


Kenya 


550-90 


Costa Rica 


550-81 


Korea, North 




Cotp fl'Tvoirp fTvorv 




TCnrpa South 




Coast) 






550-152 


Cuba 


550-58 


Laos 


550-22 


Cyprus 


550-24 


Lebanon 


550-158 


Czechoslovakia 


550-38 


Liberia 


550-36 


Dominican Republic 


550-85 


Libya 




and Haiti 






550-52 


Ecuador 


550-172 


Malawi 


550-43 


Egypt 


550-45 


Malaysia 


550-150 


El Salvador 


550-161 


Mauritania 



471 



550-79 Mexico 

550-76 Mongolia 

550^9 Morocco 

550-64 Mozambique 

550-35 Nepal and Bhutan 

550-88 Nicaragua 

550-157 Nigeria 

550-94 Oceania 

550^8 Pakistan 

550-46 Panama 

550-156 Paraguay 

550-185 Persian Gulf States 

550-42 Peru 

550-72 Philippines 

550-162 Poland 

550-181 Portugal 

550-160 Romania 

5 50-3 7 Rwanda and B urundi 

550-51 Saudi Arabia 

550-70 Senegal 

550-180 Sierra Leone 

550-184 Singapore 

550-86 Somalia 

550-93 South Africa 

550-95 Soviet Union 



550-179 Spain 

550-96 Sri Lanka 

550-27 Sudan 

550-47 Syria 

550-62 Tanzania 

550-53 Thailand 

550-89 Tunisia 

550-80 Turkey 

550-74 Uganda 

550-97 Uruguay 

550-71 Venezuela 

550-32 Vietnam 

550-183 Yemens, The 

550-99 Yugoslavia 

550-67 Zaire 

550-75 Zambia 

550-171 Zimbabwe 



472 



PIN: 032045-000 



